PLUTARCH

On the *daimonion* of Socrates

Scripta Antiquitatis Posterioris
ad Ethicam REligionemque pertinentia
XVI

Mohr Siebeck

SAPERE

Scripta Antiquitatis Posterioris
ad Ethicam REligionemque pertinentia

Schriften der späteren Antike
zu ethischen und religiösen Fragen

Herausgegeben von

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und Rainer Hirsch-Luipold

Band XVI

Plutarch

On the *daimonion* of Socrates

Human liberation, divine guidance and philosophy

edited by

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SAPERE

Greek and Latin texts of Later Antiquity (1st–4th centuries AD) have for a long time been overshadowed by those dating back to so-called 'classical' times. The first four centuries of our era have, however, produced a cornucopia of works in Greek and Latin dealing with questions of philosophy, ethics, and religion that continue to be relevant even today. The series SAPERE (Scripta Antiquitatis Posterioris ad Ethicam REligionemque pertinentia, 'Writings of Later Antiquity with Ethical and Religious Themes'), now funded by the German Union of Academies, undertakes the task of making these texts accessible through an innovative combination of edition, translation, and commentary in the form of interpretative essays.

The acronym 'SAPERE' deliberately evokes the various connotations of sapere, the Latin verb. In addition to the intellectual dimension – which Kant made the motto of the Enlightenment by translating 'sapere aude' with 'dare to use thy reason' – the notion of 'tasting' should come into play as well. On the one hand, SAPERE makes important source texts available for discussion within various disciplines such as theology and religious studies, philology, philosophy, history, archaeology, and so on; on the other, it also seeks to whet the readers' appetite to 'taste' these texts. Consequently, a thorough scholarly analysis of the texts, which are investigated from the vantage points of different disciplines, complements the presentation of the sources both in the original and in translation. In this way, the importance of these ancient authors for the history of ideas and their relevance to modern debates come clearly into focus, thereby fostering an active engagement with the classical past.

Preface to this Volume

The first idea of bringing this volume into existence came into my head after a dinner conversation with Donald Russell at All Souls College, Oxford in May 2004, during which Donald told me that already a long time ago he had collected material for an edition (with commentary) of *De genio Socratis*, one of the most wonderful pieces of Plutarch's *Moralia*. When – twenty-two months later – I finally plucked up the courage to ask him whether he might be willing to provide an introduction into and a text and translation (with notes) of *De genio* for a SAPERE volume, his first reaction was to call me a fool for bothering someone at his age with such a proposition – but barely half a year later he had in fact done what I had asked him for, thus giving us the heart of the present volume. He had first worked on this subject under the guidance of E. R. Dodds, and would like this contribution to be regarded as a partial, and very late, fulfilment of his obligations to that great scholar.

It took the next two and a half years to assemble a team of further contributors and get them to write a number of essays, all of which – I hope – will be useful and enlightening to all interested in *De genio*. To all contributors I am profoundly grateful for the time and energy they poured into this venture; it has been a privilege and a pleasure to work with each and everyone of them. My greatest debt of gratitude, however, I still owe to Donald, without whom this volume would not exist. May he yet live long to receive the acclaim he deserves for it.

Heinz-Günther Nesselrath Göttingen, August 2009

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A. Introduction

Introduction

D. A. Russell

1. Preliminary Remarks

> Il est des ouvrages en Plutarque où il oublie son thème, où le propos de son argument ne se trouve que par incident, tout estouffé en matiere estrangere: voyez ses alleures au Daemon de Socrate. O Dieu, que ces gaillardes escapades, que cette variation a de beauté, et plus lors que plus elle retire au nonchalant et fortuite!

Montaigne (*Essais* III. ix) here admires the inconsequentiality of *De genio*. Most modern scholarship has been disconcerted by the combination of exciting historical romance and serious philosophical and religious discussion. Many attempts have therefore been made to identify themes and connections which might be held to unify the whole: Liberation (as the soul is freed with difficulty from the ills of the body, so Thebes is freed from the Spartan occupation); divine guidance (Epaminondas, like Socrates, is under a special tutelary *daimon*); or a general concern with signs and portents. It is doubtful whether any of these ideas is a guide to Plutarch's intentions.[1] These should be sought rather in his educational concerns. In the preface to *De audiendis poetis* (14E) he observes that young students, not yet ready for the formal study of philosophy, nevertheless take pleasure in works like Heraclides' *Abaris* and Ariston's *Lycon*, in which philosophy and fabulous narrative are combined. If we consider *De genio* in this light, it is clear that it fills the bill very well. There is the exciting patriotic story of the liberation of Thebes; there is also the speculation about divination and the fate of the soul after death; there is even a miniature Socratic dialogue on doing good (584B–585D) and a suggestion that it is a good thing to study mathematics (579A–D). We should also recall that the narrator, Caphisias, Epaminondas' younger brother, is young, and emphasises his youth (he has lovers, he spends time in the gymnasia), and that the bravery of Charon's fifteen year old son is given special prominence (595B–D). It would be foolish to suggest that Plutarch is *primarily* targeting an adolescent readership (or his own pupils) but he certainly has one in mind, as he does also in his *Banquet of the Seven Wise Men* and in *Gryllus*. And

[1] But note the articles by A. Georgiadou ("Epameinondas and the Socratic paradigm in the De genio Socratis") and P. Hardie ("Sign language in On the sign of Socrates") in: Van der Stockt 1996, 113–22 and 123–36.

it is a Boeotian audience: he makes the visionary who relates the myth a native of his own city, Chaeronea, and he gives us a great deal of antiquarian detail about the religions and political practices of Boeotia in classical times.

2. Synopsis[2]

1 (575A–576B).
The frame dialogue (not resumed at the end, cf. Plato's *Phaedo, Theaetetus*) serves as a preface. It limits the scope of the following narrative (Archedamus explains what he and his friends already know: 575F–576B) and it makes an important statement about the value of detail and motivation, as against mere information about the upshot of events, for hearers who are connoisseurs of the moral aspects of actions. This recalls prefatory statements in several *Lives*: e.g. *Nicias* 1, *Alexander* 1, *Timoleon* 1 and 6. And we are again reminded of *De audiendis poetis*; Archedamus' friends are like those serious readers of poetry who are not just in search of amusement (30D: note τὸ δὲ φιλόκαλον καὶ φιλότιμον, corresponding to τὸν δὲ φιλότιμον καὶ φιλόκαλον ... θεατήν in 575C).

The exact occasion of this frame dialogue is unclear. It is perhaps thought of as preceding the Athenian renunciation of the Theban alliance (*Pelopidas* 14.1, Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.19), but we do not learn whether Plutarch had any evidence that Caphisias participated in any such mission. Archedamus' Boeotian sympathies, however, are well attested, as is the unpopularity they caused him.

2–5 (576B–578C).
The initial scenes of Caphisias' story are set outdoors, as a party of the conspirators makes its way to Simmias' house. Simmias is in many ways the central character of the whole dialogue. Famous, from *Phaedo*, as an intimate of Socrates and a pupil (at Thebes) of the Pythagorean Phidolaus, he has travelled far and acquired much knowledge. He is of course involved in the conspiracy, though his illness prevents him from taking an active part. Like Theages in Plato (*Rep.* 6.496D) his infirmity keeps him loyal to philosophy. The day has come when the exiles are due to return, and a messenger arrives from Athens to bring word that there are twelve of them, and to inquire who will give them lodging. Charon offers (576D). This prompts the prophet (*mantis*) Theocritus to compare this readiness on the part of a comparatively uneducated person with the reluctance of the highly educated Epaminondas to take an active part. Caphisias naturally defends his brother. There is no doubt that Epaminondas' stance is an im-

[2] A particularly careful analysis can be found in Lattanzi 1933.

portant theme of the whole dialogue. We learn later of his Pythagorean upbringing and his steadfast refusal of material gain. Theanor, the mysterious visitor, will declare that the *daimon* who guarded the dead Pythagorean philosopher Lysis, now guides his pupil Epaminondas. Here is at least one link between the philosophical topics and the narrative, for we are led to conclude that a political life too can be divinely guided. The loss of Plutarch's *Epaminondas* prevents us from knowing whether the career development suggested in *De genio* – from quietism to military leadership – was a theme in the *Life* also.

Caphisias' conversation on this subject is interrupted (577A) by Galaxidorus, who has seen two officers of the Spartan occupation, Archias and Lysanoridas, approaching. Archias takes Theocritus aside. Everyone is worried about the reason for this. Another conspirator, Phyllidas, now appears, and discusses matters with Caphisias. There is a longish lacuna in the text at 577D, which must cover the return of Theocritus to the group. They are then joined by yet another figure, Phidolaus of Haliartus, who asks them to wait a little before entering Simmias' house, because Simmias is trying to negotiate with the pro-Spartan Leontiadas about the fate of a leader of the anti-Spartan party, Amphitheus, who is in prison. The narrative now takes a new turn. Theocritus is glad to see Phidolaus, because he wants to ask him about the remains of Alcmena, which Agesilaus removed from Haliartus to Sparta some years before. It appears that there was a mysterious inscription on the tomb, which Agesilaus submitted to Egyptian priests for interpretation: 'Simmias may have something to tell us about this.' Theocritus, on hearing Phidolaus' account, reveals that his recent conversation with Lysanoridas was about some ominous sign, and that Lysanoridas will go to Haliartus to offer some ritual reparation to Alcmena. When he comes back, says Theocritus, he is just the man to pry into the Theban secret of the whereabouts of Dirce's tomb.

What has all this to do with the main themes of the dialogue? It is not unusual for some minor matters to be discussed before a main theme is addressed: thus in *De Pyth. or.* 8–16, several disconnected topics delay the introduction of the main issue. In *De genio*, there is a dramatic reason for sending Lysanoridas to Haliartus, since he is (crucially) to be out of town on the day of the coup. And the series of episodes enhances the atmosphere: portents ominous for the Spartans, deep concern for Theban customs and ritual.

6–7 (578C–579D).

The scene changes to Simmias' house, and a further series of episodes, preliminary both to the development of the plot and to the main discussion, takes place here. Simmias has been disappointed in his attempt to win over Leontiadas; but he has learned from him of the arrival of a mysterious

stranger, who has been performing some ritual at Lysis' tomb, and inquiring for the family of Polymnis, the father of Epaminondas and Caphisias. Phidolaus, however, is still preoccupied with the Alcmena inscription: can Simmias throw any light on this (578E)? Only indirectly, it would appear. Simmias tells a story about another text sent by the Spartans to Egypt, while he and others were studying there, which turned out to be an exhortation to the Greeks to pursue the arts of peace, not war. The same message was intended by the oracle given to the Delians, ordering them to 'double the size of the altar'; this baffled them, until Plato explained to them the necessary mathematics. The true meaning of this oracle, again, was an exhortation to peace and the civilized pursuits of science and learning.

Two things are achieved by this section: the Pythagorean stranger is introduced, and the point is made that science and philosophy go with a peaceful life. If we venture to look at this in the light of Plutarch's own day, it is an acceptance of the role of Greece as the peaceful partner in the Roman world, whose contribution lies in the sciences and the arts.

8–9 (579D–580C).

Polymnis arrives. We hear more about the visitor, who will shortly be brought before the company. Simmias likes very much what he hears of the man. Galaxidorus does not: to him, the visitor sounds like a superstitious charlatan, unworthy of philosophy, which Socrates (in contrast to Pythagoras and Empedocles) showed to be a rational and down-to-earth business. This view is at once challenged by the *mantis* Theocritus, who thinks that it implies an acceptance of the charge of impiety brought against Socrates by his accusers.

10–12 (580C–582C).

This leads immediately to the *daimonion*, which (according to Theocritus) shows Socrates a greater prophet than Pythagoras himself. We may distinguish five stages in this first 'act' of the discussion:

1. Theocritus' acceptance of the fact that Socrates had a divine guide (a 'vision' [580C] though this perception will not be maintained), and his reminiscence of a rather trivial episode in which it figured.
2. Galaxidorus' argument that Socrates was really skilled in observing signs (e.g. sneezes or casual words) as other diviners do.
3. Polymnis' rejection of the sneeze theory (which he attributes to Terpsion) on the ground that it could not possibly explain Socrates' nobility of character, his prophecy of defeat in Sicily, or his inspired behaviour at the battle of Delium.
4. Polymnis' appeal to Simmias, supported by Phidolaus.
5. Galaxidorus' second speech, in which he too defers to Simmias, but (i) refutes Phidolaus by saying that small signs may indicate great events,

and using the analogy of writing, in which a few small scratches can display great wars and sufferings to the literate scholar, and (ii) answers Polymnis by urging that Socrates called his sign *daimonion* not out of pretentiousness but because he knew the difference between agent (the god) and instrument (the sign).

13–16 (582C–586A).
The discussion is broken off by the entrance of Epaminondas and Theanor, who dominate the following scene. Theanor explains who he is, and the circumstances which have led him to track down the exiled Lysis. He has had a dispute with Epaminondas, because he wishes to pay the family for their care of Lysis, and Epaminondas refuses to accept anything. A lengthy dialogue, in a Socratic style, shows Epaminondas able to justify his point of view. Finally, Theanor gives his decision: Lysis' body is to remain where it is. He looks hard at Epaminondas, for he has come to believe that the young man is guided by the *daimon* who once guided Lysis.

17–19 (586A–588B).
At this point, Phyllidas comes in, and asks the others (including the narrator) to go outside with him. There is cause for alarm: Hipposthenidas has gone so far as to send a messenger to warn the exiles not to enter the city. Why? Because he thinks the plot may have been discovered, and he takes this to be confirmed by a friend's rather ominous dream. Theocritus comes to the rescue by suggesting a more favourable interpretation; and the messenger, Chlidon, unexpectedly returns, having been unable to ride out to meet the exiles, as he had been ordered, because his wife had lent his bridle to a neighbour! There had been quite a scene about this; but they conclude that the alarms were all false, and the plan is to go ahead. Theocritus and Caphisias go back to Simmias' house, where the discussion is still going on.

20–24 (588B–594A).
This central part of the dialogue, the definitive discussion of its nominal subject, is best considered as a whole.

(1) The narrator has not heard Simmias' reply to Galaxidorus, and so cannot tell what it was. This is (I think) an important clue to the general tendency of the dialogue. Galaxidorus is not a figure to be ridiculed, like Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic* or Planetiades in Plutarch's *De defectu* (413A–D). True, he is contemptuous of people like Empedocles and Pythagoras, and Pythagoreanism is very much in evidence in everything to follow. But it is probably[3] a mistake to make too much of this. Galaxidorus has maintained Socrates' superiority as a man of reason, and he has

[3] But see Pierluigi Donini, "Sokrates und sein Dämon im Platonismus des 1. und 2. Jahrhunderts n. Chr.", in: Baltes et al. 2004, 149.

deferred to Simmias' superior knowledge. (His view is akin to the Stoic interpretation reported in Cicero [*De divinatione* 1.122], which treats Socrates as indeed an observer of signs, but one whose capacity depends on a pure and chaste mind.) Much of what he said would be acceptable to Plutarch, and it is worth noting that in one of the very few ancient references to *De genio* (Eustratius *in Eth. Nic.* 5,13 Heylbut), Galaxidorus' and Simmias' speeches are dovetailed together.

(2) Simmias' theory.[4] Simmias believed that Socrates' *daimonion* was not a vision (so Theocritus was wrong), but the apprehension of a thought not articulated in speech, but rather like the words we seem to hear in dreams. Socrates' special aptitude (due to his unconcern with material things) was to pick up these signals even when awake (the comparison and contrast with dreams occurs again in Cic. *De div.* l.c., and is a motif common in such discussion). The theory is that the thought (logos) of a *daimon* can communicate itself to gifted souls without the violent 'blow' involved in ordinary communication by sound. These souls yield readily to 'the intellect (νοῦς) of the higher being…' The best Simmias can do is to make this plausible by analogies: the ship guided by the tiller, the potter's wheel controlled by the fingertip, and our common experience (however difficult it is to understand the mechanism of it) of the power of mind over matter (589A–B). There is a sort of illumination or effulgence (ἀνταύγεια: see note for the problem of this passage) in the thoughts of the superior powers which makes them accessible to specially privileged minds; by contrast, our knowledge of the thoughts of others is dim, mediated only by voice. If this is hard to grasp (589C), the analogy of sound may help. Sound depends on an impact made on the air, and we may suppose that the *daimon's* thoughts also produce a physical change, discernible only to those specially endowed minds. Or try another analogy, this time a military one: the presence of sappers in a tunnel can be detected by resonance on a bronze shield held in the right place. And if (once again) it seems odd that something we think of as a dream-experience should be possible to a person who is awake, yet another analogy (suggested by the *harmonia* arguments of *Phaedo*) presents itself: a musician needs his lyre tuned, not unstrung. The essential point is that Socrates is very special. An oracle given when he was a child (not otherwise known to us) declared that he had his best guide within himself. Pressed, this implies that the guide was in some sense his own νοῦς: This is inconsistent with the theory of com-

[4] See R. Heinze, *Xenokrates: Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente* (Leipzig 1892) 102–4; K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos and Sympathie: Neue Untersuchungen über Poseidonios* (München 1926) 214; id., "Poseidonios von Apameia, der Rhodier genannt", in: *RE* XXII 1 (1953) [558–826] 803; von Arnim 1921, 3–10; Corlu 1970, 53–8; Lattanzi 1933, 43–9; van der Stockt (1992) 57–8.

munication just developed, but it is indeed a Platonic idea (*Timaeus* 90) and we shall find it again in the myth which soon follows.

This repetitive and complicated speech has been much discussed, and its 'sources' conjectured. It is no doubt Plutarch's own synthesis, but there are some texts, of Platonic provenance, which are very similar to it, and it may be convenient to mention the most striking of these here:[5]

(a) Within the writings of Plato himself, one may draw attention to *Critias* 109c, where Critias describes how in early times the gods guided human beings "like pilots from the stern of the vessel, ... holding our souls by the rudder of persuasion" (transl. Jowett).[6]

(b) Philo, *De decalogo* 32–35, where it is explained that God spoke to Moses not with a physical voice but miraculously, 'commanding an invisible sound to be created in air, more wonderful than any instrument [cf. 588F], not without soul … but itself a rational soul … which shaped the air and gave utterance to an articulate voice.'

(c) Calcidius §255: 'the voice of which Socrates was aware was not such as would result from impact on air, but such as might reveal the presence and company of a familiar divinity to a soul whose exceptional chastity made it clean and therefore more intelligent.' Calcidius goes on, almost in Plutarch's terms, to draw the comparison between our dream experience and Socrates' waking perception of a divine presence.[7]

(3) The myth of Timarchus.[8] Timarchus consults the oracle of Trophonius in order to learn about Socrates' divine warnings. He gets no explicit answers but he (and we) can draw some conclusions.

In reading the myth, we must of course have in mind both its Platonic models (esp. *Phaedo*) and Plutarch's other attempts in this genre (in *De sera numinis vindicta* and *De facie*).[9] But we must also remember that there is much room left for invention, fantasy, and deliberate mystification. Plutarch's myths (like Plato's) draw on a fund of religious, philosophical and scientific lore; but this fund does not amount to a coherent system, and it would be rash to assume that there is such a thing, and that Plutarch is just revealing parts of it to us, a bit at a time. (He is not at all like J.R.R. Tolkien.)

Timarchus is probably named after a person mentioned in *Theages* 129A, in connection with the *daimonion*. Plutarch makes him a Chaeronean, and sets his vision at the great Boeotian oracle of Trophonius at Lebadea. The

[5] Translations of most of these texts can be found in the Appendix, below pp. 201–207

[6] See H.-G. Nesselrath, *Platon Kritias, Übersetzung und Kommentar* (Göttingen 2006) 132–3.

[7] Further development of these ideas is to be found in Neoplatonist texts: note esp. Hermias *in Phaedrum* 68–9 Couvreur, Proclus *in rempublicam* 2.166 (which explains how souls converse in Hades).

[8] See, in addition to works cited above (n. 4), Hamilton 1934b; Soury 1942, 153–76; Vernière 1977; Dillon 1996, 214–6.

[9] See W. Deuse's essay, below pp. 169–97.

story begins (590B–C) with Timarchus lying in the cave (having performed all the due rituals), not knowing whether he is asleep or awake. He feels a blow on his head, followed by a pleasurable sensation of rising and expanding, bright light, and a harmonious sound (presumably the music of the spheres). His soul has escaped from the opening sutures of his skull (an unparalleled detail in such stories, it would seem). He cannot see the earth, but when he looks up (from a standpoint not clearly indicated), he sees innumerable islands moving through a great sea, and all shining with variously coloured light. These islands are the heavenly bodies, planets included; the sea represents the whole celestial sphere.[10] There is clearly (590E) an allusion, not without mystification, to the inclination of the ecliptic to the celestial equator. When Timarchus looks *down*, as he does next (590F), he sees a dark gulf, from which emerge sounds of human suffering: this gulf is Hades, and it is (or at least includes) the earth on which we live.[11] Timarchus sees, but as yet does not understand. An unseen speaker (591A) offers to enlighten him, but only with regard to 'the realm of Persephone',[12] because 'the things above' belong to 'other gods'. So the vision is limited. Persephone's realm is bounded by Styx, which is, we are told, the earth's shadow, periodically in its revolution catching the moon, and causing an eclipse. Though the voice cannot tell much about the world beyond, it does offer a curious metaphysical system (591B), which seems to be a complication of one set out in *De facie* (943–4). This involves the triad Monas-Nous-Physis, which puts us in mind of later Neoplatonism,[13] but which is no doubt based largely on a text of Plato, *Sophist* 248.[14] The system plays no part in what follows, for the voice goes on to explain simply that 'Styx' catches many souls in the air below the moon, and takes them back for rebirth. Some, the wicked, are rejected by the moon altogether and in anger; others, whose time has come, are rescued by her, and (presumably) suffer no further reincarnation.

This is the explanation given by the Voice: all Timarchus can actually see is a lot of stars moving up and down. These are souls, more or less obedient to their *daimon* (or νοῦς), but also more or less submerged in the body. This variation in obedience and recalcitrance occurs, it seems, both in incarnate souls and after death, when the souls seek to escape from the trammels of the body altogether. But what of Socrates? We must infer that he was one of these most obedient and least troubled by the demands of the

[10] It cannot be simply the Milky Way, as von Arnim 1921 thought, though one detail – the white and foamy part of it [590F] – does seem to represent this.

[11] Heinze 1892, 135; H. Adam, *Plutarchs Schrift* Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum (Amsterdam 1974) 70 n. 18.

[12] Which includes the moon: cf. *De facie* 942D–943C.

[13] Dillon 1996, 214–6.

[14] Reinhardt 1926, 327.

body, and this was evident in his lifetime: He is not mentioned by name; the example given is Hermodorus of Clazomenae, whose soul travelled freely around the world while his body lay asleep.

(4) Theanor's speech.[15] Theanor does not mention Socrates either. He treats the myth as something to be dedicated to the god, and so uncriticized; he accepts, in general, what Simmias has said. But he has his own point of view, and presents it in a magisterial fashion. Some men are specially favoured by gods, and these are they who can understand the thought of the gods, as is (he thinks) shown by the example of Helenus in Homer (but see notes). More generally, humans are in the care of *daimones*, these being disembodied souls, whose special function seems here to be to guide towards final salvation souls which have completed their cycle of births and deaths. This is a classical 'demonology', such as Apuleius and Maximus use in their accounts of Socrates. Based on classic texts of Hesiod and Plato, and probably developed by Xenocrates, it is a standard element in Platonism by Plutarch's time.[16] Where does Socrates fit in? Was he one of the rare ones guided by a god? We are not told. But the guidance he receives, we must infer, is from an outside power (as Simmias said), not from something like his νοῦς, which could be interpreted as within him.

25–34 (594A–598F).

The conclusion of the narrative is rapid and skilful, and is not again interrupted. Epaminondas tells Caphisias to go to the gymnasium; he himself remains to continue the discussion. For this, he makes his apologia: he will not take part in violence or illegal executions, but reserves himself to come to the front later. At the gymnasium, plotting continues, and Archias and Philip go off to the dinner which is to be fatal to them (25). And now the conspirators join forces with the twelve exiles, who have had a good omen (lightning on their right) on entering the city (26). They all meet together at Charon's house, and are greatly alarmed when Archias sends for Charon; he obeys the summons, and leaves his son in his friends' charge, with an emotional speech. Cephisodorus and Theocritus advise prompt action, to preempt betrayal; and they get ready (27–28). But Charon soon returns, and is quite cheerful: he does not think Archias has had any sure information, and there is no reason to believe that the plot has been disclosed (29). The conspirators hesitate no longer: one party goes to deal with Leontiadas, the other (including some disguised as women) to the party having dinner with Archias. (Archias has in fact had another warning, but has disregarded it, with the remark 'Serious business tomorrow!' – a saying which became proverbial). (30). The attack on the dinner is successful, the archon Cabirichus is killed, the servants killed or locked in (31). Meanwhile, the

[15] See Jones 1916, 31–3; Lattanzi 1933, 65–7; Soury 1942, 131–40.

[16] See J. Dillon in Baltes et al. 2004, 123–41.

second party (which includes Pelopidas) has prevailed against Leontiadas and Hypates, despite strong resistance (32). Finally, the two parties are united. Amphitheus and others are released from prison. There is a general rising, and the Spartan garrison surrenders (33–34).

3. The Text

De genio (like a number of other works) survives in two manuscripts only, Par. gr. 1672 (E) and Par. gr. 1675 (B). E probably dates from the second half of the fourteenth century, B is later. There has been much discussion of the relation between them (summary in Schröder 1990, 73–80). The conclusion here adopted is that B is dependent on E, though not a direct copy. The consequence is that good readings in B should be accepted as good conjectures, and that the indications and placing of lacunae in E (though not infallible) are more likely to represent the gaps in the damaged ancestor than those in B. In many places no convincing supplement of the lacunae is possible; we have made what seem to us probable choices, and the notes record some other suggestions.

4. Suggested variations from Teubner text

(See also the notes on the translation. Anonymous changes are by D. A. Russell. Passages are indicated by page and line numbering in the Teubner edition as well as by the traditional Stephanus pagination.)

461, 10–12 [575C]	– ⟨ὡς⟩ τοῦ μὲν τέλους πολλὰ κοινὰ πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἔχοντος, τοὺς δὲ ταῖς αἰτίαις καὶ τοῖς ⟨ἔργοις αὐτοῖς προσήκοντος⟩ μέρους ἀγῶνας ἀρετῆς πρὸς τὰ συντυγχάνοντα –, καὶ τόλμας
462, 1 [575E]	δοκεῖ κἂν ἀνεγείρειν (Post)
462, 3 [575E]	μαραινόμενον ⟨ἐξ οὗ Σιμμίας μὲν καὶ Κέβης φοιτῶντες⟩ παρὰ Σωκράτη
462, 14 [575F]	οἰκεῖον ἂν ἔχειν
462, 20 [575F]	Λεοντιάδαν (and throughout, but there must be some doubt about the form)
463, 28 [576D]	θηρεύειν (Hartman)
464, 14 [576E]	⟨... ὡς εἰ μὴ παρὰ⟩ τοῦτον παρὰ τίνα (Wyttenbach)
464, 23 [576F]	μηδένα (Wyttenbach) τῶν πολιτῶν
464, 24 [576F]	ἀλλὰ χωρὶς αἵματος (cf. Einarson)
465, 12 [577A]	διακρούων ὁ Γαλαξίδωρος, 'ἐγγὺς γάρ,' ⟨εἶπεν, 'Ἀρχίαν ὁρῶ⟩ καὶ Λυσανορίδαν ... ' (?)

465, 21 [577B]	⟨συνειδὼς δὲ καὶ τοὺς φυγάδας μέλλοντας⟩ (post Wilamowitz, qui post Turnebi γραμματεύοντα supplevit συνειδὼς τοὺς φυγάδας μέλλοντας
466, 4 [577C]	ἢ πλείους ⟨γ'⟩
467, 3 [577F]	συμπεπηγυῖαν ... τοῦ μνήματος ⟨ἔκειτο⟩ (we can't be sure what the missing words were)
468, 2 [578B]	ὑπὸ σκότους (Bernardakis)
469, 8 [578F]	ὃν παρ' ἡμῶν (Reiske)
469, 13 [578F]	τότὲ (post Schwartz, qui ⟨ᾧ πολλὰ⟩ τότε)
469, 17 [578F]	πρὸς ἑαυτὸν· ⟨ὁ⟩ δὲ (Kronenberg, Waterfield)
470, 7 [579B]	ᾗ (Waterfield) τὸ (Hartman)
470, 13 [579C]	εἶναι τὴν δυεῖν (Holwerda)
471, 20 [579F]	ἐκθειάζουσι (Pohlenz)
471, 22 [580A]	ἀνδράσι {καὶ} πρὸς
471, 29 [580A]	ἐπαναφέρει τὴν τῶν πράξεων ἀρχὴν (Bernardakis, after Amyot)
473, 7 [580E]	⟨ἀνεκαλεῖτο φάσκων αὑτῷ⟩ (cf. Amyot)
473, 19 [580F]	⟨ἡμᾶς ἅμα καὶ⟩ (Wyttenbach)
473, 23 [580F]	μόριόν τι μαντικῆς (Holwerda)
474, 4 [581A]	⟨οὐχ οἷόν τε, μικρὸν ὂν⟩ καὶ κοῦφον (von Arnim)
474, 20 [581B]	lacuna after δοκοῦμεν (Waterfield)
474, 23 [581C]	τό⟨νον καὶ ἰσχὺν⟩ (cf. *De prof. in virt.* 12.83B)
476, 15 [582B]	{τῷ ἱστορικῷ} (?)
476, 25 [582C]	τὸ δαιμόνιον
477, 9 [582D]	τὸν ξένον ἔοικεν (E)
477, 12 [582D]	καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ τῶν φίλων (Reiske)
478, 26 [583B]	τὸ δαιμόνιον Λύσιδος (Sandbach)
478, 27 [583B]	προὐπεφήνει (Russell 1954)
479, 14 [583D]	μόνη (E)
479, 20 [583D]	οὐ προδίδωσι τὴν πενίαν οὐδ' ὡς βαφὴν ἀνίησι τὴν πάτριον {πενίαν}
481, 20 [584E]	αἳ ⟨γενόμεναι μὲν⟩ ἐκ κενῶν
482, 10 [584F]	πρῶτον' εἶπε 'τῆς (cf. E)
482, 12 [585A]	{ἀσκήσεως}
482, 14 [585A]	ἥνπερ ... ἐπιδείκνυσθε (Wyttenbach)
482, 15 [585A]	γυμναζόμενοι {καὶ}
482, 21 [585A]	δικαιοσύνης
483, 5 [585C]	ἐνδέδωκε [E]
483, 15 [585D]	τῶν ἀγώνων (Reiske)
483, 18 [585D]	διελθόντος ὁ Σιμμίας ὅσον (Wyttenbach)
484, 25 [586A]	τὴν φύσιν {τὸ εἶδος}
485, 18 [586C]	συμπαρεσκεύασεν;
486, 4 [586E]	Ἡριππίδας (Reiske: cf. 511, 19 = 598F)

487, 21 [587D] προείληφε (Reiske)
488, 14–5 [587F] χρόνον· ὡς δὲ ζητοῦσα καὶ σκευωρουμένη τὰ ἔνδον, ἱκανῶς ἀπολαύσασά (E)
489, 25 [588D] ⟨μᾶλλον ἀκούουσιν, ὕπαρ δὲ⟩ (Pohlenz)
490, 2 [588D] μη⟨δαμῶς εἰ μὴ⟩ μικρὰ (Russell 1954)
490, 11 [588E] βιαίως ⟨ὡς⟩
490, 13 [588F] ἐνδοῦσα
490, 27 [589A] ἅμα τῷ (E)
491, 1 [589A] ὁ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως (Emperius)
491, 4 [589B] ἀλλ' ὡς σῶμα καὶ δίχα φωνῆς (cf. Einarson / de Lacy)
491, 8 [589B] †ὥσπερ φῶς ἀνταύγειαν† (φῶς fortasse delendum)
491, 10 [589B] τοῖς δεχομένοις (Waterfield) ἐλλάμπουσιν
491, 19 [589C] ⟨τί⟩ θαυμάζειν ἄξιον
491, 19–20 [589C] κατ' αὐτὸ (von Arnim)
491, 20 [589C] ὑπὸ τῶν κρει⟨ττόνων⟩
492, 22 [589C] λόγον;
492, 1 [589D] τῶν δ' ἄλλων (E)
492, 3 [589D] ἀθόρυβον ἦθος (E)
492, 17 [589D] κινεῖ (Bock) (?)
492, 11 [589E] ἐν αὑτοῖς (Bernardakis)
492, 22 [589F] ⟨εἰσαγόντων⟩
492, 24 [589F] ὑπὲρ τούτου (E)
493, 4 [590A] ⟨οὐ πολλ⟩αῖς
493, 21 [590C] συστελλομένην (Einarson)
493, 21 [590C] πλείονα] μείζονα
493, 26 [590C] ἐξαμειβούσας ⟨δ'⟩
493, 27 [590C] βαφὴν ⟨ἐπ⟩άγειν (von Arnim) ... μεταβολάς
494, 3 [590C] ⟨ἐμμελῶς⟩
494, 9–10 [590D] ἄλλας δὲ πολλὰς .... ⟨συν⟩ἐφέλκεσθαι τῇ ⟨τῆς θαλάττης ῥοῇ, καὶ αὐτῆς κύκλῳ⟩ σχεδὸν ὑποφερομένης
494, 19 [590E] τούτων] ταύτην (cf. Vernière)
495, 14 [591A] ὡς] num ἣν ?
496, 17 [591D] ἀνακραθεῖσαι (Wyttenbach)
496, 21 [591E] ⟨δικτύου⟩ δεδυκότος (after Caster)
497, 2 [591F] διαφερόμενοι (E)
497, 24 [592B] ἐνθένδε (E)
499, 5–6 [592F] μηδενί πω Post (μηδενί πη E)
499, 16 [593B] ἀπὸ ταὐτοῦ γένους
499, 21 [593B] εὐθύνοντες,
499, 26 [593B] fortasse τι προσταττόμενον
501, 3 [593F] ⟨μεθίησιν⟩ ἡμᾶς

502, 12 [594D]	περὶ τῆς ⟨...⟩ γυναικός: ⟨ὑπάνδρου⟩ Bernardakis, ⟨γαμετῆς⟩ Post
502, 20 [594E]	ὑπερβαλόντες (Herwerden)
503, 22 [595A]	πιθανὸν εἶναι
504, 3 [595B]	πρὸς τὸ συμπεσούμενον (an πρὸς τὸ συμπῖπτον?)
504, 29 [595E]	Κηφισόδωρος ⟨ὁ⟩ Διο⟨γεί⟩τονος (Wilamowitz)
505, 6 [595E]	πρὸς ἀνθρώπους (Russell 1954)
507, 9 [596F]	κατακεκλασμένος (E)
507, 11 [596F]	ὑπέρ τινων σπουδαίων (Herwerden)
511, 8 [598E]	ἐκκρίτους (Wilamowitz)

B. Text, Translation and Notes

Πλουτάρχου

Περὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους δαιμονίου

575A **1.** (Α.) Ζωγράφου τινός, ὦ Καφισία, <μέμνημαί ποτε> περὶ τῶν θεωμένων τοὺς γεγραμμένους πίνακας λόγον οὐ φαῦλον ἀκούσας ἐν εἰ-
575B κόνι λελεγμένον. ἔφη γὰρ ἐοικέναι τοὺς μὲν ἰδιώτας καὶ ἀτέχνους θεατὰς ὄχλον ὁμοῦ πολὺν ἀσπαζομένοις, τοὺς δὲ κομψοὺς καὶ φιλοτέχνους καθ' ἕκαστον ἰδίᾳ τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων προσαγορεύουσι. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀκριβὴς ἀλλὰ τύπῳ τινὶ γίγνεται μόνον ἡ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων σύνοψις, τοὺς δὲ τῇ κρίσει κατὰ μέρος τὸ ἔργον διαλαμβάνοντας οὐδὲν ἀθέατον οὐδ' ἀπροσφώνητον ἐκφεύγει τῶν καλῶς ἢ τοὐναντίον γεγο-
575C νότων. οἶμαι δὴ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀληθινὰς πράξεις ὁμοίως τῷ μὲν ἀργοτέρῳ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐξαρκεῖν πρὸς ἱστορίαν, εἰ τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ πέρας πύθοιτο τοῦ πράγματος, τὸν δὲ φιλότιμον καὶ φιλόκαλον τῶν ὑπ' ἀρετῆς ὥσπερ τέχνης μεγάλης ἀπειργασμένων θεατὴν τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα μᾶλλον εὐφραίνειν – ⟨ὡς⟩ τοῦ μὲν τέλους πολλὰ κοινὰ πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἔχοντος, τοὺς δὲ ταῖς αἰτίαις καὶ τοῖς ⟨ἔργοις αὐτοῖς προσήκοντος⟩ μέρους ἀγῶνας ἀρετῆς πρὸς τὰ συντυγχάνοντα –, καὶ τόλμας ἔμφρονας
575D παρὰ τὰ δεινὰ καθορῶντα καιρῷ καὶ πάθει μεμιγμένου λογισμοῦ. τούτου δὴ τοῦ γένους τῶν θεατῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ὑπολαμβάνων εἶναι δίελθέ τε τὴν πρᾶξιν ἡμῖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ὡς ἐπράχθη καὶ τοῦ λόγου ⟨μετάδος ὃν ἀκούομεν⟩ γενέσθαι ⟨τότε σοῦ⟩ παρόντος, ὡς ἐμοῦ μηδ' ἂν εἰς Θήβας ἐπὶ τούτῳ κατοκνήσαντος ἐλθεῖν, εἰ μὴ καὶ νῦν Ἀθηναίοις πέρα τοῦ δέοντος ἐδόκουν βοιωτίζειν.

(Κ.) Ἀλλ' ἔδει μέν, ὦ Ἀρχέδαμε, σοῦ δι' εὔνοιαν οὕτω προθύμως τὰ πεπραγμένα μαθεῖν σπουδάζοντος ἐμέ ‘καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον θέσθαι’ κατὰ Πίνδαρον τὸ δεῦρ' ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν διήγησιν· τὸ δὲ πρεσβείας
575E ἀφιγμένους ἕνεκα καὶ σχολὴν ἄγοντας, ἄχρι οὗ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις τοῦ δήμου λάβωμεν, ἀντιτείνειν καὶ ἀγροικίζεσθαι πρὸς εὐγνώμονα καὶ φίλον ἑταῖρον δοκεῖ κἂν ἀνεγείρειν τὸ κατὰ Βοιωτῶν ἀρχαῖον εἰς μισολογίαν ὄνειδος ἤδη μαραινόμενον ⟨ἐξ οὗ Σιμμίας μὲν καὶ Κέβης φοιτῶντες⟩ παρὰ Σωκράτη τὸν ὑμέτερον, ἡμεῖς δὲ παρὰ Λῦσιν τὸν ἱερὸν σπουδάζοντες οὕτω διεφάνημεν. ἀλλ' ὅρα τοὺς παρόντας, εἰ πρὸς ἀκρόασιν ἅμα πράξεων καὶ λόγων τοσούτων εὐκαίρως ἔχουσιν· οὐ γὰρ βραχὺ

Plutarch

On the *daimonion* of Socrates

1. **[575A]** *[Archedamus:]*[1] I remember, Caphisias,[2] that I once heard a painter use rather an apt image to describe people who look at pictures.[3] **[575B]** He said that a layman with no knowledge of the art was like a man addressing a whole crowd at once, whereas the sophisticated connoisseur was more like someone greeting every person he met individually. Laymen, you see, have an inexact and merely general view of works of art, while those who judge detail by detail let nothing, whether well or badly executed, pass unobserved or without comment. It is much the same, I fancy, with real events. For the **[575C]** lazy-minded, it satisfies curiosity to learn the basic facts and the outcome of the affair; but the devotee of honour and beauty, who views the achievement of the great Art (as it were) of Virtue, takes pleasure rather in the detail, because – since the outcome has much in common with Fortune, while the part of the matter <concerned with> motives and <the action itself>[4] involves conflicts between virtue and circumstance – he can there observe instances of intelligent daring in the face of danger, where rational calculation is mixed with moments of crisis and emotion. So please regard us **[575D]** as viewers of this sort, tell us the story of the whole action from the beginning, and <share> with us the discussions which <we hear> took place <then in your> presence, bearing in mind that I should not have hesitated even to go to Thebes for this, if I were not already thought by the Athenians to be too pro-Boeotian.

[Caphisias:] The very fact, Archedamus, that your goodwill makes you so eager to hear what happened would itself have obliged me to 'put it above all business', as Pindar[5] says, and make the journey to Athens to tell the tale; but as we are here anyway for an embassy,[6] and have time to spare until we get the people's answer, **[575E]** any ill-mannered resistance to so well-disposed a friend would be likely to revive the old reproach against the Boeotians[7] for their dislike of culture, though that has been fading away <ever since Simmias and Cebes>[8] showed themselves enthusiastic students of your Socrates, and my family of the holy man Lysis.[9] But what about these people here? Do they have time to listen to such a lot of incidents

μῆκός ἐστι τῆς διηγήσεως, ἐπεὶ σὺ καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσπεριβαλέσθαι κελεύεις.

575F (Α.) Ἀγνοεῖς, ὦ Καφισία, τοὺς ἄνδρας; ἦ μὴν ἄξιον εἰδέναι πατέρων ὄντας ἀγαθῶν καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς οἰκείως ἐχόντων. ὁδὶ μέν ἐστιν ἀδελφιδοῦς Θρασυβούλου Λυσιθείδης, ὁδὶ δὲ Τιμόθεος Κόνωνος υἱός, οὗτοι δ' Ἀρχίνου παῖδες, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι τῆς ἑταιρίας ⟨καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς⟩ ἡμετέρας πάντες· ὥστε σοι θέατρον εὔνουν καὶ οἰκεῖον ἂν ἔχειν τὴν διήγησιν.

(Κ.) Εὖ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ τίς ἂν ὑμῖν μέτριος ἀρχὴ γένοιτο τῆς διηγήσεως πρὸς ἃς ἴστε πράξεις;

(Α.) Ἡμεῖς, ὦ Καφισία, σχεδὸν ὡς εἶχον αἱ Θῆβαι πρὸ τῆς καθόδου τῶν φυγάδων ἐπιστάμεθα. καὶ γάρ, ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἀρχίαν καὶ Λεοντιάδαν Φοιβίδαν πείσαντες ἐν σπονδαῖς καταλαβεῖν τὴν Καδμείαν τοὺς μὲν
576A ἐξέβαλον τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς δὲ φόβῳ κατεῖργον | ἄρχοντες αὐτοὶ παρανόμως καὶ βιαίως, ἔγνωμεν ἐνταῦθα τῶν περὶ Μέλωνα καὶ Πελοπίδαν, ὡς οἶσθα, ἰδιόξενοι γενόμενοι καὶ παρ' ὀν χρόνον ἔφευγον ἀεὶ συνδιατρίβοντες αὐτοῖς· καὶ πάλιν ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιοι Φοιβίδαν μὲν ἐζημίωσαν ἐπὶ τῷ τὴν Καδμείαν καταλαβεῖν καὶ τῆς εἰς Ὄλυνθον στρατηγίας ἀπέστησαν, Λυσανορίδαν δὲ τρίτον αὐτὸν ἀντ' ἐκείνου πέμψαντες ἐγκρατέστερον ἐφρούρουν τὴν ἄκραν, ἠκούσαμεν· ἔγνωμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν
576B Ἰσμηνίαν οὐ τοῦ βελτίστου θανάτου τυχόντ' εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῆς δίκης τῆς περὶ αὐτοῦ γενομένης, Γοργίδου πάντα τοῖς φυγάσι δεῦρο διὰ γραμμάτων ἐξαγγείλαντος. ὥστε σοι λείπεται τὰ περὶ τὴν κάθοδον αὐτὴν τῶν φίλων καὶ τὴν κατάλυσιν τῶν τυράννων διηγεῖσθαι.

2. (Κ.) Καὶ μὴν ἐκείναις γε ταῖς ἡμέραις, ὦ Ἀρχέδαμε, πάντες οἱ τῶν πραττομένων μετέχοντες εἰώθειμεν εἰς τὴν Σιμμίου συνιόντες οἰκίαν ἔκ τινος πληγῆς περὶ τὸ σκέλος ἀναλαμβάνοντος αὐτὸν ἐντυγχάνειν μὲν ἀλλήλοις εἴ του δεήσειε, φανερῶς δὲ διατρίβειν ἐπὶ λόγοις καὶ φι-
576C λοσοφίᾳ, πολλάκις ἐφελκόμενοι τὸν Ἀρχίαν καὶ τὸν Λεοντιάδαν εἰς τὸ ἀνύποπτον οὐκ ὄντας ἀλλοτρίους παντάπασι τῆς τοιαύτης διατριβῆς. καὶ γὰρ ὁ Σιμμίας πολὺν χρόνον ἐπὶ τῆς ξένης γεγονὼς καὶ πεπλανημένος ἐν ἀλλοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀλίγῳ πρόσθεν εἰς Θήβας ἀφῖκτο μύθων τε παντοδαπῶν καὶ λόγων βαρβαρικῶν ὑπόπλεως· ὧν ὁπότε τυγχάνοι σχολὴν ἄγων ὁ Ἀρχίας, ἡδέως ἠκροᾶτο συγκαθιεὶς μετὰ τῶν νέων καὶ βουλόμενος ἡμᾶς ἐν λόγοις διάγειν μᾶλλον ἢ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν οἷς ἔπραττον ἐκεῖνοι. τῆς δ' ἡμέρας ἐκείνης, ἐν ᾗ σκότους ἔδει γενομένου τοὺς φυγάδας ἥκειν κρύφα πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος, ἀφικνεῖταί τις ἐνθένδε Φερενίκου πέμψαντος ἄνθρωπος οὐδενὶ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ἢ Χάρωνι
576D γνώριμος· ἐδήλου δὲ τῶν φυγάδων ὄντας δώδεκα τοὺς νεωτάτους μετὰ κυνῶν περὶ τὸν Κιθαιρῶνα θηρεύειν ὡς πρὸς ἑσπέραν ἀφιξομένους· αὐτὸς δὲ πεμφθῆναι ταῦτά τε προερῶν καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐν ᾗ κρυβήσονται

and conversations? The story is not a short one, since you are asking me to include the discussion as well.

[Archedamus:] You don't know them, Caphisias. But you should: they are sons of brave fathers who were also friends of Thebes. **[575F]** Lysitheides here is the nephew of Thrasybulus. This one is Timotheus, Conon's son. These are the sons of Archinus.[10] The others <too> are <themselves> all members of our group. So your story will find[11] a well-disposed and congenial audience.

[Caphisias:] Good! But what, from your point of view, would be the proper place to begin the story, having regard to the events you know already?

[Archedamus:] Well, Caphisias, we know more or less the condition of Thebes before the return of the exiles. How Archias and Leontiadas[12] persuaded Phoebidas[13] to seize the Cadmea[14] in a time of truce, and how they expelled some of the citizens **[576A]** and terrorized the rest by their violent and lawless rule – all that we learned from people like Melon[15] and Pelopidas,[16] whose hosts we were (as you know) and in whose company we constantly were throughout their exile. Again, we have heard how the Lacedaemonians fined Phoebidas for his seizure of the Cadmea, removed him from the command of the expedition to Olynthus,[17] but sent Lysanoridas[18] with two colleagues to Thebes in his place, reinforcing the garrison on the citadel. We know also that Ismenias[19] came to an unhappy end straight after his trial; Gorgidas[20] reported all this to the exiles in his letters. **[576B]** So what is left for you is to tell us about the actual return of our friends and the overthrow[21] of the tyrants.[22]

2. *[Caphisias:]* It was in those very days, Archedamus, that all of us who were involved in the affair used to meet in Simmias'[23] house, where he was recovering from a leg injury; we could discuss with one another whatever was necessary, but ostensibly we were occupying the time with philosophical discussion, and we often brought Archias and Leontiadas along to allay suspicion, for they were no strangers to this kind of discourse. **[576C]** Simmias, having spent a long time abroad[24] and wandered among many kinds of people, had recently returned to Thebes, full of all sorts of stories and exotic lore. Archias enjoyed listening to this when he had leisure; he relaxed in the company of the young, and he would rather we spent our time in these discussions than in addressing our minds to what he and his friends were doing. Now, on the day when the exiles were due to come secretly up to the wall after dark, a person arrived from Athens, sent by Pherenicus[25] but known to none of our party except Charon.[26] He brought word that the youngest of the exiles, twelve in number,[27] were hunting with hounds on Cithaeron,[28] **[576D]** intending to reach their destination at evening. He himself had been sent (he said) to give notice of this and

παρελθόντες, ὃς παρέξει, γνωσόμενος, ὡς ἂν εἰδότες εὐθὺς ἐκεῖ βαδίζοιεν. ἀπορουμένων δ' ἡμῶν καὶ σκοπούντων αὐτὸς ὡμολόγησεν ὁ Χάρων παρέξειν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄνθρωπος ἔγνω πάλιν ἀπελθεῖν σπουδῇ πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας·

3. ἐμοῦ δ' ὁ μάντις Θεόκριτος τὴν χεῖρα πιέσας σφόδρα καὶ πρὸς τὸν Χάρωνα βλέψας προερχόμενον 'οὗτος,' εἶπεν 'ὦ Καφισία, φιλόσοφος οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ μετείληφε παιδείας διαφόρου καὶ περιττῆς ὥσπερ Ἐπα-
576E μεινώνδας ὁ σὸς ἀδελφός· ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς, ὅτι φύσει πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων ἀγόμενος τὸν μέγιστον ὑποδύεται κίνδυνον ἑκουσίως ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ Βοιωτῶν ἁπάντων τῷ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀξιῶν διαφέρειν ἀμβλύς ἐστι καὶ ἀπρόθυμος ⟨... ὡς εἰ μὴ παρὰ⟩ τοῦτον παρὰ τίνα βελτίονα καιρὸν αὑτῷ πεφυκότι καὶ παρεσκευ-
576F ασμένῳ καλῶς οὕτω χρησόμενος;' κἀγὼ πρὸς αὐτόν 'ὦ προθυμότατε' εἶπον 'Θεόκριτε, τὰ δεδογμένα πράττομεν ἡμεῖς· Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ μὴ πείθων, ὡς οἴεται βέλτιον εἶναι, ταῦτα μὴ πράσσειν εἰκότως ἀντιτείνει πρὸς ἃ μὴ πέφυκε μηδὲ δοκιμάζει παρακαλούμενος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρὸν ἄνευ σιδήρου καὶ πυρὸς ὑπισχνούμενον τὸ νόσημα παύσειν εὐγνωμονοίης ἄν, οἶμαι, τέμνειν ἢ ἀποκάειν βιαζόμενος .... οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτος .... δήπου μηδένα τῶν πολιτῶν ⟨ἀποκτενεῖν ὑπισχνεῖται, μὴ μεγάλης γε γενομένης ἀνάγκης,⟩ ἄκριτον, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς αἵματος ἐμφυλίου καὶ σφαγῆς τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθεροῦσι συναγωνιεῖσθαι προθύμως. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ πεί-
577A θει τοὺς πολλούς, ἀλλὰ ταύτην ὡρμήκαμεν τὴν ὁδόν, ἐᾶν αὐτὸν κελεύει φόνου καθαρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἀναίτιον | ἐφεστάναι τοῖς καιροῖς μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι προσοισόμενον. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅρον ἔξειν τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ Φερένικον μὲν ἴσως καὶ Πελοπίδαν ἐπὶ τοὺς αἰτίους μάλιστα τρέψεσθαι καὶ πονηρούς, Εὐμολπίδαν δὲ καὶ Σαμίδαν, ἀνθρώπους διαπύρους πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ θυμοειδεῖς, ἐν νυκτὶ λαβόντας ἐξουσίαν οὐκ ἀποθήσεσθαι τὰ ξίφη, πρὶν ἐμπλῆσαι τὴν πόλιν ὅλην φόνων καὶ διαφθεῖραι πολλοὺς τῶν ἰδίᾳ διαφόρων ὄντων.'

4. Ταῦτά μου διαλεγομένου πρὸς τὸν Θεόκριτον διακρούων ὁ Γαλαξίδωρος, 'ἐγγὺς γάρ,' ⟨εἶπεν, 'Ἀρχίαν ὁρῶ⟩ καὶ Λυσανορίδαν τὸν Σπαρτι-
577B άτην ἀπὸ τῆς Καδμείας ὥσπερ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἡμῖν σπεύδοντας.' ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν ἐπέσχομεν, ὁ δ' Ἀρχίας καλέσας τὸν Θεόκριτον καὶ τῷ Λυσανορίδᾳ προσαγαγὼν ἰδίᾳ ⟨διε⟩λάλει πολὺν χρόνον ἐκνεύσας τῆς ὁδοῦ μικρὸν ὑπὸ τὸ Ἄμφιον, ὥσθ' ἡμᾶς ἀγωνιᾶν, μή τις ὑπόνοια προσπέπτωκεν ἢ μήνυσις αὐτοῖς, περὶ ἧς ἀνακρίνουσι τὸν Θεόκριτον. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Φυλλίδας, ὃν οἶσθ', ὦ Ἀρχέδαμε, τότε τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀρχίαν πολεμαρχοῦσι γραμματεύων ⟨συνειδὼς δὲ καὶ τοὺς φυγάδας μέλλοντας⟩ ἥξειν καὶ τῆς πράξεως μετέχων, λαβόμενός μου τῆς χειρὸς ὥσπερ εἰώθει φανε-

to ascertain who was to provide a house where they could be hidden on arrival, so that they could know and make their way straight there. While we were puzzling over this, and considering the question, Charon offered to provide the house himself. The man therefore decided to return to the exiles with all speed.

3. At this, Theocritus the diviner[29] gripped my hand hard, and looked towards Charon as he went on his way. 'Caphisias,' he said, 'that man is not a philosopher, and he has not enjoyed any remarkable or special education, like your brother Epaminondas.[30] But you see that he is naturally guided by the laws[31] to do the honourable thing, and willingly incurs great danger in his country's cause. Epaminondas, on the other hand, who regards himself as superior to all the Boeotians because he has been educated for virtue is dull and unenthusiastic…[32] as though he will one day use his splendid natural endowments and training, <if not for this, then for> what better occasion?' **[576F]** 'My dear enthusiastic Theocritus,' I replied, 'we are doing what we resolved to do. Epaminondas, being unable to persuade us to give it up, as he thinks we should, is quite reasonably resisting requests to do something for which he is not suited and which he does not approve. If a doctor promised to cure a disease without knife or cautery, you would surely not be justified in forcing him to operate or cauterize.' <'Of course not,' said Theocritus.>[33] 'So he too… <undertakes> not <to put> any citizen <to death> without trial <except in cases of great necessity>,[34] but also to cooperate enthusiastically with attempts to liberate the city <without>[35] civil bloodshed and slaughter. However, as he cannot convince the majority, and we have taken this path, he asks us to let him remain pure and innocent of bloodshed and wait on events, **[577A]** so as to contribute to the advantage as well as the justice of our cause. The action, he believes, will not be limited: Pherenicus[36] and Pelopidas will perhaps concentrate their attentions on the guilty and the wicked, but once Eumolpidas and Samidas,[37] passionate men and quick to anger, get their chance in the night, they will not lay down their swords till they have swamped the whole city with blood and killed many of their private enemies.'

4. While I was having this conversation with Theocritus, Galaxidorus[38] cut us short, <saying 'I see Archias and>[39] the Spartan Lysanoridas near by, hurrying from the Cadmea as though to join us.' **[577B]** So we stopped, and Archias called Theocritus, led him up to Lysanoridas,[40] and talked with him privately for some time, turning off the road a little way below the Amphion,[41] so that we were on tenterhooks, for fear that they had some suspicion or information and were questioning Theocritus about it. Meanwhile, Phyllidas[42] (you know whom I mean, Archedamus), who was at that time clerk to the polemarchs,[43] <and who knew that the exiles were due>[44] to arrive and was privy to our scheme, grasped me by the hand,

ρῶς ἔσκωπτεν εἰς τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν πάλην, εἶτα πόρρω τῶν ἄλλων
577C ἀπαγαγὼνἐπυνθάνετο περὶ τῶν φυγάδων, εἰ τὴν ἡμέραν φυλάττουσιν. ἐμοῦ δὲ φήσαντος 'οὐκοῦν' εἶπεν 'ὀρθῶς ἐγὼ τὴν ὑπο δοχὴν παρεσκεύακα σήμερον ὡς δεξόμενος Ἀρχίαν καὶπαρέξων ἐν οἴνῳ καὶ μέθῃ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν εὐχείρωτον.'

'ἄριστα μὲν οὖν,' εἶπον 'ὦ Φυλλίδα, καὶ πειράθητι πάντας ἢ πλείους ⟨γ'⟩ εἰς ταὐτὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν συναγαγεῖν.'

'ἀλλ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον,' ἔφη 'μᾶλλον δ' ἀδύνατον· ὁ γὰρ Ἀρχίας ἐλπίζων τινὰ τῶν ἐν ἀξιώματι γυναικῶν ἀφίξεσθαι τηνικαῦτα πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐ βούλεται παρεῖναι τὸν Λεοντιάδαν. ὥσθ' ἡμῖν δίχα διαιρετέον αὐτοὺς
577D ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκίας· Ἀρχίου γὰρ ἅμα καὶ Λεοντιάδου προκαταληφθέντων οἶμαι τοὺς ἄλλους ἐκποδὼν ἔσεσθαι φεύγοντας ἢ μενεῖν μεθ' ἡσυχίας ἀγαπῶντας ἄν τις διδῷ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν.'

'οὕτως' ἔφην 'ποιήσομεν. ἀλλὰ τί πρᾶγμα τούτοις πρὸς Θεόκριτόν ἐστιν, ὑπὲρ οὗ διαλέγονται;' καὶ ὁ Φυλλίδας 'οὐ σαφῶς' εἶπεν ⟨'ἔχω λέγειν⟩ οὐδ' ὡς ἐπιστάμενος, ἤκουον δὲ σημεῖα καὶ μαντεύματα δυσχερῆ καὶ χαλεπὰ προτεθεσπίσθαι τῇ Σπάρτῃ.' ...

Φειδόλαος ὁ ⟨Ἁλιάρ⟩τιος ἀπαντήσας 'μικρόν' εἶπεν 'ὑμᾶς ἐνταῦθα
577E περιμεῖναι ⟨παρακαλεῖ⟩ Σιμμίας· ἐντυγχάνει γὰρ ἰδίᾳ Λεοντιάδᾳ περὶ Ἀμφιθέου παραιτούμενος μεῖναι αὐτὸν διαπράξασθαι φυγὴν ἀντὶ θανάτου τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.'

5. Καὶ ὁ Θεόκριτος 'εἰς καιρόν' ἔφη 'καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες· καὶ γὰρ ἐβουλόμην πυθέσθαι, τίν' ἦν τὰ εὑρεθέντα καὶ τίς ὅλως ἡ ὄψις τοῦ Ἀλκμήνης τάφου παρ' ὑμῖν ἀνοιχθέντος, εἰ δὴ παρεγένου καὶ αὐτός, ὅτε πέμψας Ἀγησίλαος εἰς Σπάρτην τὰ λείψανα μετεκόμιζε.'

καὶ ὁ Φειδόλαος 'οὐ γάρ' ἔφη 'παρέτυχον, καὶ πολλὰ δυσανασχετῶν
577F καὶ ἀγανακτῶν πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας ἐγκατελείφθην ὑπ' αὐτῶν. εὑρέθη δ' οὖν ... σώματος, ψέλλιον δὲ χαλκοῦν οὐ μέγα καὶ δύ' ἀμφορεῖς κεραμεοῖ γῆν ἔχοντες ἐντὸς ὑπὸ χρόνου λελιθωμένην ἤδη καὶ συμπεπηγυῖαν ... τοῦ μνήματος ⟨ἔκειτο⟩ πίναξ χαλκοῦς ἔχων γράμματα πολλὰ θαυμαστὸν ὡς παμπάλαια· γνῶναι γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν παρεῖχε καίπερ ἐκφανέντα τοῦ χαλκοῦ καταπλυθέντος, ἀλλ' ἴδιός τις ὁ τύπος καὶ βαρβαρικὸς τῶν χαρακτήρων ἐμφερέστατος Αἰγυπτίοις· διὸ καὶ Ἀγησίλαος, ὡς ἔφασαν, ἐξέπεμψεν ἀντίγραφα τῷ βασιλεῖ δεόμενος δεῖξαι
578A τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν, εἰ ξυνήσουσιν. ἀλλὰ περὶ τούτων μὲν ἴσως ἂν ἔχοι τι καὶ Σιμμίας ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, | κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ πολλὰ τοῖς ἱερεῦσι διὰ φιλοσοφίαν συγγενόμενος. Ἁλιάρτιοι δὲ τὴν μεγάλην ἀφορίαν καὶ τὴν ἐπίβασιν τῆς λίμνης οὐκ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γενέσθαι νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ μήνιμα τοῦ τάφου τοῦτο περιελθεῖν ἀνασχομένους ὀρυττόμενον.'

and, in his usual way, made a show of joking about my athletic interests and my wrestling, but then took me aside from the others and asked whether the exiles were keeping to their day. I said they were, and he went on: **[577C]** 'So I was right, then, to make preparations to entertain Archias today and make him an easy prey for our friends when he is in drink.'

'You were very right, Phyllidas,' I said, 'and do try to collect all or most of our enemies together.'

'Not easy,' he said, 'indeed impossible. Archias is expecting a certain distinguished lady to visit him at that time, and he doesn't want Leontiadas there. So we must divide them between the houses. If Archias and Leontiadas are dealt with first, **[577D]** the rest will either flee and be out of our way, or else stay quietly, content just to be offered safety.'

'That's what we'll do, then,' said I, 'but what is the business that those people are talking to Theocritus about?' '<I can't say>[45] for sure,' he said, 'or out of knowledge, but I heard there had been some signs and prophecies ominous and threatening to Sparta'…[46]

Phidolaus of Haliartus[47] met us and said 'Simmias <asks you> to wait here a little, because he is having a private conversation with Leontiadas about Amphitheus,[48] pleading with him to arrange for the man's sentence **[577E]** to be commuted from death to exile.'

5. 'You've come at the right moment,' said Theocritus, 'and as though it was meant. I wanted to ask what was found, and, in general, what was the appearance of Alcmena's tomb[49] when it was opened in your country – if, that is, you were present yourself when Agesilaus[50] sent and had the remains removed to Sparta.'[51]

'No,' said Phidolaus, 'I wasn't present, and, thanks to all my indignation and complaints to my fellow-citizens, I was left out by them. However, what was found was … of a body,[52] **[577F]** a bronze bracelet of no great size, and two pottery jars containing earth compressed and hardened like stone by the passage of time; …[53] the tomb <there was> a bronze tablet with much writing on it, wonderfully ancient. This writing appeared clearly when the bronze was washed, but it allowed nothing to be made out, because the form of the characters was peculiar and foreign, very like the Egyptian. For this reason, as they said, Agesilaus sent a copy to the king,[54] asking him to show it to the priests to see if they could understand it. But Simmias may perhaps have something to tell us about this, since at that time **[578A]** he was much in contact with the priests in Egypt for philosophy. As for the people of Haliartus, they think that the great dearth and overflowing of the lake[55] was not fortuitous, but was a visitation of wrath come upon them from the tomb for allowing it to be dug up.'

καὶ ὁ Θεόκριτος μικρὸν διαλιπών ‘ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ αὐτοῖς’ ἔφη ‘Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀμήνιτον ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ δαιμόνιον, ὡς προδείκνυσι τὰ σημεῖα περὶ ὧν ἄρτι Λυσανορίδας ἡμῖν ἐκοινοῦτο· καὶ νῦν μὲν ἄπεισιν εἰς Ἀλί-
578B αρτον ἐπιχώσων αὖθις τὸ σῆμα καὶ χοὰς ποιησόμενος Ἀλκμήνῃ καὶ Ἀλέῳ κατὰ δή τινα χρησμόν, ἀγνοῶν τὸν Ἄλεον ὅστις ἦν· ἐπανελθὼν δ’ ἐκεῖθεν οἷός ἐστι τὸν Δίρκης ἀναζητεῖν τάφον ἄγνωστον ὄντα τοῖς Θηβαίοις πλὴν τῶν ἱππαρχηκότων. ὁ γὰρ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τὸν παραλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἀρχὴν μόνος ἄγων μόνον ἔδειξε νύκτωρ, καί τινας ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δράσαντες ἀπύρους ἱερουργίας, ὧν τὰ σημεῖα συγχέουσι καὶ ἀφανίζουσιν, ὑπὸ σκότους ἀπέρχονται χωρισθέντες. ἐγὼ δέ τ.... μέν, ὦ
578C Φειδόλαε, ... καλῶς ἐξευρήσειν αὐτοὺς νομίζω· φεύγουσι γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἱππαρχηκότων νομίμως, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντες πλὴν Γοργίδου καὶ Πλάτωνος, ὧν οὐδ’ ἂν ἐπιχειρήσειαν ἐκπυνθάνεσθαι δεδιότες τοὺς ἄνδρας· οἱ δὲ νῦν ἄρχοντες ἐν τῇ Καδμείᾳ τὸ δόρυ καὶ τὴν σφραγῖδα παραλαμβάνουσιν οὔτ’ εἰδότες οὐδὲν οὔτε ....’

6. Ταῦτα τοῦ Θεοκρίτου λέγοντος ὁ Λεοντιάδας ἐξῄει μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ἡμεῖς δ’ εἰσελθόντες ἠσπαζόμεθα τὸν Σιμμίαν ἐπὶ τῆς κλίνης καθεζόμενον οὐ κατατετευχότα τῆς δεήσεως, οἶμαι, μάλα σύννουν καὶ δια-
578D λελυπημένον· ἀποβλέψας δὲ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἡμᾶς ‘ὦ Ἡράκλεις,’ εἶπεν ‘ἀγρίων καὶ βαρβάρων ἠθῶν· εἶτ’ οὐχ ὑπέρευ Θαλῆς ὁ παλαιὸς ἀπὸ ξένης ἐλθὼν διὰ χρόνου τῶν φίλων ἐρωτώντων ὅ τι καινότατον ἱστορήκοι ‘τύραννον’ ἔφη ‘γέροντα.’ καὶ γὰρ ᾧ μηδὲν ἰδίᾳ συμβέβηκεν ἀδικεῖσθαι, τὸ βάρος αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν σκληρότητα τῆς ὁμιλίας δυσχεραίνων ἐχθρός ἐστι τῶν ἀνόμων καὶ ἀνυπευθύνων δυναστειῶν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως θεῷ μελήσει· τὸν δὲ ξένον ἴστε τὸν ἀφιγμένον, ὦ Καφισία, πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὅστις ἐστίν;’

‘οὐκ οἶδ’,’ ἔφην ἐγώ ‘τίνα λέγεις.’

578E ‘καὶ μήν’ ἔφη ‘Λεοντιάδας ⟨φησὶν⟩ ἄνθρωπον ὠφθαι παρὰ τὸ Λύσιδος μνημεῖον ἐκ νυκτῶν ἀνιστάμενον, ἀκολουθίας πλήθει καὶ κατασκευῇ σοβαρόν, αὐτόθι κατηυλισμένον ἐπὶ στιβάδων· φαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἄγνου καὶ μυρίκης χαμεύνας ἔτι δ’ ἐμπύρων λείψανα καὶ χοὰς γάλακτος· ἔωθεν δὲ πυνθάνεσθαι τῶν ἀπαντώντων, εἰ τοὺς Πολύμνιος παῖδας ἐνδημοῦντας εὑρήσει.’

‘καὶ τίς ἄν’ εἶπον ‘ὁ ξένος εἴη; περιττῷ γὰρ ἀφ’ ὧν λέγεις τινὶ καὶ οὐκ ἰδιώτῃ προσέοικεν.’

7. ‘Οὐ γὰρ οὖν’ εἶπεν ὁ Φειδόλαος· ‘ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μέν, ὅταν ἥκῃ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, δεξόμεθα· νυνὶ δ’ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀρτίως ἠποροῦμεν, ὦ Σιμμία, γραμ-
578F μάτων, εἴ τι γιγνώσκεις πλεῖον ἐξάγγειλον ἡμῖν· λέγονται γὰρ οἱ κατ’

Theocritus paused a moment, and then said: 'It looks as though the divine powers are angry with the Lacedaemonians too, to judge by the signs about which Lysanoridas has just now been consulting me. He's now gone off to Haliartus to fill in the grave again, and offer libations **[578B]** to Alcmena and Aleos, in accordance with some oracle, though he does not know who Aleos was.[56] On his return, he is just the sort of man to investigate the tomb of Dirce; it is unknown to the Thebans, except to those who have been hipparchs.[57] The outgoing hipparch takes his successor alone at night and shows him the tomb; they then perform certain rituals without fire, the traces of which they destroy and obliterate, before going their separate ways under cover of darkness. I, however, Phidolaus …[58] <don't> think that he will easily find them, since most of the lawfully appointed hipparchs are in exile – **[578C]** all of them indeed, except Gorgidas and Plato,[59] and they would be too afraid of these men to seek to interrogate them. The present office-holders on the Cadmea receive the spear and the seal, but without knowing anything or … .[60]

6. While Theocritus was speaking Leontiadas came out with his friends, and we went in and greeted Simmias. He was sitting on his bed,[61] very thoughtful and distressed, having (I suppose) failed to obtain his request. He looked at us all. 'Heracles!' he cried, **[578D]** 'what savage, barbarous ways! Wasn't it clever of old Thales,[62] when he came home from abroad after a long absence and his friends asked him what was the most novel thing he had discovered, to answer 'An old tyrant'?[63] Even if one has suffered no personal wrong, one comes to hate unlawful and irresponsible power out of disgust for the oppressiveness and difficulty of living with it. But maybe God will take care of all this. But do you people know the stranger who has come to visit your family, Caphisias?'

'I don't know who you mean,' I said.

'Nevertheless,' he said, 'Leontiadas <alleges> that a man has been seen by Lysis'[64] tomb, getting up before daylight, an impressive figure, **[578E]** with a large and well-equipped group of attendants, having slept out there on straw. A bed of agnus castus[65] and tamarisk could be seen, and the remains of burnt offerings and libations of milk. And in the morning (Leontiadas tells me) the man asked passers-by whether he would find the sons of Polymnis[66] in town.'

'Who can the stranger be?' I said, 'from what you say, he seems to be someone special, and not just an ordinary person.'

7. 'Indeed not,' said Phidolaus, 'but we'll make him welcome when he comes to us. But for the moment, Simmias, tell us if you know anything more about the writing that we were puzzling over just now. **[578F]** The

Αἴγυπτον ἱερεῖς τὰ γράμματα συμβαλεῖν τοῦ πίνακος, ὃν παρ' ἡμῶν ἔλαβεν Ἀγησίλαος τὸν Ἀλκμήνης τάφον ἀνασκευασάμενος.'

καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας εὐθὺς ἀναμνησθείς 'οὐκ οἶδ'' ἔφη 'τὸν πίνακα τοῦτον, ὦ Φειδόλαε, γράμματα δὲ πολλὰ παρ' Ἀγησιλάου κομίζων Ἀγητορίδας ὁ Σπαρτιάτης ἦκεν εἰς Μέμφιν ὡς Χόνουφιν τὸν προφήτην, ... τότὲ συμφιλοσοφοῦντες διετρίβομεν ἐγὼ καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ἑλλοπίων ὁ Πεπαρήθιος. ἦκε δὲ πέμψαντος βασιλέως καὶ κελεύσαντος τὸν Χόνουφιν, εἴ τι συμβάλλοι τῶν γεγραμμένων, ἑρμηνεύσαντα ταχέως ἀποστεῖλαι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν· ⟨ὁ⟩ δὲ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἀναλεξάμενος βιβλίων τῶν παλαιῶν παν-
579A τοδαποὺς χαρακτῆρας | ἀντέγραψε τῷ βασιλεῖ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔφρασεν, ὡς Μούσαις ἀγῶνα συντελεῖσθαι κελεύει τὰ γράμματα, τοὺς δὲ τύπους εἶναι τῆς ἐπὶ Πρωτεῖ βασιλεύοντι γραμματικῆς, ⟨ἣν⟩ Ἡρακλέα τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἐκμαθεῖν, ὑφηγεῖσθαι μέντοι καὶ παραινεῖν τοῖς Ἕλλησι διὰ τῶν γραμμάτων τὸν θεὸν ἄγειν σχολὴν καὶ εἰρήνην διὰ Φιλοσοφίας, ἀγωνιζομένους ἀεί Μούσαις, καὶ λόγῳ διακρινομένους περὶ τῶν δικαί-
579B ων τὰ ὅπλα καταθέντας. ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ τότε λέγειν καλῶς ἡγούμεθα τὸν Χόνουφιν καὶ μᾶλλον ὁπηνίκα κομιζομένοις ἡμῖν ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου περὶ Καρίαν Δηλίων τινὲς ἀπήντησαν δεόμενοι Πλάτωνος ὡς γεωμετρικοῦ λῦσαι χρησμὸν αὐτοῖς ἄτοπον ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ προβεβλημένον. ἦν δ' ὁ χρησμὸς Δηλίοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι παῦλαν τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἔσεσθαι διπλασιάσασι τὸν ἐν Δήλῳ βωμόν. οὔτε δὲ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐκεῖνοι συμβάλλειν δυνάμενοι καὶ περὶ τὴν τοῦ βωμοῦ κατασκευὴν γελοῖα πάσχοντες (ἑκάστης γὰρ τῶν τεσσάρων πλευρῶν διπλασιαζομένης ἔλαθον τῇ αὐξήσει τόπον στερεὸν ὀκταπλάσιον ἀπεργασάμενοι
579C δι' ἀπειρίαν ἀναλογίας ᾗ τὸ μήκει διπλάσιον παρέχεται) Πλάτωνα τῆς ἀπορίας ἐπεκαλοῦντο βοηθόν.

ὁ δὲ τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου μνησθεὶς προσπαίζειν ἔφη τὸν θεὸν Ἕλλησιν ὀλιγωροῦσι παιδείας οἷον ἐφυβρίζοντα τὴν ἀμαθίαν ἡμῶν καὶ κελεύοντα γεωμετρίας ἅπτεσθαι μὴ παρέργως· οὐ γάρ τοι φαύλης οὐδ' ἀμβλὺ διανοίας ὁρώσης ἄκρως δὲ τὰς γραμμὰς ἠσκημένης ἔργον εἶναι τὴν δυεῖν μέσων ἀνάλογον λῆψιν, ᾗ μόνῃ διπλασιάζεται σχῆμα κυβικοῦ σώματος ἐκ πάσης ὁμοίως αὐξόμενον διαστάσεως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν Εὔδοξον αὐτοῖς τὸν Κνίδιον ἢ τὸν Κυζικηνὸν Ἑλίκωνα συντελέσειν· μὴ τοῦτο δ' οἴεσθαι χρῆναι ποθεῖν τὸν θεὸν ἀλλὰ προστάσσειν Ἕλλησι
579D πᾶσι πολέμου καὶ κακῶν μεθεμένους Μούσαις ὁμιλεῖν καὶ διὰ λόγων καὶ μαθημάτων τὰ πάθη καταπραΰνοντας ἀβλαβῶς καὶ ὠφελίμως ἀλλήλοις συμφέρεσθαι.'

8. Μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ Σιμμίου λέγοντος ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν Πολύμνις ἐπεισῆλθε καὶ καθίσας παρὰ τὸν Σιμμίαν 'Ἐπαμεινώνδας' ἔφη 'καὶ σὲ καὶ τούτους παρακαλεῖ πάντας, εἰ μή τις ἀσχολία μείζων, ἐνταῦθα περι-

priests in Egypt, you see, are said to have understood the writing on the tablet which[67] Agesilaus obtained from us when he had Alcmena's tomb dismantled.'

Simmias recollected at once. 'I don't know this tablet, Phidolaus,' he said, 'but the Spartan Agetoridas[68] brought many writings from Agesilaus to Memphis to the prophet Chonouphis[69] ... <with whom>[70] I and Plato and Ellopion[71] of Peparethus were then studying philosophy. He came on a mission from the king with orders to Chonouphis to translate the writings, if he could understand them, and then send them straight back to him. Chonouphis spent three days on his own studying all kinds of scripts in ancient books, and then replied to the king, **[579A]** and explained to us, that the text ordered the holding of a competition in honour of the Muses. The alphabet, he told us, was that in use in the reign of Proteus,[72] which Heracles the son of Amphitryon[73] had learned; but the god's intention in the writing was to urge and exhort the Greeks to live in leisure and peace, competing always in philosophy, laying weapons aside and deciding questions of right with the aid of the Muses and of reason. We thought at the time that this was well said by Chonouphis, and even more so when, on our return voyage from Egypt, **[579B]** we were met in Caria[74] by some Delians, who asked Plato, as a mathematician, to solve an extraordinary oracle which the god had given them. The oracle said that the Delians and the rest of the Greeks would find a respite from their present troubles by doubling the altar at Delus.[75] They were unable to understand the meaning, and made a ridiculous mistake in the construction of the altar: by doubling each of the four sides, they inadvertently produced a solid eight times as large, because they were ignorant of the proportion by which[76] a linear duplication is produced. **[579C]** So they wanted to call in Plato to solve their problem.

'Remembering the Egyptian prophet, Plato declared that the god was alluding humorously to the Greeks' neglect of education, scorning our ignorance, as it were, and bidding us make mathematics our prime concern. Finding the mean proportionals, which is the only way of doubling a cube by an equal extension of each dimension, is not a job for a weak or dim intellect, but for one thoroughly trained in the use of geometrical diagrams. Eudoxus of Cnidus (he told them) or Helicon of Cyzicus[77] would do it. However, they should not think this was what the god really desired, rather, he was bidding all Greeks **[579D]** to give up war and evil doing, consort with the Muses, calm their emotions by rational discussion and study, and live innocently and profitably with one another.'[78]

8. Simmias was still speaking when my father Polymnis came in and sat down beside him. 'Epaminondas,' he said, 'begs you and all these others, if you have no more important business, to wait here, because he wants

μεῖναι βουλόμενος ὑμῖν γνωρίσαι τὸν ξένον, ἄνδρα γενναῖον μὲν αὐτὸν ⟨ὄντα⟩ μετὰ ⟨δὲ⟩ γενναίας καὶ καλῆς ἀφιγμένον τῆς προαιρέσεως
579E ⟨ἀποστειλάντων⟩ ἐξ Ἰταλίας τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν. ἀφῖκται δὲ Λύσιδι τῷ γέροντι χοὰς χέασθαι περὶ τὸν τάφον ἔκ τινων ἐνυπνίων ὥς φησι καὶ φασμάτων ἐναργῶν, συχνὸν δὲ κομίζων χρυσίον οἴεται δεῖν Ἐπαμεινώνδᾳ τὰς Λύσιδος γηροτροφίας ἀποτίνειν καὶ προθυμότατός ἐστιν οὐ δεομένων οὐδὲ βουλομένων ἡμῶν τῇ πενίᾳ βοηθεῖν.'

καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἡσθείς 'πάνυ θαυμαστόν γε λέγεις' εἶπεν 'ἄνδρα καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἄξιον· ἀλλὰ τίς ἡ αἰτία, δι' ἣν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἥκει πρὸς ἡμᾶς;'

579F 'ἐκεῖνον' ἔφη 'νυκτερεύσαντα περὶ τὸν τάφον ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τὸν Λύσιδος ἦγεν Ἐπαμεινώνδας πρὸς τὸν Ἰσμηνὸν ἀπολουσόμενον, εἶτ' ἀφίξονται δεῦρο πρὸς ἡμᾶς· πρὶν δ' ἐντυχεῖν ἐνηυλίσατο τῷ τάφῳ διανοούμενος ἀνελέσθαι τὰ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος καὶ κομίζειν εἰς Ἰταλίαν, εἰ μή τι νύκτωρ ὑπεναντιωθείη δαιμόνιον.' ὁ μὲν οὖν πατὴρ ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐσιώπησεν,

9. ὁ δὲ Γαλαξίδωρος 'ὦ Ἡράκλεις,' εἶπεν 'ὡς ἔργον ἐστὶν εὑρεῖν ἄνδρα καθαρεύοντα τύφου καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκοντες ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν τούτων ἁλίσκονται δι' ἀπειρίαν ἢ δι' ἀσθένειαν, οἱ δέ, ὡς θεοφιλεῖς καὶ περιττοί τινες εἶναι δοκοῖεν, ἐκθειάζουσι τὰς πράξεις, ὀνείρατα
580A καὶ φάσματα καὶ τοιοῦτον ἄλλον ὄγκον προϊστάμενοι τῶν ἐπὶ νοῦν ἰόντων. | ὃ πολιτικοῖς μὲν ἀνδράσι καὶ πρὸς αὐθάδη καὶ ἀκόλαστον ὄχλον ἠναγκασμένοις ζῆν οὐκ ἄχρηστον ἴσως ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἐκ χαλινοῦ τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ἀντεπισπάσαι καὶ μεταστῆσαι τοὺς πολλούς· φιλοσοφίᾳ δ' οὐ μόνον ἔοικεν ἀσχήμων ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι σχηματισμός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν ἐναντίος, εἰ πᾶν ἐπαγγειλαμένη λόγῳ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον διδάσκειν εἰς θεοὺς ἐπαναφέρει τὴν τῶν πράξεων ἀρχὴν ὡς τοῦ λόγου καταφρονοῦσα, καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ᾗ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν ἀτιμάσασα πρὸς μαντεύματα τρέπεται καὶ ὀνει-
580B ράτων ὄψεις, ἐν οἷς ὁ φαυλότατος οὐχ ἧττον τῷ κατατυγχάνειν πολλάκις φέρεται τοῦ κρατίστου. διὸ καὶ Σωκράτης ὁ ὑμέτερος, ὦ Σιμμία, δοκεῖ μοι φιλοσοφώτερον χαρακτῆρα παιδείας καὶ λόγου περιβάλλεσθαι, τὸ ἀφελὲς τοῦτο καὶ ἄπλαστον ὡς ἐλευθέριον καὶ μάλιστα φίλον ἀληθείας ἑλόμενος τὸν δὲ τῦφον ὥσπερ τινὰ καπνὸν φιλοσοφίας εἰς τοὺς σοφιστὰς ἀποσκεδάσας.'

ὑπολαβὼν δ' ὁ Θεόκριτος 'τί γάρ,' εἶπεν 'ὦ Γαλαξίδωρε; καὶ σὲ Μέ-
580C λητος πέπεικεν, ὅτι Σωκράτης ὑπερεώρα τὰ θεῖα; τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους κατηγόρησεν.'

'οὐδαμῶς' ἔφη 'τά γε θεῖα· φασμάτων δὲ καὶ μύθων καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας ἀνάπλεω φιλοσοφίαν ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου .... Ἐμπεδοκλέους δεξάμενος εὖ μάλα βεβακχευμένην εἴθισεν ὥσπερ πρὸς τὰ πράγματα πεπνῦσθαι καὶ λόγῳ νήφοντι μετιέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν.'

to introduce our visitor to you. He is a noble person, who has come with a noble and honourable purpose from Italy, <sent by> the Pythagoreans. The purpose of his visit is to offer libations to old Lysis at his tomb, **[579E]** in consequence (he says) of certain dreams and vivid visions.[79] He is also bringing a large sum in gold, and thinks he ought to repay Epaminondas for his care of the old man. He is very keen on this, though we neither need nor desire any help for our poverty'.

Simmias was delighted. 'He sounds a wonderful man,' he said, 'and worthy of philosophy. But why has he not come straight to us?'

[579F] 'I think,' replied Polymnis, 'that, after he has spent the night by Lysis' tomb, Epaminondas took him to wash to the Ismenus.[80] They will come to us next. He had encamped by the tomb before meeting us, with the intention of collecting the remains of the body and taking them to Italy, unless some divine opposition to this occurred during the night.' Having said this, my father remained silent.

9. Galaxidorus[81] then spoke up. 'Heracles!' he cried, 'how hard it is to find a man free of humbug and superstition! Some are involuntary victims of these feelings through inexperience or weakness; but there are others who, in order to be thought special favourites of the gods, ascribe their actions to divine intervention, and make dreams, visions and such pretentious nonsense **[580A]** a cover for their own thoughts. It may be quite useful for politicians who[82] are forced to deal with a wilful and disorderly population to use superstition as a kind of curb to rein back and divert the masses in the right direction.[83] But for philosophy, this sort of decoration is not only indecorous,[84] but contrary to her professed aims, if, after promising to teach the good and the expedient rationally, she refers[85] the origin of actions to the gods, as though she disdained reason, and then, dishonouring her own speciality, demonstration, turns instead to prophecies and dream-visions, in which **[580B]** the poorest mind is often no less successful than the best. And that, Simmias, is why your Socrates seems to me to have adopted a more philosophical style of education and argument, by choosing this simple and unaffected approach as a mark of liberality and love of truth, and blowing the humbug, which is a sort of philosophical smoke, off onto the sophists.'

'Why do you say that, Galaxidorus?' replied Theocritus, 'has Meletus[86] persuaded you too that Socrates despised the divine?[87] That was the accusation **[580C]** he brought against him in the Athenian court.'

'No,' he answered, 'not the divine; but it was a philosophy laden with visions and fables that he took over from Pythagoras …[88] <and> Empedocles; she was in a state of complete intoxication, but he accustomed her to come to her senses, as it were, in the face of the facts,[89] and pursue the truth with sober reason.'

10. ‘Εἶεν’ εἶπεν ὁ Θεόκριτος, ‘τὸ δὲ δαιμόνιον, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὸ Σωκράτους ψεῦδος ἢ τί φαμεν; ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν οὕτω μέγα τῶν περὶ Πυθαγόρου λεγομένων εἰς μαντικὴν ἔδοξε καὶ θεῖον· ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ οἵαν Ὅμηρος Ὀδυσσεῖ πεποίηκε τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ‘ἐν πάντεσσι πόνοισι παρισταμένην,’
580D τοιαύτην ἔοικε Σωκράτει τοῦ βίου προποδηγὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τινα συνάψαι τὸ δαιμόνιον ὄψιν, ‘ἥ’ μόνη ‘οἱ πρόσθεν ἰοῦσα τίθει φάος’ ἐν πράγμασιν ἀδήλοις καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσυλλογίστοις φρόνησιν, ⟨ἐν⟩ οἷς αὐτῷ συνεφθέγγετο πολλάκις τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐπιθειάζον ταῖς αὐτοῦ προαιρέσεσι. τὰ μὲν οὖν πλείονα καὶ μείζονα Σιμμίου χρὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκπυνθάνεσθαι Σωκράτους ἑταίρων· ἐμοῦ δὲ παρόντος, ὅτε πρὸς Εὐθύφρονα τὸν μάντιν ἥκομεν, ἔτυχε μέν, ὦ Σιμμία, μέμνησαι γάρ, ἄνω πρὸς τὸ Σύμβολον Σωκράτης καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν Ἀνδοκίδου βαδίζων ἅμα τι διερωτῶν καὶ διασείων τὸν Εὐθύφρονα μετὰ παιδιᾶς. ἄφνω δ’ ἐπιστὰς καὶ σιωπήσας προσέσχεν αὐτῷ συχνὸν χρόνον, εἶτ’ ἀναστρέ-
580E ψας ἐπορεύετο τὴν διὰ τῶν κιβωτοποιῶν καὶ τοὺς προκεχωρηκότας ἤδη τῶν ἑταίρων ⟨ἀνεκαλεῖτο φάσκων αὐτῷ⟩ γεγονέναι τὸ δαιμόνιον. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ συνανέστρεφον, ἐν οἷς κἀγὼ τοῦ Εὐθύφρονος ἐχόμενος, νεανίσκοι δέ τινες τὴν εὐθεῖαν βαδίζοντες ὡς δὴ τὸ Σωκράτους ἐλέγξοντες δαιμόνιον ἐπεσπάσαντο Χάριλλον τὸν αὐλητὴν ἥκοντα καὶ αὐτὸν μετ’ ἐμοῦ εἰς Ἀθήνας πρὸς Κέβητα· πορευομένοις δ’ αὐτοῖς διὰ τῶν ἑρ-
580F μογλύφων παρὰ τὰ δικαστήρια σύες ἀπαντῶσιν ἀθρόαι βορβόρου περίπλεαι καὶ κατ’ ἀλλήλων ὠθούμεναι διὰ πλῆθος, ἐκτροπῆς δὲ μὴ παρούσης τοὺς μὲν ἀνέτρεψαν ἐμβαλοῦσαι τοὺς δ’ ἀνεμόλυναν. ἦκεν οὖν καὶ ὁ Χάριλλος οἴκαδε τά τε σκέλη καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια βορβόρου μεστός, ὥστ’ ἀεὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους δαιμονίου μεμνῆσθαι μετὰ γέλωτος ⟨ἡμᾶς ἅμα καὶ⟩ θαυμάζοντας, εἰ μηδαμοῦ προλείπει τὸν ἄνδρα μηδ’ ἀμελεῖ τὸ θεῖον αὐτοῦ.’

11. Καὶ ὁ Γαλαξίδωρος ‘οἶει γάρ,’ ἔφη ‘Θεόκριτε, τὸ Σωκράτους δαιμόνιον ἰδίαν καὶ περιττὴν ἐσχηκέναι δύναμιν, οὐχὶ τῆς κοινῆς μόριόν τι μαντικῆς τὸν ἄνδρα πείρᾳ βεβαιωσάμενον ἐν τοῖς ἀδήλοις καὶ ἀτεκμάρτοις τῷ λογισμῷ ῥοπὴν ἐπάγειν; ὡς γὰρ ὁλκὴ μία καθ’ αὑτὴν οὐκ
581A ἄγει τὸν ζυγόν, | ἰσορροποῦντι δὲ βάρει προστιθεμένη κλίνει τὸ σύμπαν ἐφ’ ἑαυτήν, οὕτω πταρμὸς ἢ κληδὼν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον σύμβολον ⟨οὐχ οἷόν τε, μικρὸν ὂν⟩ καὶ κοῦφον ἐμβριθῆ διάνοιαν ἐπισπάσασθαι πρὸς πρᾶξιν· δυεῖν δ’ ἐναντίων λογισμῶν θατέρῳ προσελθὸν ἔλυσε τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς ἰσότητος ἀναιρεθείσης, ὥστε κίνησιν γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὁρμήν.’

ὑπολαβὼν δ’ ὁ πατήρ ‘ἀλλὰ μήν’ ἔφη ‘καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Γαλαξίδωρε, Μεγαρικοῦ τινος ἤκουσα, Τερψίωνος δὲ ἐκεῖνος, ὅτι τὸ Σωκράτους δαιμόνιον πταρμὸς ἦν, ὅ τε παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ παρ’ ἄλλων. ἑτέρου μὲν γὰρ πτα-
581B ρόντος ἐκ δεξιᾶς εἴτ’ ὄπισθεν εἴτ’ ἔμπροσθεν ὁρμᾶν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὴν πρᾶ-

10. 'Well then,' said Theocritus, 'what do we say about Socrates' *daimonion*, my good friend? Is it a fiction, or what? Nothing related of Pythagoras' power of prophecy has seemed to me as impressive and divine as this. Just as Homer makes Athena 'stand beside' Odysseus 'in all his troubles',[90] so, it would seem, the divine power gave Socrates from the beginning a vision which alone **[580D]** 'went before him and gave light'[91] in dark affairs, inscrutable to human thinking, wherein the power (*daimonion*) often agreed with him, lending divine sanction to his own choices. You must ask Simmias and Socrates' other friends about most of these happenings, and the more important ones; but here is one at which I was present myself. When we paid a visit to Euthyphron[92] the diviner, Socrates – you remember this, Simmias – was walking towards the Symbolon and Andocides' house,[93] all the time questioning and puzzling Euthyphron in his playful way. Then he suddenly stopped and concentrated on his own thoughts in silence for some time, **[580E]** before turning round and going down Boxmakers' Street[94] and <tried to call back> those of his friends who had gone ahead, <saying>[95] that 'the *daimonion* had happened'.[96] Most of us turned back with him (including me, who was sticking close to Euthyphron), but some young people went straight on, hoping to prove Socrates' *daimonion* wrong, and they took Charillus[97] the piper with them; he too had come to Athens with me to visit Cebes.[98] As they were going down Statuaries' Street, by the lawcourts,[99] they were confronted by a herd of pigs, **[580F]** covered in mud and jostling one another because there were so many of them. There was no escape: the pigs knocked some of the young people over and bespattered others. Charillus arrived with his legs and his cloak all muddied. So <we> always laugh when we remember Socrates' *daimonion*, <at the same time>[100] marvelling at the way the divine power never abandoned or neglected the man in any circumstances.'

11. 'Do you say this, Theocritus,' said Galaxidorus, 'because you think that Socrates' *daimonion* possessed some special and peculiar power, rather than that the man had assured himself by experience of some department of common divination,[101] and used this to tip the balance of his thinking in obscure or inscrutable matters? A single weight by itself does not turn the scale, **[581A]** but if it is added to an evenly-balanced load, it pulls the whole thing down. Likewise, a sneeze[102] or a casual word[103] or some such sign, <being small> and light, <cannot>[104] determine a weighty mind to action; but, added to one of two opposing calculations, it resolves the doubt by destroying the equipoise. Movement and impulse follow.'

'Indeed, Galaxidorus,' put in my father, 'I myself heard from a Megarian, who heard it from Terpsion,[105] that Socrates' *daimonion* was a sneeze, his own or another's. If someone sneezed on the right, either behind **[581B]** or in front, it impelled him to act; if on the left, it deterred him. As to his

ξιν, εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς, ἀποτρέπεσθαι· τῶν δ' αὐτοῦ πταρμῶν τὸν μὲν ἔτι μέλλοντος βεβαιοῦν τὸν δ' ἤδη πράσσοντος ἐπέχειν καὶ κωλύειν τὴν ὁρμήν. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό μοι δοκεῖ θαυμαστόν, εἰ πταρμῷ χρώμενος οὐ τοῦτο τοῖς ἑταίροις ἀλλὰ δαιμόνιον εἶναι τὸ κωλῦον ἢ κελεῦον ἔλεγε· τύφου γὰρ ἂν ἦν τινος, ὦ φίλε, κενοῦ καὶ κόμπου τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἀληθείας καὶ ἁπλότητος οἷς τὸν ἄνδρα μέγαν ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν πολλῶν γεγονέναι δοκοῦμεν ***, ὑπὸ φωνῆς ἔξωθεν ἢ πταρμοῦ τινος ὁπηνίκα τύχοι θορυβούμενον ἐκτῶν πράξεων ἀνατρέπεσθαι καὶ προ-
581C ϊεσθαι τὸ δεδογμένον. αἱ δὲ Σωκράτους ὁρμαὶ τό⟨νον καὶ ἰσχὺν⟩ ἔχουσαι καὶ σφοδρότητα φαίνονται πρὸς ἅπαν, ὡς ἂν ἐξ ὀρθῆς καὶ ἰσχυρᾶς ἀφειμέναι κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς· πενίᾳ γὰρ ἐμμεῖναι παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον ἑκουσίως σὺν ἡδονῇ καὶ χάριτι τῶν διδόντων ἔχειν δυνάμενον καὶ φιλοσοφίας μὴ ἐκστῆναι πρὸς τοσαῦτα κωλύματα καὶ τέλος εἰς σωτηρίαν καὶ φυγὴν αὐτῷ σπουδῆς ἑταίρων καὶ παρασκευῆς εὐμηχάνου
581D γενομένης μήτε καμφθῆναι λιπαροῦσι μήθ' ὑποχωρῆσαι τῷ θανάτῳ πελάζοντι, χρῆσθαι δ' ἀτρέπτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ πρὸς τὸ δεινόν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὸς ἐκ κληδόνων ἢ πταρμῶν μεταβαλλομένην ὅτε τύχοι γνώμην ἔχοντος ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μείζονος ἐπιστασίας καὶ ἀρχῆς ἀγομένου πρὸς τὸ καλόν. ἀκούω δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ τῆς Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεως φθορὰν προειπεῖν αὐτὸν ἐνίοις τῶν φίλων. καὶ πρότερον ἔτι τούτων Πυριλάμπης ὁ Ἀντιφῶντος ἅλοὺς ἐν τῇ διώξει περὶ Δήλιον ὑφ' ἡμῶν δορατίῳ τετρωμένος, ὡς ἤκουσε τῶν ἐπὶ τὰς σπονδὰς ἀφικομένων Ἀθήνηθεν,
581E ὅτι Σωκράτης μετ' Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ Λάχητος †ἐπὶ Ῥηγίστης† καταβὰς ἀπονενοστήκοι, πολλὰ μὲν τοῦτον ἀνεκαλέσατο, πολλὰ δὲ φίλους τινὰς καὶ λοχίτας οἷς συνέβη μετ' αὐτοῦ παρὰ τὴν Πάρνηθα φεύγουσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἱππέων ἀποθανεῖν, ὡς τοῦ Σωκράτους δαιμονίου παρακούσαντας ἑτέραν ὁδὸν οὐχ ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἦγε τρεπομένους ἀπὸ τῆς μάχης. ταῦτα δ' οἶμαι καὶ Σιμμίαν ἀκηκοέναι.'

'πολλάκις' ὁ Σιμμίας ἔφη 'καὶ πολλῶν· διεβοήθη γὰρ οὐκ ἠρέμα τὸ Σωκράτους Ἀθήνησιν ἐκ τούτων δαιμόνιον.'

12. 'Τί οὖν,' ὁ Φειδόλαος εἶπεν 'ὦ Σιμμία; Γαλαξίδωρον ἐάσωμεν παί-
581F ζοντα καταβάλλειν τοσοῦτο μαντείας ἔργον εἰς πταρμοὺς καὶ κληδόνας, οἷς καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἰδιῶται περὶ μικρὰ προσχρῶνται καὶ παίζοντες, ὅταν δὲ κίνδυνοι βαρύτεροι καὶ μείζονες καταλάβωσι πράξεις, ἐκεῖνο γίγνεται τὸ Εὐριπίδειον „οὐδεὶς σιδήρου ταῦτα μωραίνει πέλας";'

καὶ ὁ Γαλαξίδωρος 'Σιμμίου μέν,' ἔφη 'Φειδόλαε, περὶ τούτων, εἴ τι Σωκράτους αὐτὸς λέγοντος ἤκουσεν, ἕτοιμος ἀκροᾶσθαι καὶ πείθεσθαι μεθ' ὑμῶν· τὰ δ' ὑπὸ σοῦ λελεγμένα καὶ Πολύμνιος οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀνε-

own sneezes, one that happened while he was still hesitating confirmed his resolution, but if he had already begun to act it checked and stopped his impulse. What surprises me is that, if he was depending on a sneeze, he did not tell his friends that it was this that stopped or encouraged him, but that it was the *daimonion*. Such behaviour, my friend, would have been a sign of empty affectation and pretentiousness, not of the truthfulness and simplicity in which we believe Socrates' greatness and superiority to the mass of mankind to have consisted…[106] to be thrown into a panic and made to retreat from actions and abandon a decision because of a voice from outside or a fortuitous sneeze. **[581C]** Socrates' impulses, on the contrary, clearly possessed…[107] <tension and vigour> in all circumstances, springing as they did from a correct and powerful judgement and principle. To remain voluntarily in poverty all his life, when he could have had relief which others would have been pleased and charmed to give; not to abandon philosophy despite all the obstacles in his way; and finally, when friends' zeal and means were available to assure his safety in exile, not to yield to their insistence nor shrink before the approach of death, but to face **[581D]** the terrible moment with unflinching reason – these are not the actions of a man whose mind can be changed fortuitously by casual words or sneezes, but of one who is guided towards the honourable by some superior control and rule. I have heard too that he foretold to some of his friends the destruction of the Athenian force in Sicily. [108] There is an even earlier instance. Pyrilampes,[109] the son of Antiphon, was wounded by a spear and captured by our men in the pursuit at Delium;[110] and when he was told by the people who came from Athens to negotiate the truce, that Socrates, with Alcibiades and Laches, had gone down to (?Rhegiste)[111] **[581E]** and got home safely, thereafter often called to mind both Socrates and some friends and comrades who had fled with him by Parnes[112] and been killed by our cavalry. He said they had not heeded Socrates' *daimonion*, and had left the battlefield by a different route from that by which he was leading them. I imagine Simmias has heard all this too.'

'Often,' said Simmias, 'and from many people. There was a lot of talk at Athens about Socrates' *daimonion* because of this.'

12. 'Well then, Simmias,' said Phidolaus, 'are we to let Galaxidorus amuse himself by reducing this great achievement of prophecy to sneezes and casual words? **[581F]** Most ordinary people appeal to these on trivial matters, and not in earnest; when graver dangers and greater actions overtake them, Euripides' words are to the point: "None plays the fool like that when swords are out."[113]

'I am as ready to listen and be convinced by Simmias as you others are, Phidolaus,' said Galaxidorus, 'if he has heard anything from Socrates himself on the subject. But it's easy enough to refute what you and Polymnis

λεῖν. ὡς γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ σφυγμὸς ἢ φλύκταινα μικρὸν οὐ μικροῦ δὲ σημεῖόν ἐστι, καὶ κυβερνήτῃ πελαγίου φθόγγος ὄρνιθος ἢ διαδρομὴ κνη-
582A κίδος ἀραιᾶς | πνεῦμα σημαίνει καὶ κίνησιν τραχυτέραν θαλάσσης, οὕτω μαντικῇ ψυχῇ πταρμὸς ἢ κληδὼν οὐ μέγα καθ' αὑτὸ ⟨μεγάλου δὲ σημεῖον⟩ συμπτώματος· ⟨ἐπ'⟩ οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ τέχνης καταφρονεῖται τὸ μικροῖς μεγάλα καὶ δι' ὀλίγων πολλὰ προμηνύειν. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἄπειρος γραμμάτων δυνάμεως ὁρῶν ὀλίγα πλήθει καὶ φαῦλα τὴν μορφὴν ἀπιστοίη ἄνδρα γραμματικὸν ἐκ τούτων ἀναλέγεσθαι πολέμους
582B μεγάλους, οἳ τοῖς πάλαι συνέτυχον, καὶ κτίσεις πόλεων πράξεις τε καὶ παθήματα βασιλέων, εἶτα φαίη δαιμόνιόν τι μηνύειν καὶ καταλέγειν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἱστορικῷ τούτων ἕκαστον, ἡδὺς ἄν, ὦ φίλε, γέλως σοι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῆς ἀπειρίας ἐπέλθοι, οὕτω σκόπει, μὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς τῶν μαντικῶν ἑκάστου τὴν δύναμιν ἀγνοοῦντες, ᾗ συμβάλλει πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, εὐήθως ἀγανακτῶμεν, εἰ νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τούτων ἂν ἀποφαίνεταί τι περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων, καὶ ταῦτα φάσκων αὐτὸς οὐ πταρμὸν οὐδὲ φωνὴν ἀλλὰ δαιμόνιον αὐτῷ τῶν πράξεων ὑφηγεῖσθαι. μέτειμι γὰρ ἤδη πρὸς σέ, ὦ Πολύμνι, θαυμάζοντα Σωκράτους ἀνδρὸς ἀτυφίᾳ καὶ
582C ἀφελείᾳ μάλιστα δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἐξανθρωπίσαντος, εἰ μὴ πταρμὸν μηδὲ κληδόνα τὸ σημεῖον ἀλλὰ τραγικῶς πάνυ „τὸ δαιμόνιον" ὠνόμαζεν. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν τοὐναντίον ἐθαύμαζον ἀνδρὸς ἄκρου διαλέγεσθαι καὶ κρατεῖν ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ Σωκράτης, εἰ μὴ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἀλλὰ τὸν πταρμὸν αὐτῷ σημαίνειν ἔλεγεν· ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὑπὸ τοῦ βέλους φαίη τετρῶσθαι μὴ τῷ βέλει ὑπὸ τοῦ βαλόντος, μεμετρῆσθαι δ' αὖτὸ βάρος ὑπὸ τοῦ ζυγοῦ μὴ τῷ ζυγῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἱστάντος. οὐ γὰρ τοῦ ὀργάνου τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὗ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ χρῆται πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· ὄργανον δέ τι καὶ τὸ σημεῖον ᾧ χρῆται τὸ σημαῖνον. ἀλλ' ὅπερ εἶπον, εἴ τι Σιμμίας ἔχει λέγειν, ἀκουστέον, ὡς εἰδότος ἀκριβέστερον.'

582D **13.** Καὶ ὁ Θεόκριτος 'πρότερόν γ'' ἔφη 'τοὺς εἰσιόντας οἵτινές εἰσιν ἀποσκεψαμένοις, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν ξένον ἔοικεν ἡμῖν Ἐπαμεινώνδας ὁδὶ κομίζειν.'

ἀποβλέψαντες οὖν πρὸς τὰς θύρας ἑωρῶμεν ἡγούμενον μὲν τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ τῶν φίλων Ἰσμηνόδωρον καὶ Βακχυλίδαν καὶ Μέλισσον τὸν αὐλητήν, ἑπόμενον δὲτὸν ξένον οὐκ ἀγεννῆ τὸ εἶδος ἀλλὰ πραότητα καὶ φιλοφροσύνην τοῦ ἤθους ὑποφαίνοντα καὶ σεμνῶς ἀμπεχόμενον τὸ σῶμα. καθίσαντος οὖν ἐκείνου μὲν αὐτοῦ παρὰ τὸν Σιμμίαν τοῦ δ' ἀδελφοῦ παρ' ἐμὲ τῶν δ' ἄλλων ὡς ἕκαστος ἔτυχε καὶ γενομένης σιωπῆς ὁ Σιμμίας τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἡμῶν καλέσας 'εἶεν,' εἶπεν

have said. In medicine, a throbbing pulse or a blister is a small thing in itself, but the symptom of something serious. For the pilot of a ship, the cry of a sea-bird or the passing over of a thin wisp of cloud **[582A]** is a sign of wind and the sea turning rough. Similarly, for the prophetic mind, a sneeze or a casual word is a small thing in itself, but <a sign of some important>[114] occurrence. In no art is the prediction of great things by small or many things by few regarded with contempt. If a man ignorant of the power of letters, seeing a few unimpressive marks, could not believe that a scholar could read from them great wars that befell men of old, foundations of cities, and the deeds and sufferings **[582B]** of kings, and therefore declared that it was 'something *daemonic*' that disclosed and related these things to the scholar,[115] you would have a good laugh, my friend, at the fellow's ignorance. In the same way, ask yourself whether, ignorant as we are of how any particular form of prophecy relates to the future, we are perhaps foolish to feel indignation if a man of sense uses these means to reveal something of the unknown, even if he does say himself that it is not a sneeze or a voice but 'something *daemonic*' that directs his actions. And now I turn to you, Polymnis, and your surprise that Socrates, who did most to humanize philosophy by his unpretentiousness and simplicity, called his sign not a sneeze **[582C]** or a casual word but, in high tragic style, 'the[116] *daimonion*'. For my part, on the contrary, I should have been surprised if a supreme dialectician and master of words like Socrates had not said that it was 'the *daimonion*' but a sneeze[117] that gave him his signs. It would be as though one said that one had been wounded by the dart, as an agent, and not by the thrower as agent with the dart as instrument; or again that the scales were the agent that weighed something, and not the weigher the agent and the scales the instrument. The work, you see, does not belong to the instrument, but to the owner of the instrument which he uses for the work; and the sign which the signalling agent uses is, in a sense, his instrument. But, as I said, we must listen to anything Simmias has to say, for he has better information.'

13. 'But,' said Theocritus, 'not until we have seen who are these people coming in. **[582D]** Or rather, it's Epaminondas, I think, bringing in the stranger.'[118]

We looked towards the door, and saw Epaminondas leading the way and some of our friends with him[119] – Ismenodorus, Bacchylidas and the piper Melissus:[120] the stranger followed, a noble looking personage, but with an air of gentleness and kindness, and splendidly dressed. He sat down himself next to Simmias, my brother next to me, and the rest took their chance. Silence fell. 'Well now, Epaminondas,' said Simmias, addressing himself to my brother, 'who is your guest, how should we ad-

582E ‘ὦ Ἐπαμεινώνδα, τίνα χρὴ τὸν ξένον καὶ πῶς καὶ πόθεν προσαγορεύειν; ἀρχὴ γάρ τις ἐντυχίας καὶ γνώσεως αὕτη συνήθης.’

καὶ ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ‘Θεάνωρ,’ εἶπεν ‘ὦ Σιμμία, ὄνομα μὲν τῷ ἀνδρί, γένος δὲ Κροτωνιάτης τῶν ἐκεῖ φιλοσόφων οὐ καταισχύνων τὸ μέγα Πυθαγόρου κλέος· ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν ἥκει δεῦρο μακρὰν ὁδὸν ἐξ Ἰταλίας ἔργοις καλοῖς καλὰ δόγματα βεβαιῶν.’

ὑπολαβὼν δ’ ὁ ξένος ‘οὐκοῦν’ ἔφη ‘σὺ κωλύεις, ὦ Ἐπαμεινώνδα, τῶν
582F ἔργων τὸ κάλλιστον. εἰ γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους καλόν, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εὖ πάσχειν ὑπὸ φίλων· ἡ γὰρ χάρις οὐχ ἧττον δεομένη τοῦ λαμβάνοντος ἢ τοῦ διδόντος ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τελειοῦται πρὸς τὸ καλόν, ὁ δὲ μὴ δεξάμενος ὥσπερ σφαῖραν εὖ φερομένην κατήσχυνεν ἀτελῆ πεσοῦσαν. ποίου γὰρ οὕτω σκοποῦ βάλλοντα καὶ τυχεῖν ἡδὺ καὶ διαμαρτάνειν ἀνιαρὸν ὡς ἀνδρὸς εὖ παθεῖν ἀξίου διὰ χάριτος ἐφιέμενον; ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖ μὲν ὁ τοῦ σκοποῦ μένοντος ἀτυχήσας σφάλλεται δι’ αὑτόν, ἐνταυθοῖ δ’ ὁ παραιτούμενος καὶ ὑποφεύγων ἀδικεῖ τὴν χάριν εἰς ὃ ἔσπευκε μὴ περαίνουσαν.

583A σοὶ μὲν οὖν τὰς αἰτίας ἤδη διῆλθον, ὑφ’ ὧν ἔπλευσα δεῦρο, | βούλομαι δὲ καὶ τούτοις διελθὼν χρήσασθαι πρός σε δικασταῖς. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐξέπεσον αἱ κατὰ πόλεις ἑταιρεῖαι τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν στάσει κρατηθέντων, τοῖς δ’ ἔτι συνεστῶσιν ἐν Μεταποντίῳ συνεδρεύουσιν ἐν οἰκίᾳ πῦρ οἱ Κυλώνειοι περιένησαν καὶ διέφθειραν ἐν ταὐτῷ πάντας πλὴν Φιλολάου καὶ Λύσιδος νέων ὄντων ἔτι ῥώμῃ καὶ κουφότητι διωσαμένων τὸ πῦρ, Φιλόλαος μὲν εἰς Λευκανοὺς φυγὼν ἐκεῖθεν ἀνεσώθη πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φίλους ἤδη πάλιν ἀθροιζομένους καὶ κρατοῦντας τῶν Κυλω-
583B νείων, Λῦσις δ’ ὅπου γέγονεν ἠγνοεῖτο πολὺν χρόνον, πρίν γε δὴ Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀναπλέων εἰς Σικελίαν ἀπήγγελλε τοῖς περὶ Ἄρκεσον βεβαίως Λύσιδι συγγεγονέναι διατρίβοντι περὶ Θήβας. ὥρμησε μὲν ὁ Ἄρκεσος πόθῳ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς αὐτὸς ὡς εἶχε πλεῦσαι, κομιδῇ δὲ διὰ γῆρας καὶ ἀσθένειαν ἐλλείπων ἐπέσκηψε μάλιστα μὲν ζῶντα κομίσαι τὸν Λῦσιν εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἢ τὰ λείψανα τεθνηκότος. οἱ δ’ ἐν μέσῳ πόλεμοι καὶ στάσεις καὶ τυραννίδες ἐκώλυσαν αὐτῷ ζῶντι συντελέσαι τοὺς φίλους τὸν ἆθλον. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡμῖν τὸ δαιμόνιον Λύσιδος ἤδη τεθνηκότος ἐναργῶς προὐπεφήνει τὴν τελευτήν, καὶ τὰς παρ’ ὑμῖν, ὦ Πολύμνι,
583C θεραπείας καὶ διαίτας τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οἱ σαφῶς εἰδότες ἀπήγγελλον, ὅτι πλουσίας ἐν οἴκῳ πένητι γηροκομίας τυχὼν καὶ πατὴρ τῶν σῶν υἱέων ἐπιγραφεὶς οἴχοιτο μακαριστός, ἀπεστάλην ἐγὼ νέος καὶ εἷς ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ πρεσβυτέρων, ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔχουσι χρήματα διδόντων, πολλὴν ⟨δὲ⟩ χάριν καὶ φιλίαν ἀντιλαμβανόντων. Λῦσις δὲ καὶ κεῖται καλῶς ὑφ’ ὑμῶν, καὶ τάφου καλοῦ κρείττων αὐτῷ χάρις ἐκτινομένη φίλοις ὑπὸ φίλων καὶ οἰκείων.’

dress him, **[582E]** and where does he come from? That's the usual way to start meeting and knowing somebody.'[121]

'His name,' said Epaminondas, 'is Theanor. By origin he is from Croton,[122] one of the philosophers there, and he does not disgrace Pythagoras' great reputation. He has made the long journey here from Italy to crown good beliefs with good deeds.'

'Nevertheless,' interrupted the stranger, 'it is you, Epaminondas, who are hindering the best of my deeds. If it is honourable to benefit friends, **[582F]** it is no shame to receive benefits from friends. A favour needs a recipient as well as a giver, and both are needed for its honourable completion. The man who refuses it, one might say, spoils a well-thrown ball, which falls and fails in its purpose.[123] For what target can be more pleasing to hit and more distressing to miss than a deserving person whom one aims to reach with a favour? In the game, however, it is your own failure if you miss a stationary target; but in this business, to decline and step aside is to be unfair to the favour so that it fails to reach its goal.

'I've already told you the reasons for my voyage here, **[583A]** but I should like to explain them also to these people, and make them judges between you and me. After the Pythagoreans were defeated in the disturbances and the societies in the cities were expelled,[124] the group at Metapontum[125] were meeting in a house, when Cylon's[126] party set fire to it and killed everyone there, except Philolaus[127] and Lysis, who were young, vigorous and agile enough to escape the flames. Philolaus fled to Lucania,[128] and from there safely reached the other friends, who were by now gathering again and getting the better of Cylon's party. Where Lysis was, **[583B]** long remained unknown, until Gorgias of Leontini,[129] on his return from Greece to Sicily,[130] gave Arcesus[131] and his group reliable information that he had met Lysis, who was living at Thebes. Arcesus planned to make the voyage himself, out of love for Lysis, but he was failing through old age and illness, and he ordered us to bring Lysis to Italy, alive if possible, but, if dead, his remains. However, the intervening wars, revolutions, and tyrannies prevented his friends from fulfilling this task while he lived. But when, after Lysis' death, god[132] revealed[133] to us his end, and well-informed people told us **[583C]** of the care and support that your family gave him, Polymnis – how he had enjoyed lavish care in his old age in a poor household, had been registered as your sons' father, and had died a blessed death – then I, on my own and young, became the emissary of many senior men, who offered money (which they possess) to you (who possess none), and were ready to accept in return great favour and friendship. Lysis has had from you a fair burial; but better for him than his fair tomb is the repayment of friends' kindness by friends and kindred.'

14. Ταῦτα τοῦ ξένου λέγοντος ὁ μὲν πατὴρ ἐπεδάκρυσε τῇ μνήμῃ τοῦ
583D Λύσιδος πολὺν χρόνον, ὁ δ' ἀδελφὸς ὑπομειδιῶν ὥσπερ εἰώθει πρὸς ἐμέ 'πῶς' ἔφη 'ποιοῦμεν, ὦ Καφισία; προϊέμεθα τὴν πενίαν τοῖς χρήμασι καὶ σιωπῶμεν;'

'ἥκιστ'' ἔφην ἐγώ 'τὴν φίλην καὶ „ἀγαθὴν κουροτρόφον", ἀλλ' ἄμυνε· σὸς γὰρ ὁ λόγος.'

'καὶ μὴν ἐγώ,' εἶπεν 'ὦ πάτερ, ταύτῃ μόνῃ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐδεδίειν ἁλώσιμον ὑπὸ χρημάτων εἶναι, κατὰ τὸ Καφισίου σῶμα καλῆς μὲν ἐσθῆτος δεόμενον ἵνα τοῖς ἐρασταῖς ἐγκαλλωπίσηται τοσούτοις οὖσιν, ἀφθόνου δὲ καὶ πολλῆς τροφῆς ἵν' ἀντέχῃ πρὸς τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις ἀγῶνας· ὁπηνίκα δ' οὗτος οὐ προδίδωσι τὴν πενίαν
583E οὐδ' ὡς βαφὴν ἀνίησι τὴν πάτριον πενίαν, ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὢν μειράκιον εὐτελείᾳ καλλωπίζεται καὶ στέργει τὰ παρόντα, τίς ἂν ἡμῖν γένοιτο τῶν χρημάτων διάθεσις καὶ χρῆσις; ἧπου καταχρυσώσομεν τὰ ὅπλα καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα πορφύρᾳ συμμεμιγμένῃ πρὸς χρυσίον, ὥσπερ Νικίας ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, διαποικιλοῦμεν; σοὶ δ', ὦ πάτερ, Μιλησίαν χλανίδα τῇ δὲ μητρὶ παραλουργὸν ὠνησόμεθα χιτώνιον; οὐ γὰρ εἰς γαστέρα δήπου καταχρησόμεθα τὴν δωρεὰν εὐωχοῦντες αὑτοὺς πολυτελέστερον, ὥσπερ ξένον ὑποδεδεγμένοι βαρύτερον τὸν πλοῦτον.'

583F 'ἄπαγ',' εἶπεν ὁ πατήρ 'ὦ παῖ· μηδέποτε τοιαύτην ἐπίδοιμι μετακόσμησιν τοῦ βίου ἡμῶν.'

'καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἀργόν' ἔφη 'καθισόμεθα φρουροῦντες οἴκοι τὸν πλοῦτον· ἄχαρις γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἡ χάρις καὶ ἄτιμος ἡ κτῆσις εἴη.'

'τί μήν;' εἶπεν ὁ πατήρ.

'οὐκοῦν' ἔφη ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας 'Ἰάσωνι μὲν τῷ Θετταλῶν ταγῷ πέμψαντι δεῦρο πολὺ χρυσίον ἔναγχος πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ δεομένῳ λαβεῖν ἀγροικότερος ἐφάνην ἀποκρινόμενος ἀδίκων χειρῶν αὐτὸν κατάρχειν,
584A ὅτι μοναρχίας ὢν ἐραστὴς ἄνδρα δημότην ἐλευθέρας καὶ αὐτονόμου πόλεως ἐπείρα διὰ χρη|μάτων· σοῦ δ', ὦ ξένε, τὴν μὲν προθυμίαν (καλὴ γὰρ καὶ φιλόσοφος) δέχομαι καὶ ἀγαπῶ διαφερόντως, ἥκεις δὲ φάρμακα φίλοις μὴ νοσοῦσι κομίζων. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ πολεμεῖσθαι πυθόμενος ἡμᾶς ἔπλευσας ἡμᾶς ὅπλοις καὶ βέλεσιν ὠφελήσων, εἶτα φιλίαν καὶ εἰρήνην εὗρες, οὐκ ἂν ᾠου δεῖν ἐκεῖνα διδόναι καὶ ἀπολείπειν μὴ δεομένοις, οὕτω σύμμαχος μὲν ἀφῖξαι πρὸς πενίαν ὡς ἐνοχλουμένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς, ἡ δ' ἐστὶ ῥᾴστη φέρειν ἡμῖν καὶ φίλη σύνοικος· οὔκουν δεῖ χρημάτων οὐδ' ὅπλων ἐπ' αὐτὴν μηδὲν ἀνιῶσαν, ἀλλ' ἀπάγγελλε τοῖς
584B ἐκεῖ γνωρίμοις, ὅτι κάλλιστα μὲν αὐτοὶ πλούτῳ χρῶνται καλῶς δὲ πενίᾳ χρωμένους αὐτόθι φίλους ἔχουσι, τὰς δὲ Λύσιδος ἡμῖν τροφὰς καὶ ταφὰς αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ Λῦσις ἀπέδωκε,τά τ' ἄλλα καὶ πενίαν διδάξας μὴ δυσχεραίνειν.'

14. As our visitor was speaking, my father wept for a while, in remembrance of Lysis. My brother smiled slightly, **[583D]** as he commonly did, and said to me: 'What do we do, Caphisias? Do we sacrifice poverty to money, and say nothing?'

'Certainly not,' I said, 'she is our dear and "kindly nurse";[134] defend her, it's for you to speak.'

'Well, father,' he said, 'the only[135] fear I had of our family's being conquered by money concerned Caphisias' person, which needs fine clothing for him to show off proudly to all his lovers, and generous rations to make him strong enough for the gymnasia and the wrestling-bouts. But as he does not betray poverty, or, as it were, lose the sharp edge he has inherited,[136] but, **[583E]** mere boy though he is, prides himself on economy, and is content with what he has, what way of using or disposing of the money could we have? Are we to gild our weapons, or decorate our shield with purple and gold, like the Athenian Nicias?[137] Or buy you a Milesian[138] cloak, father, or my mother a dress with a purple border? We surely shan't spend the gift on our stomachs, giving ourselves more expensive dinners, as though wealth was a burdensome guest to be entertained!'

'For goodness' sake, child,' said my father, 'let me not live to see **[583F]** that kind of change in our life!'

'Neither shall we sit back and keep our riches idle at home,' went on Epaminondas, 'for in that case the grace would be graceless and the possession bring no honour.'

'Of course,' said my father.

'Well,' said Epaminondas, 'when Jason, the Thessalian ruler[139] sent us a large sum of money here recently and asked us to accept it, I was seen as rather rude when I replied that he was actually an aggressor, because, in his passion for monarchical rule, he was trying to bribe an ordinary citizen of a free and independent city. **[584A]** But I accept and very much appreciate your concern, sir, for it is noble and worthy of a philosopher; but you have come bringing medicine for friends who are not ill. If you had heard that we were at war, and had come over to help us with arms and missiles, and then found all peace and friendship, you wouldn't have thought it right to give us these things and leave them with us, when we were in no need of them. In the same way, you have come to be our ally against poverty, assuming that she was a trouble to us; but in fact she is very easy for us to bear, and is a dear member of our family. So we need no money as a weapon against her, since she does us no harm. **[584B]** Tell your acquaintances[140] over there that, while they use wealth most nobly, they have friends here who use poverty nobly; tell them that Lysis has him-

15. Ὑπολαβὼν δ' ὁ Θεάνωρ 'ἆρ' οὖν' ἔφη 'τὸ πενίαν δυσχεραίνειν ἀγεννές ἐστι τὸ δὲ πλοῦτον δεδιέναι καὶ φεύγειν οὐκ ἄτοπον;'

〈'ἄτοπον', εἶπεν ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας〉, 'εἰ μὴ λόγῳ τις αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ σχηματιζόμενος ἢ δι' ἀπειροκαλίαν ἢ τῦφόν τινα διωθεῖται.'

'καὶ τίς ἄν' ἔφη 'λόγος ἀπείργοι τὴν ἐκ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων κτῆσιν, ὦ
584C Ἐπαμεινώνδα; μᾶλλον δὲ (πραότερον γὰρ ἡμῖν ἢ τῷ Θετταλῷ πρὸς τὰς ἀποκρίσεις ἐνδίδου σαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τούτων) εἰπέ μοι, πότερον ἡγῇ δόσιν μὲν εἶναί τινα χρημάτων ὀρθὴν λῆψιν δὲ μηδεμίαν ἢ καὶ τοὺς διδόντας ἁμαρτάνειν πάντως καὶ τοὺς λαμβάνοντας;'

'οὐδαμῶς' εἶπεν ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, 'ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄλλου τινὸς ἐγὼ καὶ πλούτου χάριν τε καὶ κτῆσιν εἶναι νομίζω τὴν μὲν αἰσχρὰν τὴν δ' ἀστείαν.'

'ἆρ' οὖν' ἔφη ὁ Θεάνωρ 'ὁ ἃ ὀφείλων διδοὺς ἑκουσίως καὶ προθύμως οὐ καλῶς δίδωσιν;'

ὡμολόγησεν.

'ὁ δ' ἅ τις καλῶς δίδωσι δεξάμενος οὐ καλῶς εἴληφεν; ἢ γένοιτ' ἂν δικαιοτέρα χρημάτων λῆψις τῆς παρὰ τοῦ δικαίως διδόντος;'

584D 'οὐκ ἄν' ἔφη 'γένοιτο.' 'δυεῖν ἄρα φίλων,' εἶπεν 'ὦ Ἐπαμεινώνδα, εἰ θατέρῳ δοτέον, θατέρῳ δήπου ληπτέον· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς μάχαις τὸν εὖ βάλλοντα τῶν πολεμίων ἐκκλιτέον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς χάρισι τὸν καλῶς διδόντα τῶν φίλων οὔτε φεύγειν οὔτ' ἀπωθεῖσθαι δίκαιον· εἰ γὰρ ἡ πενία μὴ δυσχερές, οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν ὁ πλοῦτος οὕτως ἄτιμος καὶ ἀπόβλητος.'

'οὐ γὰρ οὖν' εἶπεν ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, 'ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅτῳ μὴ λαβόντι τὸ καλῶς διδόμενον τιμιώτερον ὑπάρχει καὶ κάλλιον· οὑτωσὶ δ' ἐπίσκεψαι μεθ' ἡμῶν. εἰσὶ δήπουθεν ἐπιθυμίαι πολλαὶ καὶ πολλῶν, ἔνιαι μὲν ἔμ-
584E φυτοι λεγόμεναι καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα βλαστάνουσαι πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἡδονάς, αἱ δ' ἐπήλυδες, αἳ 〈γενόμεναι μὲν〉 ἐκ κενῶν δοξῶν, ἰσχὺν δὲ καὶ βίαν ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας ἐν τροφῇ μοχθηρᾷ λαβοῦσαι πολλάκις ἕλκουσι καὶ ταπεινοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐρρωμενέστερον τῶν ἀναγκαίων. ἔθει δὲ καὶ μελέτῃ πολὺ μέν τις ἤδη καὶ τῶν ἐμφύτων ἀπαρύσαι παθῶν τῷ λόγῳ παρέσχε· τὸ δὲ πᾶν τῆς ἀσκήσεως κράτος, ὦ φίλε, ταῖς ἐπεισοδίοις καὶ περιτταῖς προσάγοντας ἐπιθυμίαις ἐκπονεῖν χρὴ καὶ ἀποκόπτειν αὐτὰς ἀνείρξεσι καὶ κατοχαῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου κολαζομένας. εἰ
584F γὰρ δίψαν ἐκβιάζεται καὶ πεῖναν ἡ πρὸς τροφὴν καὶ ποτὸν ἀντίβασις τοῦ λογισμοῦ, μακρῷ δήπου ῥᾷόν ἐστι φιλοπλουτίαν κολοῦσαι καὶ φι-

self paid us for his keep and his burial, most of all by teaching us not to complain of poverty.'

15. 'And so,' replied Theanor, 'it's mean (is it?) to complain of poverty, but not absurd to fear and shun wealth!'

'<No, that is absurd,' said Epaminondas>,[141] unless one rejects it on reasonable grounds, and not just as an affectation or through some sort of bad taste or cant.'

'And what reason, Epaminondas,' said Theanor, 'might prevent the acquisition of wealth by honourable and just means? Or rather – and please allow yourself to answer us about this more gently than you answered the Thessalian – **[584C]** tell me: do you think it is sometimes right to offer money, but never right to accept it? Or that offer and acceptance are always equally wrong?'

'Not at all,' said Epaminondas, 'I think that both the bestowal and the acquisition of wealth (as of anything else) may be either disgraceful or virtuous.'

'Well then,' said Theanor, 'does not a debtor who pays up willingly act honourably in so doing?'

He agreed.

'And is not acceptance of an honourable offer itself honourable? Can there be a juster way of accepting money than from an offer justly made?' **[584D]** 'No, there can't,' he said. 'And therefore, Epaminondas,' said the other, 'if one of two friends has an obligation to give, the other has an obligation to receive. In battles, one has to avoid the enemy's good shots; but in doing favours, it is wrong to avoid or reject a friend who makes an honourable offer. If poverty is nothing disagreeable, neither is wealth to be undervalued or rejected.'

'No,' said Epaminondas, 'but there are people for whom an honourable offer is more valuable and more honourable if they do not accept it. Look at it like this, as we do. There are many desires, and many objects of desire. Some desires are said to be innate, and develop in the body with reference to necessary pleasures. **[584E]** Others are adventitious; these, arising out of[142] empty fancies, but acquiring strength and force in time and by habit through bad upbringing, frequently drag down and depress the soul more effectively than the necessary desires. By habit and practice, men have been able to let reason draw off a good deal even of the innate passion; but it is on the intrusive, unnecessary desires, my friend, that we need to deploy the full force of exercise, and work to eradicate them by restraints and inhibitions, as they are brought under control by reason. If **[584F]** the resistance of reason to food and drink can force out thirst and hunger, it is

λοδοξίαν ἀποχαῖς ὧν ἐφίενται καὶ ἀνείρξεσιν εἰς τέλος καταλυθείσας· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;'

ὡμολόγησεν ὁ ξένος.

'ἆρ' οὖν' ἔφη 'διαφορὰν ὁρᾷς ἀσκήσεως καὶ τοῦ πρὸς ὃ ἡ ἄσκησις ἔργου, καὶ καθάπερ ἀθλητικῆς ἔργον μὲν ἂν εἴποις τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφάνου πρὸς τὸν ἀντίπαλον ἅμιλλαν, ἄσκησιν δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦτο διὰ τῶν γυμνασίων παρασκευὴν τοῦ σώματος, οὕτω καὶ ἀρετῆς ὁμολογεῖς τὸ μὲν ἔργον εἶναι τὸ δ' ἄσκησιν;'

ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ τοῦ ξένου 'φέρε τοίνυν πρῶτον' εἶπε 'τῆς ἐγκρα-
585A τείας τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ παρανόμων ἡδονῶν ἀπέχεσθαι πότερον ἄσκησιν | ἢ μᾶλλον ἔργον καὶ ἀπόδειξιν ἀσκήσεως εἶναι νομίζεις;'

'ἔργον' εἶπεν 'ἐγὼ καὶ ἀπόδειξιν.'

'ἄσκησιν δὲ καὶ μελέτην μετὰ ἐγκρατείας οὐχ ἥνπερ ἔτι νῦν ἐπιδείκνυσθε πάντες ὑμεῖς, ὅταν γυμναζόμενοι καὶ κινήσαντες ὥσπερ ζῷα τὰς ὀρέξεις ἐπιστῆτε λαμπραῖς τραπέζαις καὶ ποικίλοις ἐδέσμασι πολὺν χρόνον, εἶτα ταῦτα τοῖς οἰκέταις ὑμῶν εὐωχεῖσθαι παραδόντες αὐτοὶ τὰ λιτὰ καὶ ἁπλᾶ προσφέρησθε κεκολασμέναις ἤδη ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις; ἡ γὰρ ἐν οἷς ἔξεστιν ἀποχὴ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄσκησίς ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς ἃ κεκώλυται.'

'πάνυ μὲν οὖν' εἶπεν.

585B 'ἔστιν οὖν τις, ὦ φίλε, καὶ δικαιοσύνης πρὸς φιλοπλουτίαν καὶ φιλαργυρίαν ἄσκησις, οὐ τὸ μὴ κλέπτειν ἐπιόντα νύκτωρ τὰ τῶν πέλας μηδὲ λωποδυτεῖν, οὐδ' εἰ μὴ προδίδωσί τις πατρίδα καὶ φίλους δι' ἀργύριον, οὗτος ἀσκεῖ πρὸς φιλαργυρίαν (καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος ἴσως ἐνταῦθα καὶ ὁ φόβος ἀπείργει τὴν πλεονεξίαν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν), ἀλλ' ὁ τῶν δικαίων καὶ συγκεχωρημένων ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου κερδῶν πολλάκις ἀφιστὰς ἑαυτὸν ἑκουσίως ἀσκεῖ καὶ προσεθίζεται μακρὰν εἶναι παντὸς ἀδίκου καὶ παρανόμου λήμματος. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἡδοναῖς μεγάλαις μὲν ἀτόποις δὲ
585C καὶ βλαβεραῖς οἷόν τε τὴν διάνοιαν ἠρεμεῖν μὴ πολλάκις ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀπολαύειν καταφρονήσασαν, οὔτε λήμματα μοχθηρὰ καὶ πλεονεξίας μεγάλας εἰς ἐφικτὸν ἡκούσας ὑπερβῆναι ῥᾴδιον ὥτινι μὴ πόρρωθεν ἐνδέδωκε καὶ κεκόλασται τὸ φιλοκερδές, ἀλλ' ⟨ἐν⟩ οἷς ἔξεστιν ἀνέδην εἰς τὸ κερδαίνειν ἀνατεθραμμένον ὁ γὰρ σπαργᾷ περὶ τῆς ἀδικίας μάλα μόλις καὶ χαλεπῶς τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπεχόμενον. ἀνδρὶ δὲ μὴ φίλων προϊεμένῳ χάρισι μὴ βασιλέων δωρεαῖς αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τύχης κλῆρον ἀπειπαμένῳ καὶ θησαυροῦ φανέντος ἐπιπηδῶσαν ἀποστήσαντι τὴν φιλοπλουτίαν οὐκ ἐπανίσταται πρὸς τὰς ἀδικίας οὐδὲ θορυβεῖ
585D τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀλλ' εὐκόλως χρῆται πρὸς τὸ καλὸν αὑτῷ μέγα φρονῶν καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα τῇ ψυχῇ συνειδώς. τούτων ἐγὼ καὶ Καφισίας ἐρασταὶ τῶν ἀγώνων ὄντες, ὦ φίλε Σιμμία, παραιτούμεθα τὸν ξένον ἐᾶν ἡμᾶς ἱκανῶς ἐγγυμνάσασθαι τῇ πενίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκείνην.'

surely far easier to curtail and ultimately to eliminate love of wealth and love of reputation by denying them their objects and keeping them under restraint. Don't you think so?'

The stranger agreed.

'Then do you see the difference between exercise and the activity towards which the exercise is directed? You might say that, in athletics, the contest against the opponent for the crown is the work, and the preparation of the body for this in the gymnasia is the exercise. Do you now agree that in virtue too there is both work and exercise?'

The stranger agreed again. 'Well then,' said Epaminondas,[143] 'first of all, do you think that abstinence from base and unlawful pleasures is an exercise of continence **[585A]** or rather a work and demonstration of it?'[144]

'A work and demonstration,' he said.

'And is it not exercise and practice of continence that you Pythagoreans still display[145] when, by way of exercise, you excite your desire,[146] like animals, and stand a long time in front of splendidly set tables and a great variety of food, only to pass it all over to your servants to feast on, offering your own now chastened appetites only plain and simple fare? Abstinence from permitted pleasures is training for the soul to resist the forbidden.'

'Yes, indeed,' he said.

'Then, my friend,' he said, **[585B]** 'there is training also for justice[147] to prevent greed and avarice: and it's not just abstaining from going out in the night to rob or mug your neighbours. Nor if a man just abstains from betraying friends or country for money is he training to avoid avarice; in his case, it's probably the law and fear which restrain his greed from committing a crime. It is the man who voluntarily and habitually distances himself from perfectly proper and legally permitted profits who is training and accustoming himself to keep a long way away from any unjust or illegal gain. It is impossible to keep the mind at rest in the presence of intense but abnormal and harmful pleasures, unless it has repeatedly **[585C]** scorned enjoyments which were open to it. Nor is it easy to rise above dishonest profits and great material advantages that come within reach, if one's love of gain has not yielded[148] and been chastened long before, but has rather been bred to take any permissible profit without restraint, swells to bursting, and is only with great difficulty kept back from seizing any chance of gain. If a man has not surrendered to friends' favours or kings' gifts, but has even declined a lucky windfall, and checked his love of riches when it pounced on a treasure just come to light, his greedy impulse does not rise up to commit crimes or throw his mind into confusion. **[585D]** Proud and with his conscience clear, he deploys himself contentedly for honourable ends. Caphisias and I, my dear Simmias, are enamoured of these battles,[149]

16. Ταῦτα τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ διελθόντος ὁ Σιμμίας ὅσον δὶς ἢ τρὶς ἐπινεύσας τῇ κεφαλῇ ‘μέγας’ ἔφη ‘μέγας ἀνήρ ἐστιν Ἐπαμεινώνδας, τούτου δ’ αἴτιος οὑτοσὶ Πολύμνις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὴν ἀρίστην τροφὴν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τοῖς παισὶ παρασκευασάμενος. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων αὐτοὶ διαλύεσθε
585E πρὸς αὑτούς, ὦ ξένε· τὸν δὲ Λῦσιν ἡμῖν, εἰ θέμις ἀκοῦσαι, πότερον ἄρα κινεῖς ἐκ τοῦ τάφου καὶ μετοικίζεις εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἢ καταμένειν ἐνταῦθα παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐάσεις εὐμενέσι καὶ φίλοις, ὅταν ἐκεῖ γενώμεθα, συνοίκοις χρησόμενον;’

καὶ ὁ Θεάνωρ ἐπιμειδιάσας ‘ἔοικεν’ ἔφη ‘Λῦσις, ὦ Σιμμία, φιλοχωρεῖν οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν ἐνδεὴς γεγονὼς δι’ Ἐπαμεινώνδαν. ἔστι γάρ τι γιγνόμενον ἰδίᾳ περὶ τὰς ταφὰς τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν ὅσιον, οὗ μὴ τυχόντες οὐ δοκοῦμεν ἀπέχειν τὸ μακαριστὸν καὶ οἰκεῖον τέλος. ὡς οὖν ἔγνωμεν ἐκ τῶν ὀνείρων τὴν Λύσιδος τελευτήν (διαγιγνώσκομεν δὲ σημείῳ τινὶ φαινομένῳ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους, εἴτε τεθνηκότος εἴτε ζῶντος εἴδωλόν ἐστιν), ἔννοια πολλοῖς ἐπεισῆλθεν, ὡς ἐπὶ ξένης ὁ Λῦσις ἄλλως
585F κεκήδευται καὶ κινητέος ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ὅπως ἐκεῖ μεταλάχῃ τῶν νομιζομένων. τοιαύτῃ δὲ διανοίᾳ παραγενόμενος καὶ πρὸς τὸν τάφον εὐθὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγχωρίων ὁδηγηθεὶς ἑσπέρας ἤδη χοὰς ἐχεόμην ἀνακαλούμενος τὴν Λύσιδος ψυχὴν κατελθεῖν ἀποθεσπίσουσαν ὡς χρὴ ταῦτα πράσσειν. προϊούσης δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς εἶδον μὲν οὐδέν, ἀκοῦσαι δὲ φωνῆς ἔδοξα τὰ ἀκίνητα μὴ κινεῖν· ὁσίως γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων κεκηδεῦσθαι τὸ Λύσιδος σῶμα, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἤδη κεκριμένην ἀφεῖσθαι πρὸς ἄλλην γένεσιν
586A ἄλλῳ δαίμονι συλλαχοῦσαν. καὶ μέντοι καὶ συμβαλὼν ἔωθεν Ἐπαμεινώνδᾳ | καὶ τὸν τρόπον ἀκούσας ᾧ θάψειε Λῦσιν ἐπέγνων ὅτι καλῶς ἄχρι τῶν ἀπορρήτων πεπαιδευμένος ὑπ’ ἐκείνου τἀνδρὸς εἴη καὶ χρῷτο ταὐτῷ δαίμονι πρὸς τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ κακὸς ἐγὼ τεκμήρασθαι τῷ πλῷ τὸν κυβερνήτην. Μυρίαι μὲν γὰρ ἀτραποὶ βίων, ὀλίγαι δ’ ἃς δαίμονες ἀνθρώπους ἄγουσιν.’ ὁ μὲν οὖν Θεάνωρ ταῦτ’ εἰπὼν τῷ Ἐπαμεινώνδᾳ προσέβλεψεν, οἷον ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἀναθεώμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν τὸ εἶδος.

17. Ἐν τούτῳ δ’ ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς προσελθὼν περιέλυσε τοῦ Σιμμίου τὸν
586B ἐπίδεσμον ὡς θεραπεύσων τὸ σῶμα, Φυλλίδας δ’ ἐπεισελθὼν μεθ’ Ἱπποσθενείδου καὶ κελεύσας ἐμὲ καὶ Χάρωνα καὶ Θεόκριτον ἐξαναστῆναι προσῆγεν εἴς τινα γωνίαν τοῦ περιστύλου, σφόδρα τεταραγμένος ὡς διεφαίνετο τῷ προσώπῳ. κἀμοῦ ‘μή τι καινότερον, ὦ Φυλλίδα, προσπέπτωκεν;’ εἰπόντος ‘ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐδέν’ ἔφη ‘καινόν, ὦ Καφισία· καὶ γὰρ προῄδειν καὶ προύλεγον ὑμῖν τὴν Ἱπποσθενείδου μαλακίαν δεόμενος μὴ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι μηδὲ παραλαμβάνειν εἰς τὴν πρᾶξιν.’

ἐκπλαγέντων δὲ τὸν λόγον ἡμῶν ὁ Ἱπποσθενείδας ‘μὴ λέγε πρὸς θεῶν,’ ἔφη ‘Φυλλίδα, ταῦτα μηδὲ τὴν προπέτειαν εὐτολμίαν οἰόμενος ἀνατρέψῃς καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ’ ἔασον ἀσφαλῶς, εἴπερ εἵμαρ-

and we are asking our guest to let us train ourselves properly by poverty to acquire this virtue.'

16. When my brother had finished, Simmias nodded some two or three times.[150] 'A great man,' he said, 'a great man is Epaminondas, and Polymnis here is responsible, because he has given his children the best upbringing in philosophy right from the start. But you must settle this issue between yourselves, sir.[151] **[585E]** As to Lysis: if we are allowed to hear, are you moving him from his grave and settling him in Italy, or will you let him stay here with us, so that he can have our company, as friends and wellwishers, when we pass to the other side?'[152]

'Simmias,' said Theanor, smiling at him, 'Lysis, I fancy, is at home where he is, and, thanks to Epaminondas, he lacks no honour. There is a private observance at Pythagoreans' burials, and if we do not receive it we think we do not have our proper, blessed end. When we learned from dreams of Lysis' end (we can tell from a certain sign in dreams **[585F]** whether the vision is of a dead or a living person),[153] many formed the notion that Lysis had been buried in a foreign land without our rites, and ought to be moved so as to have his due portion in the other world.[154] It was with this in mind that I came here, and was at once guided to the tomb by the local people. It was evening: I poured a libation, and summoned Lysis' soul to return and reveal how I should go about this. In the course of the night, I saw nothing, but I seemed to hear a voice bidding me 'not move the unmoveable'.[155] Lysis' body (the voice declared) had been buried with due rites by his friends, and his soul had already been judged and released to another birth, allotted now to another *daimon*.[156] In the morning, when I met Epaminondas **[586A]** and heard how he had buried Lysis, I realized that he had been well instructed by the man himself, even in the secrets, and had the same *daimon* to guide him in life, if I am any good at guessing the pilot by the course he sets. Paths of lives are innumerable, but there are only a few by which *daimones* guide humans.' Having said this, Theanor looked hard at Epaminondas, as though studying his characteristics[157] afresh.

17. Meanwhile the doctor had come and loosened Simmias' bandage, prior to making him comfortable. Phyllidas **[586B]** had also come in, with Hipposthenidas.[158] He asked me, Charon, and Theocritus to get up, and led us into a corner of the colonnade. His face showed that he was deeply disturbed, and when I asked 'Has anything new happened, Phyllidas?' he replied: 'Nothing that was new to me, Caphisias. I foresaw Hipposthenidas' weakness, and I told you, and begged you not to share our plans with him or involve him in them.'

We were aghast at this. 'For heaven's sake, Phyllidas,' said Hipposthenidas, 'don't talk like that. Don't mistake rashness for courage, and ruin us and the city. Let the men come home safely, if they are fated to do so.'

586C ται, κατελθεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας'. καὶ ὁ Φυλλίδας παροξυνόμενος 'εἰπέ μοι,' φησίν 'ὦ Ἱπποσθενείδα, πόσους οἴει μετέχειν τῶν ἀπορρήτων εἰς τὴν πρᾶξιν ἡμῖν;'

'ἐγὼ μέν' εἶπεν 'οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἢ τριάκοντα γιγνώσκω.'

'τί οὖν' ἔφη 'τοσούτων τὸ πλῆθος ὄντων τὰ πᾶσι δόξαντα μόνος ἀνήρηκας καὶ διακεκώλυκας ἐκπέμψας ἱππέα πρὸς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἤδη καθ' ὁδὸν ὄντας, ἀναστρέφειν κελεύσας καὶ μὴ κατατεῖναι σήμερον, ὅτε τῶν

πρὸς τὴν κάθοδον αὐτοῖς τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον συμπαρεσκεύασεν;'

586D εἰπόντος δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ Φυλλίδου πάντες μὲν διεταράχθημεν, ὁ δὲ Χάρων τῷ Ἱπποσθενείδᾳ πάνυ σκληρῶς τὴν ὄψιν ἐνερείσας 'ὦ μοχθηρέ' εἶπεν 'ἄνθρωπε, τί δέδρακας ἡμᾶς;' 'οὐδέν' ἔφη 'δεινόν' ὁ Ἱπποσθενείδας, 'ἐὰν ἀνεὶς τὴν τραχύτητα τῆς φωνῆς ἀνδρὸς ἡλικιώτου καὶ πολιὰς παραπλησίως ἔχοντος λογισμῶν μετάσχῃς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εὐψυχίαν φιλοκίνδυνον ἀποδείξασθαι τοῖς πολίταις καὶ θυμὸν ὀλιγωροῦντα τοῦ βίου προῃρήμεθα, Φυλλίδα, πολὺ τὸ τῆς ἡμέρας μῆκος ἔτι, καὶ τὴν ἑσπέραν μὴ περιμένωμεν ἀλλ' ἤδη βαδίζωμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς τυράννους τὰ ξίφη λαβόντες· ἀποκτιννύωμεν, ἀποθνήσκωμεν, ἀφειδῶμεν ἑαυτῶν. εἰ δὲ
586E ταῦτα μὲν οὔτε δρᾶσαι χαλεπὸν οὔτε παθεῖν, ἐξελέσθαι δὲ τὰς Θήβας ὅπλων τοσούτων πολεμίων περιεχόντων καὶ τὴν Σπαρτιατῶν φρουρὰν ἀπώσασθαι δυσὶ νεκροῖς ἢ τρισὶν οὐ ῥᾴδιον (οὐδὲ γὰρ τοσοῦτον εἰς τὰ συμπόσια καὶ τὰς ὑποδοχὰς παρεσκεύακε Φυλλίδας ἄκρατον, ὥστε τοὺς χιλίους καὶ πεντακοσίους Ἀρχία μεθυσθῆναι δορυφόρους· ἀλλὰ κἂν ἐκεῖνον ἀνέλωμεν, ἐφεδρεύει τῇ νυκτὶ νήφων Ἠριππίδας καὶ Ἄρκεσος), τί σπεύδομεν κατάγειν φίλους καὶ οἰκείους ἄνδρας ἐπὶ προῦπτον ὄλεθρον καὶ τοῦτο μηδ' ἀγνοούντων τῶν ἐχθρῶν παντάπασι τὴν κάθοδον; διὰ τί γὰρ Θεσπιεῦσι μὲν παρήγγελται τρίτην ἡμέραν ταύτην ἐν
586F τοῖς ὅπλοις εἶναι καὶ προσέχειν, ὅταν οἱ Σπαρτιατῶν ἡγεμόνες καλῶσιν; Ἀμφίθεον δὲ σήμερον, ὡς πυνθάνομαι, μέλλουσιν ἀνακρίναντες, ὅταν Ἀρχίας ἐπανέλθῃ, διαφθερεῖν. οὐ μεγάλα ταῦτα σημεῖα τοῦ μὴ λανθάνειν τὴν πρᾶξιν; οὐ κράτιστον ἐπισχεῖν χρόνον οὐχὶ πολὺν ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐξοσιώσασθαι τὰ θεῖα; καὶ γὰρ οἱ μάντεις τῇ Δήμητρι τὸν βοῦν θύοντες πολὺν θόρυβον καὶ κίνδυνον λέγουσι δημόσιον ἀποσημαίνειν τὰ ἔμπυρα. καὶ τὸ σοὶ πλείστης δεόμενον, ὦ Χάρων, εὐλαβείας, ἐχθὲς ἐξ ἀγροῦ μοι συνοδεύων Ὑπατόδωρος ὁ Ἐριάνθους, χρηστὸς μὲν ἄλλως
587A καὶ οἰκεῖος ἀνὴρ οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν πρασσομένων συνειδώς, | „ἔστι σοι," φησίν „ὦ Ἱπποσθενείδα, Χάρων ἑταῖρος ἐμοὶ δ' οὐ πάνυ συνήθης· ἐὰν οὖν δοκῇ σοι, φράσον αὐτῷ φυλάττεσθαί τινα κίνδυνον ἐξ ἐνυπνίου μάλα δυσχεροῦς καὶ ἀτόπου. τῆς γὰρ ἄλλης νυκτὸς ᾤμην αὐτοῦ τὴν οἰκίαν ὠδίνειν ὥσπερ κύουσαν, αὐτὸν δὲ καὶ τοὺς φίλους συναγωνιῶντας εὔχεσθαι καὶ κύκλῳ παρεῖναι, τὴν δὲ μυκᾶσθαι καὶ ἀφιέναι φωνάς τινας

[586C] Phyllidas was annoyed. 'Tell me, Hipposthenidas,' he said, 'how many people do you suppose share the secrets of our plan?'

'I know at least thirty,' he said.

'Then why, when there are so many of us, have you alone upset and frustrated what was unanimously agreed, by sending a rider to the men when they were already on their way, telling them to turn back and not press on today – when chance too has provided most of the condition for their return?'

Phyllidas' speech threw us all into confusion. **[586D]** Charon stared hard and fiercely at Hipposthenidas. 'Wretch,' he said, 'what have you done to us?' 'Nothing very dreadful,' said Hipposthenidas, 'if only you will soften your tone of voice, and share the thinking of a man of your own age, who has just as many grey hairs as you. If we are determined, Phyllidas, to demonstrate to our fellow-citizens our courage, our readiness to take risks, and a spirit that recks little of life, there's much of the day left, let's not wait till evening, but pick up our swords and go for the tyrants; let's kill and die and not spare ourselves. But while there's no difficulty in killing and dying, it's not easy **[586E]** to rescue Thebes with the hostile army all around, or to drive out the Spartan garrison at the cost of two or three dead. I don't suppose Phyllidas has provided enough wine for the party and the entertainment to make Archias' fifteen hundred guards all drunk! Anyway, if we kill him, Herippidas and Arcesus[159] are on night guard, and sober. So why are we in a hurry to bring our friends and kinsmen home to certain death, when even the enemy knows something about their return? Why were the Thespians[160] ordered **[586F]** to be in arms two days ago, and hold themselves ready for orders from the Spartan commanders?[161] And I hear they intend to question Amphitheus[162] today, and put him to death when Archias comes back. Are not these strong signs that our plan is discovered? Would it not be best to wait a while – not long, but enough to propitiate heaven? The seers, sacrificing the ox to Demeter,[163] say that the burnt offerings indicate great trouble and public danger. And there's something that needs particular care on your part, Charon: on my way back from the country yesterday, I had the company of Hypatodorus, the son of Erianthes,[164] a good man, and a connection of mine, but knowing nothing of what is being planned. **[587A]** He said to me, "Charon is a friend of yours, Hipposthenidas, but I am not at all familiar with him; please tell him (if you think it right) to beware of a danger threatened by a very unpleasant and strange dream. Last night, I dreamed that his house was groaning as if in labour, and he and his friends were standing round and praying, in great anxiety for it; the house groaned and uttered inartic-

ἀνάρθρους, τέλος δὲ πῦρ λάμψαι πολὺ καὶ δεινὸν ἐξ αὐτῆς ἔνδοθεν, ὡς
587B τὰ πλεῖστα τῆς πόλεως φλέγεσθαι τὴν δὲ Καδμείαν καπνῷ μόνῳ περιέχεσθαι τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἄνω μὴ ἐπιπολάζειν.“ ἡ μὲν οὖν ὄψις, ὦ Χάρων, ἣν ὁ ἄνθρωπος διεξῆλθε, τοιαύτη τις ἦν· ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ παραχρῆμα κατέδεισα καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀκούσας σήμερον ὡς εἰς τὴν σὴν οἰκίαν οἱ φυγάδες καταίρειν μέλλουσιν, ἀγωνιῶ, μὴ μεγάλων κακῶν ἐμπλήσωμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν ἀξιόλογον τοὺς πολεμίους δράσαντες ἀλλ’ ὅσον διαταράξαντες. τὴν γὰρ πόλιν πρὸς ἡμῶν τίθεμαι, τὴν δὲ Καδμείαν ὥσπερ ἐστὶ πρὸς ἐκείνων.’

18. ὑπολαβὼν δ’ ὁ Θεόκριτος καὶ κατασχὼν τὸν Χάρωνα βουλόμενον εἰπεῖν τι πρὸς τὸν Ἱπποσθενείδαν ‘ἀλλ’ ἔμοιγ’’ εἶπεν ‘ἀπ’ οὐδενὸς οὕ-
587C τως οὐδέποτε θαρρῆσαι πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὦ Ἱπποσθενείδα, παρέστη, καίπερ ἱεροῖς ἀεὶ χρησαμένῳ καλοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν φυγάδων, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως ταύτης· εἴ γε φῶς μὲν πολὺ καὶ λαμπρὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει λέγεις ἐξ οἰκίας φίλης ἀνασχεῖν, καπνῷ δὲ συμμελανθῆναι τὸ τῶν πολεμίων οἰκητήριον οὐδὲν οὐδέποτε δακρύων καὶ ταραχῆς φέροντι κρεῖττον, ἀσήμους δὲ φωνὰς ἐκφέρεσθαι παρ’ ἡμῶν, ὥστε κἂν εἰ τις ἐπιχειρῇ κατηγορεῖν, περιφώνησιν ἀσαφῆ καὶ τυφλὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἡ πρᾶξις λαβοῦσα μόνον ἅμα καὶ φανήσεται καὶ κρατήσει. δυσιερεῖν δέ γε θύοντας εἰκός· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ ἱερεῖον οὐ δημόσιον ἀλλὰ τῶν κρατούντων ἐστίν.’

587D ἔτι δὲ τοῦ Θεοκρίτου λέγοντος λέγω πρὸς τὸν Ἱπποσθενείδαν ‘τίνα πρὸς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξαπέστειλας; εἰ γὰρ οὐ πολὺ προείληφε, διωξόμεθα.’

καὶ ὁ Ἱπποσθενείδας ‘οὐκ οἶδ’,’ εἶπεν ‘ὦ Καφισία (δεῖ γὰρ ὑμῖν τἀληθῆ λέγειν), εἰ καταλάβοις ἂν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἵππῳ χρώμενον τῶν ἐν Θήβαις κρατίστῳ· γνώριμος δ’ ὑμῖν ὁ ἄνθρωπός, ἐστι τῶν Μέλωνος ἁρματηλατῶν ἐπιστάτης καὶ διὰ Μέλωνα τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς συνειδώς.’

κἀγὼ κατιδὼν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ‘ἆρ’ οὐ Χλίδωνα λέγεις,’ εἶπον ‘ὦ Ἱπποσθενείδα, τὸν κέλητι τὰ Ἡρά⟨κλε⟩ια νικῶντα πέρυσιν;’

‘ἐκεῖνον μὲν οὖν αὐτόν’ ἔφησε.

‘καὶ τίς οὗτος’ ἔφην ‘ἐστὶν ὁ πρὸς ταῖς αὐλείοις θύραις ἐφεστὼς πάλαι καὶ προσβλέπων ἡμῖν;’

587E ἐπιστρέψας οὖν ὁ Ἱπποσθενείδας ‘Χλίδων’ ἔφη ‘νὴ τὸν Ἡρακλέα· φεῦ, μή τι χαλεπώτερον συμβέβηκε;’

κἀκεῖνος, ὡς εἶδεν ἡμᾶς προσέχοντας αὐτῷ, ἀπὸ τῆς θύρας ἡσυχῇ προσῆγε. τοῦ δ’ Ἱπποσθενείδου νεύσαντος αὐτῷ καὶ λέγειν κελεύσαντος εἰς ἅπαντας .... ‘οἶδ’’ ἔφη ‘τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀκριβῶς, Ἱπποσθενείδα, καί σε μήτε κατ’ οἶκον εὑρὼν μήτ’ ἐπ’ ἀγορᾶς δεῦρο πρὸς τούτους ἐτε-
587F κμαιρόμην ἥκειν καὶ συνέτεινον εὐθύς, ἵνα μηδὲν ἀγνοῆτε τῶν γεγονότων. ὡς γὰρ ἐκέλευσας τάχει παντὶ χρησάμενον ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄρους ἀπαντῆσαι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, εἰσῆλθον οἴκαδε ληψόμενος τὸν ἵππον, αἰτοῦντι

ulate cries, and ultimately a terrible great fire blazed up from within it, so that most of the city caught fire, though the Cadmea was only enveloped in smoke, **[587B]** the fire not rising so high." That was the vision, Charon, that my companion told me. I was alarmed at the time, but hearing today that the exiles are due to lodge in your house, I am all the more anxious that we may bring disaster on ourselves without doing our enemies any worthwhile harm, beyond causing them some confusion. For I interpret the city as our side, and the Cadmea as theirs, as indeed it is.'

18. Charon was about to say something in reply to Hipposthenidas, but Theocritus interrupted and stopped him. 'For my part,' he said, 'though I have always had **[587C]** favourable omens from sacrifices on behalf of the exiles, Hipposthenidas, I have never encountered anything so heartening for our plans as this vision. You tell me that a great bright light went up from a friendly house in the city, while the enemies' base was darkened by smoke, which never produces anything better than tears and confusion. Then, the sounds from our side were inarticulate; and so, even if there is an attempt to denounce us, our affair will only produce a vague reverberation and a dim suspicion, and will be revealed only in the moment of victory. As for the bad omens at the sacrifice, they are only to be expected, for the office and the victim belong to those in power, not to the people.'

While Theocritus was still speaking, I said to Hipposthenidas, 'Whom did you **[587D]** send to the men? If he hasn't a big start,[165] we will try to catch him up.'

'To tell you the truth, Caphisias,' said Hipposthenidas, 'as I must, I don't know if you could catch him up, for he is riding the best horse in Thebes. You all know the man – he's the head man of Melon's[166] charioteers, and because of Melon he has been conscious of the plan from the beginning.'

Then I caught sight of the man. 'Don't you mean Chlidon,[167] Hipposthenidas,' I said, 'last year's horse-race winner at the Heraclea?[168]

'That's the man,' he said.

'And who's this,' I said, 'who has been standing at the street door looking at us for quite a time?'

[587E] 'By Heracles,' he said, turning round, 'it's Chlidon. Oh, I wonder if something worse has happened.'

As soon as Chlidon saw that we noticed him, he stepped quietly forward from the door. Hipposthenidas signed to him and told him to speak before us all… [169] 'I know these men perfectly well, Hipposthenidas,' he said, 'and when I couldn't find you at home or in the agora, I guessed that you had joined them here. **[587F]** I lost no time in hurrying here, so that you should all know everything that has happened. When you ordered me to make all speed and rendezvous with the men on the mountain, I

δέ μοι τὸν χαλινὸν οὐκ εἶχεν ἡ γυνὴ δοῦναι, ἀλλὰ διέτριβεν ἐν τῷ ταμιείῳ πολὺν χρόνον· ὡς δὲ ζητοῦσα καὶ σκευωρουμένη τὰ ἔνδον, ἱκανῶς ἀπολαύσασά μου τέλος ὡμολόγησε κεχρηκέναι τῷ γείτονι τὸν χαλινὸν ἐσπέρας αἰτησαμένης αὐτοῦ τῆς γυναικός. ἀγανακτοῦντος δ' ἐμοῦ καὶ κακῶς αὐτὴν λέγοντος τρέπεται πρὸς δυσφημίας ἀποτροπαίους ἐπα-
588A ρωμένη κακὰς ⟨μὲν⟩ ὁδοὺς κακὰς δ' ἐπανόδους· | ἃ νὴ Δία πάντα τρέψειαν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐκείνην οἱ θεοί. τέλος δὲ μέχρι πληγῶν προαχθεὶς ὑπ' ὀργῆς, εἶτ' ὄχλου γειτόνων καὶ γυναικῶν συνδραμόντος αἴσχιστα ποιήσας καὶ παθὼν μόλις ἀφῖγμαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὅπως ἄλλον ἐκπέμπητε πρὸς τοὺς ἄνδρας, ὡς ἐμοῦ παντάπασιν ἐκστατικῶς ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ κακῶς ἔχοντος.'

19. ἡμᾶς δέ τις ἔσχεν ἄτοπος μεταβολὴ τοῦ πάθους. μικρὸν γὰρ ἔμπροσθεν τῷ κεκωλῦσθαι δυσχεραίνοντες πάλιν διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα τοῦ καιροῦ καὶ τὸ τάχος, ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀναβολῆς, εἰς ἀγωνίαν ὑπηγόμεθα
588B καὶ φόβον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐγὼ προσαγορεύσας τὸν Ἱπποσθενείδαν καὶ δεξιωσάμενος ἐθάρρυνον, ὡς καὶ τῶν θεῶν παρακαλούντων ἐπὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου Φυλλίδας μὲν ᾤχετο τῆς ὑποδοχῆς ἐπιμελησόμενος καὶ τὸν Ἀρχίαν εὐθὺς ἐνσείσων εἰς τὸν πότον, Χάρων δὲ τῆς οἰκίας ...., ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ Θεόκριτος πάλιν πρὸς τὸν Σιμμίαν ἐπανήλθομεν, ὅπως τῷ Ἐπαμεινώνδᾳ καιρὸν λαβόντες ἐντύχοιμεν.

20. οἱ δ' ἦσαν ἤδη πρόσω ζητήσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς ἀλλ' ἧς ὀλίγον ἔμπρο-
588C σθεν οἱ περὶ Γαλαξίδωρον καὶ Φειδόλαον ἥψαντο, διαποροῦντες τίνος οὐσίας καὶ δυνάμεως εἴη τὸ Σωκράτους λεγόμενον δαιμόνιον. ἃ μὲν οὖν πρὸς τὸν Γαλαξιδώρου λόγον ἀντεῖπεν ὁ Σιμμίας οὐκ ἠκούσαμεν· αὐτὸς δὲ Σωκράτη μὲν ἔφη περὶ τούτων ἐρόμενός ποτε μὴ τυχεῖν ἀποκρίσεως, διὸ μηδ' αὖθις ἐρέσθαι, πολλάκις δ' αὐτῷ παραγενέσθαι τοὺς μὲν δι' ὄψεως ἐντυχεῖν θείῳ τινὶ λέγοντας ἀλαζόνας ἡγουμένῳ, τοῖς δ' ἀκοῦσαί τινος φωνῆς φάσκουσι προσέχοντι τὸν νοῦν καὶ διαπυνθανομένῳ μετὰ σπουδῆς. 'ὅθεν ἡμῖν παρίστατο σκοπουμένοις ἰδίᾳ πρὸς ἀλ-
588D λήλους ὑπονοεῖν μήποτε τὸ Σωκράτους δαιμόνιον οὐκ ὄψις ἀλλὰ φωνῆς τινος αἴσθησις ἢ λόγου νόησις εἴη συνάπτοντος ἀτόπῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ πρὸς αὐτόν, ὥσπερ καὶ καθ' ὕπνον οὐκ ἔστι φωνή, λόγων δέ τινων δόξας καὶ νοήσεις λαμβάνοντες οἴονται φθεγγομένων ἀκούειν. ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄναρ ἡ τοιαύτη σύνεσις γίγνεται δι' ἡσυχίαν καὶ γαλήνην τοῦ σώματος, ὅταν καθεύδωσι ⟨μᾶλλον ἀκούουσιν, ὕπαρ δὲ⟩ μόλις ἐπήκοον ἔχουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν κρειττόνων καὶ πεπνιγμένοι γε θορύβῳ τῶν παθῶν καὶ περιαγωγῇ τῶν χρειῶν εἰσακοῦσαι καὶ παρασχεῖν τὴν διάνοιαν οὐ δύνανται τοῖς δηλουμένοις.

went home to fetch the horse. But when I asked for the bridle, my wife couldn't give it me. She stayed a long time in the storehouse; and when[170] she had fooled me long enough, pretending to search for it and check the contents of the store, she finally confessed that she had lend the bridle to our neighbour the evening before, at his wife's request. I was angry, and said some bad things about her; she resorted to cursing me quite abominably, wishing me a bad journey and a bad return. **[588A]** May the gods visit as much on her! In the end, I was provoked to strike her in anger, and a crowd of neighbours and their wives gathered around us. What I did then, and what I suffered, was an absolute disgrace, and I've only just managed to get to you, so that you can send someone else out to the men, because I'm quite beside myself for the moment, and in a very bad way.'

19. We now experienced an extraordinary change of feeling. A little before, we had felt frustrated by the obstacles; now the urgency of the situation and the speed of events brought us once again to an agony of fear. There was no putting things off. **[588B]** I spoke to Hipposthenidas and clasped him by the hand to give him heart; the gods too (I said) were urging us to act. Phyllidas then departed, to see to the reception of his guests, and to contrive to get Archias drinking at once. Charon <went to see to> his house…[171] Theocritus and I returned to Simmias, to find some opportunity to talk to Epaminondas.

20. They were now deep into a grand subject, the one on which Galaxidorus and Phidolaus had lately touched: they were discussing the essence and power **[588C]** of what was called Socrates' *daimonion*. We did not hear Simmias' reply to Galaxidorus. He said however that he had himself once asked Socrates about the matter, but not had an answer, and therefore had not asked again. But he had often (he said) been present when Socrates dismissed as impostors people who said they had encountered some divine being in a vision, but paid careful attention and made eager inquiry of any who claimed to have heard a voice: 'So when we discussed it privately among ourselves, we came to suspect that Socrates' *daimonion* was not a vision, but the perception of a voice **[588D]** or the apprehension of a thought which made contact with him in some extraordinary way, just as in sleep there is no voice, but people get impressions or apprehensions of words and think they hear people speaking. For some however, such understanding actually occurs in dreams, <since they have better perception>[172] when they are asleep, because of the quiet and calm of the body, <whereas when awake> they have difficulty in subjecting their mind to the higher power, and, stifled as they are by the tumult of emotions and the distraction of wants, are incapable of listening or addressing their minds to the things shown to them.

Σωκράτει δ' ὁ νοῦς καθαρὸς ὢν καὶ ἀπαθής, τῷ σώματι μη⟨δαμῶς
588E εἰ μὴ⟩ μικρὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν καταμιγνὺς αὑτόν, εὐαφὴς ἦν καὶ λεπτὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ προσπεσόντος ὀξέως μεταβαλεῖν· τὸ δὲ προσπῖπτον οὐ φθόγγον ἀλλὰ λόγον ἄν τις εἰκάσειε δαίμονος ἄνευ φωνῆς ἐφαπτόμενον αὐτῷ τῷ δηλουμένῳ τοῦ νοοῦντος. πληγῇ γὰρ ἡ φωνὴ προσέοικε τῆς ψυχῆς δι' ὤτων βίᾳ τὸν λόγον εἰσδεχομένης, ὅταν ἀλλήλοις ἐντυγχάνωμεν· ὁ δὲ τοῦ κρείττονος νοῦς ἄγει τὴν εὐφυᾶ ψυχὴν ἐπιθιγγάνων τῷ νοηθέντι πληγῆς μὴ δεομένην, ἡ δ' ἐνδίδωσιν αὐτῷ χαλῶντι
588F καὶ συντείνοντι τὰς ὁρμὰς οὐ βιαίως ⟨ὡς⟩ ὑπὸ παθῶν ἀντιτεινόντων, ἀλλ' εὐστρόφους καὶ μαλακὰς ὥσπερ ἡνίας ἐνδοῦσα.

οὐ δεῖ δὲ θαυμάζειν ὁρῶντας τοῦτο μὲν ὑπὸ μικροῖς οἴαξι μεγάλων περιαγωγὰς ὁλκάδων τοῦτο δὲ τροχῶν κεραμεικῶν δίνησιν ἄκρας παραψαύσει χειρὸς ὁμαλῶς περιφερομένων· ἄψυχα μὲν γὰρ ἀλλ' ὅμως τροχαλὰ ταῖς κατασκευαῖς ὑπὸ λειότητος ἐνδίδωσι πρὸς τὸ κινοῦν ῥοπῆς γενομένης, ψυχὴ δ' ἀνθρώπου μυρίαις ὁρμαῖς οἷον ὕσπληξιν ἐντεταμένη μακρῷ πάντων ὀργάνων εὐστροφώτατόν ἐστιν, ἄν τις κατὰ
589A λόγον ἅπτηται, ῥοπὴν λαβοῦσα πρὸς τὸ νοηθὲν κινεῖσθαι. | ἐνταῦθα γὰρ εἰς τὸ νοοῦν αἱ τῶν παθῶν καὶ ὁρμῶν κατατείνουσιν ἀρχαί, τούτου δὲ σεισθέντος ἑλκόμεναι σπῶσι καὶ συντείνουσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ᾗ καὶ μάλιστα τὸ νοηθὲν ἡλίκην ἔχει ῥώμην καταμαθεῖν δίδωσιν· ὀστᾶ γὰρ ἀναίσθητα καὶ νεῦρα καὶ σάρκες ὑγρῶν περίπλεαι καὶ βαρὺς ὁ ἐκ τούτων ὄγκος ἡσυχάζων καὶ κείμενος, ἅμα τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν νῷ τι βαλέσθαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ κινῆσαι τὴν ὁρμὴν ὅλος ἀναστὰς καὶ συνταθεὶς πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσιν οἷον ἐπτερωμένος φέρεται πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν. ὁ
589B δὲ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ συνεντάσεως καὶ παραστάσεως τρόπος χαλεπὸς ἢ παντελῶς ἄπορος συνοφθῆναι, καθ' ὃν ἡ ψυχὴ νοήσασα ἐφέλκεται ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τὸν ὄγκον, ἀλλ' ὡς σῶμα καὶ δίχα φωνῆς ἐννοηθεὶς κινεῖ λόγος ἀπραγμόνως, οὕτως οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι δυσπείστως ἔχοιμεν ὑπὸ νοῦ κρείσσονος νοῦν καὶ ⟨ψυχὴν⟩ ψυχῆς θειοτέρας ἄγεσθαι θύραθεν ἐφαπτομένης ἣν πέφυκεν ἐπαφὴν λόγος ἴσχειν πρὸς λόγον †ὥσπερ φῶς ἀνταύγειαν†.

τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὰς μὲν ἀλλήλων νοήσεις οἷον ὑπὸ σκότῳ διὰ φωνῆς ψηλαφῶντες γνωρίζομεν· αἱ δὲ τῶν δαιμόνων φέγγος ἔχουσαι τοῖς δε-
589C χομένοις ἐλλάμπουσιν, οὐ δεόμεναι ῥημάτων οὐδ' ὀνομάτων, οἷς χρώμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ ἄνθρωποι συμβόλοις εἴδωλα τῶν νοουμένων καὶ εἰκόνας ὁρῶσιν, αὐτὰ δ' οὐ γιγνώσκουσι πλὴν οἷς ἔπεστιν ἴδιόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον ὥσπερ εἴρηται φέγγος. καίτοι τὸ περὶ τὴν φωνὴν γιγνό-

'Socrates' intellect, on the other hand, was pure and untrammelled, not involving itself in the body except[173] to a small extent **[588E]** for necessary purposes; it was therefore sensitive and delicate enough to respond quickly to whatever impinged upon it. And that, it may be supposed, was not a sound but the thought of a daimon, making contact voicelessly with the thinking mind by its bare meaning.[174] Voice is like a blow to the soul, which receives the thought by force through the ears, whenever we converse with one another. The intellect of the higher being, on the other hand, guides the gifted soul, which needs no blow, touching it with its thought; and that soul surrenders its impulses to this intellect, which relaxes or tightens them, not violently <as>[175] **[588F]** against the resistance of passions, but yielding[176] as it were its soft and pliable reins.

'There is no need to wonder at this, when we see, on the one hand, huge merchantmen turned round by small tillers, and, on the other, the revolution of the potter's wheel that turns so smoothly at the touch of a fingertip. These things, though lifeless, are so contrived as to run easily, and their smoothness enables them to yield to the motive force, once the inclination is given. The human mind, likewise, is strung as it were with the strings of countless impulses, and is much the most easily guided of machines; touch it by reason, and it accepts the pressure to move as the idea directs. **[589A]** In us, you see, the origins of emotions and impulses lead back to the intelligence; once this is disturbed, there is a tug upon them, and they in turn exert a pull and a tension upon the man. This above all is how the idea lets us understand what great power it has. For bones and sinews and moisture-laden flesh have no sensation, and the mass made of them, so heavy when at rest and inert, rises up, all of it, becomes tense in all its parts, and takes off for action as though on wings, the moment[177] the soul forms a conception in the intellect and rouses its impulse to respond to it. Now[178] how the mode of movement, tension and excitation **[589B]** by which the soul, having formed its thought, draws the mass after it by its impulses, is difficult or indeed impossible to understand. But as the conception of a thought, even without a voice,[179] does in fact easily move the body, so we should be ready to believe that an intellect may be guided by superior intellect and a mind by a more divine mind which makes contact with it from outside with the form of contact which is natural between thought and thought, a sort of effulgence [light] as it were.[180]

'For in truth, while we understand the thoughts of others by groping for them in the dark, as it were, by the spoken word, the thoughts of *daimones*, by contrast, have brilliance and shine on those who can receive[181] them, with no need of the verbs and nouns[182] **[589C]** which humans use as symbols among themselves to discern images and pictures of their thoughts, the thoughts themselves remaining unrecognized except by these on whom,

μενον ἔστιν ᾗ παραμυθεῖται τοὺς ἀπιστοῦντας· ὁ γὰρ ἀὴρ φθόγγοις ἐνάρθροις τυπωθεὶς καὶ γενόμενος δι' ὅλου λόγος καὶ φωνὴ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀκροωμένου περαίνει τὴν νόησιν. ὥστε ⟨τί⟩ θαυμάζειν ἄξιον, εἰ καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ νοηθὲν ὑπὸ τῶν κρει⟨ττόνων⟩ ὁ ἀὴρ τρεπόμενος δι' εὐπάθειαν ἐνσημαίνεται τοῖς θείοις καὶ περιττοῖς ἀνδράσι τὸν τοῦ νοήσαντος λόγον; ὥσπερ γὰρ αἱ πληγαὶ τῶν ⟨ὑποροττ⟩όντων ἀσπίσι
589D χαλκαῖς ἁλίσκονται διὰ τὴν ἀντήχησιν, ὅταν ἐκ βάθους ἀναφερόμεναι προσπέσωσι, τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἀδήλως διεκθέουσαι λανθάνουσιν, οὕτως οἱ τῶν δαιμόνων λόγοι διὰ πάντων φερόμενοι μόνοις ἐνηχοῦσι τοῖς ἀθόρυβον ἦθος καὶ νήνεμον ἔχουσι τὴν ψυχήν, οὓς δὴ καὶ ἱεροὺς καὶ δαιμονίους ἀνθρώπους καλοῦμεν.

οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ καταδαρθοῦσιν οἴονται τὸ δαιμόνιον ἀνθρώποις ἐπιθειάζειν, εἰ δ' ἐγρηγορότας καὶ καθεστῶτας ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν ὁμοίως κινεῖ, θαυμαστὸν ἡγοῦνται καὶ ἄπιστον· ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις οἴοιτο τὸν μουσικὸν ἀνειμένῃ τῇ λύρᾳ χρώμενον, ὅταν συστῇ τοῖς τόνοις ἢ καθαρμοσθῇ,
589E μὴ ἅπτεσθαι μηδὲ χρῆσθαι. τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον οὐ συνορῶσι, τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναρμοστίαν καὶ ταραχήν, ἧς ἀπήλλακτο Σωκράτης ὁ ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ δοθεὶς ἔτι παιδὸς ὄντος αὐτοῦ τῷ πατρὶ χρησμὸς ἀπεθέσπισεν· ἐᾶν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐκέλευσεν ὅ τι ἂν ἐπὶ νοῦν ἴῃ πράττειν, καὶ μὴ βιάζεσθαι μηδὲ παράγειν ἀλλ' ἐφιέναι τὴν ὁρμὴν τοῦ παιδός, εὐχόμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ Διὶ Ἀγοραίῳ καὶ Μούσαις, τὰ δ' ἄλλα μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν
589F περὶ Σωκράτους, ὡς κρείττονα δήπουθεν ἔχοντος ἐν αὑτῷ μυρίων διδασκάλων καὶ παιδαγωγῶν ἡγεμόνα πρὸς τὸν βίον.'

21. 'Ἡμῖν μέν, ὦ Φειδόλαε, καὶ ζῶντος Σωκράτους καὶ τεθνηκότος οὕτως ἐννοεῖν περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου παρίσταται, τῶν κληδόνας ἢ πτερμοὺς ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ⟨εἰσαγόντων⟩ καταφρονοῦσιν· ἃ δὲ Τιμάρχου τοῦ Χαιρωνέως ἠκούσαμεν ὑπὲρ τούτου διεξιόντος, οὐκ οἶδα μὴ μύθοις ⟨ὁμοιότερ' ἢ⟩ λόγοις ὄντα σιωπᾶν ἄμεινον.'

'μηδαμῶς' εἶπεν ὁ Θεόκριτος, 'ἀλλὰ δίελθ' αὐτά· καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ λίαν ἀκριβῶς, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅπη ψαύει τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὸ μυθῶδες. πρότερον
590A δὲ τίς ἦν οὗτος ὁ Τίμαρχος φράσον· | οὐ γὰρ ἔγνων τὸν ἄνθρωπον.'

'εἰκότως γ',' εἶπεν ὁ Σιμμίας 'ὦ Θεόκριτε· νέος γὰρ ὢν κομιδῇ ⟨κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον⟩ καὶ Σωκράτους δεηθεὶς ταφῆναι παρὰ Λαμπροκλέα τὸν Σωκράτους υἱόν, ⟨οὐ πολλ⟩αῖς πρότερον ἡμέραις αὐτοῦ τεθνηκότα, φίλον καὶ ἡλικιώτην γενόμενον. οὗτος οὖν ποθῶν γνῶναι τὸ Σωκράτους δαιμόνιον ἣν ἔχει δύναμιν, ἅτε δὴ νέος οὐκ ἀγεννὴς ἄρτι γεγευ-
590B μένος φιλοσοφίας, ἐμοὶ καὶ Κέβητι κοινωσάμενος μόνοις εἰς Τροφωνί-

as I said, there shines some special, daemonic brilliance. The phenomenon of speech in some ways offers the unbeliever some reassurance. Air moulded by articulate sound and wholly converted into word and speech conveys the thought to the hearer's mind. So why[183] should we be surprised if the air, because of its plasticity, is changed in accordance with what thoughts[184] the higher beings[185] have, and so impresses the meaning of the thinker on the minds of divine and exceptional men? Think how the noise made by sappers in a tunnel is detected by bronze shields[186] because of the resonance produced **[589D]** when the sounds are carried up from the depths and strike the shields, though they pass through everything else[187] undetected. In the same way, the thoughts of *daimones* pass everywhere, but echo only in the ears of those who have an untroubled personality[188] and whose soul is tranquil, 'holy' and 'daemonic' individuals, as we call them.

'Most people however believe that it is only in sleep that the 'daemonic' power inspires humans. That it should move[189] them in the same way when awake and of sound mind they find surprising and incredible. But that is like thinking that a musician uses his lyre only when it is unstrung, and does not touch or use it when it has been adjusted and tuned. They do not see that the cause is **[589E]** the tunelessness and confusion within themselves.[190] Our friend Socrates was completely free of this, as the oracle given to his father when he was a child foretold.[191] It told the father to let Socrates do whatever came into his mind, and not to force or divert the boy's impulses, but give them their head; he should pray for Socrates to Zeus Agoraios and the Muses, and otherwise not bother about him – **[589F]** because (I suppose) he had within himself a guide for life better than any number of teachers and tutors.

21. 'Such were the thoughts which occurred to us, Phidolaus, about the *daimonion*, both during Socrates' lifetime and after his death. We despised those who <adduced>[192] chance words or sneezes or anything like that. As for the account of this which we heard from Timarchus of Chaeronea,[193] it is <more like> myth than rational argument,[194] and perhaps it is best left unsaid.'

'Not at all,' said Theocritus, 'tell us about it. Myth too does in some degree touch on truth, even if not very precisely. But first tell us who this Timarchus was, **[590A]** for I don't know him.'

'Naturally you don't, Theocritus,' said Simmias, 'since he <died>[195] quite young, and asked Socrates to let him be buried next to Socrates' son Lamprocles,[196] his friend and contemporary, who died <not many>[197] days before him. Timarchus had a strong desire to know the power of Socrates' *daimonion* – he was a spirited youth, who had just got his teeth into philosophy – and (not consulting anyone except Cebes and me) he descended

ου κατῆλθε δράσας τὰ νομιζόμενα περὶ τὸ μαντεῖον. ἐμμείνας δὲ δύο νύκτας κάτω καὶ μίαν ἡμέραν, τῶν πολλῶν ἀπεγνωκότων αὐτὸν ἤδη καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὀδυρομένων, πρωὶ μάλα φαιδρὸς ἀνῆλθε· προσκυνήσας δὲ τὸν θεόν, ὡς πρῶτον διέφυγε τὸν ὄχλον, διηγεῖτο ἡμῖν θαυμάσια πολλὰ καὶ ἰδεῖν καὶ ἀκοῦσαι.

22. ἔφη δὲ καταβὰς εἰς τὸ μαντεῖον περιτυχεῖν σκότῳ πολλῷ τὸ πρῶτον, εἶτ' ἐπευξάμενος κεῖσθαι πολὺν χρόνον οὐ μάλα συμφρονῶν ἐναργῶς εἴτ' ἐγρήγορεν εἴτ' ὀνειροπολεῖ· πλὴν δόξαι γε τῆς κεφαλῆς ἅμα ψόφῳ προσπεσόντι πληγείσης τὰς ῥαφὰς διαστάσας μεθιέναι τὴν ψυχήν. ὡς δ' ἀναχωροῦσα κατεμίγνυτο πρὸς ἀέρα διαυγῆ καὶ καθαρὸν
590C ἀσμένη, πρῶτον μὲν ἀναπνεῦσαι τότε δοκεῖν διὰ χρόνου συχνοῦ συστελλομένην τέως καὶ μείζονα γίγνεσθαι τῆς πρότερον ὥσπερ ἱστίον ἐκπεταννύμενον, ἔπειτα κατακούειν ἀμαυρῶς ῥοίζου τινὸς ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς περιελαυνομένου φωνὴν ἡδεῖαν ἱέντος. ἀναβλέψας δὲ τὴν μὲν γῆν οὐδαμοῦ καθορᾶν, νήσους δὲ λαμπομένας μαλακῷ πυρὶ κατ' ἀλλήλων ἐξαμειβούσας ⟨δ'⟩ ἄλλην ἄλλοτε χρόαν ὥσπερ βαφὴν ⟨ἐπ⟩άγειν τῷ φωτὶ ποικιλλομένῳ κατὰ τὰς μεταβολάς. φαίνεσθαι δὲ πλήθει μὲν ἀναρίθμους μεγέθει δ' ὑπερφυεῖς, οὐκ ἴσας δὲ πάσας ἀλλ' ὁμοίως κυκλοτερεῖς· οἴεσθαι δὲ ταύταις τὸν αἰθέρα κύκλῳ φερομέναις ὑπορροιζεῖν ⟨ἐμμελῶς⟩ · εἶναι γὰρ ὁμολογουμένην τῇ τῆς κινήσεως λειότητι
590D τὴν πραότητα τῆς φωνῆς ἐκείνης ἐκ πασῶν συνηρμοσμένης. διὰ μέσου δ' αὐτῶν θάλασσαν ἢ λίμνην ὑποκεχύσθαι τοῖς χρώμασι διαλάμπουσαν διὰ τῆς γλαυκότητος ἐπιμιγνυμένοις· καὶ τῶν νήσων ὀλίγας μὲν ⟨δι⟩εκπλεῖν κατὰ πόρον καὶ διακομίζεσθαι πέραν τοῦ ῥεύματος, ἄλλας δὲ πολλὰς .... ⟨συν⟩εφέλκεσθαι τῇ ⟨τῆς θαλάττης ῥοῇ, καὶ αὐτῆς κύκλῳ⟩ σχεδὸν ὑποφερομένης. εἶναι δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης πῇ μὲν πολὺ βάθος κατὰ νότον μάλιστα, ⟨πῇ⟩ δ' ἀραιὰ τενάγη καὶ βραχέα, πολλαχῇ δὲ καὶ ὑπερχεῖσθαι καὶ ἀπολείπειν αὖθις οὐ μεγάλας ἐκβολὰς λαμβάνουσαν, καὶ
590E τῆς χρόας τὸ μὲν ἄκρατον καὶ πελάγιον, τὸ δ' οὐ καθαρὸν ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον καὶ λιμνῶδες. τῶν δὲ ῥοθίων τὰς νήσους ἅμα περιγινομένας ἐπανάγειν· οὐ μὴν εἰς ταὐτὸ τῇ ἀρχῇ συνάπτειν τὸ πέρας οὐδὲ ποιεῖν κύκλον, ἀλλ' ἡσυχῇ παραλλάσσειν τὰς ἐπιβολὰς ἕλικα ποιούσας μίαν ἐν τῷ περιστρέφεσθαι. ταύτην δὲ πρὸς τὸ μέσον μάλιστα τοῦ περιέχον-
590F τος καὶ μέγιστον ἐγκεκλίσθαι τὴν θάλασσαν ὀλίγῳ τῶν ὀκτὼ μερῶν τοῦ παντὸς ἔλαττον, ὡς αὐτῷ κατεφαίνετο· δύο δ' αὐτὴν ἔχειν ἀναστομώσεις πυρὸς ἐμβάλλοντας ἐναντίους ποταμοὺς δεχομένας, ὥστ' ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀνακοπτομένην κοχλάζειν καὶ ἀπολευκαίνεσθαι τὴν γλαυκότητα.

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὁρᾶν τερπόμενος τῇ θέᾳ· κάτω δ' ἀπιδόντι φαίνεσθαι χάσμα μέγα στρογγύλον οἷον ἐκτετμημένης σφαίρας, φοβερὸν δὲ δεινῶς καὶ βαθύ, πολλοῦ σκότους πλῆρες οὐχ ἡσυχάζοντος ἀλλ' ἐκτα-

into the cave of Trophonius,[198] first performing the regular rituals of the oracle. **[590B]** He stayed down there two nights and a day; most people despaired of him, and his relations were already mourning, when he reappeared early in the morning, very cheerful, prostrated himself before the god and (as soon as he could escape the crowd) told us of many marvels he had seen and heard.[199]

22. 'He said that, after descending into the cave of the oracle, he first found himself in deep darkness. Then he prayed, and lay there for a long time, with no clear consciousness of whether he was awake or dreaming. It seemed to him however that there was a sudden noise and at the same time a blow on his head; the sutures of his skull opened[200] and let his soul out. It left joyfully to blend into the pure, bright air, and seemed then first to relax **[590C]** at long last after its former confinement[201] and become bigger[202] than before, like a sail being unfurled. Then he dimly heard a kind of whirring going round and round above his head, making a pleasant sound. When he looked up, he could not see the earth anywhere. Islands, shining upon one another with a soft glow, and[203] constantly changing hue, dyed[204] the light, as it were, so that it varied as they changed. They seemed innumerable and huge in size, not all equal but all alike round. He fancied that the heaven made a <melodious>[205] sound in response to their revolutions, for the softness of the sound produced by the harmony **[590D]** of them all corresponded to the smoothness of their motion. In between them lay a sea or lake gleaming with colours that blended with its greyness. A few of the islands sailed out along a channel and were carried to the other side of the stream, but many others were borne along <with the flow of the sea> which itself moved more or less <in a circular track>.[206] In some parts of the sea, principally towards the south, there were great depths; elsewhere there were small patches of shallows;[207] in many areas it flooded and again ebbed, but not making any great outflow.[208] In colour, part was the pure hue of the open sea, **[590E]** part was polluted, turbid, and swampy. As the islands surmounted the surges, they turned back, not however making the end of their movement coincide with its starting-point, nor completing a circle, but changing position a little, so as to produce a single spiral in their revolution.[209] This[210] sea was inclined (as it seemed to Timarchus) at a little less than eight parts of the whole to the central and widest part of the surrounding space.[211] **[590F]** It had two openings, receiving rivers of fire which emptied into it from opposite directions, so that a large extent of it was lashed and broken into foam and its greyness turned to white water.[212]

'Timarchus watched all this with delight. But when he looked down, there came into view a huge round gulf, as though a sphere had been excavated from it,[213] very terrible and deep, full of a darkness that was not still

ραττομένου καὶ ἀνακλύζοντος πολλάκις· ὅθεν ἀκούεσθαι μυρίας μὲν ὠρυγὰς καὶ στεναγμοὺς ζῴων μυρίων δὲ κλαυθμὸν βρεφῶν καὶ μεμιγμένους ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ὀδυρμούς, ψόφους δὲ παντοδαποὺς καὶ
591A θορύβους ἐκ βάθους πόρρωθεν ἀμυδροὺς ἀναπεμπομένους | οἷς οὐ μετρίως αὐτὸς ἐκπεπλῆχθαι. χρόνου δὲ προϊόντος εἰπεῖν τινα πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐχ ὁρώμενον „ὦ Τίμαρχε, τί ποθεῖς πυθέσθαι;“

φράσαι δ' αὐτὸν ὅτι „πάντα, τί γὰρ οὐ θαυμάσιον;“ „ἀλλ' ἡμῖν“ φάναι „τῶν ἄνω μέτεστι μικρόν· ἄλλων γὰρ θεῶν ἐκεῖνα· τὴν δὲ Φερσεφόνης μοῖραν, ἣν ἡμεῖς διέπομεν, τῶν τεττάρων μίαν οὖσαν ὡς ἡ Στὺξ ὁρίζει, βουλομένῳ σοι σκοπεῖν πάρεστιν.“

ἐρομένου δ' αὐτοῦ τίς ἡ Στύξ ἐστιν, „ὁδὸς εἰς Ἅιδου“ φάναι „καὶ πρόεισιν ⟨ἐξ⟩ ἐναντίας, αὐτῇ σχίζουσα τῇ κορυφῇ τὸ φῶς· ἀνατείνουσα δ', ὡς ὁρᾷς, ἐκ τοῦ Ἅιδου κάτωθεν ᾗ ψαύει περιφερομένη καὶ τοῦ φωτός,
591B ἀφορίζει τὴν ἐσχάτην μερίδα τῶν ὅλων. τέσσαρες δ' εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ πάντων, ζωῆς μὲν ἡ πρώτη κινήσεως δ' ἡ δευτέρα γενέσεως δ' ἡ τρίτη φθορᾶς δ' ἡ τελευταία· συνδεῖ δὲ τῇ μὲν δευτέρᾳ τὴν πρώτην Μονὰς κατὰ τὸ ἀόρατον, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν τῇ τρίτῃ Νοῦς καθ' ἥλιον, τὴν δὲ τρίτην πρὸς τετάρτην Φύσις κατὰ σελήνην. τῶν δὲ συνδέσμων ἑκάστου Μοῖρα κλειδοῦχος Ἀνάγκης θυγάτηρ κάθηται,τοῦ μὲν πρώτου Ἄτροπος τοῦ δὲ
591C δευτέρου Κλωθώ, τοῦ δὲ πρὸς σελήνην Λάχεσις, περὶ ἣν ἡ καμπὴ τῆς γενέσεως. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλαι νῆσοι θεοὺς ἔχουσι· σελήνη δὲ δαιμόνων ἐπιχθονίων οὖσα φεύγει τὴν Στύγα μικρὸν ὑπερφέρουσα, λαμβάνεται δ' ἅπαξ ἐν μέτροις δευτέροις ἑκατὸν ἑβδομήκοντα ἑπτά. καὶ τῆς Στυγὸς ἐπιφερομένης αἱ ψυχαὶ βοῶσι δειμαίνουσαι· πολλὰς γὰρ ὁ Ἅιδης ἀφαρπάζει περιολισθανούσας, ἄλλας δ' ἀνακομίζεται κάτωθεν ἡ σελήνη προσνηχομένας, αἷς εἰς καιρὸν ἡ τῆς γενέσεως τελευτὴ συνέπεσε, πλὴν ὅσαι μιαραὶ καὶ ἀκάθαρτοι· ταύτας δ' ἀστράπτουσα καὶ μυκωμένη φοβερὸν οὐκ ἐᾷ πελάζειν, ἀλλὰ θρηνοῦσαι τὸν ἑαυτῶν πότμον ἀποσφαλλόμεναι φέρονται κάτω πάλιν ἐπ' ἄλλην γένεσιν, ὡς ὁρᾷς.“

591D „ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ὁρῶ“ τὸν Τίμαρχον εἰπεῖν „ἢ πολλοὺς ἀστέρας περὶ τὸ χάσμα παλλομένους, ἑτέρους δὲ καταδυομένους εἰς αὐτό, τοὺς δ' ἄττοντας αὖ κάτωθεν.“

„αὐτοὺς ἄρα“ φάναι „τοὺς δαίμονας ὁρῶν ἀγνοεῖς. ἔχει γὰρ ὧδε· ψυχὴ πᾶσα νοῦ μετέσχεν, ἄλογος δὲ καὶ ἄνους οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς σαρκὶ μιχθῇ καὶ πάθεσιν, ἀλλοιούμενον τρέπεται καθ' ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀλγηδόνας εἰς τὸ ἄλογον. μίγνυται δ' οὐ πᾶσα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· ἀλλ' αἱ ⟨μὲν⟩ ὅλαι κατέδυσαν εἰς σῶμα, καὶ δι' ὅλων ἀνακραθεῖσαι τὸ
591E σύμπαν ὑπὸ παθῶν διαφέρονται κατὰ τὸν βίον· αἱ δὲ πῇ μὲν ἀνεκράθησαν, πῇ δ' ἔλιπον ἔξω τὸ καθαρώτατον, οὐκ ἐπισπώμενον ἀλλ' οἷον ἀκρόπλουν ἐπιψαῦον ἐκ κεφαλῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καθάπερ ἐν βυθῷ ⟨δι-

but turbulent[214] and continually welling up. From this were to be heard innumerable howls and groans of animals, the weeping of innumerable infants, the mingled mourning of men and women, and all kinds of noises and dim tumult rising out of the distant depths, **[591A]** by which he was greatly disturbed. After a time, someone (whom he could not see) spoke to him and said, "Timarchus, what do you wish to know?"

"Everything," he replied, "for what is not worthy of wonder?" "Well," said the voice, "we[215] have little to do with what is above; that belongs to other gods. But, if you wish, you can view the Portion of Persephone[216] which we administer, which is one of the four portions, and is as Styx delimits it."[217]

"What is Styx?" asked Timarchus. "The road to Hades," the voice replied, "it starts on the opposite side[218] and the extreme tip of it divides the light. It stretches up, as you see, from Hades below, and the point where, in its revolution, it touches the light marks the boundary of the last division of the universe. **[591B]** There are four Principles of all things: the first is that of Life, the second that of Motion, the third that of Becoming, and the fourth that of Decay. The first is bonded to the second by the Monad in the Invisible; the second to the third by Intellect in the sun; and the third to the fourth by Nature in the moon.[219] A Fate, daughter of Necessity, sits holding the keys of each of these bonds: Atropos has the first, Clotho the second, and Lachesis the bond in the moon, where the turning-point of Becoming is found.[220] **[591C]** The other islands have gods, but the moon belongs to terrestrial *daimones*,[221] and she avoids Styx by rising a little above it, though she is caught once in every 177 second measures.[222] As Styx approaches, the souls cry out in terror. Many slip, and Hades snatches them, while others are hauled up from below by the moon as they swim towards her. These are they for whom the end of Becoming has come opportunely. The foul and unclean are the exception: the moon does not let them come near, but flashes and roars at them horribly. They lament their fate, tumble away, and are carried down to another birth, as you see."

"But I don't see anything," **[591D]** said Timarchus, "except a lot of stars moving up and down around the gulf, others plunging into it, and others darting up again from below."

"Then," he said, "you see the *daimones* themselves, but you do not recognize them. This is how it is: every soul has its share of Intellect, there is none which is without reason or Intellect. But whatever part of the soul combines with flesh and passions is changed by pleasures and pains and becomes irrational. Not every soul is combined in the same way: Some are wholly sunk in the body, wholly mixed[223] with it and entirely at the mercy of their passion throughout life. Others are mixed to some extent, **[591E]** but to some extent leave their purest element outside. This is not

κτύου⟩ δεδυκότος ἄρτημα κορυφαῖον, ὀρθουμένης περὶ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
ἀνέχον ὅσον ὑπακούει καὶ οὐ κρατεῖται τοῖς πάθεσιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑπο-
βρύχιον ἐν τῷ σώματι φερόμενον ψυχὴ λέγεται· τὸ δὲ φθορᾶς λειφθὲν
οἱ πολλοὶ νοῦν καλοῦντες ἐντὸς εἶναι νομίζουσιν αὑτῶν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς
ἐσόπτροις τὰ φαινόμενα κατ' ἀνταύγειαν· οἱ δ' ὀρθῶς ὑπονοοῦντες,
ὡς ἐκτὸς ὄντα δαίμονα προσαγορεύουσι. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἀποσβέννυσθαι
591F δοκοῦντας ἀστέρας, ὦ Τίμαρχε," φάναι „τὰς εἰς σῶμα καταδυομένας
ὅλας ψυχὰς ὁρᾶν νόμιζε, τοὺς δ' οἷον ἀναλάμποντας πάλιν καὶ ἀνα-
φαινομένους κάτωθεν, ἀχλύν τινα καὶ ζόφον ὥσπερ πηλὸν ἀποσειο-
μένους, τὰς ἐκ τῶν σωμάτων ἐπαναπλεούσας μετὰ τὸν θάνατον· οἱ δ'
ἄνω διαφερόμενοι δαίμονές εἰσι τῶν νοῦν ἔχειν λεγομένων ἀνθρώπων.
πειράθητι δὲ κατιδεῖν ἑκάστου τὸν σύνδεσμον, ᾗ τῇ ψυχῇ συμπέφυκε."

ταῦτ' ἀκούσας αὐτὸς ἀκριβέστερον προσέχειν καὶ θεᾶσθαι τῶν ἀστέ-
592A ρων ἀποσαλεύοντας τοὺς μὲν ἧττον τοὺς δὲ μᾶλλον, | ὥσπερ τοὺς τὰ
δίκτυα διασημαίνοντας ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ φελλοὺς ὁρῶμεν ἐπιφερομέ-
νους· ἐνίους δὲ τοῖς κλωθομένοις ἀτράκτοις ὁμοίως ἕλικα τεταραγμέ-
νην καὶ ἀνώμαλον ἕλκοντας, οὐ δυναμένους καταστῆσαι τὴν κίνησιν
ἐπ' εὐθείας. λέγειν δὲ τὴν φωνὴν τοὺς μὲν εὐθεῖαν καὶ τεταγμένην
κίνησιν ἔχοντας εὐηνίοις ψυχαῖς χρῆσθαι διὰ τροφὴν καὶ παίδευσιν
ἀστείαν, οὐκ ἄγαν σκληρὸν καὶ ἄγριον παρεχομέναις τὸ ἄλογον· τοὺς
δ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω πολλάκις ἀνωμάλως καὶ τεταραγμένως ἐγκλίνοντας,
592B οἷον ἐκ δεσμοῦ σπαραττομένους, δυσπειθέσι καὶ ἀναγώγοις δι' ἀπαι-
δευσίαν ζυγομαχεῖν ἤθεσι, πῇ μὲν κρατοῦντας καὶ περιάγοντας ἐπὶ δε-
ξιάν, πῇ δὲ καμπτομένους ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν καὶ συνεφελκομένους τοῖς
ἁμαρτήμασιν, εἶτα πάλιν ἀντιτείνοντας καὶ βιαζομένους. τὸν μὲν γὰρ
σύνδεσμον οἷα χαλινὸν τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐμβεβλημένον, ὅταν ἀν-
τισπάσῃ, τὴν λεγομένην μεταμέλειαν ἐπάγειν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις καὶ τὴν
ἐπὶ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, ὅσαι παράνομοι καὶ ἀκρατεῖς, αἰσχύνην, ἀλγηδόνα
592C καὶ πληγὴν οὖσαν ἐνθένδε τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος καὶ ἄρχον-
τος ἐπιστομιζομένης, μέχρι ἂν οὕτω κολαζομένη πειθήνιος γένηται καὶ
συνήθης ὥσπερ θρέμμα πρᾶον ἄνευ πληγῆς καὶ ἀλγηδόνος ὑπὸ συμ-
βόλων ὀξέως καὶ σημείων αἰσθανομένη τοῦ δαίμονος.

„αὗται μὲν οὖν ὀψέ ποτε καὶ βραδέως ἄγονται καὶ καθίστανται πρὸς
τὸ δέον. ἐκ δὲ τῶν εὐηνίων ἐκείνων ⟨καὶ⟩ κατηκόων εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς
καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ οἰκείου δαίμονος καὶ τὸ μαντικόν ἐστι καὶ θεοκλυ-
τούμενον γένος· ὧν τὴν Ἑρμοδώρου τοῦ Κλαζομενίου ψυχὴν ἀκήκοας
δήπουθεν, ὡς ἀπολείπουσα παντάπασι τὸ σῶμα νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέ-

dragged down by it, but floats as it were, keeping contact with the man by his head, like an attachment on top of <a net>[224] sunk in deep water. The soul straightens itself around it, and it holds up as much of the soul as is obedient and not under the domination of the passions. The part submerged in the body[225] is called the soul: the part that survives destruction is commonly called Intellect, and people believe it to be within themselves, just as they believe reflections to be *in* mirrors. Those who have the right idea of it, however, call it *daimon*, regarding it as outside themselves. The stars which seem to be being extinguished, Timarchus," he went on, "you should understand **[591F]** as souls being wholly submerged in the body; those that light up again, as it were, and appear from below, shaking off the mire of darkness and mist, as those making the voyage up from their bodies after death. Those that are moving around[226] above are the *daimones* of men who are said to possess Intellect.[227] Try to catch a sight of the bond in each of them, to see how it is joined to the soul."

'When he heard this, Timarchus (as he told us) paid closer attention and saw the stars tossing up and down, some more and some less violently, **[592A]** like the movement we see of corks marking nets in the sea. Some however described a confused and irregular spiral[228] like a spindle as the thread is spun, being unable to steady their motion and keep to a straight path. The Voice explained that those who displayed a straight, controlled motion had souls made responsive to guidance thanks to good nurture and education, souls which therefore delivered their irrational element in not too stubborn or savage a condition. Those that swerved up and down in an irregular and confused way, as though jerked about **[592B]** at the end of a tether, were struggling against a personality rendered disobedient and uncontrollable by lack of education; sometimes they prevailed and guided their course to the right,[229] sometimes they were deflected by passions and dragged along by misdeeds, only to try once again to resist and enforce their control. The bond, you see, was like a curb put on the irrational element in the soul; when the *daimon* pulls on it, it induces what is called repentance for misdeeds and shame for illicit and uncontrolled pleasures. This shame is a painful wound felt because the soul is from this point[230] being checked by its controlling and ruling power, and it continues to be felt **[592C]** until this chastisement makes the soul accustomed and responsive to the rein, like a well-broken animal, needing no blow or pain, but quickly becoming aware of the *daimon* through symbols and signs.

"These souls," the Voice went on, "are guided and settled in the way they should be though slowly and late in the day. But it is from those which are responsive and obedient to their own *daimon* from the start, from birth in fact, that the race of prophets and divine men comes. Among these, you have doubtless heard of the soul of Hermodorus of Clazomenae.[231]

592D ραν ἐπλανᾶτο πολὺν τόπον, εἶτ' αὖθις ἐπανήει πολλοῖς τῶν μακρὰν λεγομένων καὶ πραττομένων ἐντυχοῦσα καὶ παραγενομένη, μέχρι οὗ τὸ σῶμα τῆς γυναικὸς προδούσης λαβόντες οἱ ἐχθροὶ ψυχῆς ἔρημον οἴκοι κατέπρησαν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐξέβαινεν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος, ὑπείκουσα δ' ἀεὶ καὶ χαλῶσα τῷ δαίμονι τὸν σύνδεσμον ἐδίδου περιδρομὴν καὶ περιφοίτησιν, ὥστε πολλὰ συνορῶντα καὶ κατακούοντα τῶν ἐκτὸς εἰσαγγέλλειν. οἱ δ' ἀφανίσαντες τὸ σῶμα κοιμωμένου μέχρι νῦν δίκην ἐν τῷ ταρτάρῳ τίνουσι. ταῦτα δ' εἴσῃ" φάναι
592E „σαφέστερον, ὦ νεανία, τρίτῳ μηνί· νῦν δ' ἄπιθι."

παυσαμένης δὲ τῆς φωνῆς βούλεσθαι μὲν αὐτὸν ὁ Τίμαρχος ἔφη θεάσασθαι περιστρέφοντα, τίς ὁ φθεγγόμενος εἴη· σφόδρα δὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν αὖθις ἀλγήσας, καθάπερ βίᾳ συμπιεσθεῖσαν, οὐδὲν ἔτι γιγνώσκειν οὐδ' αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν καθ' ἑαυτόν, εἶτα μέντοι μετὰ μικρὸν ἀνενεγκὼν ὁρᾶν αὐτὸν ἐν Τροφωνίου παρὰ τὴν εἴσοδον, οὗπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατεκλίθη, κείμενον.

592F **23.** ὁ μὲν οὖν Τιμάρχου μῦθος οὗτος· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐλθὼν Ἀθήναζε τρίτῳ μηνὶ κατὰ τὴν γενομένην φωνὴν ἐτελεύτησεν, ἡμεῖς δὲ Σωκράτει θαυμάζοντες ἀπηγγέλλομεν, ἐμέμψατο Σωκράτης ἡμᾶς, ὅτι μὴ ζῶντος ἔτι τοῦ Τιμάρχου διήλθομεν· αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἂν ἡδέως ἐκείνου πυθέσθαι καὶ προσανακρῖναι σαφέστερον.'

'Ἀπέχεις, ὦ Θεόκριτε, μετὰ τοῦ λόγου τὸν μῦθον, ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ καὶ τὸν ξένον ἡμῖν παρακλητέον ἐπὶ τὴν ζήτησιν· οἰκεία γὰρ πάνυ καὶ προσήκουσα θείοις ἀνδράσι.'

'τί δ'' εἶπεν 'Ἐπαμεινώνδας οὐ συμβάλλεται γνώμην ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγόμενος ἡμῖν;'

καὶ ὁ πατὴρ μειδιάσας 'τοιοῦτον' ἔφη 'τὸ ἦθος, ὦ ξένε, τὸ τούτου, σιωπηλὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους εὐλαβές, ἄπληστον δὲ τοῦ μανθάνειν καὶ ἀκροᾶσθαι· διὸ καὶ Σπίνθαρος ὁ Ταραντῖνος οὐκ ὀλίγον αὐτῷ συνδιατρίψας ἐνταῦθα χρόνον ἀεὶ δήπου λέγει μηδενί πω τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν
593A ἀνθρώπων ἐντετυχηκέναι | μήτε πλείονα γιγνώσκοντι μήτ' ἐλάσσονα φθεγγομένῳ. σὺ οὖν ἃ φρονεῖς αὐτὸς δίελθε περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων.'

24. 'Ἐγὼ τοίνυν' ἔφη 'τὸν μὲν Τιμάρχου λόγον ὥσπερ ἱερὸν καὶ ἄσυλον ἀνακεῖσθαί φημι τῷ θεῷ χρῆναι· θαυμάζω δ' εἰ τοῖς ὑπὸ Σιμμίου λεγομένοις αὐτοῦ δυσπιστήσουσί τινες, κύκνους μὲν γὰρ ἱεροὺς καὶ δράκοντας καὶ κύνας καὶ ἵππους ὀνομάζοντες, ἀνθρώπους δὲ θείους εἶναι καὶ θεοφιλεῖς ἀπιστοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτα τὸν θεὸν οὐ φίλορνιν ἀλλὰ φι-
593B λάνθρωπον ἡγούμενοι. καθάπερ οὖν ἀνὴρ φίλιππος οὐ πάντων ὁμοίως ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν ἀπὸ ταὐτοῦ γένους, ἀλλ' ἀεί τιν' ἄριστον ἐξαιρῶν καὶ ἀποκρίνων καθ' αὑτὸν ἀσκεῖ καὶ τρέφει καὶ ἀγαπᾷ διαφερόντως, ⟨οὕτω⟩ καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς βελτίστους οἷον ἐξ ἀγέλης χαρά-

It used to leave his body completely, at night and by day, and wander far and wide returning again **[592D]** after encountering and witnessing many things done and said in distant places, until his wife betrayed him, and his enemies found the body, abandoned by the soul, in his house, and burnt it. This account however is not quite true: the soul did not depart from the body, it merely eased and loosened its bond to the *daimon*, and let the *daimon* travel and wander around, so that it could report back the many things it saw and heard in the world outside. Those who destroyed the body as Hermodorus slept are even now paying the penalty in Tartarus. You will know these things **[592E]** better, young man," the Voice continued, "two months from now. For the present, you may go."

'When the Voice had ceased, Timarchus said, he wanted to turn round and see who the speaker was. But he again felt a violent pain in his head, as though it was forcibly crushed, and he had no further understanding or sense of his situation. But after a little while he recovered consciousness and saw that he was lying in the cave of Trophonius, just by the entrance, where he had originally lain down.

23. 'Well, that is Timarchus' story. He died, as the Voice had said, two months after his return to Athens. **[592F]** We marvelled, and told Socrates; and he blamed us for not having told him about it while Timarchus was still alive, because he would have liked to hear it from him and question him in more detail.

'So, Theocritus, there is your myth and there is your argument. But maybe we should ask our guest to join our investigation for it is one that is very proper and fitting for godly men.'

'But,' said the stranger, 'why doesn't Epaminondas contribute his view, seeing that he has had the same training as we have?'

My father smiled. 'That is his personality, sir,' he said, 'taciturn and cautious in speech, but insatiable in learning and listening. Spintharus of Tarentum,[232] who spent quite a long time with him here, says that he never yet met any man of his time **[593A]** who knew more or said less. So tell us what you yourself think about what has been said.'

24. 'My opinion,' said Theanor, 'is that Timarchus' account should be dedicated to the god, as sacred and inviolable. But as to what Simmias has said on his own behalf, I should be surprised if any should disbelieve it, or be prepared to call swans, snakes, dogs, and horses 'sacred',[233] without believing that there are men who are godly and loved by the gods – and that, though they think god to be 'lover of mankind' not 'lover of birds'. And just as a horse-lover **[593B]** does not take equal care of all the specimens of the same breed,[234] but always singles out and selects one that is best, trains it by itself, fosters it, and specially cherishes it, so those above us put

ξαντες ἰδίας τινὸς καὶ περιττῆς παιδαγωγίας ἀξιοῦσι, οὐχ ὑφ' ἡνίας οὐδὲ ῥυτήρων ἀλλὰ λόγῳ διὰ συμβόλων εὐθύνοντες, ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀγελαῖοι παντάπασιν ἀπείρως ἔχουσιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ κύνες τῶν θηρατικῶν σημείων οὐδ'οἱ πολλοὶ ἵπποι τῶν ἱππικῶν συνιᾶσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μεμαθηκότες εὐθὺς ἀπὸ σιγμοῦ τοῦ τυχόντος ἢ ποππυσμοῦ τὸ προ-
593C σταττόμενον αἰσθανόμενοι ῥᾳδίως εἰς ὃ δεῖ καθίστανται. φαίνεται δὲ γιγνώσκων καὶ Ὅμηρος ἣν λέγομεν διαφορὰν ἡμεῖς· τῶν γὰρ μάντεων οἰωνοπόλους τινὰς καλεῖ καὶ ἱερεῖς, ἑτέρους δὲ τῶν θεῶν αὐτῶν διαλεγομένων συνιέντας καὶ συμφρονοῦντας ἀποσημαίνειν οἴεται τὸ μέλλον, ἐν οἷς λέγει

„τῶν δ' Ἕλενος, Πριάμοιο φίλος παῖς, ξύνθετο θυμῷ
βουλήν, ἥ ῥα θεοῖσιν ἐφήνδανε μητιόωσι"

καί

„ὡς γὰρ ἐγὼν ὄπ' ἄκουσα θεῶν ⟨αἰει⟩ γενετάων." ὥσπερ γὰρ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν τὴν διάνοιαν οἱ μὲν ἐκτὸς αἰσθάνονται καὶ γιγνώσκουσι πυρσοῖς τισι καὶ κηρύγμασι καὶ ὑπὸ σαλπίγγων, τοῖς δὲ πιστοῖς καὶ συνήθεσιν αὐτοὶ φράζουσιν, οὕτω τὸ θεῖον ὀλίγοις ἐντυγ-
593D χάνει δι' αὑτοῦ καὶ σπανίως, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς σημεῖα δίδωσιν, ἐξ ὧν ἡ λεγομένη μαντικὴ συνέστηκε. θεοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὖν ὀλίγων ἀνθρώπων κοσμοῦσι βίον, οὓς ἂν ἄκρως μακαρίους τε καὶ θείους ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι βουληθῶσιν· αἱ δ' ἀπηλλαγμέναι γενέσεως ψυχαὶ καὶ σχολάζουσαι τὸ λοιπὸν ἀπὸ σώματος, οἷον ἐλεύθεραι πάμπαν ἀφειμέναι, δαίμονές εἰσιν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελεῖς καθ' Ἡσίοδον. ὡς γὰρ ἀθλητὰς καταλύσαντας ἄσκησιν ὑπὸ γήρως οὐ τελέως ἀπολείπει τὸ φιλότιμον καὶ φιλοσώματον, ἀλλ' ἑτέρους ἀσκοῦντας ὁρῶντες ἥδονται καὶ παρα-
593E καλοῦσι καὶ συμπαραθέουσιν, οὕτως οἱ πεπαυμένοι τῶν περὶ τὸν βίον ἀγώνων δι' ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς γενόμενοι δαίμονες οὐ παντελῶς ἀτιμάζουσι τὰ ἐνταῦθα πράγματα καὶ λόγους καὶ σπουδάς, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ γυμναζομένοις τέλος εὐμενεῖς ὄντες καὶ συμφιλοτιμούμενοι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐγκελεύονται καὶ συνεξορμῶσιν, ὅταν ἐγγὺς ἤδη τῆς ἐλπίδος ἁμιλλωμένους καὶ ψαύοντας ὁρῶσιν.

593F οὐ γὰρ οἷς ἔτυχε συμφέρεται τὸ δαιμόνιον, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν νηχομένων ἐν θαλάττῃ τοὺς μὲν πελαγίους ἔτι καὶ πρόσω τῆς γῆς φερομένους οἱ ἐπὶ γῆς ἑστῶτες σιωπῇ θεῶνται μόνον, τοὺς δ' ἐγγὺς ἤδη παραθέοντες καὶ παρεμβαίνοντες ἅμα καὶ χειρὶ καὶ φωνῇ βοηθοῦντες ἀνασῴζουσιν, οὕτος, ὦ .... τοῦ δαιμονίου ὁ τρόπος· ⟨μεθίησιν⟩ ἡμᾶς βαπτιζομένους ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ σώματα πολλὰ καθάπερ ὀχήματα μεταλαμβάνοντας αὐτοὺς ἐξαμιλλᾶσθαι καὶ μακροθυμεῖν δι' οἰκείας πειρωμένους ἀρετῆς σῴζεσθαι καὶ τυγχάνειν λιμένος. ἥτις δ' ἂν ἤδη διὰ μυρίων γενέσεων ἠγωνισμένη μακροὺς ἀγῶνας εὖ καὶ προθύμως

their brand, as it were, on the best of the herd and think that these deserve some particular and special guidance, controlling them not by reins or halters but by reason through the medium of secret signs which are entirely unknown to the many and the common herd. After all, most dogs don't understand the hunter's signals, most horses don't understand the trainer's; only those who have learned immediately perceive the command that is being given by a casual whistle or a clacking of the tongue[235] **[593C]** and easily come to order. Homer clearly understands the distinction we are making. He calls some prophets augurs and priests, while believing that others understand and are conscious of the talk of the gods themselves and so give warning of the future. He says:

"Then Priam's dear son Helenus understood
The plans the gods in counsel had approved";

and again

"For so I heard the voice of the immortal gods."[236] The outside world perceives and knows the intention of kings and generals by beacons and proclamations and trumpet-calls, while to their loyal associates they declare it themselves. Similarly,[237] the divine power **[593D]** converses directly with few men and rarely, while to the many it gives signs, out of which is constituted what is called 'divination'. The gods honour the lives of a few men whom they wish to make supremely blessed and truly godly; but souls which have done with Becoming[238] are free from concern with the body and are left as it were to range free – these are, as Hesiod tells us,[239] the *daimones* that take care of humans. Athletes who have given up training because of age are not altogether abandoned by the spirit of competitiveness and concern for the body; they enjoy seeing others training, they encourage them and run beside them. **[593E]** So those who have retired from the contests of life and, because of the excellence of their soul, have become *daimones*, do not altogether spurn the affairs, arguments, and enthusiasms of this world, but feel well-disposed to those in training for the same goal, and encourage and urge them on in their quest for virtue, when they see that their striving has brought them within touching distance of their hopes.

'The daemonic power, indeed, does not aid all and sundry. **[593F]** Think how spectators on shore watch in silence swimmers who are still out at sea and far from land, but, once they come close, run down and wade into the water, helping by hand and voice to bring them to safety. This…[240] is the way of the daemonic power: it <leaves>[241] us, when we are swamped by circumstances, passing from body to body – from boat to boat, as it were – to struggle and suffer in our efforts to save ourselves by our own virtue and come safely into port. But if a soul has fought its long fight well and enthusiastically through countless births, and now, its cycle

594A ψυχὴ τῆς περιόδου συμπεραινομένης κινδυνεύουσα | καὶ φιλοτιμουμένη περὶ τὴν ἔκβασιν ἱδρῶτι πολλῷ ⟨τοῖς⟩ ἄνω προσφέρηται, ταύτῃ τὸν οἰκεῖον οὐ νεμεσᾷ δαίμονα βοηθεῖν ὁ θεὸς ἀλλ' ἀφίησι τῷ προθυμουμένῳ· προθυμεῖται δ' ἄλλος ἄλλην ἀνασῴζειν ἐγκελευόμενος, ἡ δὲ συνακούει διὰ τὸ πλησιάζειν καὶ σῴζεται, μὴ πειθομένη δέ, ἀπολιπόντος τοῦ δαίμονος, οὐκ εὐτυχῶς ἀπαλλάσσει.'

25. Τούτων εἰρημένων ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἀποβλέψας εἰς ἐμέ 'σοὶ μέν,' εἶπεν 'ὦ Καφισία, σχεδὸν ὥρα βαδίζειν εἰς τὸ γυμνάσιον ἤδη καὶ μὴ
594B ἀπολείπειν τοὺς συνήθεις, ἡμεῖς δὲ Θεάνορος ἐπιμελησόμεθα διαλύσαντες ὅταν δοκῇ τὴν συνουσίαν.'

κἀγώ 'ταῦτ'' ἔφην 'πράττωμεν· ἀλλὰ μικρὸν οἶμαί τι μετ' ἐμοῦ καὶ Γαλαξιδώρου βούλεταί σοι διαλεχθῆναι ὁ Θεόκριτος οὑτοσί.'

'ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ' εἶπε 'διαλεγέσθω' καὶ προῆγεν ἀναστὰς εἰς τὸ ἐπικάμπειον τῆς στοᾶς. καὶ ἡμεῖς περισχόντες αὐτὸν ἐπεχειροῦμεν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν. ὁ δὲ καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἔφη πάνυ σαφῶς εἰδέναι τῆς καθόδου τῶν φυγάδων καὶ συντετάχθαι μετὰ Γοργίδου τοῖς φίλοις πρὸς τὸν καιρόν, ἀποκτενεῖν δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν ἄκριτον οὐδένα μὴ με-
594C γάλης ἀνάγκης γενομένης, ἄλλως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ἁρμόζειν τὸ Θηβαίων εἶναί τινας ἀναιτίους καὶ καθαροὺς τῶν πεπραγμένων, ⟨οἳ⟩ μᾶλλον ἔξουσιν ἀνυπόπτως ⟨πρὸς⟩ τὸν δῆμον ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίστου παραινοῦντες. ἐδόκει ταῦθ' ἡμῖν. κἀκεῖνος μὲν ἀνεχώρησεν αὖθις ὡς τοὺς περὶ Σιμμίαν, ἡμεῖς δὲ καταβάντες εἰς τὸ γυμνάσιον ἐνετυγχάνομεν τοῖς φίλοις, καὶ διαλαμβάνων ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐν τῷ συμπαλαίειν τὰ μὲν ἐπυνθάνετο τὰ δ' ἔφραζε καὶ συνετάττετο πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν. ἑωρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τοὺς περὶ Ἀρχίαν καὶ Φίλιππον ἀληλιμμένους ἀπιόντας
594D ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον. ὁ γὰρ Φυλλίδας δεδιὼς μὴ τὸν Ἀμφίθεον προανέλωσιν, εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Λυσανορίδου προπομπῆς τὸν Ἀρχίαν δεξάμενος καὶ περὶ τῆς ⟨...⟩ γυναικός, ἧς ἐπιθυμῶν ἐτύγχανεν, εἰς ἐλπίδας ἐμβαλὼν ὡς ἀφιξομένης εἰς τὸν πότον, ἔπεισε πρὸς ῥᾳθυμίαν καὶ ἄνεσιν τραπέσθαι μετὰ τῶν εἰωθότων αὐτῷ συνακολασταίνειν.

26. Ὀψὲ δ' ⟨ἦν⟩ ἤδη τό τε ψῦχος ἐπέτεινε πνεύματος γενομένου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῶν πολλῶν τάχιον εἰς τὰς οἰκίας ἀνακεχωρηκότων ἡμεῖς μὲν τοὺς περὶ Δαμοκλείδαν καὶ Πελοπίδαν καὶ Θεόπομπον ἐντυχόντες
594E ἀνελαμβάνομεν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλους· ἐσχίσθησαν γὰρ εὐθὺς ὑπερβαλόντες τὸν Κιθαιρῶνα, καὶ παρέσχεν αὐτοῖς ὁ χειμὼν τὰ πρόσωπα συγκεκαλυμμένοις ἀδεῶς διελθεῖν τὴν πόλιν· ἐνίοις δ' ἐπήστραψε δεξιὸν ἄνευ βροντῆς εἰσιοῦσι διὰ τῶν πυλῶν· καὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἐδόκει καλὸν πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ δόξαν, ὡς λαμπρῶν ἀκινδύνων δὲ τῶν πράξεων ἐσομένων.

complete, draws near the upper region, ever in danger **[594A]** and striving with much sweat to secure its landing[242] – then god does not grudge its *daimon* the chance to help it, but lets it do so if it so wishes; and one wishes to save one soul, and another another by cries of encouragement, and the soul can hear (for it is close by now) and is saved; or if it does not heed, and the *daimon* deserts it, it comes to no happy end.'

25. At the end of this speech, Epaminondas looked at me. 'It's nearly time for you to go to the gymnasium, Caphisias,' he said, 'and not desert your comrades. **[594B]** We will choose the time to break off this conversation, and then we will look after Theanor.'

'Let's do that,' I said, 'but here is Theocritus, wanting, I think, to have some talk with you, with Galaxidorus and myself present.'

'Good luck to him,' he said, 'let him have it.' He got up and led us out to the angle of the colonnade. We gathered round him, and tried to urge him to take part in the plan. He said that he was well aware of the day of the exiles' return, and he and Gorgidas had made arrangements with their friends to meet the situation; but he would not kill any citizen without trial except in case of great necessity; **[594C]** moreover, it was right for the general population of Thebes that there should be some persons without responsibility or involvement in the affair, who could be less suspect to the people,[243] and be known to have the highest moral grounds for their advice. We approved this. Epaminondas then returned to Simmias and the rest, while we[244] went down to the gymnasium and met our friends. Wrestling with different partners, we were all able to ask questions, give explanations, and organize ourselves for the action. We saw Archias and Philippus[245] also anoint themselves and go off to the dinner. Phyllidas, in fact, **[594D]** being afraid they might kill Amphitheus[246] before we could act, had intercepted Archias as soon as he had returned from escorting Lysanoridas,[247] and instilled into him some hope that the…[248] woman with whom he was in love would be coming to the drinking party. He had thus persuaded him to relax and be comfortable with his usual companions in debauchery.

26. It was late now, and getting colder, and a wind had arisen. Most people therefore had gone home quickly. We[249] fell in with Damoclidas,[250] Pelopidas, and Theopompus[251] and took them along with us. Others did the same for others of the exiles; they had separated immediately **[594E]** after crossing Cithaeron,[252] and the stormy weather enabled them to wrap up and hide their faces, so as to pass through the city without fear. Some, as they entered the gate, had seen a flash of lightning on the right, unaccompanied by thunder.[253] This was a good sign of safety and of glory: our actions would be famous, but free of danger.

27. ὡς οὖν ἅπαντες ἔνδον ἦμεν πεντήκοντα δυεῖν δέοντες, ἤδη τοῦ Θεοκρίτου καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν οἰκίσκῳ τινὶ σφαγιαζομένου πολὺς ἦν τῆς θύρας ἀραγμός, καὶ μετὰ μικρὸν ἧκέ τις ἀγγέλλων ὑπηρέτας τοῦ Ἀρχίου δύο κόπτειν τὴν αὐλειον ἀπεσταλμένους σπουδῇ πρὸς Χάρωνα καὶ κελεύ-
594F εἰν ἀνοίγειν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν βράδιον ὑπακουόντων. θορυβηθεὶς οὖν ὁ Χάρων ἐκείνοις μὲν εὐθὺς ἀνοιγνύναι προσέταξεν, αὐτὸς δ' ἀπαντήσας ἔχων στέφανον ὡς τεθυκὼς καὶ πίνων ἐπυνθάνετο τῶν ὑπηρετῶν ὅ τι βούλοιντο. λέγει δ' ἄτερος 'Ἀρχίας καὶ Φίλιππος ἔπεμψαν ἡμᾶς κελεύοντες ὡς τάχιστά σ' ἥκειν πρὸς αὐτούς.' ἐρομένου δὲ τοῦ Χάρωνος, τίς ἡ σπουδὴ τῆς τηνικαῦτα μεταπέμψεως αὐτοῦ καὶ μή τι καινότερον, 'οὐδὲν ἴσμεν' ὁ ὑπηρέτης ἔφη 'πλέον, ἀλλὰ τί λέγωμεν αὐτοῖς;' 'ὅτι νὴ Δί'' εἶπεν ὁ Χάρων 'θεὶς τὸν στέφανον ἤδη καὶ λαβὼν τὸ ἱμάτιον ἕπομαι· μεθ' ὑμῶν γὰρ τηνικαῦτα βαδίζων διαταράξω τινὰς ὡς ἀγόμενος.'

595A 'οὕτως' ἔφη 'ποίει· | καὶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς δεῖ τοῖς ὑπὸ πόλιν φρουροῖς κομίσαι τι πρόσταγμα παρὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων.'

ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν ᾤχοντο, τοῦ δὲ Χάρωνος εἰσελθόντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ ταῦτα φράσαντος ἔκπληξις ἅπαντας ἔσχεν οἰομένους μεμηνῦσθαι, καὶ τὸν Ἱπποσθενείδαν ὑπενόουν οἱ πλεῖστοι κωλῦσαι μὲν ἐπιχειρήσαντα τὴν κάθοδον διὰ τοῦ Χλίδωνος, ἐπεὶ δ' ἀπέτυχε καὶ συνῆπτε τῷ καιρῷ τὸ δεινόν, ἐξενηνοχέναι πιθανὸν εἶναι τὴν πρᾶξιν ὑπὸ δέους· οὐ γὰρ ἀφίκετο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἐδόκει πονηρὸς γεγονέναι καὶ παλίμβολος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τόν γε Χάρωνα πάντες
595B ᾠόμεθα χρῆναι βαδίζειν καὶ ὑπακούειν τοῖς ἄρχουσι καλούμενον. ὁ δὲ κελεύσας τὸν υἱὸν ἐλθεῖν κάλλιστον ὄντα Θηβαίων, ὦ Ἀρχέδαμε, παῖδα καὶ φιλοπονώτατον περὶ τὰ γυμνάσια, πεντεκαιδεκέτη μὲν σχεδὸν πολὺ δὲ ῥώμῃ καὶ μεγέθει διαφέροντα τῶν ὁμηλίκων, 'οὗτος,' εἶπεν 'ὦ ἄνδρες, ἐμοὶ μόνος ἐστὶ καὶ ἀγαπητός, ὥσπερ ἴστε· τοῦτον ὑμῖν παραδίδωμι πρὸς θεῶν ἅπασι πρὸς δαιμόνων ἐπισκήπτων· εἰ φανείην ἐγὼ πονηρὸς περὶ ὑμᾶς, ἀποκτείνατε, μὴ φείσησθ' ἡμῶν· τὸ δὲ λοιπόν, ὦ
595C ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, πρὸς τὸ συμπεσούμενον ἀντιτάξασθε, μὴ πρόησθε τὰ σώματα διαφθεῖραι τοῖς ἐχθίστοις ἀνάνδρως καὶ ἀκλεῶς, ἀλλ' ἀμύνασθε τὰς ψυχὰς ἀηττήτους τῇ πατρίδι φυλάττοντες.' ταῦτα τοῦ Χάρωνος λέγοντος τὸ μὲν φρόνημα καὶ τὴν καλοκἀγαθίαν ἐθαυμάζομεν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὑποψίαν ἠγανακτοῦμεν καὶ ἀπάγειν ἐκελεύομεν τὸν παῖδα.

'τὸ δ' ὅλον' εἶπεν ὁ Πελοπίδας 'οὐδ' εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι δοκεῖς ἡμῖν, ὦ Χάρων, μὴ μεταστησάμενος εἰς οἰκίαν ἑτέραν τὸν υἱόν· τί γὰρ αὐτὸν δεῖ κινδυνεύειν μεθ' ἡμῶν ἐγκαταλαμβανόμενον; καὶ νῦν ἐκπεμπτέος, ἵν' ἡμῖν, ἐάν τι πάσχωμεν, εὐγενὴς ὑποτρέφηται τιμωρὸς ἐπὶ τοὺς
595D τυράννους.' 'οὐκ ἔστιν' εἶπεν ὁ Χάρων, 'ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ παραμενεῖ καὶ κινδυνεύσει μεθ' ὑμῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτῳ καλὸν ὑποχείριον γενέσθαι τοῖς

27. When we were all in the house,[254] forty-eight of us, and while Theocritus was sacrificing privately in a separate room, there was a great hammering on the door. Very soon, someone came to tell us that two officers of Archias were knocking at the street-door, on an urgent errand to Charon: **[594F]** they were telling the servants to open up, and were angry at their slowness in obeying. Charon was greatly alarmed. He gave orders to open up at once, and himself went to meet the visitors, wearing a wreath, as though he had sacrificed and was now drinking. He asked the officers what they wanted. 'Archias and Philippus sent us,' said one of them, 'with orders for you to go to them as soon as possible.' Charon asked what was the urgency in sending for him at such an hour, and whether there was any fresh news. 'We know no more,' replied the officer, 'but what are we to tell them?' Tell them,' said Charon, 'that I'm following you, as soon as I have taken off my garland and got my cloak;[255] if I go with you at this time of night, I shall cause a disturbance: people will think I am being arrested.'

'Do as you say,' said the officer, **[595A]** 'we have also to deliver some order from the authorities to the guard in the lower town.'

So they went their way, and Charon came back to us and told us what had happened. We were all appalled. We thought we had been betrayed, and most suspected Hipposthenidas: he had tried to prevent the return by sending Chlidon,[256] and, when he had failed and the moment of danger had come, it was only too plausible[257] that he should have revealed the plan out of fear. In fact, he had not come to the house with the rest, and was generally thought to have been a disloyal and unreliable character. None the less, we all agreed that Charon should go **[595B]** and obey the authorities' orders. He then sent for his son. He was the most beautiful boy in Thebes, Archedamus, and the keenest athlete in the gymnasia, about fifteen years old, but much stronger and taller than his contemporaries. 'This, gentleman,' said Charon, 'is my beloved only child. I entrust him to your hands, and I enjoin you all, by all the powers of heaven, if I should prove traitor to you, to kill him, and not spare us. And now, my brave friends, prepare to face whatever happens.[258] Do not hand your lives to your bitterest enemies like craven cowards. **[595C]** Defend yourselves, keep your hearts unconquered for your country's sake.' We marvelled at Charon's spirit and nobility as he said this, but we were grieved at his suspicions of us, and told him to take the boy away.

'Altogether, Charon,' said Pelopidas, 'we think you made a wrong decision in not moving your son to another house. Why need he run risks by being caught with us? Even now, he should be sent away, so that he can grow up to avenge us nobly on the tyrants.' 'Impossible,' said Charon, 'he shall stay here **[595D]** and run the risk with you. It is not right for him too to be under our enemies' sway. My boy, be brave beyond your age: this is

ἐχθροῖς, ἀλλὰ τόλμα παρ' ἡλικίαν, ὦ παῖ, γευόμενος ἄθλων ἀναγκαίων καὶ κινδύνευε μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν πολιτῶν ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας καὶ ἀρετῆς· πολλὴ δ' ἐλπὶς ἔτι λείπεται, καί πού τις ἐφορᾷ θεῶν ἡμᾶς ἀγωνιζομένους περὶ τῶν δικαίων.'

28. Δάκρυα πολλοῖς ἐπῆλθεν ἡμῶν, ὦ Ἀρχέδαμε, πρὸς τοὺς λόγους τἀνδρός, αὐτὸς δ' ἄδακρυς καὶ ἄτεγκτος ἐγχειρίσας Πελοπίδᾳ τὸν υἱὸν ἐχώρει διὰ θυρῶν δεξιούμενος ἕκαστον ἡμῶν καὶ παραθαρρύνων. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἂν ἠγάσω τοῦ παιδὸς αὐτοῦ τὴν φαιδρότητα καὶ τὸ ἀδεὲς
595E πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, ὥσπερ τοῦ Νεοπτολέμου, μήτ' ὠχριάσαντος μήτ' ἐκπλαγέντος, ἀλλ' ἕλκοντος τὸ ξίφος τοῦ Πελοπίδου καὶ καταμανθάνοντος. ἐν τούτῳ Κηφισόδωρος ⟨ὁ⟩ Διο⟨γεί⟩τονος, εἷς τῶν φίλων, παρῆν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ξίφος ἔχων καὶ θώρακα σιδηροῦν ὑπενδεδυμένος καὶ πυθόμενος τὴν Χάρωνος ὑπ' Ἀρχίου μετάπεμψιν ἠτιᾶτο τὴν μέλλησιν ἡμῶν καὶ παρώξυνεν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκίας βαδίζειν· φθήσεσθαι γὰρ ἐμπεσόντας αὐτοῖς, εἰ δὲ μή, βέλτιον εἶναι προελθόντας ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ συμπλέκεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἀσυντάκτους καὶ σποράδας ἢ μένειν ἐν οἰκίσκῳ
595F καθειρξαντας αὑτοὺς ὥσπερ σμῆνος ἐξαιρεθησομένους ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων. ἐνῆγε δὲ καὶ ὁ μάντις Θεόκριτος, ὡς τῶν ἱερῶν σωτηρίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν ἐχεγγύων αὐτῷ γεγονότων.

29. ὁπλιζομένων δ' ἡμῶν καὶ συνταττομένων αὖθις ἀφικνεῖται Χάρων ἱλαρῷ τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ μειδιῶν καὶ προσβλέπων εἰς ἡμᾶς θαρρεῖν ἐκέλευεν, ὡς δεινοῦ μηδενὸς ὄντος ἀλλὰ τῆς πράξεως ὁδῷ βαδιζούσης.
596A 'ὁ γὰρ Ἀρχίας' ἔφη 'καὶ ὁ Φίλιππος ὡς ἤκουσαν ἥκειν ἐμὲ κεκλημένον, | ἤδη βαρεῖς ὑπὸ τῆς μέθης ὄντες καὶ συνεκλελυμένοι τοῖς σώμασι τὰς ψυχάς, μόλις διαναστάντες ἔξω προῆλθον ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας. εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀρχίου „φυγάδας, ὦ Χάρων, ἀκούομεν ἐν τῇ πόλει κρύπτεσθαι παρεισελθόντας" οὐ μετρίως ἐγὼ διαταραχθείς „ποῦ δ'" εἶπον „εἶναι λέγονται καὶ τίνες;" „ἀγνοοῦμεν" ὁ Ἀρχίας εἶπε „καί σε τούτου χάριν ἐλθεῖν ἐκελεύσαμεν, εἰ δή τι τυγχάνοις σαφέστερον ἀκηκοώς." κἀγὼ μικρὸν ὥσπερ ἐκ πληγῆς ἀναφέρων τὴν διάνοιαν ἐλογιζόμην λόγον εἶναι τὴν μήνυσιν οὐ βέβαιον, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν συνειδότων ἐξενηνέχθαι
596B τὴν πρᾶξιν οὐδενός· οὐ γὰρ ⟨ἂν⟩ ἀγνοεῖν τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτούς, εἴ τις εἰδὼς ἀκριβῶς ἐμήνυεν, ἄλλως δ' ὑποψίαν ἢ λόγον ἄσημον ἐν τῇ πόλει περιφερόμενον ἥκειν εἰς ἐκείνους. εἶπον οὖν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι „ζῶντος μὲν Ἀνδροκλείδου πολλάκις ἐπίσταμαι φήμας τοιαύτας ῥυείσας διακενῆς καὶ λόγους ψευδεῖς ἐνοχλήσαντας ἡμῖν, νυνὶ δ'" ἔφην „οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα τοιοῦτον, ὦ Ἀρχία· σκέψομαι δὲ τὸν λόγον, εἰ κελεύεις, κἂν πύθωμαί τι φροντίδος ἄξιον, ὑμᾶς οὐ λήσεται."

„πάνυ μὲν οὖν" ὁ Φυλλίδας εἶπε „μηδέν, ὦ Χάρων, ἀδιερεύνητον μηδ' ἄπυστον ὑπὲρ τούτων ἀπολίπῃς· τί γὰρ κωλύει μηδενὸς καταφρο-

your first taste of fights that have to be fought. Face danger at the side of many brave citizens, for freedom and for honour. There is still good hope, and surely some god watches over us when we fight in a just cause.'

28. Many of us burst into tears, Archedamus, at Charon's words; but he himself remained dry-eyed and unmoved. He handed his son over to Pelopidas, and walked out through the door, taking each of us by the hand and giving us encouragement. You would have admired even more the boy's radiance and fearlessness in the face of danger. **[595E]** Like Neoptolemus[259] he neither paled nor showed fear. He drew Pelopidas' sword and examined it closely. Meanwhile, Cephisodorus,[260] the son of Diogeiton, one of our friends, arrived to join us, wearing a sword and an iron corselet under his clothes. When he heard of Charon's summons to Archias, he reproached us for delay, and urged us to make our move against the houses at once: we should thus anticipate their attack, or, if not, it was better to go forward and engage a disorganized and scattered foe[261] in the open, than to stay shut up in a building, **[595F]** to be smoked out by the enemy like a swarm of bees.[262] Theocritus the diviner urged this course too: his sacrifices had been auspicious and favourable, and guaranteed our safety.

29. While we were arming and getting ready, Charon returned, cheerful and smiling. He looked at us, and bade us be of good heart. There was nothing to fear, things were going according to plan.

'Archias and Philippus,' he said,[263] **[596A]** 'were already far gone in drink when they heard that I had come in accordance with their summons. Their minds were as paralysed as their bodies. They could hardly stand up, but they came to the door. "We hear, Charon," said Archias, "that some exiles have slipped into the city and are in hiding." I was much disturbed. "Where are they said to be, and who are they?" I asked. "We don't know," said Archias, "and that is why we asked you to come, in case you have heard something more definite." I was a little while recovering my thoughts from the blow, as it were, but I reckoned that their information was only unreliable talk, **[596B]** and that none of the conspirators had revealed the plot; they would have known the houses, I thought, if the information had come from anyone with exact knowledge. Some suspicion or vague rumour circulating in the city must have reached their ears. So I replied: "While Androclidas[264] was alive, I know there was often a stream of such idle rumours and false stories which were a nuisance to us, but I've heard nothing like that now, Archias. If you wish, I will inquire into the story, and if I learn anything that warrants concern, you shall hear of it."

"Just so," said Phyllidas, "don't let anything pass without question or inquiry in this connection, Charon. What's wrong with treating nothing as

596C νεῖν ἀλλὰ πάντα φυλάττεσθαι καὶ προσέχειν; καλὸν γὰρ ἡ πρόνοια καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλές.“ ἅμα δὲ τὸν Ἀρχίαν ὑπολαβὼν ἀπῆγεν εἰς τὸν οἶκον, ἐν ᾧ πίνοντες τυγχάνουσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴ μέλλωμεν, ἄνδρες,’ ἔφη, ‘προσευξάμενοι δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς ἐξίωμεν.’

ταῦτα τοῦ Χάρωνος εἰπόντος εὐχόμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους.

30. Ὥρα μὲν οὖν ἦν καθ’ ἣν ἄνθρωποι μάλιστα περὶ δεῖπνόν εἰσι, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα μᾶλλον ἐπιτεῖνον ἤδη νιφετὸν ὑπεκίνει ψεκάδι λεπτῇ μεμιγμένον, ὥστε πολλὴν ἐρημίαν εἶναι διὰ τῶν στενωπῶν διεξιοῦσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν Λεοντιάδαν καὶ τὸν Ὑπάταν ταχθέντες ἐγγὺς ἀλλή-
596D λων οἰκοῦντας ἐν ἱματίοις ἐξήεσαν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν ἕτερον τῶν ὅπλων ἢ μάχαιραν ἕκαστος (ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἦν καὶ Πελοπίδας καὶ Δαμοκλείδας καὶ Κηφισόδωρος), Χάρων δὲ καὶ Μέλων καὶ οἱ μετ’ αὐτῶν ἐπιτίθεσθαι τοῖς περὶ Ἀρχίαν μέλλοντες, ἡμιθωράκια ἐνδεδυμένοι καὶ στεφάνους δασεῖς ἔχοντες οἱ μὲν ἐλάτης οἱ δὲ πεύκης, ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ χιτώνια τῶν γυναικ⟨εί⟩ων ἀμπεχόμενοι, μεθύοντας ἀπομιμούμενοι κώμῳ χρωμένους μετὰ γυναικῶν.

ἡ δὲ χείρων, ὦ Ἀρχέδαμε, τύχη καὶ τὰς τῶν πολεμίων μαλακίας καὶ ἀγνοίας ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἐπανισοῦσα τόλμαις καὶ παρασκευαῖς καὶ κα-
596E θάπερ δρᾶμα τὴν πρᾶξιν ἡμῶν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς διαποικίλλουσα κινδυνώδεσιν ἐπεισοδίοις εἰς αὐτὸ συνέδραμε τὸ ἔργον, ὀξὺν ἐπιφέρουσα καὶ δεινὸν ἀνελπίστου περιπετείας ἀγῶνα. τοῦ γὰρ Χάρωνος ὡς ἀνέπεισε τοὺς περὶ Ἀρχίαν καὶ Φίλιππον ἀναχωρήσαντος οἴκαδε καὶ διασκευάζοντος ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἦκεν ἐνθένδε παρ’ ὑμῶν ἐπιστολὴ παρ’ Ἀρχίου τοῦ ἱεροφάντου πρὸς Ἀρχίαν ἐκεῖνον ὄντα φίλον αὐτῷ καὶ ξένον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξαγγέλλουσα τὴν κάθοδον καὶ τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν τῶν φυγά-
596F δων καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν, εἰς ἣν παρεληλύθεισαν, καὶ τοὺς συμπράττοντας αὐτοῖς. ἤδη δὲ καὶ τῇ μέθῃ κατακεκλασμένος ὁ Ἀρχίας καὶ τῇ προσδοκίᾳ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀνεπτοημένος ἐδέξατο μὲν τὴν ἐπιστολήν, τοῦ δὲ γραμματοφόρου φήσαντος ὑπέρ τινων σπουδαίων αὐτῷ γεγράφθαι ‘τὰ σπουδαῖα τοίνυν εἰς αὔριον’ ἔφη. καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπιστολὴν ὑπέθηκεν ὑπὸ τὸ προσκεφάλαιον, αἰτήσας δὲ ποτήριον ἐκέλευσεν ἐγχεῖν καὶ τὸν Φυλλίδαν ἐξέπεμπε συνεχῶς ἐπὶ θύρας σκεψόμενον εἰ τὰ γύναια πρόσεισι.

31. τοιαύτης δὲ τὸν πότον ἐλπίδος διαπαιδαγωγησάσης προσμίξαντες ἡμεῖς καὶ διὰ τῶν οἰκετῶν εὐθὺς ὠσάμενοι πρὸς τὸν ἀνδρῶνα μικρὸν
597A ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις ἔστημεν ἐφορῶντες τῶν κατακειμένων ἕκαστον. | ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν στεφάνων καὶ τῆς ἐσθῆτος ὄψις παραλογιζομένη τὴν ἐπιδημίαν ἡμῶν σιγὴν ἐποίησεν· ἐπεὶ δὲ πρῶτος ὁ Μέλων ὥρμησε διὰ μέσου τὴν χεῖρα τῇ λαβῇ τοῦ ξίφους ἐπιβεβληκώς, Καβίριχος ὁ κυαμευτὸς ἄρχων τοῦ βραχίονος αὐτὸν παραπορευόμενον ἀντισπάσας ἀνεβόησεν ‘οὐ Μέλων οὗτος, ὦ Φυλλίδα;’ τούτου μὲν οὖν ἐξέκρουσε τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν ἅμα τὸ ξίφος ἀνέλκων, διανιστάμενον δὲ χαλεπῶς τὸν Ἀρχίαν

beneath notice **[596C]** but keeping a watchful eye on all things? Foresight and security are an excellent thing." With this, he supported Archias back into the house, where they are now drinking. Let us not delay, friends,' Charon concluded, 'but pray to the gods and set forth.'

When he had spoken, we said our prayers to the gods and tried to give one another courage.

30. It was now time when people are mostly at dinner. The wind was rising, and bringing a mixture of snow and light rain. So the streets were deserted as we passed through them. The party detailed to deal with Leontiadas and Hypatas,[265] who lived near each other, went in cloaks, armed only with a dagger each. **[596D]** Pelopidas, Damoclidas and Cephisodorus were in this group. Charon, Melon and their companions, who were due to attack Archias' party, wore breastplates and had thick garlands of fir or pine, and some of them had put on women's dresses, pretending that it was a party of drunken revellers with their women.[266]

But bad fortune, Archedamus, which both evened the odds between the enemy's indolence and ignorance and our daring and preparedness, and had from the start varied the drama of our plot **[596E]** with scenes of danger, now accompanied us to the very moment of action, producing the sudden, dangerous crisis of a quite unexpected turn of events.[267] Charon, having convinced Archias and Philippus, had returned home, and was preparing us for action, when there came a letter from Athens, addressed by Archias the hierophant to the other Archias, who was his friend and guest,[268] reporting (presumably)[269] the return and **[596F]** conspiracy of the exiles, the house to which they had gone, and their collaborators. Archias was now completely shattered by drink[270] and excited by the expectation of the women. He took the letter, but when the courier said it was about a serious piece of business,[271] he merely said 'Serious business tomorrow!' put the letter under his pillow, called for a cup and ordered it to be filled, and sent Phyllidas repeatedly to the door to see if the women were coming.

31. These hopes kept them happily drinking until we joined the party. We pushed straight past the servants into the dining-room, but paused for a moment at the door, observing each of the diners. **[597A]** The sight of our garlands and our clothes misled them as to the nature of our visit, and produced a silence. Melon was the first to plunge in, hand on sword-hilt. Cabirichus, the archon-by-lot,[272] caught him by the arm as he passed him and cried out 'Phyllidas, isn't this Melon?' Melon shook him off, and at the same time drew his sword. Archias made an effort to rise, but Melon ran at him and struck and struck again till he had killed him. As to Philippus, he

ἐπιδραμὼν οὐκ ἀνῆκε παίων ἕως ἀπέκτεινε. τὸν δὲ Φίλιππον ἔτρωσε
597B μὲν Χάρων παρὰ τὸν τράχηλον, ἀμυνόμενον δὲ τοῖς παρακειμένοις ἐκπώμασιν ὁ Λυσίθεος ἀπὸ τῆς κλίνης χαμαὶ καταβαλὼν ἀνεῖλε. τὸν δὲ Καβίριχον ἡμεῖς κατεπραΰνομεν ἀξιοῦντες μὴ τοῖς τυράννοις βοηθεῖν ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρίδα συνελευθεροῦν ἱερὸν ὄντα καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς καθωσιωμένον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς· ὡς δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸν οἶνον οὐκ ἦν εὐπαρακόμιστος τῷ λογισμῷ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ἀλλὰ μετέωρος καὶ τεταραγμένος ἀνίστατο καὶ τὸ δόρυ προεβάλλετο κατ' αἰχμήν, ὅπερ ἐξ ἔθους ἀεὶ φοροῦσιν οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν ἄρχοντες, ἐγὼ μὲν ἐκ μέσου διαλαβὼν τὸ δόρυ καὶ μετεωρί-
597C σας ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἐβόων ἀφεῖναι καὶ σῴζειν ἑαυτόν, εἰ δὲ μή, πεπλήξεσθαι· Θεόπομπος δὲ παραστὰς ἐκ δεξιῶν καὶ τῷ ξίφει πατάξας αὐτόν 'ἐνταῦθ'' ἔφη 'κεῖσο μετὰ τούτων, οὓς ἐκολάκευες· μὴ γὰρ ἐν ἐλευθέραις στεφανώσαιο ταῖς Θήβαις μηδὲ θύσειας ἔτι τοῖς θεοῖς, ἐφ' ὧν καταράσω πολλὰ τῇ πατρίδι πολλάκις ὑπὲρ τῶν πολεμίων εὐχόμενος.' πεσόντος δὲ τοῦ Καβιρίχου τὸ μὲν ἱερὸν δόρυ Θεόκριτος παρὼν ἀνήρπασεν ἐκ τοῦ φόνου, τῶν δὲ θεραπόντων ὀλίγους τολμήσαντας ἀμύνασθαι διεφθείραμεν ἡμεῖς, τοὺς δ' ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας εἰς τὸν ἀνδρῶνα κατεκλείσαμεν οὐ βουλόμενοι διαπεσόντας ἐξαγγεῖλαι τὰ πεπραγμένα, πρὶν εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ τῶν ἑταίρων εἰ καλῶς κεχώρηκεν.

597D **32.** Ἐπράχθη δὲ κἀκεῖνα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· ἔκοψαν οἱ περὶ Πελοπίδαν τοῦ Λεοντιάδου τὴν αὔλειον ἡσυχῇ προσελθόντες καὶ πρὸς τὸν ὑπακούσαντα τῶν οἰκετῶν ἔφασαν ἥκειν Ἀθήνηθεν γράμματα τῷ Λεοντιάδᾳ παρὰ Καλλιστράτου κομίζοντες. ὡς δ' ἀπαγγείλας καὶ κελευσθεὶς ἀνοῖξαι τὸν μοχλὸν ἀφεῖλε καὶ μικρὸν ἐνέδωκε τὴν θύραν, ἐμπεσόντες ἀθρόοι καὶ ἀνατρέψαντες τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἵεντο δρόμῳ διὰ τῆς αὐλῆς ἐπὶ τὸν θάλαμον. ὁ δ' εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐξενεχθεὶς τῇ ὑπο-
597E νοίᾳ καὶ σπασάμενος τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον ὥρμησε πρὸς ἄμυναν, ἄδικος μὲν ἀνὴρ καὶ τυραννικὸς εὔρωστος δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ κατὰ χεῖρα ῥωμαλέος· οὐ μὴν ἔγνω γε τὸν λύχνον καταβαλεῖν καὶ διὰ σκότους συμμῖξαι τοῖς ἐπιφερομένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν φωτὶ καθορώμενος ὑπὸ τούτων ἅμα τῆς θύρας ἀνοιγομένης παίει τὸν Κηφισόδωρον εἰς τὸν λαγόνα καὶ δευτέρῳ τῷ Πελοπίδᾳ συμπεσὼν μέγα βοῶν ἀνεκαλεῖτο τοὺς θεράποντας. ἀλλ' ἐκείνους μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Σαμίδαν ἀνεῖργον οὐ παρακινδυνεύοντας εἰς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν ἀνδράσιν ἐπιφανεστάτοις τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ κατ' ἀλκὴν
597F διαφέρουσιν. ἀγὼν δ' ἦν τῷ Πελοπίδᾳ πρὸς τὸν Λεοντιάδαν καὶ διαξιφισμὸς ἐν ταῖς θύραις τοῦ θαλάμου στεναῖς οὔσαις καὶ τοῦ Κηφισοδώρου πεπτωκότος ἐν μέσαις αὐταῖς καὶ θνήσκοντος, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι τοὺς ἄλλους προσβοηθεῖν. τέλος δ' ὁ ἡμέτερος λαβὼν μὲν εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν οὐ μέγα τραῦμα δοὺς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ καταβαλὼν τὸν Λεοντιάδαν ἐπέσφαξε θερμῷ τῷ Κηφισοδώρῳ· καὶ γὰρ εἶδε πίπτοντα τὸν ἐχθρὸν ὁ ἀνὴρ καὶ τῷ Πελοπίδᾳ τὴν δεξιὰν ἐνέβαλε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀσπα-

was wounded in the neck by Charon, and then, when he tried to defend himself with the drinking-cups that were at hand, **[597B]** Lysitheus[273] threw him off the couch on to the floor and finished him off. Cabirichus we tried to calm down, pointing out that he ought not to help the tyrants, but ought to help to liberate his country, seeing that he was a sacred person, consecrated to the gods on her behalf. But, thanks to the wine, he was incapable of being induced by argument to understand his interests; he got to his feet in high excitement and confusion, and brandished the point of the spear which our archons always carried by custom. I seized the spear by the shaft, raised it above his head,[274] and shouted to him to let go and save himself, or else be struck down. **[597C]** Theopompus[275] came up on the right, struck him with his sword, and cried out 'Lie there with the men whose toady you were! God forbid that you should wear your garland in a free Thebes, or sacrifice any more to the gods in whose presence you so often cursed your country by praying for its enemies.' After Cabirichus had fallen, Theocritus, who was near by, snatched the sacred spear out of the blood. A few of the servants ventured to attempt resistance; we killed them. Those who stayed quiet we locked in the dining-room, not wanting them to slip through and spread the news before we knew **[597D]** whether our friends had been successful.

32. That business too had been done, in the following way: Pelopidas' party had quietly approached Leontiadas' street door, and told the servant who answered that they had come from Athens with a letter for him from Callistratus.[276] The man gave the message, and was ordered to open up. As soon as he had removed the bar and opened the door a little, they all rushed in together, threw the man to the floor and ran through the courtyard to the bedroom. Leontiadas guessed the truth at once, drew his sword, **[597E]** and set about defending himself. He was an unjust and tyrannical person, but he had a stout heart and a powerful arm. But he did not think of knocking over the lamp and confronting his attackers in the dark. Instead, in full view of them all, the instant the door was opened, he wounded Cephisodorus in the thigh. Next he fell on the second man, Pelopidas, and shouted to summon the servants. They however were held back by Samidas'[277] party, and did not risk coming to blows with distinguished citizens who were also outstanding fighters. The struggle was between Pelopidas and Leontiadas. They crossed swords **[597F]** in the narrow doorway of the bedroom, where Cephisodorus had fallen and lay dying in the middle of the entrance, so that the others could not join in. In the end, our man received a slight wound in the head, but he gave many, and finally felled Leontiadas and killed him over Cephisodorus' still living body. Indeed, Cephisodorus saw the enemy fall, gave his right hand to Pelopidas, said a word of greeting to the others, and breathed his last, a

σάμενος ἅμ' ἴλεως ἐξέπνευσε. γενόμενοι δ' ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπὶ τὸν Ὑπάταν τρέπονται καὶ τῶν θυρῶν ὁμοίως αὐτοῖς ἀνοιχθεισῶν φεύγοντα τὸν Ὑπάταν ὑπὲρ τέγους τινὸς εἰς τοὺς γείτονας ἀποσφάττουσιν.

598A **33.** | Ἐκεῖθεν δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἠπείγοντο καὶ συμβάλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἔξωθεν παρὰ τὴν πολύστυλον. ἀσπασάμενοι δ' ἀλλήλους καὶ συλλαλήσαντες ἐχωροῦμεν ἐπὶ τὸ δεσμωτήριον. ἐκκαλέσας ⟨δὲ τὸν⟩ ἐπὶ τῆς εἱρκτῆς ὁ Φυλλίδας 'Ἀρχίας' ἔφη 'καὶ Φίλιππος κελεύουσί σε ταχέως ἄγειν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς Ἀμφίθεον.' ὁ δ' ὁρῶν καὶ τῆς ὥρας τὴν ἀτοπίαν καὶ τὸ μὴ καθεστηκότα λαλεῖν αὐτῷ τὸν Φυλλίδαν, ἀλλὰ θερμὸν ὄντα τῷ ἀγῶνι καὶ μετέωρον, ὑπειδόμενος τὸ πλάσμα 'πότ',' ἔλεγεν 'ὦ Φυλλίδα, τηνι-
598B καῦτα μετεπέμψαντο δεσμώτην οἱ πολέμαρχοι; πότε δὲ διὰ σοῦ; τί δὲ κομίζεις παράσημον;' **** ἅμα δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ξυστὸν ἱππικὸν ἔχων διῆκε τῶν πλευρῶν καὶ κατέβαλε πονηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ᾧ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐπενέβησαν καὶ προσέπτυσαν οὐκ ὀλίγαι γυναῖκες. ἡμεῖς δὲ τὰς θύρας τῆς εἱρκτῆς κατασχίσαντες ἐκαλοῦμεν ὀνομαστὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὸν Ἀμφίθεον, εἶτα τῶν ἄλλων πρὸς ὃν ἕκαστος ἐπιτηδείως εἶχεν· οἱ δὲ τὴν φωνὴν γνωρίζοντες ἀνεπήδων ἐκ τῶν χαμευνῶν ἄσμενοι τὰς ἀλύσεις ἐφέλκοντες, οἱ δὲ τοὺς πόδας ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ δεδεμένοι τὰς χεῖρας ὀρέγον-
598C τες ἐβόων δεόμενοι μὴ ἀπολειφθῆναι. λυομένων δὲ τούτων ἤδη πολλοὶ προσεφέροντο τῶν ἐγγὺς οἰκούντων αἰσθανόμενοι τὰ πραττόμενα καὶ χαίροντες. αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες, ὡς ἑκάστη περὶ τοῦ προσήκοντος ἤκουσεν, οὐκ ἐμμένουσαι τοῖς Βοιωτῶν ἔθεσιν ἐξέτρεχον πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ διεπυνθάνοντο παρὰ τῶν ἀπαντώντων, αἱ δ' ἀνευροῦσαι πατέρας ἢ ἄνδρας αὐτῶν ἠκολούθουν, οὐδεὶς δ' ἐκώλυε· ῥοπὴ γὰρ ἦν μεγάλη πρὸς τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας ὁ παρ' αὐτῶν ἔλεος καὶ δάκρυα καὶ δεήσεις σωφρόνων γυναικῶν.

34. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῶν πραγμάτων ὄντων πυθόμενος τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν
598D ἐγὼ καὶ τὸν Γοργίδαν ἤδη μετὰ τῶν φίλων συναθροίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερὸν ἐπορευόμην πρὸς αὐτούς, ἦκον δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ὁμοῦ καὶ συνέρρεον ἀεὶ πλείονες. ὡς δ' ἀπήγγειλα καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτοῖς τὰ πεπραγμένα καὶ παρεκάλουν βοηθεῖν ἐλθόντας εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν, ἅμα πάντες εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐκήρυττον τοὺς πολίτας. τοῖς δὲ τότ' ὄχλοις τῶν συνισταμένων ὅπλα παρεῖχον αἵ τε στοαὶ πλήρεις οὖσαι παντοδαπῶν λαφύρων καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐγγὺς οἰκούντων ἐργαστήρια μαχαιροποιῶν. ἦκε δὲ καὶ Ἱπποσθενείδας μετὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ οἰκετῶν τοὺς ἐπιδεδημηκότας κατὰ τύχην πρὸς
598E τὰ Ἡράκλεια σαλπικτὰς παραλαμβάνων. εὐθέως δ'οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἐσήμαινον οἱ δὲ κατ' ἄλλους τόπους, πανταχόθεν ἐκταράττοντες τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ὡς πάντων ἀφεστώτων. οἱ μὲν οὖν λακωνίζοντες .... τὴν Καδμείαν ἔφευγον ἐπισπασάμενοι καὶ τοὺς ἐκκρίτους λεγομένους, εἰωθότας δὲ περὶ τὴν ἄκραν κάτω νυκτερεύειν, οἱ δ' ἄνω, τούτων μὲν

happy man. Next, they turned to Hypatas; here too the door was opened to them, and they cut Hypatas down as he tried to escape over the roof to his neighbours.

33. **[598A]** From there they made haste to join us and met us outside the Long Colonnade.[278] After greeting one another and talking together, we proceeded to the prison. Phyllidas called the prison governor out and said 'Archias and Philippus order you to deliver Amphitheus to them immediately.' In view of the unusual hour, and the fact that Phyllidas was not speaking in a very collected manner, but was heated and excited by his fight, the governor saw through the trick. 'And when have **[598B]** the polemarchs ever sent for a prisoner at this hour, Phyllidas?' he said, 'and when did they ever use you as the messenger? What token of your authority have you got?' '<This,' said Phyllidas>[279] ; and as he spoke he drove the cavalry lance which he had with him through his opponent's side, and laid the vile creature low; many women trampled and spat on him next morning. We forced open the door of the prison, and called the prisoners by name – Amphitheus first, then any others with whom any of us was connected. When they recognized our voices, some leapt joyfully out of their beds, dragging their chains with them, while others, whose feet were held in the stocks, stretched out their arms and shouted, begging not to be left behind. While they were being freed, **[598C]** many of the people living nearby came to join us, hearing what was happening and delighted by it. The women too, when they heard about their relatives, abandoned their usual Boeotian ways,[280] ran out to visit one another, and questioned anyone they met. Those who found fathers or husbands went with them, and no one stopped them. All who met them were greatly moved both by pity and by the tears and prayers of these honest women.

34. This was the state of affairs when I learned that Epaminondas and Gorgidas were assembling with their friends **[598D]** at the sanctuary of Athena.[281] I made my way there to join them, as did many good citizens, the numbers constantly growing. When I had reported in detail what had been done, and urged them to go to the agora to support us, they all instantly set about summoning the citizens to liberate themselves. The crowds of supporters that then gathered were supplied with weapons from the colonnades, which were full of spoils of war of every kind, and from the workshops of the sword-makers who lived nearby. Hipposthenidas now came on the scene with his friends and servants, bringing with them **[598E]** the trumpeters who happened to be in town for the Festival of Heracles.[282] Some of these sounded a call in the agora, others in other places, causing alarm to the enemy on every side, and making him think the whole population was in revolt. The supporters of the Spartans fled… <to>[283] the Cadmea, taking with them also the so-called special guard,[284] who regu-

ἀτάκτως καὶ τεθορυβημένως ἐπιχεομένων, ἡμᾶς δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἀφορῶντες, οὐδενὸς μέρους ἡσυχάζοντος, ἀλλὰ πανταχόθεν ψόφων καὶ θορύβων ἀναφερομένων, καταβαίνειν μὲν οὐ διενοοῦντο, καίπερ
598F περὶ πεντακοσίους καὶ χιλίους τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες, ἐκπεπληγμένοι δὲ τὸν κίνδυνον ἄλλως προυφασίζοντο Λυσανορίδαν περιμένειν· † γὰρ .... ἡ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης. διὸ καὶ τοῦτον μὲν ὕστερον, ὡς πυνθανόμεθα, χρήμασιν οὐκ ὀλίγοις ἐζημίωσαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οἱ γέροντες, Ἠριππίδαν δὲ καὶ Ἄρκεσον ἀπέκτειναν εὐθὺς ἐν Κορίνθῳ λαβόντες, τὴν δὲ Καδμείαν ὑπόσπονδον παραδόντες ἡμῖν ἀπήλλαττον μετὰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν.

larly spent the night at the foot of the citadel. Those on the citadel itself, confronted by this disorderly and confused influx, and seeing us in the agora – no peace anywhere, sounds of tumult reaching them from every side – had no thought of coming down, **[598F]** though they were about fifteen hundred strong.[285] Appalled by the danger, they could only make the excuse that they were waiting for Lysanoridas,[286] … that day.[287] For that reason, as we learned later, the Spartan *gerousia* <fined> Lysanoridas <heavily>,[288] and put Herippidas and Arcesus[289] to death when they captured them at Corinth. They surrendered the Cadmea to us under a truce, and began to withdraw with all their forces.

Notes on the Translation

1 The Athenian, who starts the introductory dialogue by questioning Caphisias about the liberation of Thebes, is probably identical with Archedemus of Pelekes, mentioned in Aeschin. *or.* 3.139 as having made himself unpopular by his pro-Theban sentiments. On chronological grounds he is probably to be distinguished from the Archedemus who was leader of the popular party in Athens in 406 (Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.2). [RP]

2 The narrator, Epaminondas' younger brother. [RN]

3 For the use of the picture-simile, see now Hirsch-Luipold 2002, 1–2. [N]

4 Reading uncertain. Pohlenz has τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς αἰτίαις καὶ τοῖς ⟨ἔργοις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ⟩ μέρους ἀγῶνας; Waterfield 1992 has τοὺς δὲ ταῖς αἰτίαις ⟨καταδήλους γιγνομένους ἐπὶ⟩ μέρους ἀγῶνας ... παρὰ τὰ δεινὰ καθηκόντως [with καθηκόντως replacing the transmitted καθορῶντα] καιρῷ καὶ πάθει μεμιγμένου λογισμοῦ ("yet by virtue of their causes the particular contests of virtue against chance occurrences and the acts of intelligent bravery in the face of fearful conditions ⟨become clear cases of⟩ rationality suitably blended with opportunity and emotion"). [R] Hani reads τοῦ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς αἰτίαις καὶ τοῖς ⟨ἐπὶ⟩ μέρους ⟨ἴδιον ἕκαστον, μυρίους⟩ ἀγῶνας, following Kronenberg. [N]

5 Pindar, *Isthmians* 1.2. Already quoted (also in a prefatory section of a dialogue) by Plato, *Phaedrus* 227b. [R]

6 There were numerous Theban embassies to Athens after the pro-Spartan oligarchic regime had been overthrown (see, e.g., Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.62, Diod. 15.25.4), but we do not know anything about Caphisias in one of these embassies. [N]

7 Cf. Pindar, *Ol.* 6.152 ἀρχαῖον ὄνειδος … Βοιωτίαν ὗν, already quoted by Plat. *Symp.* 182b, *Phaedo* 64b. Alluded to by Plut. at *De E* 6.387D, *De Herod. mal.* 31.864D. – Text: Post's conjecture δοκεῖ κἂν ἀνεγείρειν (instead of the corrupt δοκεῖν ἀνεγείρειν of the manuscripts) is nearer to the paradosis than Holwerda's δόξειεν ἂν ἐγείρειν. [R]

8 No lacuna is indicated in E, but Simmias and Cebes must be mentioned in this context (Hani reads ... μαραινόμενον· ⟨Σιμμίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ Κέβης⟩ παρὰ Σωκράτη …). [R] On Simmias, see below n. 23 [N]

9 On the relationship between Caphisias' family and Lysis (the Pythagorean exile who taught Epaminondas, and whose tomb his disciple Theanor visits) see below, n. 64. [RN]

10 The Athenians mentioned in these lines are historical characters whose Theban sympathies were well-attested. Much friendly feeling between Athens and Thebes went back to 404/3, when many Athenian refugees from the Spartan-backed regime of the 'Thirty Tyrants' in Athens lived in Thebes; the liberation movement started from there. Thrasybulus of Collytus and Archinus were leading figures in that movement (for Archinus' role see Dem. *or.* 24.135, where a son Myronides is mentioned). Thrasybulus was 'trusted in Thebes like no other' (Aeschin. *or.* 3.138), and his nephew Thrason, brother of the Lysitheides of *De Genio*, was Theban *proxenos* (ibid.). The great admiral Conon destroyed the Spartan fleet at Cnidus in 394, and his son Timotheus (frequently elected general from 378 onwards) continued the anti-Spartan effort. On political groups (*hetaireiai*) of the kind here mentioned see S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. III (Oxford 2008) 917–20. [RP]

11 E's οἰκείαν ἔχον is clearly corrupt. Sieveking adopts Madvigs's conjecture οἰκεῖον ἔχειν, but οἰκεῖον ἂν ἔχειν might better explain the paradosis. [R]

12 Archias is one of the Theban polemarchs (i.e. military commanders) at the time of the story, in which he plays a large part as collaborator with the Spartans. Leontiadas had long been prominent as a leader of the pro-Spartan faction in Theban politics (*Hell. Oxy.* XVII.1, referring to the year 395); in 382 he was one of the polemarchs, locked in conflict with his bitter political enemy Ismenias (see n. 19 below) who was also a polemarch (Xen.*Hell.* 5.2.25), and used his position to support and perhaps provoke (see following note) the Spartan seizure of the Cadmea. [RP]
Text: Λεοντιάδας seems the best form of his name (also adopted by Hani): in Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25 (and in *Hell. Oxy.* XVII.1) it is Λεοντιάδης. E here gives Λεοντίδης; mss of Plutarch's *Pelopidas* (5, 6, 11) have Λεοντίδας, in Plutarch's *Agesilaus* (23) mss vary between Λεοντιάδης and Λεοντίδας. [R]

13 Phoebidas was the Spartan commander who was supposed to lead Spartan troops to Olynthus, but seized the Cadmea instead, whether through persuasion by Leontiadas (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25–36; Plut. *Pel.* 5) or in fulfilment of a secret Spartan policy (Diod. 15.20.2, cf. Plut. *Ages.* 24.1). [RP]

14 The Cadmea is the Theban acropolis, its name being derived from the mythical founder of Thebes, Cadmus. [N]

15 Melon is a prominent Theban exile, who returns in the course of the story (see Plut. *Pelopidas* 8, 11, 12; *Agesilaus* 24). In Xenophon's account (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.2–7), he is the leading spirit; Xenophon, whose hatred of the great Theban leaders Pelopidas and Epaminondas is well known, never even mentions Pelopidas in this context. [RP]

16 Next to Epaminondas (on whom see below n. 30), Pelopidas is the most prominent Theban political and military leader of these times. A fuller account of the events summarized here is in Plut. *Pelopidas* 5. It differs considerably from Xenophon's (see above n. 15), and stresses Pelopidas' role at the expense of Melon's. See Pelling, below pp. 113. 121–22. [R]

17 Olynthus was an important city on the Northern Greek Chalcidice peninsula, which had established a powerful confederacy. Two nearby cities, Acanthus and Apollonia, persuaded Sparta to send a force to check the dangerous growth of Olynthian power (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.11–24). [P]

18 Lysanoridas is one of the Spartan governors installed on the Cadmea (the other two were Herippidas and Arkesos; see below, n. 159). He was fined and exiled after the liberation of Thebes; see Plut. *Pelopidas* 13. [RN] Ziegler (on Pelopidas 13) reads his name as Λυσανδρίδας (cf. Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 fr. 240). [RN]

19 At the time of the seizure of the Cadmea Ismenias (or Hismenias: see Einarson / De Lacy on Plut. *De exilio* 16.606F), the leader of the anti-Spartan faction in Thebes, was polemarch along with the pro-Spartan Leontiadas (see n. 12 above), with whom he had been in bitter conflict for many years (*Hell. Oxy.* XVII.1, referring to the year 395; cf. ibid. XVIII). Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.2.35) has him tried and executed at Thebes before a court drawn from members of the Peloponnesian League; Plutarch (*Pel.* 5.3) merely speaks of his being carried off to Sparta and there killed. [RP]

20 Gorgidas was a former Theban hipparch (i.e. cavalry commander; 578C), a moderate who did not go into exile, but kept in touch with those who did. He was also one of the Boeotarchs (i.e. leading officials of the Boeotian confederacy) in 379/78 (according to Plut. *Pel.* 14.2; but for the modern controversy on this issue see R. J. Buck, *Boiotia and the Boiotian League*, Alberta 1994, 150 n. 78), organizer of the so-called 'sacred band', and a close friend of Epaminondas. See Plut. *Pelopidas* 12, 14, 18–19. [RP]

21 Accepting Sieveking's κατάλυσιν for E's ἅλωσιν: cf. Plut. *Praec. reip. ger.* 10.804F and *Pelopidas* 6.2. [R]

22 'Tyrants' is the collective label given here (following 4th c. usage: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.1–2) to the pro-Spartan oligarchs Archias, (first mentioned in 30.596C; see below, n. 265), Leontiadas, and Philippus (see below, n. 245). [NP]

23 Simmias is a former disciple of Socrates (and, together with Cebes, Socrates' most important dialogue partner in Plato's *Phaedo*), now returned to Thebes; he will be the principal speaker in the discussion on the *daimonion*. [RN]

24 In Plato, *Phaedo* 78a, Socrates recommends Cebes, Simmias' companion, to seek men of wisdom throughout the world. This hint seems to have given rise to the inclusion of Simmias in stories of Plato and others travelling to Egypt and elsewhere to consort with wise men; see below 578F. Simmias' illness recalls both Socrates in prison (both need medical attention) and also Theages (Plato, *Rep.* 6.496b) who is held to philosophy by the 'curb' of illness, which Socrates compares to his own compulsion, the δαιμόνιον σημεῖον. [R]

25 Pherenicus was one of the Thebans in exile at Athens (Plut. *Pel.* 5.3). At the time of the recovery of Thebes, he led the larger group of exiles who waited on the borders ready to be summoned if the smaller group succeeded in killing the pro-Spartan leaders (Plut. *Pel.* 8.1, cf. 12.1 and 577A below, where his involvement is anticipated). [RP]

26 Charon is a leading conspirator, who makes his house available to the exiles; his son also plays a part. His role is also described in Plutarch's *Pelopidas* (7.3, where the offer of his house has been made earlier than in the *De Genio* passage, 8.3–4, 9.3, 9.6–10.5, 11.2, 13.1, 25.5–14), and briefly mentioned by Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.4.3: 'a certain Charon'). [RP]

27 The number twelve is also given in Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 8.3, while Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.4.1 and 3) mentions only seven (against Thebes!). [R]

28 Cithaeron is the mountain range separating Boeotia in the south from Attica. [N]

29 The *mantis* Theocritus is a key figure in the dialogue, who interprets signs and has his own links with Socrates (see *De gen. Socr.* 10.580E) through his fellow *mantis* Euthyphro. Later (*Pelopidas* 22.3) he saves the Thebans from making a human sacrifice before the battle of Leuctra. [R]

30 As the victor of the battle of Leuctra and chief architect of Theban supremacy (short-lived though it was) in Greece, Epaminondas is the most important Theban politician and general of that epoch. Plutarch devoted a biography to him, which is unfortunately lost. He is also a key figure in this dialogue, holding back from active participation in the conspiracy, but sympathetic to it. He is presented as a devotee of the Pythagorean Lysis and as a real philosopher. It is remarkable to see how Epaminondas—after being introduced as the pious disciple of one Pythagorean (Lysis: 8.579DE; 16.585E)—is then shown in spirited debate with another (Theanor: 13.582E–15.585D) and unequivocally carrying victory in this debate. With this, Epaminondas seems in fact to be making a critique of the life-style of a wealthy Pythagorean who thinks that money is an appropriate reward for looking after his fellow Pythagorean Lysis. It may be that Plutarch has some pretentious people of his own time in his sight here. [RN]

31 Holwerda wrongly inserted ⟨οὐχ⟩ before ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων ἀγόμενος. There is no contradiction in being naturally law-abiding. [R]

32 The long lacuna in this passage (67 letters in E) has not yet been convincingly filled. We take τίνα as interrogative. But if the length of the lacuna is correctly indicated in E, there must be more missing. [R]

33 The lacuna contains Theocritus' reply. [R]

34 The lacuna (22 letters in E, 56 in B!) can only be filled by guesswork (25.594B shows what the general sense should be). We translate μηδένα τῶν πολιτῶν ⟨ἀποκτενεῖν ὑπισχνεῖται, μὴ μεγάλης γε γενομένης ἀνάγκης,⟩ ἄκριτον. [R]

35 The text here proposed (ἀλλὰ χωρὶς αἵματος: ἀλλὰ καὶ αἵματος E) is inspired by Einarson (ἀλλὰ καὶ αἵματος ⟨ἄτερ⟩). [R]

36 On Pherenicus, see above n. 25. [R]

37 Eumolpidas and Samidas are two otherwise unknown participants in the conspiracy. [R]

38 Galaxidorus plays an important part in the discussion (on his role and character, see now Wälchli 2003, 64–67 and 93–106). He is a historical character, one of those Thebans who were said to have accepted Persian money from Timocrates in 395–4 (as were Androclidas, see below n. 263, and Ismenias) to foment war with Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1). Despite his anti-Spartan record, the dialogue supposes that he has been living quietly in Spartan-dominated Thebes. [RP]

39 Reading διακρούων (Einarson) and supplementing εἶπεν, Ἀρχίαν ὁρῶ in the lacuna keeps closer to the paradosis (διακούων ὁ Γαλαξίδωρος, ἐγγὺς γάρ ... καὶ Λυσανορίδαν E). Hani reads διέκρουσεν [proposed by Bernardakis and accepted by Sieveking] ὁ Γαλαξίδωρος, ἐγγὺς γὰρ ⟨Ἀρχίαν ἤγγειλε [proposed by Einarson]⟩ καὶ Λυσανορίδαν. [R]

40 On Lysanoridas, see above n. 18. [R]

41 The 'Amphion' in Thebes is also mentioned by Xenophon *Hell.* 5.4.8, where it serves as a place of muster for released prisoners during the events of 379, and Arrian *Anab.* 1.8.6, where troops going from the Cadmea to the rest of the city pass by it. The walls of Thebes had supposedly been built by Amphion and Zethus, twin sons of Zeus and Antiope and Theban equivalents to the Dioscuri; their importance in the city is shown by the Theban oath 'by the two gods' (Arist. *Ach.* 905 with commentators). The 'Amphion' is therefore generally (but see R. Schober in *RE* Va, 1934, s.v. Thebai, 1446) associated (though the formation is linguistically surprising) with the 'tomb of Amphion' which tragic poets treat as a conspicuous Theban landmark; Aeschylus locates it outside the Northern gates (*Sept.* 528), and Euripides implies that it was of some height or sited on an elevation (Eur. *Suppl.* 663, ἔνερθε σεμνῶν μνημάτων Ἀμφίονος). The 'tomb of Zethus' of Eur. *Phoen.* 145 was the same monument, if, as is plausible, the later attested tradition (Σ Eur. *Phoen.*145; Paus. 9.17.4) that the twin brothers shared a tomb goes back to the fifth century. Pausanias speaks, without precise location, of a 'mound of earth of no great size' as their common tomb (9.17.4); he surely supposed this to be the same monument as that known to the poets, whether it was or not. A flat-topped hillock (once λόφος τοῦ Ταλάρου, apparently now renamed Amphion) of c. 65 by 45 metres about 50 metres north of the Cadmea has long been identified as the Amphion (so e.g. Symeonoglou 1985, 25 and 273–4, with references, and pl. 4 and map A; cf. the plan in R. Barber, *Blue Guide. Greece*, 6th rev. ed. London 2001) The identification gained greatly in plausibility with the discovery on top of the hillock of an early or middle Helladic mud-brick tumulus (T. Spyropoulos, *Arkhaiologikon Deltion* 27b, 1972, 307–8; ib. 28b, 1973, 248–52; C.M. Antonaccio, *An Archaeology of Ancestors*, Lanham 1995); such a tumulus when partly buried could well have been Pausanias' 'mound of no great size' and have given the name Amphion to the whole hillock. See also Parker below p. 130. [P]

42 Phyllidas is a very important figure in the story, being both secretary to Archias (and the polemarchs) and a conspirator. According Plut. *Pel.* 7.4 (but not Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.2) he secured the role of secretary in order to further the conspiracy. [RP]

43 If Wilamowitz' γραμματεύοντα were right, the sense would be 'whom you know to have been clerk to the polemarchs at the time'. [R]

44 We translate ⟨συνειδὼς δὲ καὶ τοὺς φυγάδας μέλλοντας⟩ ἥξειν on the lines of Wilamowitz' supplement. [R]

45 We translate Pohlenz' ⟨ἔχω λέγειν⟩. [R]

46 The long lacuna (107 letters in E) covers the return of Theocritus to the group, who now move on and approach Simmias' house, but without going in. [R]

47 Phidolaus of Haliartus (a Boeotian town about 20 km west of Thebes) is not otherwise known. [RN]

48 Amphitheus is an imprisoned Theban patriot, to be released when the coup succeeds. He was probably named in *Hell. Oxy.* XVII.1 with Ismenias and Androclidas as one of the leaders of the anti-Spartan faction in Thebes in 395 (the papyrus gives Antitheos,

a name not otherwise attested in Boeotia); he supposedly took Persian money at that time (cf. n. 38 above and n. 264 below) to foment war against Sparta (Plut. *Lys.* 27.3, *Paus.* 3.9.8, where he is called 'Amphithemis'). [RP]

49 As the mother of the great hero Heracles, Alcmena would also be the ancestress of both the royal houses of Sparta, who were descended from Heracles; hence Agesilaus' interest in her tomb. [N]

50 Agesilaus was Spartan king from 400 to 360/59. He tried to maintain the supremacy which Sparta had won in the wake of the Peloponnesian War, but ultimately failed. [N]

51 If this has a basis in fact (but see F. Brenk, *Relighting the Souls*, Stuttgart 1998, 75 n. 2), Agesilaus will have removed Alcmena's remains in 394. It was believed that she had lived there with Rhadamanthys (identified with Aleos) after the death of Amphitryon (Plut. *Lysander* 28.9; Apollodorus 2.4.11 = 2.70). There was a quite different account (Antoninus Liberalis 33, citing Pherecydes) according to which she was sent after death to Rhadamanthys in the Isles of the Blessed, and a stone was put in her coffin instead (cf. Plut. *Romulus* 28.7). (See in general Pfister 1909, 120, 124–6 and R. Parker, below, pp. 130–1.) [RP]

52 On the basis of the 'Pherecydes' account (see above n. 52), Wilamowitz supplied ⟨λίθος ἀντὶ τοῦ⟩ σώματος, and Hani adopts Corlu's ⟨ἐν τῷ μνήματι λίθος μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ⟩ σώματος. This seems an unacceptable conflation of two quite different versions. Wyttenbach suggested οὐ ⟨δέν τι λείψανον⟩ , but it might be, e.g. ⟨λείψανα μέν τινα⟩ ("<some remains> of a body"). [R]

53 The lacuna after συμπεπηγυῖαν has been variously filled: ⟨ἐπάνω δὲ⟩ ('above') Bernardakis; ⟨ἔμπροσθεν δὲ⟩ ('in front of') Einarson / De Lacy; but it may be vaguer, e.g. ⟨ἐγγὺς δὲ⟩ or ⟨οὐ πόρρω δὲ⟩, 'near' or 'not far from'. This discovery is discussed in the context of other similar stories by W. Speyer, *Bücherfunde in der Glaubenswerbung der Antike*, Hypomnemata 24 (Göttingen 1970) 69–70. [R]

54 Agesilaus had good relations with Pharaoh Nectanebis I, who ruled from 380 (or 378); but the event here mentioned must be earlier, perhaps in the context of the help another Egyptian king, Nephereus / Nepherites I., gave to the Spartans as early as 396 (Diod. 14.79.4). [R]

55 The lake mentioned here is Lake Copais in central Boeotia; Haliartus stood its south shore. This flood is not mentioned elsewhere. [RP]

56 Aleos was another name for Rhadamanthys (Plut. *Lysander* 28.9; see above n. 51). [R]

57 The story of how Dirce maltreated Antiope, mother of the Theban founder heroes Amphion and Zethus, and was in the end savagely killed by them, was told by Euripides in Antiope. In the common tradition the twins threw her body or ashes into a famous Theban spring (mentioned five times in Pindar!) which thereafter bore her name (Eur. *Antiope* F 223.109–114, 141–144 Kannicht; Apollod. 3.44 [5.5]; Hyginus *Fab.* 7). A secret tomb of Dirce and rituals associated with it are mentioned only in this passage of *De Genio* (see Pfister 1909, 463); the positive force apparently ascribed to the heroine, despite her very negative characterisation in myth, is not unexampled, but we do not know what explanation if any was offered. Similar secrecy is supposed in Oedipus' instructions to Theseus in Soph. *OC* 1518–1539 never to reveal his tomb except on his deathbed to his heir; it is possible that traditions about secret tombs were preserved by the Athenian 'king archons', the notional successors to king Theseus. The Theban ritual was performed by the new and old hipparchs at the moment of transfer of office; for such Theban transition rites cf. Parker below, p. 130 n. 5. A Theban hipparch is mentioned, leading cavalry, by Hdt. 9.69.2; nothing else is known about the office before the Hellenistic period. [P]

58 The long lacuna here (157 letters in E) must at least contain the statement that the secret will not be easily discovered. [R]

59 This Plato is not known from other sources. On Gorgidas, see above n. 20. [R]

60 The lacuna (28 letters in E) will have contained something like 'nor performing any of the traditional rites'. [R]

61 Hirzel, who very clearly set out the debt of *De genio* to Plato's *Phaedo* (1895, 2.149–151), saw that this scene is modelled on *Phaedo* 60b–61c, where Socrates sits on his bed to talk. The situation is parodied in Lucian, *Philopseudes* 6, where Eucrates is in bed with the gout; see now Wälchli 2003, 33–5. [R]

62 Thales of Miletus is one of the famous Seven Wise Men of Old. [N]

63 Cf. Plut. *Banquet of the Seven Wise Men* 2.147B. [R]

64 The Pythagorean Lysis (*VS* 46) became the teacher of Epaminondas, after he had to leave Italy (see below, n. 124). On Lysis, see Diog. Laert. 8.7. [N]

65 *Vitex agnus castus* is a shrub (related to willow) sacred to Hera and associated with chastity; it was used as material for beds by women at the Thesmophoria (L. Deubner, *Attische Feste*, Berlin 1956, 56). [R]

66 Polymnis, the father of Caphisias and Epaminondas, makes his own appearance in the story in 8.579D. [N]

67 Reiske replaced the transmitted ἅ (referring to γράμματα) by ὅν (referring to the just mentioned πίναξ); surely Agesilaus took the tablet and not just the writing on it. [R]

68 This envoy of King Agesilaus is not otherwise known. [RN]

69 Chonouphis of Memphis is said (Plut. *De Iside* 20.354D) to have been the teacher of the Greek mathematician and astronomer Eudoxus of Cnidus. His name is genuinely Egyptian (see J. Gwyn Griffiths, *Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride*, Cardiff 1970 *ad loc.*). The story of Plato's journey to Egypt is a common feature in ancient lives of the philosopher. Strabo (17.806) reports that guides still pointed out the house where he and Eudoxus stayed at Heliopolis. For the tradition in general, see Riginos 1976, 64–5, who takes a somewhat sceptical view; J. Bidez, *Eos ou Platon et l'Orient* (Brussels 1945) 15, who is more enthusiastic; and the sober summary in Guthrie 1975, 21–2. Plutarch (*Solon* 2.8) has the information that Plato financed his journey by dealing in olive oil. [R]

70 Schwartz proposed to fill this lacuna (of 10 letters in E) by reading ⟨ὦ πολλὰ⟩ τότε, which Hani adopts τότε (instead of the transmitted ποτέ) may be right, but ὦ πολλὰ is shorter than the space (10 letters) indicated in E and thus hardly the right solution. [R]

71 This alleged fellow student of Plato and Eudoxus in Egypt is otherwise unknown. [RN]

72 This Proteus is first mentioned as the king of Egypt who reigned during the times of the Trojan War by Herodotus (2.112–120). [N]

73 Behind "Heracles the son of Amphitryon" lies another Herodotean reminiscence: in 2.43–45 Herodotus distinguishes very carefully between the Egyptian god Heracles and the (human) Greek hero Heracles, whom Herodotus always calls "son of Amphitryon" (thus in 2.43.2, 44.4, 146.1, and 6.53.2; in 2.145.4 he calls him the son of Alcmena without naming the father) and never "son of Zeus". [N]

74 Caria is the south-western coastal region of Asia Minor. [N]

75 Apollo's "horned altar" on the island of Delos was a famous place of worship and a kind of landmark. [N] The story outlined here comes from Eratosthenes' *Platonicus*, as reported by Theo of Smyrna (p. 2 Hiller). Plutarch refers to it again (*De E* 6.386E), with the interpretation (Eratosthenes') that the oracle intended to exhort the Greeks to the study of mathematics. J. Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle* (Berkeley 1978) 333, argues that though the oracle could have originated as a straightforward response to a cultic enquiry it was more probably invented for the sake of the story about Plato. Elsewhere (Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 8.2.718E, *Marcellus* 14.9) the point is that mechanical constructions are not legitimate in geometry. In our passage, there is a further twist: the god's true intention was to encourage peaceful pursuits. The basic texts on the

problem are given in I. Thomas, *Greek Mathematical Works*, I (Cambridge/Mass. 1951) 256–309. [RP]

76 Reading ἢ (Waterfield) τὸ (Hartman) for the mss reading ἢ τῷ and taking τὸ μήκει διπλάσιον as 'simply doubling' (v. Einarson *ad loc.*). But the sense is difficult: Waterfield cuts the knot by proposing ἢ τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν διπλασιάζεται, 'by which a three-dimensional object is doubled'. In any case, the solution referred to is that said to be due to Hippocrates of Chios: if two proportionals x and y are found between a and 2a, such that a : x :: x : y :: y : 2a, then x 3= 2a3. See Euclid 11.33, and corollary. [R]

77 Helicon of Cyzicus was a friend of Plato and a pupil of Eudoxus (⟨Plat.⟩ *epist.* 13.360c) and of Isocrates. He is also mentioned Plut. *Dion* 19.6, *De cohibenda ira* 16.463C. [R]

78 This moral is presumably Plutarch's addition. In most versions, the Delians' trouble was a plague; here it seems more general, and the words παῦλαν τῶν παρόντων κακῶν (579B) allude to Plat. *Rep.* 5.473d. [R]

79 The dreams and the visions may be distinct; at 13.583B (with Sandbach's correction, see *ad loc.*), Theanor tells us that the divine power 'had clearly revealed' Lysis' death. [R]

80 The Ismenus is a river running through Thebes from North to South; its name is connected with a son of Apollo and the Nereid Melie. [N]

81 On Galaxidorus, see above n. 38. [N]

82 If καὶ after πολιτικοῖς ... ἀνδράσι is not deleted, it might suggest that all πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες (and not only those who have "to deal with a wilful and disorderly population") would find it useful to employ religious superstition as a restraining instrument; but perhaps Galaxidorus does indeed think this, in which case καὶ must be kept. [R]

83 This view of religion has been common since the early sophists: see, e.g., the famous fragment from the *Sisyphus* of Critias (*TrGF* I, no. 43 F 19) and Guthrie 1969, 243–4. Cf. also Polybius 6.56.6–12 with Walbank's note. [RP]

84 The word play ἀσχήμων ... σχηματισμός is difficult to translate, but very conspicuous. [R]

85 Reading with Bernardakis (after Amyot) ἐπαναφέρει τὴν τῶν πράξεων ἀρχήν, instead of the transmitted ἐπαναφέρει τῆς τῶν πράξεων ἀρχῆς, which Sieving (and Hani) tried to emend by adopting Pohlenz' ⟨περὶ⟩ τῆς τῶν πράξεων ἀρχῆς. [R]

86 Meletus is one of the notorious accusers of Socrates (besides Anytus and Lycon), who is the foremost addressee in Plato's *Apology*. [RN]

87 A reference to the charge of 'not recognizing the gods the city recognizes, but introducing new *daimonia*' (Plat. *Apol.* 24b 8, Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.1), a charge which no doubt made use of the *daimonion* phenomenon. See, e.g., T. C. Brickhouse / N. D. Smith, *Socrates on Trial* (Oxford 1989) 30–37. [R]

88 Besides the famous Pythagoras of Samus (about 570 – 480 B.C.) and Empedocles of Acragas (about 490 – 430 B.C.), the names of other early philosophers *may* be missing here (see, e.g., the supplement ⟨καὶ τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ γενομένην καὶ δὴ καὶ παρ'⟩ of the 39–29 letter lacuna proposed by Einarson and De Lacy, which Hani puts into the text): Pherecydes is a possibility. [R]

89 We translate the transmitted ὥσπερ πρός, but note Wyttenbach's αὖ περί ('accustomed it again to show sense in respect of facts'). [R]

90 See *Iliad* 10.279 and *Odyssey* 13.301. [R]

91 The quotation makes use of *Iliad* 20.95, but considerably changes its context. [R]

92 Euthyphron is the main disputant in Plato's *Euthyphro*, perhaps also mentioned in *Cratylus* 396d. [R]

93 The Σύμβολον is apparently a crossroads north-east of the Athenian Agora; see Judeich 1931, 178. Andocides' house (situated near the Agora as well, vis-à-vis the Stoa Basileios; see Judeich 1931, 353) is mentioned in Andocides' own narrative of the Hermae affair (*or.* 1.62: see also Plut. *Alcib.* 21.2). [RN]

94 Socrates' self-concentration (cf. Plat. *Symp.* 174d–175c, 220c) is here (as never in Plato or Xenophon) associated with the *daimonion*. The location of 'Box-makers' Street' is not known. [R]

95 Supplementing ἄνεκαλεῖτο φάσκων αὑτῷ (following Amyot). [R]

96 This is one of the regular ways of describing the phenomenon: cf. Plat. *Theaet.* 151a, *Apol.* 31d, *Euthyphro* 3b. [R]

97 This aulos-player is otherwise unknown. [R]

98 This is one of only two mentions (the second is in 21.590A; but see above n. 8) of Simmias' Theban companion Cebes (on him, see above n. 24 and 25). [N]

99 For 'Statuaries' Street', see Plat. *Symp.* 215a (see also Judeich 1931, 171 and J. Travlos, *Bildlexikon zur Topographie des antiken Athen*, Tübingen 1971, 395). The source of the following story is unknown. H. D. Betz, *Plutarch's theological writings and early Christian literature*, Studia ad Corpus Hellenisticum N.T., III (Leiden 1975) 257 discusses features which it shares with various miracle-stories (eye-witness account, precise date and place, the pigs ⟨cf., e.g., Mark 5.11–13⟩, and the discomfiture of the unbelievers). [R]

100 Adopting Wyttenbach's supplement ⟨ἡμᾶς ἅμα καὶ⟩ (as also Hani does); Sieveking chose Wilamowitz' ⟨ἡμᾶς σφόδρα⟩. [R]

101 Holwerda's μαντικῆς (instead of the transmitted ἀνάγκης) is surely necessary. [R]

102 For sneezes as omens, see Johnston 2008, 130–1 and Pease on Cic. *Div.* 2.84. The earliest mention of such a sneeze in Greek literature is Hom. *Od.* 17.541. See also Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.9, ⟨Aristot.⟩ *Probl.* 33.7, and Catullus 45 (with commentators). [RP]

103 On κληδόνες, see again Johnston 2008, 130–1. [P]

104 Adopting Von Arnim's supplement οὐχ οἷόν τε, μικρὸν ὄν (as also Hani does). [R]

105 Terpsion of Megara, a friend of the Megarian philosopher Euclides, is known from Plat. *Theaetetus* 142a and *Phaedo* 59c. [R]

106 No lacuna is indicated after δοκοῦμεν in MSS, but Waterfield is probably right to mark one here. The sense required is something like 'it would be the mark of an inferior or superstitious mind', e.g. ⟨φαυλοτέρου γὰρ ἂν ἦν τινος καὶ δεισιδαίμονος⟩. [R]

107 Supplementing τό⟨νον καὶ ἰσχὺν⟩ (cf. *De prof. in virt.* 12.83B; τό⟨νον⟩ was already proposed by Reiske); Schwartz supplemented τό⟨νον ἀμετάστρεπτον⟩, adopted by Hani. [R]

108 Socrates' prediction of disaster in Sicily is mentioned in [Plat.] *Theages* 129c, and in Plut. *Nicias* 13.9, *Alcibiades* 17.5. [R]

109 Pyrilampes is Plato's stepfather, friend of Pericles and father of the famously beautiful Demos (Plat. *Gorgias* 481d, with Dodds' note); see J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* (Oxford 1971) 329–30 (no. 8792, VIII). [R]

110 Allusions to Socrates' bravery in the Delian campaign (424 BC) can be found already in Plato (*Apol.* 28e, *Laches* 181b, *Symp.* 220e), but there is more detail in the later tradition (Cic. *Div.* 1.123; *Epist. Socrat.* 1.9); the place where the warning is given is said by Cicero to be at a *trivium* ('crossroads') and in the Epistle to be a διάβασις ('crossing', perhaps of a river). [R]

111 Unintelligible. In Thuc. 4.96.7 we are told of three escape routes the beaten Athenians followed: to Delium and the sea, over Parnes (see the next note), and 'other ways taken by individuals'. Waterfield (following Einarson / De Lacy) reads ἐπὶ Ὠρωπίας, i.e. to the sea at Oropus. Hutten proposed ἐπὶ Ῥείτους, meaning the salt springs marking the boundary of Eleusis, but this seems too remote. E.R. Dodds once suggested ἐπὶ τῆς σχιστῆς, 'to the crossroads', translating Cicero's (see above n. 110) *trivium*. It is best to confess ignorance. Socrates' valour was questioned, e.g. by Herodicus of Babylon (in Athen. 5.215c–216c), who speaks of τὴν ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ ... πεπλασμένην ἀνδραγαθίαν. But see also A. Patzer, "Sokrates als Soldat", *Antike und Abendland* 45 (1999) 1–35. [R]

112 Parnes is a mountain range separating Attica from Boeotia in the east, as Cithaeron (see above, n. 28) does in the west. [N]

113 From Euripides' play *Autolycus* (fr. 282,22 Kannicht). [R]
114 Accepting the supplements in the Teubner text. [R]
115 For the analogy with reading, see Porph. *De abst.* 2.41, Synesius *De insomniis* 133A. Text: The transmitted τῷ ἱστορικῷ (retained by Hani) is most likely a later inserted explanatory gloss and should be removed; Wyttenbach's τῶν ἱστορικῶν (adopted by Sieveking) is not convincing. [R]
116 Retaining the transmitted τὸ before δαιμόνιον; Stegmann's deletion of the article (adopted by Sieveking and Hani) seems unjustified. [R]
117 I.e. Socrates, being a trained philosopher, would have grasped the difference between the real agent ('the *daimonion*') and the mere instrument ('a sneeze'). [R]
118 Bernardakis' insertion of ὅν after ξένον (adopted by Sieveking and Hani) is unnecessary. [R]
119 Adopting Reiske's καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ τῶν φίλων as emendation of the corrupt καὶ †συνεστώτων† φίλων, as also Hani does. [R]
120 Ismenodorus and Melissus, both possibly further participants of the conspiracy, are not mentioned elsewhere, while Bacchylidas is possibly one of the seven Boeotarchs at the time of the battle of Leuctra (see Paus. 9.13.7). [RN]
121 Simmias' words are a reflection of the Homeric greeting (e.g. *Od.* 1.170): τίς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν; πόθι τοι πόλις ἠδὲ τοκῆες;
122 Croton, a Greek colony founded at the end of the 8th century BC on the Southern coast of Southern Italy, was between 570 and 460 a stronghold of the Pythagorean sect. [N]
123 This comparison also occurs in a Stoic discussion of benefits, Seneca *De beneficiis* 2.17.3, 2.32.1–4. In 2.17.3 the comparison is acribed to Chrysippus, in 2.18.2 the discussion the "rules" of giving and receiving are connected with the name of Hecato (see also 2.21.4). [R]
124 Plutarch's account of the Pythagoreans diverges a good deal from those depending on Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus, and known to us mainly from Iamblichus' *Vita Pythagorea*. For the background, see esp. Burkert 1962, 176–187, 212–13. In particular, (1) Plutarch sets the final catastrophe at Metapontum (see n. 125), not Croton; (2) he says nothing about Philolaus (on whom see below, n. 127), though in one (perhaps muddled) version it is Philolaus who goes to Thebes to pay honour to Lysis (Olympiodorus *In Phaedonem* 8 Norvin). The failure to mention Philolaus at all is the more surprising because (according to Plato's *Phaedo* 61e) Simmias and Cebes were pupils of his at Thebes. However, Plutarch has his chronology to consider: Philolaus had ceased to teach in Thebes before 399, so how could he have come to Lysis' tomb if Lysis was still alive to teach Epaminondas? [R]
125 Metapontum is a Greek colony (with alleged mythical origins going back to the Iliadic hero Nestor) on the coast of the Gulf of Tarentum. [N]
126 Cylon was the leader of the anti-Pythagorean party at Croton; see Diod. 10.11.1, Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 248–249. [N]
127 Philolaus is a prominent Pythagorean from Croton (about 470 – after 399 BC; VS 44), later at Tarentum and, according to Plat. *Phaedo* 61de, as teacher of Simmias and Cebes at Boeotian Thebes. [N]
128 Lucania is the region of Southern Italy adjacent to the Gulf of Tarentum. [R]
129 The famous teacher of rhetoric in the last decades of the 5th century BC, hailing from Leontini (in Eastern Sicily, between Catane/Catania and Syracuse). [N]
130 Gorgias' visit to Greece was in 427, nearly fifty years before the events here related; if, however, Lysis arrived in Thebes when he was still young and lived there till old, the chronology might be just about possible. [RP]
131 Arcesus is unknown: the transmitted form of the name is perhaps a mistake (or corruption) for Archytas (so E.R. Dodds suggested), Aresas (a Lucanian, for whom see Iambl. *Vita Pyth.* 265; Thesleff 1965, 48) or Archippus, Lysis' fellow-survivor in some accounts (Burkert 1962, 212). [R]

132 Sandbach's (*CQ* 6, 1956, 87) correction (τὸ δαιμόνιον Λύσιδος instead of τὸ Λύσιδος δαιμόνιον) is important: δαιμόνιον does not mean '(someone's) ghost', nor do we hear something about "le démon de Lysis" (as Hani, retaining the transmitted wording, translates) elsewhere in this work. [R]

133 Reading προὐπεφήνει (pluperfect of προφαίνω) instead of the transmitted προϋπέφαινε; see Russell 1954, 61. Sandbach (*CQ* 6, 1956, 87) defended προϋπέφαινε, but προϋποφαίνω is, apart from this Plutarch passage, not earlier attested than the 4th century AD. [R]

134 A quotation from Hom. *Od.* 9.27. [R]

135 Retaining E's μόνῃ after ταύτῃ (as Hani does, too; Sieveking's μόνον was conjectured by Holwerda). [R]

136 Retaining τὴν πενίαν (which Sieveking deletes, followed by Hani) after προδίδωσι and deleting πενίαν after πάτριον. The metaphor is from the tempering of iron in cold water, rather than from a dye. [R]

137 See Plut. *Nicias* 28.6: a shield displayed at Syracuse, and supposed to have belonged to Nicias (the Athenian general who was captured and executed by the Syracusans after the disastrous end of the Sicilian Expedition), was richly ornamented with gold and purple. [R]

138 Miletus, an important Greek city on the west coast of Asia Minor, was famous for its woollen garments. [N]

139 Jason was tyrant of the Thessalian city Pherae between 380 and 370 BC; he succeeded in establishing a kind of supremacy over all of Thessaly and was recognized as ταγός ("ruler") of the whole region about 371. [N] On the episode related here cf. Aelian *VH* 11.9, and Plutarch himself in *Regum et Imperatorum Apophthegmata, Epaminondas* 13.193B. The story is chronologically out of place here, since it belongs to the (later) period of Epaminondas' power in Thebes. [R]

140 But γνώριμοι may mean 'notables' rather than 'acquaintances'. [R]

141 The supplement ⟨ἄτοπον, εἶπεν ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας⟩ (made by Bernardakis, after Wyttenbach had already inserted ἄτοπον) is necessary. [R] The argumentative clash between Epaminondas and Theanor in these chapters is most interestingly described. In its first part (13.582E–14.584B) is dominated by long statements given by Theanor and Epaminondas; in the shorter second part (14.584B–584D) Theanor seems to get the upper hand, but in the third part (14.584D–15.585D) the turn tides, and now Theanor has to listen (and agree) to a detailed argument by Epaminondas. All in all, the Pythagorean's picture in this dialogue is rather ambivalent (and perhaps even contains a touch of satire, given that he is introduced in 578E as ἀκολουθίας πλήθει καὶ κατασκευῇ σοβαρόν, "an impressive figure, with a large and well-equipped group of attendants", where σοβαρός could also mean something like "pompous" or "swaggering"): He is presented as a respect-inspiring elder philosopher who then, however, cannot prevail in an argument against the much younger Epaminondas. His speech on divine inspiration and *daimones* in a later part of the dialogue (24.593A–594A) is something like the last word of this dialogue on the matter, but curiously evokes no response at all from the other participants, and thus the degree of authority Plutarch wanted to give it remains very questionable (see Schröder, below p. 166): it takes no account of the philosophical or theological issues raised by Simmias or in the Timarchus myth; the demonology it gives is not specifically Pythagorean (as Dillon shows, below p. 144) and it seems to be presented in a pretentiously rhetorical style. [RN]

142 Reading αἳ ⟨γενόμεναι μὲν⟩ ἐκ κενῶν δοξῶν (αἳ μὲν ἐκ was already conjectured by Post) instead of E's αἱ ἕνεκεν (αἳ ἕνεκα Bernardakis) κενῶν δοξῶν, which does not go well together with the following ἰσχὺν δὲ ... λαβοῦσαι κτλ. [R]

143 Following Wyttenbach and reading πρῶτον εἶπε τῆς ἐγκρατείας κτλ. (E has πρῶρον εἰπὲ τῆς); see Russell 1954, 61. Sieveking and Hani adopt Kronenberg's πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐγκρατείας. [R]

144 Deleting ἀσκήσεως, which after ἄσκησιν ἢ μᾶλλον ἔργον καὶ ἀπόδειξιν does not make very much sense (see again Russell 1954, 61); all three accusatives have their complement in the preceding genitive τῆς ἐγκρατείας (as the translation tries to make clear). Thus, ἀσκήσεως was inserted by someone who did not understand this. [R]

145 Adopting Wyttenbach's ἥνπερ ... ἐπιδείκνυσθε instead of E's ἧπερ ... ἐφείλκυσθε. [R]

146 Keeping E's γυμναζόμενοι and deleting the following καὶ (Hani reads γυμναζόμενοι without deleting καὶ). Alternatively, read γυμνασάμενοι (proposed by Reiske), and take it as meaning 'having taken physical exercise'. [R]

147 Reading δικαιοσύνης (instead of E's δικαιοσύνῃ), as ἄσκησις is construed with such genitives in the preceding sentences as well. [R]

148 Keeping E's ἐνδέδωκε (as also Hani does); B has ἐνδέδοται, which Schwartz changed into δέδεται(adopted by Sieveking). [R]

149 Adopting Reiske's τῶν ἀγώνων (instead of E's τῶν ἀνθρώπων, which Sieveking and Hani retain). [R]

150 Reading (with Wyttenbach) διελθόντος ὁ Σιμμίας ὅσον (instead of E's διελθόντος ὅσον ὁ Σιμμίας). This makes the deletion of ὅσον (proposed by Reiske and adopted by Sieveking and Hani) unnecessary. [R]

151 I.e. you and Epaminondas must come to terms. [R]

152 I.e. when we die and are buried near him. [R]

153 The dead do not blink or cast a shadow (*Quaest. Gr.* 39.300C; see also *De sera* 24.564C). [R]

154 We take ἐκεῖ to mean "in the other world" here, but it is possible that it means "in Italy, among the Pythagoreans there." Varro ordered that he should be buried *Pythagorio more* in leaves of myrtle, olive, and black poplar (Plin. *NH* 35.46). Diog. Laert. 8.10 forbids cypress coffins; Iambl. *Vita Pyth.* 85 knows of lengthy ἀκούσματα relating to burials. O. Reverdin, *La religion de la Cité Platonicienne* (Ecole française d'Athènes, Travaux et Mémoires, VI) (Paris 1945) 125 suggested that Plato's burial rules in *Laws* 947b–e are based on Pythagorean practice. [R]

155 Proverbial: Zenobius 1.55 adds ὅτι μὴ δεῖ κινεῖν μήτε βωμοὺς μήτε τάφους ἢ ἡρῷα. cf. Hesiod *WD* 750, with West's note. [R]

156 Lysis' soul is now ready for a new birth (it is evidently not perfect enough to have escaped the cycle of becoming), and it has a new guiding *daimon*; its old *daimon* is now assigned to Epaminondas (see the next sentence). [R]

157 τὸ εἶδος is clearly a gloss on τὴν φύσιν (for this sense of φύσις, see LSJ s.v. II. 2) and must therefore be deleted. [R]

158 On Phyllidas see above, n. 42. Hipposthenidas' timidity (and his initiative on account of it) is briefly described in Plut. *Pelopidas* 8.5–6 as well. [N]

159 Herippidas and Arcesus are the two remaining Spartan commanders (while the third, Lysanoridas, had gone to Haliartus; see above, n. 18). Plut. *Pel.* 13.3 calls them all 'harmosts', wheras Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.10 and 13 speaks of one harmost only (and implies, see n. 285 below) a smaller garrison. [RP]
Herippidas' name is not totally certain: in this passage, E gives κριππίδας, and in 34.598F, Ἑρμιππίδαν, which form is also found in the manuscripts of *Pelopidas* 13.3. Xenophon, however, in his *Hellenica* has always the form Herippidas (it is also found in Diod. 14.38.4 and Plut. *Ages.* 11.3–4). [R]

160 Thespiae is a Boeotian town about 15 km east of Thebes. [N]

161 This detail is not in *Pelopidas*, and Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.4.10) says that the Spartan sent to Thespiae for help after the coup. [R]

162 On Amphitheus, see above, n. 48. [R]

163 There was a temple for Demeter Thesmophoros up on the Cadmea; on the sacrifice mentioned here see R. Parker, below p. 130 (with n. 5). [R]

164 Hypatodorus is not otherwise known. His dream is perhaps modelled on Xenophon's dream (*Anab.* 3.1.11) of a thunderbolt falling on his father's house. [R]

165 Adopting Reiske's προείληφε (as also Hani does) instead of E's προείληφας. [R]
166 On Melon, see above, n. 15. [N]
167 Chlidon's part in the affair is described also in Plut. *Pelopidas* 8.7–8. [R]
168 The MSS give Ἡραῖα, but there is no evidence for a great festival of Hera at Thebes, whereas the Heraclea were a famous and very great occasion. [R]
169 The MSS mark a long lacuna here (45 letters in E), but the sense appears complete, and we can hardly guess what, if anything, is missing. Pohlenz' ⟨ὡς τοῦ πράγματος μετέχοντας⟩ means 'because they were privy to the affair.' [R]
170 Wilamowitz' transposition of δὲ from before ζητοῦσα to behind ἱκανῶς (adopted by Sieveking and Hani) is not necessary, as the translation shows. [R]
171 The long lacuna indicated here (52 letters in E) cannot be filled with any certainty. The supplement assumed by Amyot would mean 'to make the necessary preparations to receive the exiles' ('et Charon pour tener sa maison preste à recevoir les bannis'). The genitive τῆς οἰκίας suggests that the Greek ought be, e.g. ⟨ἐπιμελησόμενος, ὡς δεξόμενος τοὺς φυγάδας⟩. [R]
172 We translate, on the lines of Pohlenz' supplement, ⟨μᾶλλλον ἀκούουσιν, ὕπαρ δὲ⟩. This takes μόλις as in effect a negation. An alternative (Russell 1954, 62–3) is to place the lacuna after τῶν κρειττόνων and supply there (e.g.) ⟨οἳ τῶν μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐμπλησθέντες ταραχῶν⟩ ('who, being filled with the turmoils of the day'). μόλις now means 'with difficulty'. The sense is altered: the contrast is now between Socrates, who can receive these messages in waking hours, and the rest of us who can with difficulty do so even in sleep, because, though our body is at peace, our minds are still disturbed: cf. Pl. *Rep.* 9.571c. [R]
173 Supplementing μη⟨δαμῶς εἰ μὴ⟩ μικρὰ instead of deleting (with the Basle edition of 1542) E's μὴ before μικρά; see Russell 1954, 63. [R]
174 On the possible sources for this concept, see the Introduction, above p. 9. [R]
175 Reading βιαίως (E) ⟨ὡς⟩, which makes Reiske's βιαίους (adopted by Sieveking and Hani) unnecessary. [R]
176 Reading ἐνδοῦσα instead of ἐνδούσας (E). [R]
177 Retaining E's ἅμα τῷ; Wilamowitz' insertion of δὲ (adopted by Sieveking and Hani) seems unnecessary. [R]
178 EB have οὐδ' ὁ, Wyttenbach εἰ δ' ὁ (adopted by Hani), but Emperius, who conjectured ὁ δὲ, is right. The argument must be that the mechanism by which the soul moves the body is unknown, but the fact that it does so is certain, and the process does not entail speech; we cannot therefore doubt the possibility of soul moving soul. [R]
179 Following Einarson / De Lacy (who conjecture ἀλλ' εἰ σῶμα μὲν δίχα φωνῆς) and reading ἀλλ' ὡς σῶμα καὶ δίχα φωνῆς (ἀλλ' [then erasure of one or two letters] σω μάλα δίχα φωνῆς E, ἀλλ' ἐν ὅσῳ μάλα δίχα φωνῆς B). Wilamowitz already conjectured ἀλλ' οἷον σῶμα; Hani adopts Kronenberg's ἀλλ' εἴσω μάλα δίχα φωνῆς. [R]
180 The words ὥσπερ φῶς ἀνταύγειαν are obscure. They are usually taken as if ὥσπερ φῶς πρὸς ἀνταύγειαν stood there, 'as light relates to reflection'; i.e., one is to another as a light is to its reflection. But ἀνταύγεια may also mean 'effulgence', and I have chosen to treat φῶς as a (correct) gloss on ἀνταύγειαν in this sense. The light metaphor continues in the following explanatory sentence. [R]
181 Reading (with Waterfield) τοῖς δεχομένοις (δυναμένοις E) ἐλλάμπουσιν, which makes Wilamowitz' δυναμένοις ⟨ἰδεῖν⟩ unnecessary. Hani adopts Herwerden's τοῖς δαιμονίοις for τοῖς δυναμένοις. [R]
182 Or perhaps 'expressions or names of things'. [R]
183 Reading ὥστε ⟨τί⟩ θαυμάζειν ἄξιον, while Sieveking and Hani adopt Amyot's ὥστε θαυμάζειν ⟨οὐκ⟩ ἄξιον. [R]
184 Reading (with Von Arnim) κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ νοηθὲν (as also Hani does; κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ νοηθὲν E, in which Wilamowitz deleted τοῦτο, followed by Sieveking). [R]

185 Reading τῶν κρει⟨ττόνων⟩, which agrees better with the letters ἀμει (followed by a lacuna of four or five letters) in E than δαι⟨μόνων⟩ conjectured by Wyttenbach (and adopted by Sieveking). Hani follows Turnebus, who supplements ἀμει⟨νόνων⟩. But ἀμείνονες is not found with the meaning 'supernatural beings, daimones', while κρείττονες is. [R]

186 For this, see Herodotus 4.200.2–3 and Aeneas Tacticus 37. [R]

187 Retaining E's τῶν δ' ἄλλων (as Hani also does); Wilamowitz' τὰ δ' ἄλλ' is unnecessary. [R]

188 Reading (with E) ἀθόρυβον ἦθος; Hubert's insertion of τὸ before ἦθος does not seem necessary. [R]

189 Reading κινεῖ with Bock (κινοῦσι E). [R]

190 Reading ἐν αὑτοῖς with Bernardakis (as Hani also does; ἐν αὐτοῖς E). [R]

191 This story is not known from other sources. [R]

192 Supplementing εἰσαγόντων; Sieveking adopts Wilamowitz' παραγόντων, Hani Bernardakis' εἰρηκότων. [R]

193 Timarchus is undoubtedly (see Introd.) an invented character. His name may have been suggested by [Plat.] *Theages* 124a, where an Athenian Timarchus goes out on an adventure which ends in his death, despite a warning from Socrates; or possibly by Callimachus *epigr.* 10 Pfeiffer, where a philosopher Timarchus is now among the blessed dead. His career is fictitious: in the common tradition, all Socrates' sons survive their father (see *Phaedo* 116a13), whereas Plutarch makes the eldest, Lamprocles, predecease Timarchus, and Timarchus predecease Socrates. [R]

194 But Theanor (593A) calls it λόγος. For the distinction cf. *De sera* 18.561B and Plat. Gorgias 523a (with Dodds' note). [R]

195 Drexler's supplement (⟨κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον⟩) is adequate; the sense is clear. [R]

196 On Socrates' eldest son Lamprocles (mentioned Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.1, Aristoxenus fr. 54ab Wehrli, Ael. *VH* 12.15, Diog. Laert. 2.26, 29), see above, n. 193. [N]

197 Supplementing ⟨οὐ πολλ⟩αῖς (αἷς E: ⟨ὀλίγ⟩αις editio Basileensis, Sieveking, Hani). [R]

198 Plutarch wrote a special work (unfortunately not preserved) on the Oracle of Trophonius at Lebadeia (no. 181 in the so-called 'Lamprias Catalogue': *On the descent into the cave of Trophonios*), and his brother Lamprias was a priest at the oracle (cf. *De defectu* 38.431C). Pausanias' uniquely elaborate account of the process of consultation (9.39: see, e.g., W. K. C. Guthrie, *The Greeks and their Gods*, London 1950, 223–232 and in detail P. Bonnechere, *Trophonios de Lébadée*, Leiden 2003) shows it to have been more elaborate, more flexible and open to auto-suggestion ("there is no single way in which they are taught about the future, but one person may see, another hear …") and above all more terrifying than any other: whence its suitability for Timarchus' startling vision. [RP]

199 Cf. Pausan. 9.39.14 ('they are obliged to dedicate a written account on a tablet of all they have individually heard or seen') and Clearchus fr. 9 Wehrli (the vision of Cleonymus, who discloses when he woke 'all he has seen and heard'). [R]

200 The sutures of the skull (cf. Plat. *Timaeus* 76a) close in infancy: they are here regarded as the passage of exit of the soul. I do not know an ancient parallel, but for Tennyson (*In memoriam* xliv) they are the 'doorways' of the head, and 'the living babe forgets the time before the sutures of the skull are closed.' [R]
J. Hani, "Le mythe de Timarque chez Plutarque et la structure de l'extase", *REG* 88, 1975, [105-120] 110–115 draws attention to some parallels he found in Shaman and Hindu lore. [N]

201 All the conjectures (συστελλομένην Einarson, στεινομένην Emperius, στενουμένην Dodds, πνιγομένην Pohlenz; E has τεινομένην) make the same point: the soul has been confined and hemmed in, and now expands. [R]

202 Reading μείζονα (instead of πλείονα, which – as Sieveking remarks in his apparatus – "parum intellegitur"). [R]

203 Supplementing δ′ after ἐξαμειβούσας (Von Arnim proposed καταλλήλως ⟨δ′⟩ ἐξαμειβούσας). [R]

204 Reading with Von Arnim ὥσπερ βαφὴν ⟨ἐπ⟩άγειν (ὥσπερ βαφὴν ἄγειν E). [R]

205 Supplementing ἐμμελῶς (λιγυρῶς Wilamowitz, adopted by Sieveking and Hani); E has a lacuna of seven letters here. [R]

206 The translation implies a conjectural supplement of the two lacunae found here (of 10 and 43 letters respectively in E) by the words (tentatively put into the text) πολλὰς ... ⟨συν⟩εφέλκεσθαι τῇ ⟨τῆς θαλάσσης ῥοῇ, καὶ αυτῆς κύκλῳ⟩ σχεδὸν ὑποφερομένης. Von Arnim proposed πολλὰς ⟨τούτῳ συν⟩εφέλκεσθαι, τῇ⟨ς θαλάσσης καὶ αὐτῆς κύκλῳ⟩ σχεδὸν ὑποφερομένης. Von Arnim's second supplement is further augmented by Einarson / De Lacy, who add ὁμαλῶς καὶ λείως after αὐτῆς, and this (as well as Von Arnim's first supplement) is adopted by Hani. [R]

207 This part of the description is rather obscure. On the view adopted here (see Introd.) the sea is the whole celestial sphere, and not (as Von Arnim held) simply the Milky Way. It is therefore not easy to explain these variations of depth. Einarson / De Lacy adduce the Stoic view ([Plut.] *Placita* 2.15) that the stars do not move in one plane but 'one in front of another in height and depth.' [R]

208 Plutarch may here have in mind Plat. *Phaedo* 113a, though ἐκβολή there has a different meaning. [R]

209 This way of describing planetary movements is standard: e.g. Plat. *Timaeus* 36b, 38b, 39b. [R]

210 Reading ταύτην instead of τούτων (cf. Vernière). [R]

211 This again is rather obscure. The angle presumably represents the inclination of the ecliptic to the equator. If Timarchus is looking upwards at a hemisphere (and Plutarch stresses that all this is how it *seemed* to Timarchus), we may take τοῦ παντός as describing a span of 180°, and the angle intended as a little less than 8/60 of this, i.e. 24°, which is what we expect. The μέρη are 'sixtieths'; Plutarch avoids the technical term ἑξηκοντάδες (for it, see, e.g., Strab. 2.5.7 p. 113–4 C.). [R]

212 This *does* seem to describe the Milky Way. [R]

213 Timarchus now looks down, where it seems as if a huge chasm has been scooped out. This chasm is (or includes) the earth itself, whence arise the howls and groans of human suffering as we know it in this life. [R]

214 ἐκταραττομένου gives an etymology of Τάρταρος, also known from Crates (Steph. Byz. s.v. Τάρταρος, cf. Serv. *Aen.* 6.577) but not the only etymology current (Plutarch *De primo frigido* 9.948F ⟨cf. Lyd. *De mensibus* 4.159⟩ derives it from ταρταρίζειν, 'trembling' from cold). [R]

215 The voice is that of a *daimon* on the moon (cf. 591C). [R]

216 For the identification of Persephone (daughter of Demeter, wife of Hades and queen of the underworld in Greek myth) with the moon, see *De facie* 27.942D–943C and *Hymn. Orph.* 29.11 Quandt. [R]

217 Already Reiske wanted to replace ὡς by ὧν; another possibility is ἣν ('which is one of the four portions, and which Styx delimits'). Styx (i.e. the earth's shadow) is a sort of frontier between Hades (the earth) and Persephone's realm of the moon. [R]

218 This is obscure ⟨to me⟩: 'diametrically opposite from here' (Waterfield). [R]

219 See Introd. (p. 10), and esp. Dillon 1996, 212–6. [R]

220 The symbolic use of the three Moirai derives from Plato's Myth of Er (*Rep.* 10.617c); Plutarch uses it also in *De facie* 30.945C (see Cherniss' notes). Cf. Deuse, below pp. 194–7. The 'turning-point' (καμπή) may have been suggested by Plato *Phaedo* 72b. [Plutarch uses the word in a different sense ('spring') in *Cons. ad uxorem* 10.611F and *De anima* fr. 177.22 Sandbach.] [R]

221 The expression δαίμονες ἐπιχθόνιοι is taken from Hesiod *WD* 122. [R]
222 The 'second measures' must be periods of 24 hours. In Plat. *Tim.* 42b 'days' and 'nights' are said to be τὰ πρῶτα μέρη τῶν χρόνων. The νυχθήμερον may therefore be 'second'. Alternatively (Lattanzi 1933, 57 n. 5), the solar year or the lunar month is regarded as 'first'. [R]
223 Reading ἀνακραθεῖσαι with Wyttenbach (ἀναταραχθεῖσαι E). [R]
224 Caster proposed adding δικτύου ('net'): if so, this must come before δεδυκότος (to avoid hiatus). It may well be right. Des Places wanted to put δικτύου into the text instead of ἄρτημα. [R]
225 Cf. Plat. *Phaedrus* 248a. [R]
226 Retaining E's διαφερόμενοι (as Hani also does, while Sieveking adopts Pohlenz' deletion of δια-). [R]
227 A revaluation of the common expression νοῦν ἔχειν ('to have good sense'). [R]
228 Von Arnim's ἕλικα τεταραγμένην (as in Sieveking's Teubner text) for ἐγκαταταραγμένην must be right. [R]
229 Cf. Plat. *Rep.* 10.614c, *Phaedrus* 247b. [R]
230 Retaining E's ἐνθένδε (as Hani also does, while Sieveking adopts Herwerden's ἔνδοθεν). [R]
231 The hero of the story now told is called Hermotimus in Aristotle (*Met.* A 3.984b 19, *Protrepticus* fr. 61 Rose = B 110 Düring), and in later authors (see E. Rohde, *Psyche* [engl. transl.], London 1925, ix n. 111–2; E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley 1951, 141; Waszink on Tertullian *De anima* 44), but he is Hermodorus also in Proclus *in Rempublicam* 2.113.24 Kroll. [R]
232 Spintharus of Tarentum (his praise of Epaminondas is mentioned also in Plut. *De aud.* 3.39B) is perhaps the father of Aristoxenus (but see F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles, Heft 2: Aristoxenos*, Basel 1967 (2. Aufl.), 47). He knew Socrates (Aristoxenus fr. 54a Wehrli), but there is no other evidence for his visit to Thebes. [R]
233 On swans as holy birds see O. Keller, *Die antike Tierwelt* (Leipzig 1909) vol. 2.214–9; on snakes, vol. 2.286, 288–90; on dogs, vol. 1.136–43; on horses, vol. 1.246–53. [R]
234 Reading τῶν ἀπὸ ταὐτοῦ γένους (τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸ γένος E, τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ γένος Wilamowitz, τῶν ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ γένος Bernardakis). [R]
235 One might consider reading τι προσταττόμενον (τὸ προσταττόμενον E). [R]
236 The quotations are Hom. *Il.* 7.44–5 and 7.53. In [Plut.] *De vita et poesi Homeri* 212, *Il.* 7.53 is used to show that Helenus was αὐτήκοος ... θείας φωνῆς, and to make it plausible that Socrates ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ δαιμονίου φωνῆς ἐμαντεύετο. Unless this author is dependent on Plutarch, there must be a common source. See Hillgruber *ad loc.* [R]
237 A rather similar analogy between earthly monarchs and god is developed in [Aristotle] *De mundo* 6. [R]
238 I.e. those who have finally escaped from the cycle of reincarnation, which Theanor (as a Pythagorean) takes for granted. [R]
239 See *WD* 122–126. [R]
240 The supplement of this lacuna (10 letters in E) is unsure: Hani adopts Wilamowitz' ὦ ⟨φίλοι, καί⟩, but we cannot tell whether Theanor addresses Simmias or 'my friends' or 'Theocritus' (because Theocritus encouraged Simmias to relate the myth). [R]
241 Reading μεθίησιν as supplement of this short lacuna (6 letters in E); Hani adopts Bernardakis' ἐᾷ γάρ (already Amyot proposed ἐᾷ μὲν γάρ). [R]
242 The picture of the soul fighting to "secure its landing" (φιλοτιμουμένη περὶ τὴν ἔκβασιν) contains a Homeric reminiscence: in Hom. *Od.* 5.410, Odysseus almost despairs about finding a place to land on the Phaeacian shore (ἔκβασις οὔ πη φαίνεθ' ἁλὸς πολιοῖο θύραζε). For the text (⟨τοῖς⟩ ἄνω προσφέρηται), see Einarson / De Lacy *ad loc.* [R]

243 The translation accepts Reiske's ⟨πρὸς⟩ (which Sieveking and Hani adopt as well). But ἀνύποπτος could mean 'unsuspecting', and we might also read ἔξουσιν ἀνύποπτον τὸν δῆμον. [R]

244 I.e. Caphisias and those with him. [R]

245 Already Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.4.2) names Philippus as one of the leading pro-Spartan oligarchs in Thebes; according to Plut. *Pelopidas* 5.2 it was Philippus who together with Archias and Leontiadas persuaded the Spartan Phoibidas to occupy the Cadmea (in *Pelopidas* 7.4 Philippus is called polemarchos together with Archias). In *De genio*, Philippus (who is mentioned here for the first time) becomes prominent only in the last part of the tale. [N]

246 On Amphitheus, see above, n. 48. [N]

247 In 4.577A Archias and Lysanoridas (on whom see above, n. 18) had come down from the Cadmea, while Caphisias, Theocritus and Galaxidorus were on their way to Simmias' house. In 5.578A Theocritus reported that Lysanoridas had set out for Haliartus to close Alcmena's tomb again. [R]

248 The supplement for this lacuna (7 letters in E) is uncertain. Bernardakis proposed ⟨ὑπάνδρου⟩, which Hani adopts; cf. Plut. *Pel.* 9.4 (Φυλλίδας ... κατηγγελκὼς τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀρχίαν πότον ... καὶ γύναια τῶν ὑπάνδρων). Post's supplement γαμετῆς also means 'married'. For Xenophon, the women promised to Archias' party were high-grade courtesans (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.4–6). [RP]

249 I.e. Caphisias' party. [R]

250 Damoclidas is a conspirator mentioned also in Plut. *Pel.* 8.2 and 11.1; he was a Boeotarch in 371 (Paus. 9.13.6). [RN].

251 Theopompus is a conspirator mentioned also in Plut. *Pel.* 8.2. [R]

252 Adopting Herwerden's ὑπερβαλόντες (ὑπερβάλλοντες E). [R]

253 This is a detail not found in *Pelopidas*: for the portent, cf. e.g. *Il.* 2.353. [R]

254 This is the house of Charon, who had volunteered (see 2.576D) to take the conspirators returning from Athens into his house. [N] The following incident, including Charon's offering of his son as hostage, is also recounted in Plut. *Pelopidas* 9. [P]

255 The translation includes θεὶς ... ἱμάτιον in Charon's speech (as also in Sieveking, Einarson / De Lacy and Hani), while Post makes them part of Charon's actions. [R]

256 On Hipposthenidas and Chlidon, see above 17.586A–18.588A. [N]

257 Reading πιθανὸν εἶναι (πιθανὸν ὄντα E), as ὑπενόουν should be construed with an infinitive and not with a participle. [R]

258 Reading πρὸς τὸ συμπεσούμενον (συμπόσιον E, συμπεσόν Reiske, which Sieveking and Hani adopt). Or perhaps read συμπῖπτον (cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 8.5.16: ἐν ... ταῖς πορείαις πρὸς τὸ συμπῖπτον ἀεὶ διατάττων ἐπορεύετο)? [R]

259 This harks back to Hom. *Od.* 11.526–530, where Odysseus relates how fearlessly (in contrast to many other Greek leaders) Neoptolemos entered the Wooden Horse. [R]

260 Adopting Wilamowitz' Κηφισόδωρος ⟨ὁ⟩ Διο⟨γεί⟩τονος (Κηφισοδώρῳ Διότονος E). The conspirator Cephisodorus is also mentioned in *Pelopidas* 11.7–8. [R]

261 Reading πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἀσυντάκτους (Russell 1954, 63), which Hani adopts; E has πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀσυντάκτους, from which Madvig (followed by Sieveking) deleted ἀλλήλους. [R]

262 For this image cf. Plut. *De audiendo* 9.42C. [R]

263 The account in Plut. *Pelopidas* 10.5 is slightly different: Charon told the truth to οἱ περὶ Πελοπίδαν and invented a reassuring fiction for the other conspirators. [P]

264 Androclidas had long been a leader of the anti-Spartan faction at Thebes (*Hell. Oxy.* XVII.1; XVIII; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1, 4, all referring to 395–4; 5.2.31, 36; Plut. *Lysander* 8.3, 27.1, *Pel.* 5.1). After the Spartans occupied the Cadmea, he fled to Athens, but was slain there by assassins sent by Leontiadas (Plut. *Pel.* 5.3, 6.3). [RNP]

265 Hypatas is (besides Archias, Philippus and Leontiadas) another leader of the pro-Spartan faction at Thebes (see Xen. *Hell.* 7.3.7, Plut. *Pel.* 11.1,9). [R]

266 Xenophon says that different stories circulated in his day, some saying that the conspirators who attacked Archias' party entered disguised as women, others as komasts. Plutarch's version (similarly *Pelopidas* 11.1) combines the two. On the popular story motif of 'warriors disguised as women' see R. J. Buck, *Boiotia and the Boiotian League* (Alberta 1994) 73. Borthwick 1976 suggested that a late 4th c. amphora-rhyton found in 1949 at Panagjurischte illustrated the assault; for dissent see J. Griffith, *Festinat Senex* (Oxford 1988) 44–49. [P]

267 Cf. *Pelopidas* 10.6. [R]

268 Cf. *Pelopidas* 10.7–9; the story is also related in *Quaest. conv.* 1.3.619D, Nepos *Pelopidas* 3.2–3 (but with Archinus for Archias). For the proverb quoted here, see *Appendix Proverbiorum* 2.58 (= *CPG* 1.404), in the (?Doric) form ἐν ἀοῖ τὰ σπουδαῖα. [R]

269 Caphisias of course can only guess the contents of the letter. There is some inconsistency here, since, in the *De genio* version (contrast *Pelopidas* 7.3), Charon has only just (i.e. earlier on this same day) offered his house to the conspirators, and this could not have been known to the correspondent in Athens. [R]

270 Cobet's κατακεκλυσμένος ('drowned in drink', 'half seas over') is attractive, but E's κατακεκλασμένος may do. [R]

271 Reading (with Herwerden, inspired by *Pel.* 10.8) ὑπέρ τινων σπουδαίων (ὑπὲρ τῶν σπουδαίων E, from which Cobet deleted τῶν, followed by Sieveking and Hani). [R]

272 Nothing is known about this magistracy beyond the religious functions (sacrifice and prayer) and appurtenances (crown; sacred spear) mentioned in what follows. Cabirichus is otherwise unknown. [RP]

273 Lysitheus is named here for the first time; he is probably one of the returning exiles. [R]

274 Or 'above my head'. [R]

275 On Theopompus, see above, n. 251. [R]

276 Callistratus of Aphidna was a prominent Athenian politician unfriendly to Thebes (see [Dem.] *or.* 59.27; Plut. *Praec. ger. reip.* 14.810F), and a considerable orator (see Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.39, 3.3, 10). We cannot say if the episode of the letter has any historical authority. [R]

277 On Samidas, see above, n. 37. [R]

278 The 'Long Colonnade' is perhaps the στοὰ μεγάλη in the agora erected in commemoration of the victory over the Athenians at Delium (Diod. 12.70.5; cf. perhaps Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.29). [RP]

279 There is no lacuna indicated in MSS, but something like this must be missing. [R]

280 Boeotian ladies are usually modest and restrained: See Plut. *Cons. ad uxorem* 7.610BC, and cf. [Dicaearchus] *GGM* 1.103 Müller = Herakleides ὁ Κριτικός 1.17–20 p. 80–83 Pfister (they even covered their whole face except the eyes). [R]

281 This is either the temple of Athena Onkaia, south or south-west of the Cadmea, or that of Athena Ismenias (or Pronaia?), south-east of the Cadmea. See Parker, below p. 131 with n. 8. [R]

282 For this, see above, n. 168 (on 18.587D). [R]

283 Presumably, they fled from the lower city to the Cadmea (lacuna of 21 letters in E). [R]

284 Adopting Wilamowitz' ἐκκρίτους (κρείττους E, which Hani retains). [R]

285 This figure is given also in *Pelopidas* 12.4 and Diodorus Siculus 15.25.3; but Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.11 says that the defenders felt themselves to be too few to resist. [P]

286 On Lysanoridas, see above, n. 18 and 159. [R]

287 The lacuna (17 letters in E) in this place makes the sense unsure: either 'he was away (at Haliartus, see 574A) that day' or 'he was expected to return that day'. [R]

288 Accepting B's ⟨οὐκ ὀλίγοις ἐζημίωσαν⟩ as a good conjecture (E has a lacuna of 19 letters here). [R]

289 On Herippidas and Arcesus, see above, n. 159. On the fate of the three Spartan commanders, see also Plut. *Pel.* 13.3. [R]

C. Essays

Between Athens, Sparta, and Persia: the Historical Significance of the Liberation of Thebes in 379

George Cawkwell

The Liberation of Thebes from Spartan control was one of the crucial moments of the fourth century. With the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, Sparta had become the unchallenged master of Greece, but the events of the night in midwinter 379/8 which provide the setting of Plutarch's dialogue, *De genio Socratis*, changed all that. The Spartan garrison was expelled from the Cadmea and the rise of Theban power began. In 371 on the battlefield of Leuctra the Thebans at a stroke set Sparta on the defensive for the rest of her history while Thebes became the leading military power of Greece. It was only the intervention of Macedon that deposed her. Much was at stake as those philosophically minded discussed the *daimon* of Socrates and the conspirators set about their murderous plans.

The rise of Thebes in the 370s and the 360s[1] was due primarily, in the view of Ephorus (Diod. 15.39.2), to three men who feature in the *De genio*, Pelopidas, Gorgidas and Epaminondas. The part of Epaminondas in the liberation, as Plutarch describes it, was minor; he had declined actively to take a hand in an action that might damage innocent citizens (594B) though he said that he and Gorgidas had known the expected date of the exiles' return, and when the uprising was under way both men had assembled with their friends ready to assist the cause (598C, D).[2] Elsewhere Plutarch made plain his high esteem for Epaminondas (*Timoleon* 36, *Philopoemen* 3) and, if one can accept that Pausanias' account of the career of Epaminondas (9.13–15.6) is an epitome of Plutarch's (lost) *Life*,[3] he rounded off his account by citing the elegiac verses on the statue of Epaminondas in Thebes, where it was proclaimed that it was due to him that 'all Hellas is independent and in freedom'. So Plutarch's silence in the *De genio* is challenging. Pelopidas' part is fully recounted (596C, 597D–F) but Plutarch drops no hint of their future partnership, nor of Pelopidas' large share in the northern extension of Theban power. Gorgidas, who had been a Hipparch before 382 (578BC), was the founder of the Sacred Band (*Pelopidas* 18) and

[1] Buckler 2003 is a valuable handbook to the period. Similarly, the *Cambridge Ancient History* VI^2 (Cambridge 1994).

[2] Cf. Cawkwell 1972.

[3] Cf. L. Peper, *De Plutarchi Epaminonda* (diss. Jena 1912) and Ziegler 1951, 896.

his minor part in the liberation is adequately described (594B, 598C).[4] The failure to point the contrast between the Epaminondas of 379/8 and the Epaminondas of 371 and later is surprising.

Of course, it may be simply that Plutarch chanced to tell it all that way, but one inevitably wonders whether he was reflecting whatever source he had concerning the liberation. His model for the whole dialogue is Platonic and just as it is vain to look to Plato's *Dialogues* for reliable factual information, so one might hesitate to give great credit to Plutarch's account of that historic night if it were not that the *De genio* chimes with barely a dissonant note with the account of the liberation in the *Life of Pelopidas*. There are furthermore very few Thebans named of whom we do not hear in other sources and there is only one historical fact which is anachronistic, viz. Jason of Pherae's tenure of the office of ταγός of Thessaly (583F).[5] So the account of the liberation is not fiction but history. The philosophical dialogue may or may not have taken place on that night but the historical account is to be taken seriously.

Whence then did Plutarch derive it? The likely enough guess is that he drew on the *Hellenica* of Callisthenes of Olynthus (*FGrHist* 124), a work covering in ten books the thirty years between the Peace of Antalcidas and the outbreak of the Sacred War. This must have been a full work, and it is highly likely that his account of the liberation of Thebes was full. There are other candidates of course, like the shadowy Daimachus of Plataea (*FGrHist* 65) and Aristophanes 'the Boeotian' whom Plutarch used in the *De Herodoti Malignitate* (*FGrHist* 379), but no matter. What is clear is that Plutarch did not use Xenophon's *Hellenica*. The two accounts differ in detail, and there is one very striking difference. Xenophon spoke of seven conspirators (5.4.1), Plutarch of twelve (576C; cf. *Pelopidas* 8), and Xenophon makes no mention at all of Pelopidas' part in the action. This is consistent with Xenophon's treatment of both Pelopidas and Epaminondas. The former does not appear in the *Hellenica* apart from the embassy to the Great King in 367 which Xenophon treated as shabby and disgraceful (7.1.33–38). The latter is not named in connection with Leuctra and makes his first appearance during the second Theban campaign in the Peloponnese (7.1.41). Xenophon's silences about Pelopidas and Epaminondas were deliberate, and scandalous. Plutarch was not deceived. Wherever it was, he found a full account of that dramatic night; what he says and does not say is

[4] H. Swoboda, "Gorgidas", *RE* 7.2 (1912) 1619–20, for what is known of Gorgidas.

[5] Eumolpidas and Samidas (577A), Phidolaus of Haliartus (577D), Ismenodorus and Melissus (582D) are otherwise unattested. There is no other evidence to support the claims that Timotheus, the son of Conon, was sympathetic to Boeotia (575F), nor that Callistratus was connected with Leontiadas (597D), though there is nothing inherently improbable in either case. Jason however did not become ταγός of Thessaly until the later 370s (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.18) and 583F is in error.

seriously to be considered, a matter not of historiography but, it would seem, of fact.

The career of Epaminondas is indeed poorly attested before he appears centre-stage in the Peace Conference at Sparta in 371 where he met Agesilaus' demand for the dissolution of the Boeotian Federation with a demand that the Spartans let the Perioecic peoples go, and then he had the Thebans refuse to join in a treaty that returned them to submission. Twenty days later he fought and won the battle of Leuctra, a cataclysmic victory, his first appearance, in a military role, as Boeotarch. The *De genio* shows he was not an active participant in 379/8; he knew about the plotted liberation but tried to dissuade the plotters (576E, F, 594B); he and Gorgidas had their friends ready to give support when the dirty work had been done (594 B) but he would not initiate the violence. This all fits with his abstaining from action in the years down to 371, and the reason Epaminondas gave for his abstinence, viz. that 'unless there was great necessity, he would not kill any of his fellow-citizens without trial' (594 B), is consistent with his attitude at the height of his power and glory. According to Diodorus (15.57), when the Thebans after Leuctra campaigned against Orchomenus, once the chief obstacle to Theban domination of Boeotia and still at least dissident, and they intended to enslave the city, Epaminondas dissuaded them saying that 'those aiming to have the leadership of the Greeks' should not so behave. The Orchomenians, Diodorus declares, were then made 'allies' and in the same mood the Phocians were made 'friends' of Thebes but on terms hardly suitable to 'those aiming to have the leadership of the Greeks', for they were able to refuse to join the army of Epaminondas on its way to settle the affairs of the Peloponnese in the battle of Mantineia; they declared that their treaty with Thebes obliged them to lend military aid in the case of an attack on Thebes but said nothing about campaigns against others (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.4). In comparable spirit Epaminondas was later to treat with moderation 'the best men' of Achaea (ibid. 7.1.42). The criticism made of him by Theocritus the diviner in 379/8 (576DE) foreshadows the enmity he aroused at the height of his career.[6] Epaminondas was, in short, a credit to philosophy if not to Realpolitik. The *De genio* makes a useful contribution to our understanding of this great man.

The main historical question, however, that naturally poses itself to readers of the *De genio* concerns the division in Theban politics between Leontiadas and Archias on the one hand and on the other the liberators and, previously, Ismenias and Androclidas, in other words between the Laconisers and their opponents.

First, one must ask whether it was a struggle between democrats and oligarchs, the sort of *stasis* with which we are familiar from all over the

[6] Cf. Cawkwell 1972, 266–8.

pages of Thucydides and especially his analysis of *stasis* (3.82). Efforts to unite Boeotia were already underway in the late sixth century as the unsuccessful Theban effort to coerce Plataea in 519 shows (Hdt. 6.108.5, Thuc. 3.68.5), and Herodotus (9.15.1) speaks of Boeotarchs in 479. However, the full Boeotian constitution may not have been in place by that date to judge by what the Thebans are made by Thucydides (3.62) to claim in answer to the charge of Medism during Xerxes' invasion. Perhaps they spoke tongue in cheek but they went on to say that things were different after the Persians withdrew and the city τοὺς νόμους ἔλαβε, there having been been previously neither ὀλιγαρχία ἰσόνομος nor δημοκρατία but a δυναστεία ὀλίγων. By the middle of the century we are on firmer ground. After victory in the battle of Oenophyta in 457 the Athenians established some sort of control over all of Boeotia save Thebes (Diod. 11.83, cf. [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.*3.11), and there would seem to have been some kind of democracy in Thebes in this period (Ar. *Pol.* 1302 b 29). Ten years later an Athenian force was defeated at Coronea (Thuc. 1.113). The Athenians completely withdrew from Boeotia and the Boeotian Confederacy, as we see it described in *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (XIX Chambers), was securely established (Thuc. 3.62.5). It was a decisive point in the rise of Boeotia, which the Theban commander at the battle of Delium in 424 used to inspire the Boeotian army (Thuc. 4.92.6), and the firm establishment of the federal constitution hardly left room for much in the way of democracy. Each of the 'divisions' (μέρη) sent one hundred and sixty councillors to the Federal Council sitting in Thebes, which decided affairs. It is not surely to be excluded that individual cities had a popular assembly but if they did, it must have been largely unemployed. Yet the political division which had come on the Boeotians, according to the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (XIX.1 Chambers), 'not many years' before the outbreak of hostilities in 395 and which set Ismenias in conflict with Leontiadas, had no constitutional effect as far as we can see. The charges made against Ismenias after his arrest in 382 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.35) appear to have nothing to do with a clash of oligarchy and democracy and everything to do with Spartan policy towards Persia. It was according to *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (XX.1) a division amongst the βέλτιστοι καὶ γνωριμώτατοι τῶν πολιτῶν. The federal constitution continued until the King's Peace of 386 when Agesilaus required its dissolution and Thebes was made into what we see in the *De genio*, a separate city with three Polemarchs as its senior magistrates.

It is true that there was some sort of assembly in Thebes which is alluded to by Plutarch in his *Life of Pelopidas* (12). It had been assembled the morning after the liberation and indeed elected, on Plutarch's account

(*Pel.* 13.1[7]), three Boeotarchs. Whenever exactly the Boeotarchy was reinstated, the seizure of Plataea by the Thebans in 373 was led by a Boeotarch who led the Thebans directly from the assembly with their weapons in hand (Paus. 9.1.6 and 7). The whole trick depending on Plataean presumption that the assembly would be longdrawn – ἠπίσταντο γὰρ τοὺς Θηβαίους ⟨ὡς⟩ πανδημεὶ καὶ ἅμα ἐπὶ πλεῖστον εἰώθεσαν βουλεύεσθαι (Paus. 9.1.5). There is a decree of the Boeotians honouring a Carthaginian (Rhodes and Osborne no. 43) which is headed ἔδοξε τῶι δάμοι. Its date is unsure but under 364 Diodorus 15.78 has Epaminondas speaking in an assembly[8] and the δῆμος then passing a decree just as was to happen at the time of the Revolt of Thebes in 335 (Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.2, Diod. 17.91). So there is no doubt that Thebes was some sort of democracy after 379. However, Pausanias' account of the assembly of 373 suggests that this democracy was as restricted after the King's Peace as it had been in 395, as described by the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*; only those with a certain property qualification were eligible for the 'four councils' (XIX.2 Chambers); there was a proclamation that 'each Theban should take his weapons with him to the assembly' (Paus. 9.1.6). It would seem then that there was no change in this regard between 395 and 373, and there is no reason to suppose that the liberation brought an outburst of democratic fervour. The factional rivalry of that period was not the struggle of δῆμος and ὀλίγοι so common in Greek states.

In 379 Thebes was in the grip of what Thucydides termed a δυναστεία ὀλίγων. Three years before, the Boeotians had, like the Athenians, sent an embassy to Olynthus and it was believed that the Olynthians had passed a decree to send embassies accompanying the Athenians and Boeotians on their return home to make alliances (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.15). For the Spartans this was a serious situation. They had used the King's Peace to require the dissolution of the Chalcidic League, just as they had done to affect the break-up of the Boeotian confederacy. Such insubordination was not to be tolerated. They sent out an army northwards and, as it passed Thebes, the Theban Laconisers persuaded the Spartans to occupy the Cadmea and stop the rot. So Leontiadas and Archias took control, and a reign of terror began. In fear three hundred Thebans fled to Athens, the situation briefly delineated in *De genio* (575F – 576A). One of the leaders of those opposed to Leontiadas, Ismenias, was arrested and judicially murdered (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.31, 35–36). The other, Androclidas, thought in Thebes to be the leader of the exiles and a likely source of plotting (595B), was assassinated by an agent of Leontiadas (Plut. *Pel.* 6.3). Amphitheus, named by Plutarch elsewhere (*Lysander* 27) as political partner of Androclidas, was, on the

[7] Buckler is prominent among those who accept Plutarch's account. Cf. Buckler 2003, 215.

[8] Aeschin. *or.* 2.105 quoted a remark of Epaminondas in an assembly.

very night of the liberation, expected to be taken from prison, questioned, and put to death (577D, 586E). Clearly, there were a good many others incarcerated (598E).

If this was not a version of the usual struggle of democrats against oligarchs, why were Leontiadas and his gang so submissive to Spartan domination? Plainly the Liberators sought to secure liberty (cf. 595D). Why did the δυναστεία ὀλίγων desire otherwise? It might have been a mixture of fear and prudence, but it is to be noted that on Xenophon's account (*Hell.* 5.2.26) the whole idea of the Spartans occupying the Cadmea originated with Leontiadas. Why was he so minded? Of course he may simply have wanted to be in power himself, but the accusations made against Ismenias (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.36) suggest that there may have been a serious issue of policy. These accusations were 'that Ismenias took the side of the Barbarian, that he had become ξένος to the Persian for no good purpose for Greece, that he had had a share of the money sent by the King, and that he and Androclidas were principally responsible for all the turmoil in Greece.'

There runs, through the history of Greece, in the fourth century, a melancholy river of folly, viz. the Panhellenist dream of the union of Greece in a war against Persia which would stop the Greeks quarrelling amongst themselves and allow them to exploit the wealth of Asia. The chief advocate of this idea was Isocrates, and the man who chiefly sought to realise it King Agesilaus of Sparta.[9] When he went to Asia in 396, his campaign was to be 'against Asia' (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2) just as in 394, when about to obey the summons to return to Greece and defend Sparta, he promised the Greeks of Asia that when he could, he would return to carry on with the grand campaign from which he had been prevented by the turmoil in Greece (Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.3 and 4; cf. 4.1.41). The King's Peace of 386 formally ended such ambitions, but it did not end his hatred of Persia according to his friend and admirer, Xenophon (cf. *Ages.* 7.7). By the time Agesilaus died in 359, Panhellenism for Spartans was an extinct idea. In Thebes, as far as we know, it had never been alive. When Agesilaus was setting out on his great campaign 'against Asia' in 396, he sought 'to make sacrifices in Aulis where Agamemnon made sacrifice when he was sailing against Troy'. The Boeotarchs intervened and violently prevented it (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.4.). Admittedly, Panhellenism was largely a matter not of action but of talk and we do not have any samples of Theban oratory as we have of Athenian, but there is no hint anywhere of Theban policy being affected by the desire to punish Persia. Indeed, in 344, when the Great King appealed to the Greek states for help in the reconquest of Egypt, the Thebans sent a force of a thousand hoplites to assist (Diod. 16.44) and in 335 when, during the Theban Revolt, Alexander called for individuals to submit, the

[9] Cf. G. L. Cawkwell, *The Greek Wars* (Oxford 2005) 6.

Thebans countered calling for volunteers from Alexander's army 'to join with the Great King and the Thebans to free the Greeks and overthrow the tyrant of Hellas…' (Diod. 17.9.5), thus displaying the clear good sense that Demosthenes (10.34) had sought for in vain in Athenian policy.

What suggests that the division between Leontiadas and Ismenias may have been at least sharpened by serious difference over the question of relations with Persia is the part played by an earlier Leontiadas, presumably a direct ancestor, probably grandfather to the leading villain of the *De genio*, in the defence of Thermopylae in 480. For all Herodotus' *malignitas*, it seems that although the δυναστεία ὀλίγων had given earth and water to Xerxes, four hundred Thebans under the command of Leontiadas fought, and, as a punishment, were branded by the Persians, 'beginning with their General' (Hdt. 7.233.2). It is not inconceivable that hostility to the Barbarian was cherished in that family. Ismenias, Leontiadas' chief opponent, had accepted from the King an invitation to become ξένος, an offer Agesilaus had, no doubt ostentatiously, rebuffed (Xen. *Ages.* 8.3). It would not be surprising if Ismenias' policy had caused serious division in the state.

In the fifth century, the centripetal forces of Boeotia seeking to establish the Boeotian Federation were strongly pro-Spartan, the centrifugal forces anti-Spartan and therefore sympathetic to Athens. After the end of the Peloponnesian War, this was abruptly reversed. In the preliminary discussions of Sparta and her allies about the terms of a settlement with Athens the Boeotian representative, like the Corinthian, spoke against any settlement and demanded the destruction of Athens (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19; cf. 3.5.8) and the enslavement of the populace (Isoc. 14.31); yet within a very short time the city of Thebes was offering refuge to the Athenian exiles (Xen. *Hell.* 2.41, etc) then supporting their return (Justin 5.9, etc) and refusing to heed Sparta's call for help in dealing with the liberation of Athens. This was a dramatic change from Thebes' earnest support of Sparta in the Decelean War and their strenuous participation in the war in Ionia, and scholars have largely concurred with the view[10] that Thebes was moved to such dissidence by Sparta's domination both in the Peloponnese and in central Greece (cf. Diodorus 14.17.7 and 82.2).

The dramatic change in Theban policy in 404 can be readily understood. But it is equally to be considered why Spartan policy towards Athens was so unexpectedly lenient. Sparta regarded walls round cities as a source of trouble. They had tried to prevent the building of the Themistoclean ring after the Persians withdrew (Thuc. 1.90.2) just as they prevented the walling of cities in the Peloponnese (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.7). In 411 it was feared in Athens that Athens' walls would be demolished (Thuc. 8.91.3) and Critias, the hard-line oligarch of 404, was believed to want Attica 'to be reduced to

[10] Cf. P. Cloche, "La Politique Thébaine de 404 à 396 av. J.C.", *REG* 31 (1918) 315–43.

sheep-grazing, emptied of the herd of men' (Philost. *V. Soph.* 1.16 = *VS* 88 A1). Why then, after all the bitterness of the Peloponnesian War, did Sparta let Athens off so lightly? Theramenes returned to Athens from what he represented as his successful negotiations at Sparta a greatly popular man (Diod. 14.4.1). But the Spartans were not soft. Why did they let the Athenians keep the city walls?

The answer is probably that Sparta was afraid of Thebes and Theban ambitions.[11] Indeed one of the Thirty at Athens went to Sparta after the return of Theramenes to the Piraeus and bade them campaign in support of the Thirty, 'saying slanderously' according to Lysias (12.58) 'that the city will belong to the Boeotians ....'. Now Thebes had certainly irritated the Spartans by claiming a tithe of the spoils of war (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.21, Plut. *Lys.* 27.4) but that and other minor incidents were not enough to make Sparta fear the Boeotians. One of these incidents is suggestive. In 420/19 the Boeotians took over the Spartan foundation Heraclea, and the Spartans were angry with them for doing so (Thuc. 5.52.1). What business had Boeotia with this place? The answer is to be found in Xenophon's explanation of Jason of Pherae destroying the fortification in 371 (*Hell.* 6.4.27); Heraclea controlled the route from Central Greece northwards. Perhaps as early as 420 Boeotian ambitions envisaged the expansion northwards of the 360s, and Sparta in the person of Lysander sought to prevent them. The measure of Lysander's efforts is to be found in the mixed army of Central Greeks which he took to fight Thebes in the battle of Haliartus in 395 (*Hell.* 3.5.6). Agesilaus in the 380s sought in the King's Peace to keep Boeotia disunited.

The Theban decision to seek an alliance with Olynthus (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.15) was an open challenge to Spartan domination. This was followed by a proclamation that no Theban was to join the campaign against the Olynthians (ibid. 5.2.27). This was the policy of Ismenias and Androclidas, clearly a challenge to the King's Peace, and Leontiadas to maintain the Peace struck. The tyranny depicted in the *De genio* was established. Of course, given the nature of the evidence, it is not to be denied that Leontiadas may have been solely concerned to secure for himself a position of power. It is equally not to be denied that he thought that the maintenance of the King's Peace was the best or rather the only way to secure peace for Thebes. Judgement of Leontiadas however depends on unanswerable questions concerning the King's Peace.[12] Was the proclamation forbidding any Theban to join in the campaign against Olynthus (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.27) a contravention of the King's Peace? Had Ismenias thereby gone too far?

[11] Cf. G. E. M. de Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London 1972) 343.

[12] Xenophon has done his best to obscure the nature of the King's Peace. Cf. Cawkwell, "The King's Peace", *CQ* 31 (1981), [69–83] 78, where the possibility is raised that in forbidding 'volunteers' joining the Spartan campaign against Olynthus Thebes was in breach of the Peace.

The Thebans were not popular. For a start they were too well fed (cf. Aristophanes *Ach.* 860–84, *Pax* 1003–5. The Athenians pinned on them the label, 'Boeotian swine', (according to Plutarch, *De esu carnium* 1.6) which Pindar the Boeotian passed on (*Ol.* VI.90) perhaps tongue in cheek,[13] but as Plutarch shows it concerned Theban eating, not Theban thinking. Ephorus would claim (*FGrHist* 70 F 119) that the leaders of Thebes neglected education (cf. Diod. 15.79.2) save in the period of Epaminondas,[14] but he neglected to explain how and why the Pythagorean Lysis of Tarentum (*VS* 44) became the teacher of Epaminondas; he had died some time before Epaminondas rose to prominence and power (cf. 578D, 583B, etc.). The two Thebans, Simmias and Cebes, familiar to us from Plato's *Phaedo*, are part of the philosophical circle pictured in the *De genio*, and all in all it is clear that Thebes in the early Fourth Century was no philosophical backwater.[15] Perhaps Plutarch meant to proclaim through his dialogues that Thebes was a place of intellectual importance. Elsewhere, in the *De malignitate Herodoti* (864D – 867B), Plutarch berated Herodotus for his treatment of the Thebans at Thermopylae and his attack seems just, though it is not to be discussed here. Overall, what is undeniable is Theban military virtue. The history of the fourth century makes that abundantly clear, as does the valour displayed on the night of the liberation. Plutarch had reason to be proud.

[13] For 'Boeotian swine', see S.C. Bakhuizen, in H. Beister / J. Buckler (edd.), *Boiotika* (Munich 1989) 67–8.

[14] Cf. P. Stylianou, *A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus* Book 15 (Oxford 1998) 10.

[15] Cf. N. H. Demand, *Thebes in the Fifth Century* (London 1982) Chapter 5, 'Philosophy in Thebes'.

The liberation of Thebes in Plutarch's *De genio Socratis* and *Pelopidas*[*]

Christopher Pelling

1. *De genio*'s Platonic subtext

The liberation of Thebes in 379 BCE offers a particularly rich opportunity to investigate Plutarch's narrative technique, for this is the most elaborate instance where we find the same episode recounted in a moral essay, the *De genio*, and in a biography, the *Pelopidas*.

As the present volume makes clear, the *De genio* attracts a good deal of scholarly interest: does, for instance, Plutarch side with Epaminondas in this essay? That view is taken by Daniel Babut,[1] Aristoula Georgiadou[2] and Frederick Brenk,[3] and already a generation ago in the standard commentary by Corlu.[4] If so, it would be a paradox, as Epaminondas, the person who decides to stay out of the Liberation, is something of an absent presence in this narrative; but that would not be the only paradox in Plutarch. Is there a moral for Plutarch's own generation, and if so what is it – political quietism on the model of Epaminondas, or the search for a new equivalent of liberation, or simply an invitation to any readers to consult their own conscience? What are we to make of the problems of reading *any* signs, whether it be the obscure writings found at the tomb of Alcmene (577E–F) or the various omens that attend the conspiracy itself? Is there

[*] This is a lightly adapted version of a paper that was given at a conference in Rethymno in May 2005; the original version is included in the volume of that conference, *The Unity of Plutarch's Work: 'Moralia' Themes in the 'Lives', Features of the 'Lives' in the 'Moralia'*, edited by Anastasios Nikolaidis (de Gruyter 2008). I am most grateful to Professor Nikolaidis and to de Gruyter for their permission to republish the material here.

[1] Babut 1969, 344–6; Babut 1984, 72–3 = Babut 1994, 426–7.

[2] A. Georgiadou, "Vita activa and vita contemplativa. Plutarch's *De Genio Socratis* and Euripides' *Antiope*", in I. Gallo / B. Scardigli (edd.), *Teoria e Prassi Politica nelle opere di Plutarco* (Naples 1995), 187–200; ead., Πράξεις and λόγοι: the Liberation of the Cadmeia in Plutarch's *de Genio* (abstract), in ΕΡΕΤΗΡΙΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΤΑΙΡΕΙΑΣ ΒΟΙΩΤΙΚΩΝ ΜΕΛΕΤΩΝ, Second International Congress, Levadeia 1992 (Athens 1995) 1129–30; Georgiadou 1996.

[3] Brenk 1996; Brenk 2002.

[4] Thus for Corlu 1970, 20, "Épaminondas incarne l'idéal plutarchéen de l'union de la philosophie et la politique". Cf. also Barigazzi 1988 and Desideri 1984, 576–7, though Desideri also brings out Plutarch's appreciation of the virtue and nerve of the active plotters (583). Hershbell 1988, 374–8 gives a balanced view.

a metatextual significance of such problematic semiotics for the reading of Plutarch's own text and the drawing of any lessons, perhaps including political lessons? That is the subject of a subtle article by Philip Hardie (1996).[5] What does the pervasive Platonic intertextuality add to it all? Is it just a clever and playful bonding with an accomplished reader, or might Plutarch be providing his own counterpart of Plato in a way that interlocks with the attempts of the characters in the text to explore a counterpart to the Platonic Socrates? Not all these issues will be explored in this chapter, but some light may fall on them if we concentrate on narrative itself and the contrast of *Life* and essay.

The Platonic intertextuality will provide the essential background for this discussion. There is a vast amount of this in the essay, and other aspects of this are explored elsewhere in this volume: questions of souls dipping up and down in the manner of *Timaeus*, questions of how a myth of rebirth works in the manner of *Republic* 10, and so on.[6] But it is the *Phaedo* that is particularly relevant. There are several particular echoes right at the beginning, the discussion of whether there is time to talk and whether those present are willing to listen (575D–E ∼ *Phaedo* 58c–d), and the introduction of 'Simmias', the man of Thebes who was so important in *Phaedo* and is now the host here. There is some wryness too in the way he is introduced. He has 'been away for a long time in foreign parts and had travelled among strange peoples' (576C, 578A): exactly as the Socrates of *Phaedo* had encouraged his interlocutors to do (78a, where Socrates was in fact talking to Cebes – but Cebes is not forgotten here either, 580E, 590E). Now Simmias has arrived home 'full of all sorts of myths and barbarian stories'. People keep visiting him at his home, not unlike the way they visited Socrates in prison; but Simmias has a rather different reason for not being able to roam around, for he has suffered a nasty ailment of the leg and can only lie on his couch. That is most convenient, as it means Simmias *cannot* involve himself in the action himself, and Plutarch therefore sidesteps the issue whether he would be an active participant like Pelopidas or a philosophical bystander like Epaminondas: the question cannot arise for him. But this participant who was closest to the Platonic Socrates shows a further wry Socratic touch: for does not the *Phaedo* itself end with a Socrates on his couch, as the hemlock gradually strikes at his – legs? There is even a 'fastening' here as well, the ἐπίδεσμος that has just been removed from

[5] On this theme cf. also Babut 1984, 63–5 = Babut 1994, 417–9; also Desideri 1988, 580–1, Brenk 1996, 45.

[6] For a treatment of some of these issues, see Vernière 1977, 93–5, 105–14, K. Döring, "Plutarch und das Daimonion des Sokrates (Plut. *de genio Socratis* Kap. 20–24)", *Mnemosyne* 37 (1984) 376–92, and Brenk 1996. See also Deuse, below p. 193 with n. 67

Simmias' leg (589A) – a blander equivalent of the fetter removed from Socrates' leg at *Phaedo* 59e.[7]

The mild divergences between Plutarch's two accounts have been well studied by others, most recently and thoroughly by Georgiadou 1997. Here I shall give a broader comparison of *Life* and essay under three headings that have become familiar from narratological theory: duration, focalisation, and voice. One recurrent question will be what we might call the intertwining of 'theme' and 'event': how far the various issues of conscience and political activism are affected by and affect the events of this stirring story. Ziegler thought the intertwining of theme and event in *De genio* was superficial and contrived, a shallow imitation of their thorough integration in the *Phaedo*.[8] Perhaps we can be a little more generous.

2. 'Duration' in *De genio* and *Pelopidas*

First, duration. The version in the *Life* is quite expansive, by *Life* standards, but is still only seven chapters long. The essay is developing the narrative all through the work: after the dialogue introduction, it starts with the arrival of the news that the plotters are on the way from Athens, and at the end it goes through to the moment when the Spartan garrison withdraws. The *Life* version might take twenty minutes to read aloud; the essay version would require more like two hours, and is getting close to an equivalent in duration to the length in real time that the events would take (so, in the terms made familiar by Bal,[9] the 'story' becomes equivalent in extent to the 'fabula'). That is especially so as the back-narrative is given in very compressed form at the beginning in 575F–6B, 'we all know already how…', and then there is a quickening of pace at the end once the action itself finally starts at 596D–E: the time in between, that taken by the discussion as the conspiracy develops, is pretty well exactly the time that the discussion, if real, would have taken. That 'isochronic' equivalence of duration is not unusual in Plutarch (compare, for instance, *De Pythiae Oraculis*, where the conversation occupies the time it would take to climb the hill at Delphi); and it is very much on the pattern of a Platonic dialogue, including the Platonic dialogue that has the most important, indeed cataclysmic action interwoven with it, the *Phaedo*.

This point of duration has several effects. The first, of course, is that

[7] For these and other Platonic echoes cf. esp. Hirzel 1895, 148–51; Corlu 1970, 93–5.

[8] Ziegler 1964, 204 = 1951, 841 ('Thema' and 'Handlung'); cf. the similar verdict of Hirzel 1895, 151. Vernière 1977, 93 states uncompromisingly that "le sujet véritable, ce n'est pas le démon de Socrate, c'est la libération de Thèbes", though she has a more nuanced view on p. 95. For a more sympathetic treatment of the interweaving of the philosophy with the narrative, see esp. Desideri 1984.

[9] Bal 1985.

this is extremely mimetic, almost the extreme case of narrative mimesis. The longueur, the agonising waiting that attends even such exciting and swift-moving events as these, is caught by the way the participants talk, almost literally, to pass the time: rather as the Spartan partisan Archias liked philosophical conversation to distract others from his disgraceful actions (576C), so the conspirators too seem to be talking as much to distract themselves as to buoy up their spirits or to provide the suspicious with an excuse for their gathering. When we come to the interaction of theme and action, this is not just a ploy of Plutarch himself to inject a factitious literary 'unity': it characterises too, for instance when the conversation turns to how a momentary inspiration allowed Socrates to escape mortal danger at the hands of, not coincidentally, the Thebans (581D–E of Delium, with a hint of Plato's *Symposium*). At times like this a mind drifts easily into preoccupation with mortal danger, and dwelling here on divine inspiration may be wishful thinking, but is psychologically just right. It is something of a contrary counterpart of the *Phaedo* itself, where it is so natural for Socrates and his friends to talk of *immortality*.

Not that the main point of the discussion is to illuminate the moment, tense though it is. The forward movement of the essay is carried not by the action but by the discussion of Socrates' *daimonion*, and the moments of action or of news punctuate it, even serve as panel-dividers to separate the discussion. We might compare the *Amatorius*, another dialogue peculiarly rich in Platonic reminiscence, where the debate is interwoven with and affected by the news coming from Thespiae of Ismenodora's doings (754E, 756A, 771D). It is a mirror-image of the phenomenon familiar from many *Lives*, though not *Pelopidas* itself, where the narrative action is divided into panels by 'digressions' (what used to be called 'eidology'), digressions that themselves have something of the manner of the *Moralia*: take, for instance, the discussion of divine inspiration at *Coriolanus* 32 or of the way mantic signs work at *Pericles* 6, both *Moralia*-like topics which happen to overlap closely with the themes of *De genio Socratis*.

There is more to it still, though, and this brings us on to the interlocking of theme and event. Some interaction is exactly what we should expect: in that *Coriolanus* case, for instance, the 'Homeric' texture of the digression has an interesting interplay with the 'Achillean' figure we have so far seen in that *Life* and the 'Odyssean' crisis of powerful womenfolk that he is about to face. In *De genio* the most obvious interaction is the way that reflections and actions affect one another: just as the characters' thoughts change under the pressure of events, so also their thought-processes drive their actions. Thus the texture of the discussion becomes different once the tingling-nerved Hipposthenidas has told how, among other things, he found the dream of Hypatodorus so frightening that he decided to abort the whole affair (587A–B). Not merely does Hipposthenidas himself illus-

trate the point made earlier, that one has to have the right mindset if one is to receive divine guidance and interpret it aright; this is also the point where dreams and visions are dropped as appropriate vehicles for inspiration, and Simmias moves the discussion on to a new level by talking of a sort of (perhaps wordless) 'voice' that Socrates always found much more reliable (588D–E). So the alarming 'events' of that night do affect the way the 'theme' of inspiration is viewed.

What is difficult is to find this interaction going the other way. The participants' determination to act may certainly be driven by their moral and philosophical convictions; but, if they are looking for divine inspiration to guide their actions now, they do not seem to find it once the narrative of events begins, and it is good planning and good luck that carries the day.[10] Or so, at least, it seems: yet this is a question to which we shall return (below, p. 125).

It is easy to represent this sort of narrative or dialogue dynamic as a purely artistic matter, just as we did a paragraph ago in asserting the thematic unity of *Coriolanus*. But the comparison with Plato suggests a further point. A Platonic dialogue is not merely an airing of philosophical issues, but an indication of the right way to do philosophy, through discussion, dialectic, and testing rather than by simple exposition. The *Phaedo* illustrates how to act and (more important) how to think in a moment of crisis, in the presence of imminent and unjust death. Cannot we make the same move with Plutarch too, and see him as exploring the way that events are not merely conditioned by but also affect the way the participants think about the biggest issues? (Though in the *Phaedo*, it is true, the more basic point is that Socrates' stable insight is *not* unsettled or revised by the imminence of death.) A cultured and insightful response to the present involves applying one's knowledge of and reflection on the paradigmatic past; and it also affects how we read and interpret the past, and we can see that in the thought-processes of the participants themselves. The impact of the present crisis means that some approaches are dropped and others become more attractive. And, if that is true of an Artemidorus and a Galaxidorus and a Simmias, might there not be a moral for Plutarch's own readers too and the ways they should think about the biggest moral dilemmas?

[10] Thus Babut 1984, 53 and 1988, esp. 384–93 = 1994, 407 and esp. 432–41; cf. Hardie 1996, 132: "[t]he success of the action depends entirely on the intelligent plans of the conspirators and on the corresponding failure of the enemy to satisfactorily analyse events" – a sort of sign-reading, to be sure, but not on the daemonic level. M. Riley, "The purpose and unity of Plutarch's *De genio Socratis*", *GRBS* 18 (1977) 257–73 by contrast claimed that "the narrative sections … show how daimonic guidance manifests itself in the real world" (258).

3. Internal and external links

Underlying this question of duration is one extremely obvious difference between the two narratives: the *Pelopidas* narrative is only a small section of a *Life*, whereas the *De genio* narrative is, together with its accompanying discussion, the whole thing. The natural inference from this would be that, when we talk of the links between the particular 'events' of the narrative and the wider 'themes', then in the *Life* we shall be looking outside these seven chapters, talking of links with other parts of Pelopidas' story – and indeed Marcellus' story too, for these are pairs, not just individual *Lives*. If it were a web-site, a link would connect with a later or an earlier screen, except that perhaps we would not realise there was a link at all until we reached that later screen and recognised the point of contact.[11] In the *De genio*, we will at least begin by looking internally within the narrative itself; the web-site might scroll us to another part of the same screen, but it would still be within this episode itself.[12]

We shall soon want to complicate that contrast of 'external' and 'internal' link-building, but still it works reasonably well as a first bid. In *Pelopidas* we certainly find those links that go outside the episode's frame. In particular, echoes of the Cadmea come back at the end of the *Life*, and come back twice, in a way that is typical of Plutarch's closural technique.[13] Pelopidas' final move against Alexander of Pherae, in the battle that takes his life, is strikingly described as an action of τυραννοκτονία (*Pel.* 34.7): this is not the most natural word for a pitched battle against a force that happens to be led by a tyrant, especially as the tyrant does not even get killed, but it is one that highlights the similarity with the liberation. The most striking element of that similarity is the readiness of Pelopidas to take a personal risk, seen in the bedroom struggle with Leontiadas (13.8–9) and again in his thrusting into the front line against the tyrant Alexander (32.8–9), in each case in the service of freedom. This is identifiably the same person, acting in a similar way.

[11] Cf. Genette 1980, 56, on Proust's *Recherche du Temps Perdu*: 'this is the most persistent function of recalls in the *Recherche*: to modify the meaning of past occurrences after the event, either by making significant what was not so originally or by refuting a first interpretation and replacing it with a new one'. We will discuss later whether such 'recalls' in *Pelopidas* do in fact replace an initial interpretation with a new one.

[12] This is not the same distinction as between 'internal' and 'external' analepsis/prolepsis in narratology, (a) because an analepsis or prolepsis is typically an *explicit* recall or anticipation of an event, whereas here the 'links' are a matter of implicit suggestion through thematic patterning ('recalls', as Genette 1980 puts it: see n. 12); and (b) because I here use 'internal' to mean 'internal to the episode' rather than 'internal to the whole work'.

[13] On *Pel.–Marc.* in particular C. B. R. Pelling, "Roman heroes and Greek culture", in M. Griffin / J. Barnes (edd.), *Philosophia Togata I* (Oxford 1989) [199–232] 207–8; more generally, Pelling 1997, esp. 240–2 = 2002, 373–6.

Once again, though, this is not simply an artistic matter of 'unity', or even of unified characterisation: the parallels are thought-provoking in a way that is important to the moralism too. In the second case, the one that brings his death, it is clear that Plutarch disapproves of Pelopidas' action. That picks up the elaborate discussion in the proem of the folly of a commander exposing himself to this sort of danger (1–2); that too is the theme that establishes the link with *Marcellus*, who similarly meets a rash death, and this duly figures as the culminating issue in the synkritic epilogue as well as in the proem (*Marc.* 33(3)).

Should we therefore infer that it was a bad idea the first time round as well, that Pelopidas should have kept his distance (something that would align the *Life* more closely with the Babut–Brenk–Georgiadou reading of the essay, incidentally, praising Epaminondas as the detached, non-violent, more Socratic figure of the pair)? What makes that more difficult to believe, at least in the case of the *Life*, is the second final contact. The last chapter of the work goes on to cover events after Pelopidas' death, where his killer Alexander of Pherae is murdered by his disgruntled wife Thebe in a similar sequence of tyrant-killing fervour, secret plotting, nervous cold feet, and a final decisive steeling of the nerve for an act of bedroom bloodiness (35). This is not the only case where a *Life* goes on past the principal's death to trace posthumous vengeance, and makes this central to a *Life*'s significance: I have discussed this elsewhere.[14] It looks, too, as if Plutarch is working hard on the tradition to link Thebe's vengeance with Pelopidas himself. In Plutarch what inspires Thebe now is her memory of meeting Pelopidas during his captivity, at a time when he again showed rashness as well as courage in his plain speaking to his captor Alexander (*Pel.* 35.5 ∼ 28.5–10): yet that does not figure in any of the several possible motivations that Xenophon airs for Thebe's murder of her husband (*Hell.* 6.4.35–7), still less in the cruder version we find in Roman authors that Thebe was simply motivated by jealousy of a concubine (Cic. *Off.* 2.25, Val. Max. 9.13 ext. 3). In the *Life* Thebe is clearly a good person doing a good thing: that makes it easier to believe that Pelopidas' own bedroom killing and the liberation was a good thing too, even if it was less of a good thing to be so precipitate in fighting in the front line.

So the differing consequences of similar behaviour need not entail any final revision of the initial, surely positive judgement we make on Pelopidas in the *Life*; but this sort of 'external' link of the liberation with later events still deeply affects the way we take the moralism. Perhaps the upshot is how very difficult it is to make such moral differentiation of apparently similar motives; or perhaps how striking a fact of human nature it is that the same human characteristic can generate acts that are so good –

[14] Pelling 1997.

Cadmea, the killing of Alexander – and so disastrous – Pelopidas' death. But the fundamental point remains: we have to build the bigger context of the man's whole career if we are to interpret the liberation episode, and we cannot take it simply on its own.

What about the essay side of that initial, straightforward contrast of external and internal link-building? Even in *De genio*, do we in fact take the Cadmea episode simply on its own? The strongly phrased proem must be relevant here. Archedamus there inveighs against allowing the perspective of later events to distort one's moral evaluation of the actions that lead to them. It is, he says, an unsophisticated reading of history that simply judges events on the basis of outcome and ignores 'causes', 'origins' or 'motives', *aitiai*:

> Archedamus: I remember, Caphisias, that I once heard a painter use rather an apt image to describe people who look at pictures. He said that a layman with no knowledge of the art was like a man addressing a whole crowd at once, whereas the sophisticated connoisseur was more like someone greeting every person he met individually. Laymen, you see, have an inexact and merely general view of works of art, while those who judge detail by detail let nothing, whether well or badly executed, pass unobserved or without comment. It is much the same, I fancy, with real events. For the lazy-minded, it satisfies curiosity to learn the basic facts and the outcome of the affair; but the devotee of honour and beauty, who views the achievement of the great Art (as it were) of Virtue, takes pleasure rather in the detail, because – since the outcome (τέλος) has much in common with Fortune, while the part of the matter <concerned with> motives (αἰτίαι) and <the action itself> involves conflicts between virtue and circumstance – he can there observe instances of intelligent daring in the face of danger, where rational calculation is mixed with moments of crisis and emotion. So please regard us as viewers of this sort, tell us the story of the whole action from the beginning, and <share> with us the discussions which <we hear> took place <then in your> presence, bearing in mind that I should not have hesitated even to go to Thebes for this, if I were not already thought by the Athenians to be too pro-Boeotian.
>
> (*De genio Socratis* 575A–D)

So the cultured and discriminating reader, says Archedamus, will realise that events are often directed by chance, and therefore very different outcomes can mask very similar origins (*aitiai*). And Plutarch clearly thought that 'Archedamus' was right about this: he says something very similar when contrasting the different outcomes of Alexander's and Crassus' Parthian campaigns (*Crass.* 37(4).4). That might encourage us to concentrate on the events of 379 BCE without being distracted by later 'consequences', and so far that chimes with our initial expectation that evaluation in the essay should be 'internal', based on the events themselves. Yet it is immediately more complicated, for the proem is also saying that, even if different story-patterns spring from similar *aitiai*, one can still find inspiring points of parallel in those 'struggles of virtue against contingency' and 'thoughtful daring in times of danger' – and that implies a process of comparison. It is just that, if we bring other events into contact with this sequence, it

will not be those that were causally linked with it in what followed, it will be other occasions where motives and mindsets and drives were similar, whatever their consequences.

In particular, of course, the whole topic of the dialogue makes us muse on how similar the 'origins' in the participants' minds in 379 BCE are to the inspiration that guided Socrates a generation or so earlier, for the Platonic intertextuality is here crucial. Whatever else that intertext may suggest, the particular recall of the *Phaedo* must recall the circumstances of Socrates' death. The difficulty is to know what we should make of that comparison of the two sequences. Should we follow Babut and Georgiadou in finding a further alignment of Socrates to Epaminondas, as both refuse to get involved in the hard, real-life exchanges of politics? Or is it rather a reminder of the dangers that any conscience-driven activity can bring, something after Plato's manner of anticipating Socrates' trial towards the end of Gorgias and in Alcibiades' 'defence' speech in *Symposium*? At the end of this chapter I shall suggest that it might be a mistake to decide too firmly in either direction.

Perhaps, too, we should develop a further 'intertext', as there is a less widely noticed series of parallels here with the killing of Julius Caesar on the Ides of March. There too we have the indications that the news is spreading (596A–B ∼ *Brut.* 15.4), and the conspirators jump to a precipitate conclusion that all is lost; there is the decisive message which the victim decides not to read (596E–F ∼ *Pel.* 10.7–10 ∼ Caes. 65); there is the sick man who cannot be involved, but wishes well (578C–D ∼ *Brut.* 11); there is the participants' nervousness as the crisis approaches (*Brut.* 15); there are the suspicions that the plot has become known (586F, 595A ∼ *Pel.* 9.8 ∼ *Brut.* 15.4); there are the conspirators who are philosophically alert and committed; there is the awareness of a deep moral issue, centring on the risk of the civil bloodshed that may ensue, and the concern of the conspirators to limit the killing as far as possible (576F–7A, *Brut.* 19.4–5, 20.2, *Ant.* 13.3); there is the intervention of a sympathiser who pretends to be pleading for his condemned brother (576D–E ∼ *Brut.* 17.3, *Caes.* 66.5); there is the heated (θερμοίν) and radiant reaction as the killers summon their fellow-citizens to liberty (598A–D ∼ *Caes.* 67.3). Perhaps such similarities simply suggest that there are only so many ways of killing a tyrant and only so many ways of describing it; but the killing of Caesar was such an epoch-making story that it is not extravagant to suspect that the parallel is expressive. Yet once again it is unclear what it is expressive *of*, other than the simple suggestion that the issues at stake and the dilemmas they pose recur time and time again, and in the most momentous ways: yet, just as with Socrates, the parallel does not make moral judgement any easier, especially as moral judgement on Caesar's assassination was notoriously so difficult.

For the moment let us simply note that, even in the self-contained narrative of the *De genio*, one can never take a single episode wholly on its own. As we saw, that is really the suggestion of the proem itself, suggesting that one ought to look for parallel *aitiai* in different sequences without being misled by different outcomes. In both *Lives* and *Moralia*, then, comparison is basic to the judgements that one makes. Even the *sort* of comparison is not wholly different, not at least if we still apply that distinction between 'origins' and 'outcomes': for even the comparison in the *Life* with later events does not look to anything that is an outcome (or at least a direct outcome, one that is seen as such) of the Cadmea liberation, but rather to separate sequences, ones that are connected by the way Pelopidas or Thebe behaves – in short, by the 'origins', by the mindset and mentality that drives on the nobly inspired individuals as they grapple for freedom. So in both *Life* and essay we are comparing similar *aitiai* and allowing that comparison to affect our moral judgement.

It is still true that the sustained intertext, of reading X against another's work Y, is a good deal more elaborate in *De genio* than we typically have in the *Lives*. Perhaps even in the *Lives* we occasionally find such sustained intertextuality, for instance in reading *Alcibiades* against *Symposium* or the end of *Cato minor* against *Phaedo* itself, but it does not usually become so pervasive through a text as it does here in *De genio*. But even if there is not that sustained reading against *another author's* Y, there is still something similar in the *Parallel Lives*: for we may certainly find a pervasive reading of one person's *Life* against another's, even if that is usually another *Life* produced by Plutarch himself. Evidently that is true here in the comparison with *Marcellus*, but as so often in Plutarch the formal synkrisis is only the part of it, and the informal comparison with Epaminondas is just as important (esp. *Pel.* 3–4, 25.4). Here there was presumably some implicit relationship to Plutarch's own *Epaminondas*, the flagship opening *Life* of the series: Plutarch will be suggesting a comparison of these two very different Boeotian models of how to apply philosophy to politics. So this has brought us back to a similar project to one found in *De genio* with its lurking presence of Epaminondas, spotlighting the issue of *paideia* and practical politics, even if once again the two *Lives* of Epaminondas and Pelopidas explore that issue over the canvas not of a single episode but of both men's whole lives.

Finally, one particularly intriguing question: does the essay show a similar awareness of other writings of Plutarch himself? Do we recall that this same author can produce works of a very different texture, rather as we do in *Pericles* where after discussing divination he adds that 'this is more suitable for another sort of work' (*Per.* 6.5) – and we know full well that Plutarch himself could write it, may indeed go on to write it? Unfortu-

nately we do not know when *De genio* was written,[15] nor whether it predates or postdates *Pelopidas*: but it might well make a difference to our reading if Plutarch were already embarked on the *Lives*, or even some *Lives* (the *Caesars*, or some of the other free-standing ones), and the original audience knew it – and therefore knew too that Plutarch himself, in other moods and modes, would be describing and evaluating these issues in a wider narrative context, one that could hardly avoid being more outcome-conscious. If that is so, Archedamus' warning in the proem could sound as a warning about *any* project of using history to provide raw material for moral inquiry, including that project on which, an audience would know, Plutarch himself had embarked.

4. 'Focalisation' in *De genio* and *Pelopidas*

Let us move on, rather more swiftly, to the category that has been exploited most assiduously in theoretical narratology, that of 'focalisation'. Again we may start with a simple contrast, and see if it works. What we would expect to find would be the *Life* focalising through Pelopidas himself, seeing things through his eyes, just as we would expect it to concentrate on his actions. The essay might be less predictable, but at least the principal narrator is one of the conspirators (in fact it is Epaminondas' brother Caphisias), so it is likely to be a partisan point of view, not just that of a mere messenger, nor even the more detached narratorial viewpoint of Plutarch himself.

In some ways, again, that initial crude contrast works quite well, but rather less well than we would expect. Pelopidas certainly figures more in the *Life* – the conspirators can be described as 'Pelopidas' party', for instance, τοῖς περὶ Πελοπίδαν (9.1 and 10, evidently a genuine plural here[16]); in the *Life* Charon gives a full report to 'Pelopidas' party', οἱ περὶ τὸν Πελοπίδαν again (10.5, this time less clearly a genuine plural), and a fictional report to others, but in the essay everyone is told the truth (595F–6C). (So this is indeed a matter of focalisation, not just narrative 'focus': it is not

[15] C. P. Jones, "Towards a chronology of Plutarch's works", *JRS* 56 (1966) [61–74] 70 (repr. in B. Scardigli [ed.], *Essays on Plutarch's Lives*, Oxford 1995 [95–123] 115), against Ziegler 1964, 205 = 1951, 842. Plutarch's close knowledge of the history in *De genio* (however he may decide to tweak or supplement it), and some elements of clear contact with the narrative details of *Pelopidas*, do not demonstrate a closeness of composition date: whatever his sources in *Pelopidas*, Plutarch was doubtless familiar with accounts of this particular episode throughout his life. On that source-question see esp. Georgiadou 1997, 15–28: not just Xenophon, clearly, for Xenophon omits Pelopidas from his liberation account at *Hell.* 5.4.1–12, something that can only be deliberate: Schmitzer 1997, 127.

[16] On the familiar later Greek idiom whereby 'οἱ περὶ X' can be, but need not be, a simple periphrasis for 'X', see esp. S. L. Radt, "Noch einmal Aischylos, Niobe Fr. 162 N^2 (278 M)", *ZPE* 38 (1980) 47–56 ("1. Die Bedeutung von οἱ περὶ Τάνταλον").

simply a matter of who is centre-stage, it also makes the reader know what Pelopidas knew and hear the successive reports as he heard them. When this Pelopidas-perspective is momentarily disturbed, Plutarch is careful to add 'as was later discovered', 10.7.) Still, the deployment of narrative detail is not always as neat and simple as that. For instance, when Charon offers his teenage son as a sort of hostage for his friends to kill if he, Charon, lets himself and his comrades down, who finds this so appalling that he protests? It is Pelopidas – but not in the *Life*, in the essay (595C); in the *Life* it is 'everyone' (9.11–12). And when Pelopidas has his own moment of physical glory, killing Leontiadas in hand-to-hand combat, it is the essay rather than the *Life* that has more details.

The essay has some interesting features too, as that partisan focalisation is in some ways more, in some ways less fulfilled than we might expect. It is more fulfilled in that Caphisias not merely tells the story as he views it now in retrospect: he also tells it in the way the story would have unfolded to him at the time. There is very little here, for instance, on the arrangements for the party at Archias' house, with the conspirators set up to arrive in women's clothing and give the lustful pro-Spartans a night to remember. The *Life* goes into detail here, drawing on Xenophon (and with an additional intertext, incidentally, in Herodotus 5.20, one that is already sensed in Xenophon), and in terms of sensational narrative that is a natural high-spot – but Caphisias, even though he could have told us about it in view of what he knows *now*, was not an observer of the party-arrangements *then*, and limits himself to what he then knew at first hand. We only hear what Charon discovered of the preliminaries at Archias' house as he reports back to Simmias' party (596A), and so we learn that a rumour was seeping out at the point when the conspirators heard of it too. In narratological terms, the 'narrating self' becomes assimilated to the 'experiencing self', and the primary focaliser Caphisias turns himself into a secondary focaliser as well,[17] involving an internal analepsis as he recalls those earlier details; or should we perhaps say, remembering the brief initial scene-setting, that the primary focaliser 'Plutarch' first introduces Caphisias as a secondary focaliser who goes on to use himself as a tertiary focaliser? The effect is complex, anyway, and the Caphisias focalisation is strong.

On the other hand, the focalisation is less intense in that it is not particularly ideologically partisan, or rather that any partisan elements are not especially interesting. Everyone accepts that the pro-Spartans are villains. If there is an interesting issue, it is not that, but what one does about it, and that brings us back to the question of right and wrong between Epaminon-

[17] Cf. Genette 1980, 198–9, discussing a similar case in Proust: he terms such suppression of information *paralipsis*, "since the narrator, in order to limit himself to the information held by the hero at the moment of the action, had to suppress all the information he acquired later, information which very often is vital". Cf. Nelles 1990, 370–1.

das and the rest: should one adopt a more Socrates-like, quietist position and stay out of it, or should one grasp the nettle and the dagger? Caphisias' characterisation does matter here. As Epaminondas' brother, he sees his point of view, and indeed articulates it particularly clearly: one should not execute people without trial except in the most extreme necessity, and it would be better to have people who had kept aloof to carry conviction in the post-bloodshed settlement (594B–C). But it is also clear that Caphisias himself disagrees with his brother, and he is involved in the action, even if not especially prominently, at the end. Just as Simmias' affliction allows him to preside without taking sides, so Caphisias' position allows him to be as close as possible to a non-partisan on that most interesting issue of all, not whether the tyrants are evil but what to do about it.

5. 'Voice' in *De genio* and *Pelopidas*

In a case such as this focalisation[18] connects inextricably with another of Genette's narratological categories, 'voice'; and here the dialogue structure of *De genio* is significant. In many ways this is a narrative within a dialogue and a dialogue within a narrative, again very much in Platonic fashion. It starts as an 'extra-diegetic'[19] dialogue between Archedamus and Caphisias, and Archedamus sets up Caphisias to speak. (*De Pythiae Oraculis* and *Amatorius* are again parallel here; so is *De Cohibenda Ira*.) This proem, incidentally, is not without a hint of the inter-state bad feeling that followed, for Archedamus says that he would even have been prepared to go to Thebes to hear the story if it had not been for the suspicion that this would trigger in Athens (575D: above, p. 118). This is just after he has been arguing that we should judge *aitiai* without an eye to outcomes

[18] I am conscious that in the previous paragraph I am using 'focalisation' in a broad sense, one involving attitudes as well as pure cognition: in other words, the 'how' in 'how one sees' is one that involves response and feeling as well as recognition. This, I think, is inevitable, for emotion and cognition are inextricably connected: one's emotional perspective not merely builds on one's perceptions, it also conditions what one notices and how one notices it. Hence emotional perspectives (what S. Chatman, "Characters and narrators: filter, center, slant and interest-focus", *Poetics Today* 7.2, 1986, [189–204] 197–8 termed 'slant'), in this case the possibilities of a partisan stance, are thoroughly relevant to 'how one sees'. On the inextricability of emotion, ideology and focalisation see Shl. Rimmon-Kenan, *Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics* (London 1983) 80–2, and in a classical context especially D. P. Fowler ("Deviant focalization in Vergil's *Aeneid*", *PCPS* 1990, 216, 42–63, repr. in id., *Roman Constructions*, Oxford 2000, 40–63), though he is treating much more intricate issues (and I find his word 'deviant' misleading: in many of his cases of embedded focalisation 'complex', 'polyvalent', or 'blurred' would be better). By now, quite evidently, I am touching on theoretical issues too large to treat properly here. I also avoid discussion of the relative merits of Genette's (1980) and Bal's (1985) slightly different terminologies, but my sympathies are with Genette for the reasons given by Nelles 1990 and, succinctly, T. C. B. Rood, *Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation* (Oxford 1998), 294–6.

[19] For this unlovely term, Genette 1980, 228–9.

and consequences: yet perhaps it is more difficult to forget consequences after all, just as Archedamus found it impossible to ignore all that later history that centred on the increasing Theban domination of Greece. And certainly that dialogue introduction points, as similar Platonic introductions do, to the way that the events and discussions described were ones that were talked about years later, and in Athens as well as Thebes. This was no ordinary day, and it was not – as if the audience did not know his already – a Liberation that failed.

Once Caphisias gets underway, it is again striking how his narrative so readily becomes dramatic dialogue. That is not just true of the philosophical dialogue and the exchange of elaborate views, but also of the moments of action too, as when Charon and Archias come face to face (595F–6C). 'There are exiles in the city,' says Archias. 'Where,' says Charon. 'I do not know', says Archias: 'that's why I called you here.' So that's all right, Charon thinks: 'There used to be lots of these rumours,' he says, 'but I haven't heard anything – I'll look into it, though'. 'Good idea,' says the scribe Phyllidas, who is in on the plot… This is a dialogue within a narrative (Charon's) within a dialogue (Charon and the others) within a narrative (Caphisias) within a dialogue (Caphisias, Archedamus and the others). Even in the *Life* there is some dialogue here (10.1–4), but only two speeches: Plutarch uses direct speech in the *Lives* very rarely – indeed its rarity makes its use here dramatically arresting too – but the version in *De genio* remains far more elaborate. That links, too, with the other dialogues that are embedded in the narrative throughout the essay, including the one that does not happen, that which Socrates would so much have liked to have with the recently-dead Timarchus (592F).

One aspect of this technique is indeed 'dramatic': the dialogue is as striking as the visual scene-setting. 'Just as in a drama,' indeed, the fortune (*tyche*) of the action 'elaborated our enterprise with perilous scenes … and brought a sharp and terrifying conflict, one involving an unexpected reversal' (*peripeteia*, 596D–E). True, there was drama already in Xenophon's account, where it is surely no coincidence that he does not have twelve assailants, as in Plutarch, but precisely seven – against Thebes (*Hell.* 5.4.3);[20] but Plutarch makes it even more theatrical. That is not all, though: throughout the essay the dialogue texture is also peculiarly suitable for raising issues – raising them, not necessarily settling them. This is not the place to debate how far the discussion settles issues of demonology or of divine intervention in mortal affairs: though it is worth recalling that earlier point, that it is hard to find inspiration on the Socratic model in action once we get to the narrative crisis; nor has there been any clear indication of *daimones* in action (a point made by Babut). Yet that too is problematic. I suggested ear-

[20] This is well brought out by Schmitzer 1997.

lier that it was good planning and good luck that brought success (p. 115) – but is it? Or is the point that all those lucky coincidences and so-nearly-went-wrongs suggest divine intervention, but of a different sort? When things could so easily have gone wrong after Hipposthenidas' failure of nerve, is Caphisias right to infer that 'the gods are encouraging us towards the deed' (588B) – or was it, indeed, just coincidence, and is Caphisias indulging in that brand of wishful thinking that Simmias immediately goes on to discuss (588C)? We cannot know. It is so characteristic of dialogues to leave loose ends, alternative views, that need not be wholly integrated or wholly decided between or among: the notion of divine guidance is significantly absent from the narrative in the *Life*, for in *Lives* interpretation is typically more clear-cut. The form of the essay allows 'voice' to be given to discordant views, and in literature as in life the most civilised and insightful of people have sometimes to realise that they cannot be sure which view is the better.

Perhaps this is the better way to look at the Epaminondas issue too, and the dialogue airs but does not decide the question whether his quietism is right. But there is an extra twist, for what makes Epaminondas so enigmatic is that he has so little voice, at least on this issue. He waxes eloquent on the virtues of poverty in turning down even acceptable wealth (and it is not clear he is right there either[21]), but others speak for him when it comes to his non-involvement in the conspiracy (576F–7A, 594B–C), a non-involvement that is slightly more total in the *De genio* than in the *Life*.[22] His taciturnity is indeed most striking, and is itself the object of comment (592F–3A). One thing he does express is his fear that the bloodshed may get out of hand (577A), but does it? The essay ends with jubilation, not with widespread slaying,[23] and even if Xenophon suggests there was a certain amount of score-settling (*Hell.* 5.4.12) that is not an emphasis that Plutarch himself gave even in *Pelopidas*. Epaminondas' high-principled stance against 'killing any fellow-citizen without trial except in the pres-

[21] 582C–586A: *pace* e.g. Desideri 1984, 576–7, he is questionable both in interpreting the request for Lysis' bones as if it was an insulting attempt to buy off people who did not resent their penury (the gentlemanly language of the Crotoniate Theanor did not deserve such a put-down), and also in treating the possibility of funds with such disdain. 'It is just as if you came offering arms to a city that you thought was at war, and then discovered it was at peace,' says Epaminondas (584A): and the analogy is closer than he thinks, for his colleagues do see themselves as at war with the Spartan occupying force, and funds are useful in warfare. Plutarch knew very well that to be too philosophical at a time of crisis may compromise a higher principle, the good of one's city (*Phoc.* 32.6–7).

[22] He is active and bellicose at *Pel.* 12.2 ('in arms') and stirs up anti-Spartan subversiveness at *Pel.* 7.4–5. In *De genio* he is simply waiting at the end (598C).

[23] Babut 1984, 56 = 1994, 410, Barigazzi 1988, 421–2 = 1994, 230–1, and Brenk 2002, 108 put weight on the fate of Cabirichus at 597B–C: not the most glorious moment of the liberation, it is true, but not I think enough to demonstrate that 'Epameinondas had been lucidly clairvoyant' (Brenk).

ence of grave necessity' (594B) is all very well: but is this not 'grave necessity'? Epaminondas only manages to occupy the high moral ground by assuming without argument that this *is* the high moral ground. And can one, should one, forget the glory that this brought to Thebes? Should one ignore all that followed, Leuctra and so on? Or should we put more weight, as Brenk does, on the internecine Greek bloodshed that followed in later centuries (579A, 579C–D), and think that this rather validates Epaminondas' viewpoint? Yet perhaps both of those views fall into the trap of 'judging events by their outcomes'. It is all very difficult: but whether or not *Pelopidas* had already been written with its enthusiastic praise of the deed (one, incidentally, that dwells on its consequences, so 'outcomes' are relevant after all, 13.4–7), Plutarch's first readers could hardly have laid aside their awareness that the natural reading of events – especially the reading that was natural for this Boeotian author Plutarch to take – was that this was a glorious action, one where the risk of bloodshed was thoroughly worth taking.[24] That, after all, is Archedamus' assumption in the proem.

So Epaminondas' stance is not dismissed out of hand, and here we may agree with Babut, Brenk, and Georgiadou: but it is not clearly validated either. The dialogue form allows both positions to be aired, and the reader is involved in weighing both points of view – in a further dialogue, if you like, a more Bakhtinian dialogic sort of dialogue in which the reader converses with the text. That dialogic dialogue may even be one we see in a different form in the *Life* as well, especially if we remember that the reader would have read *Epaminondas* too and would have seen the other possible viewpoint. As so often in both *Moralia* and *Lives*, we may see people wrestling with the past and finding it relevant but difficult to read, just as Plutarch's own readers would – and perhaps that is the 'message for his own generation', and perhaps for ours too. We are coming back to a position similar to that urged by Philip Hardie in his paper on the semiotics of this 'Sign of Socrates' (1996), where he stressed the difficulty of reading signs and the correlated difficulty of reading historical texts.[25]

[24] Or, as Ziegler put it, "er wollte einer der glänzendsten boiotischen Ruhmestaten ein Denkmal setzen und zugleich, indem er seine Helden im Augenblick der höchsten Spannung ruhigen Gemütes über die schwierigsten philosophischen Fragen diskutieren ließ, dem Vorurteil der boiotischen Ungeistigkeit entgegentreten" (1964, 204 = 1951, 841). And brilliant and glorious in memory it surely was: if Borthwick 1976 is right, it even, most unusually for a historical event, figured in artistic as well as literary representations.

[25] I argue this more fully in C. B. R. Pelling, "Plutarch's Socrates", *Hermathena* 179 (2005) 105–39, where I also suggest that this emphasis fits well with the way Plutarch treats Socrates in his other works (cf. also Hershbell 1988): the difficulty of reading and understanding Socrates is a recurrent theme.

6. Lessons for today?

One final point could hardly escape the audience at the conference in 2005 where this paper was first given,[26] at a time when the debate over American and British intervention in Iraq was raging. Many of these issues inevitably sounded all too contemporary to that audience. When is it right to take direct, murderous action to overthrow a tyrant? When is it better to keep a thoughtful, reflective detachment, feeling that civil bloodshed can so easily get out of hand? How far *should* the educated, ethically concerned patriot feel not merely a licence but an obligation to take a moral stance on issues as profound as these? Yet is that moral stance best taken by a course of risky, bloody action? How reliable a guide can religious conviction be in issues like this – or does it depend on having the right religious mindset in the first place? Plutarch's deepest moral concerns remain concerns for us, timeless ones, not simply parochial preoccupations of imperial Chaeronea. The Plutarch which Georgiadou and Brenk found in the 1990s, validating Epaminondas' detachment and concern to avoid bloodshed, is one that prefigures what one might call the European liberal consensus on the events of 2003, disapproving of the uncompromising decisiveness of American policy. Liberals are usually Epaminondases now; I am one myself. If I paint a more equivocal Plutarch, allowing voice to both sides and not plumping one way or another, in one way that is simply affirming that issues like this are very difficult, and gauging the right lessons from history is as hard as gauging the right ethical principles to apply. But there is also a sympathy for the men of action, even for the politicians, who cannot allow themselves the luxury of saying 'it is too early to tell', and have to take agonising decisions *anyway*, under the pressure of events, when in those terms of the proem one can only see the *aitiai* and can only grope nervously forwards towards the unseeable consequences. Judging in the light of outcomes is indeed the privilege of history and of biography; it is knowing what to do with those past judgments, how to apply them to the new crisis, that is both intractable and unavoidable. He knew a thing or two, did Plutarch.

[26] See above, n. ∗.

Agesilaus and the bones of Alcmena[1]

Robert Parker

The *De genio* is the unique source for the story of how king Agesilaus of Sparta attempted to fetch the remains of Heracles' mother Alcmena from Haliartus to Sparta. During the conversation at Simmias' house, the seer Theocritus, naturally interested in such matters, asks a Haliartian who happens to be present, Phidolaus, 'what was found, and, in general, what was the appearance of Alcmena's tomb when it was opened in your country – if, that is, you were present yourself when Agesilaus sent and removed the remains to Sparta.' Phidolaus replies 'I wasn't present, and, thanks to my indignation and complaints to my fellow-citizens, I was left out by them' (577E).[2] Despite his indignation at the whole procedure, he goes on to describe the finds. The first find or non-find is obscured by a lacuna in the text: it was <some remains> of a body or <no remains> of a body or even <a stone instead of> a body; if the last suggestion is right, a myth about the miraculous disappearance of Alcmena's body known from Thebes was also influential at Haliartus.[3] The certain finds were: 'a bronze bracelet of no great size, and two pottery jars containing earth compressed and hardened like stone by the passage of time'; also, somewhere in the region of the tomb (there is another short lacuna) 'a bronze tablet with much writing on it, wonderfully ancient. This writing appeared clearly when the bronze was washed, but it allowed nothing to be made out, because the form of the characters was peculiar and foreign, very like the Egyptian (577F).'

Phidolaus then tells how Agesilaus sent a copy of the bronze tablet to the king of Egypt (unfortunately unnamed) for transmission to 'the priests' to see if they could decipher it (577F). He suggests that Simmias, who was in Egypt at the time and in contact with the priests on matters of philosophy, might be able to report on the outcome. But 'as for the people of Haliartus, they think that the great dearth and overflowing of the lake was not fortuitous, but was a visitation of wrath come upon them for allow-

[1] Cf. Schwartz 1958, 80–83.

[2] The Greek can equally well be translated 'despite my indignation and complaints', in which case we would have to suppose that Phidolaus resented exclusion from an interesting spectacle. But the rendering adopted in this volume, which implies that he had protested vigorously against the violation of a tomb, surely gives better sense.

[3] See below, pp. 131–33.

ing the tomb to be dug up.' Theocritus adds that the Spartans too seem to have incurred divine anger: Lysanoridas has just been consulting him about omens, and has now gone off to Haliartus 'to fill in the grave again, and offer libations to Alcmena and Aleus, in accordance with some oracle, though he does not know who Aleus was (577F–578B).' He goes on to suggest that on his return Lysanoridas may try to seek out the tomb of Dirce, at which the outgoing and incoming Theban hipparchs meet for a secret nighttime ritual when the transfer of office between them takes place; they alone know its location.[4] We should perhaps suppose that Lysanoridas hopes to capture for the Spartans benefits that should properly fall to the Thebans from offerings brought to the hidden tomb; he is suspected, at all events, of intending to meddle with sacred matters that are no concern of his.

The theme of 'hijacked rites' becomes explicit later in the dialogue when Hipposthenidas reports nervously on the omens reported by 'the seers, sacrificing the ox to Demeter' (evidently an occasion sufficiently familiar for this casual allusion to suffice) (586F).[5] Theocritus bursts out that evil omens can only be expected when rituals are performed by usurpers (587C). Early in the dialogue a conversation is mentioned between the quisling Theban Archias, the Spartan Lysanoridas, and the Theban patriot Theocritus (577B). It occurred 'when they turned off the road a little below the Amphion', apparently the supposed place of burial of the mythical builders of Thebes' walls, Amphion and Zethus.[6] The Thebes of Plutarch's day, it should be noted, was in large part unoccupied,[7] and his topography is likely to be more literary and symbolic than realistic. The glancing allusion via the Amphion to the builders of the famous walls may be more than a touch of local colour, given that at the dramatic date of *De genio* the walls were subject to a lawless occupation. Just before the crucial appeal to the Theban citizenry to accept the proferred liberty, Epaminondas, Gorgidas and their friends assemble at the 'sanctuary of Athena' (598D), probably to

[4] See note 57 on the translation, above p. 86.

[5] Schachter 1981, 166–8 acutely argues, from the reference to 'office' in 587C, that this otherwise unknown sacrifice was offered in connection with the inauguration of the new annual board of magistrates; we know from Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.4 that the conspiracy occurred when one year's polemarchs were about to leave office. This would fit well with the unusually important civic role that Demeter had at Thebes: the sanctuary of Demeter Thesmophoros was apparently on the Cadmea, and it was here that omens occurred in relation both to the battle of Leuctra and the arrival of Alexander (Paus. 9.6.5–6); thither too were sent spoils from Leuctra (Paus. 9.16.5).

[6] See note 41 on the translation, above p. 85.

[7] Paus. 8.33.2, Dio 7. 121; cf. D. J. Mastronarde, *Euripides* Phoenissae (Cambridge 1994) 647–650 ('The poetic topography of Thebes', with bibliography also on its actual topography).

be understood as the shrine of Athena Onka associated with Cadmus and well-known from tragedy:[8] another aptly-chosen location, therefore.

I revert to the bronze tablet excavated on Agesilaus' orders. When Simmias rejoins the conversation and is appealed to, he replies that he knows nothing of the tablet from Alcmena's tomb; but he does know of many writings sent from Agesilaus by the Spartan Agetoridas, via the king (i.e. pharaoh), to the prophet Chonouphis at Memphis. When deciphered by Chonouphis after three days' study they turned out to contain instructions from Heracles (who had learnt the Egyptian language used in the age of Proteus) to 'hold a competition in honour of the Muses'; the god's (i.e. Heracles') advice to the Greeks, Chonouphis interpreted, was to live in peace and harmony.

The *De genio* says no more on the issue, except in the sense that the whole narrative of the Spartan loss of the Cadmea suggests that Lysanoridas' attempts at propitiation were vain. But from a passage in the *Life of Lysander* (28.4–5) we see that Lysanoridas' ignorance about Aleus is due to lack of knowledge of local traditions. Plutarch is discussing the topography of the Haliartus region in the context of Lysander's campaign there of 395. Near the spring Kissousa, he writes, grows the Cretan styrax, which the Haliartians take as proof of the Cretan Rhadamanthys' residence in the region. 'And they show his tomb, calling it that of Aleus[9] (καὶ τάφον αὐτοῦ δεικνύουσιν Ἀλέου (Ziegler: Ἀλεᾶ codd.) καλοῦντες). The monument of Alcmena is nearby. For it was here as they say that she was buried, having married Rhadamanthys after the death of Amphitryon.' The tradition that Rhadamanthys lived in Boeotia in exile and married Alcmena occurs elsewhere too.[10] This stage in the Cretan hero's career follows no obvious mythological logic; it might be a secondary product of a myth whereby Alcmena's body was snatched away during her funeral in order

[8] Cf. Schachter 1981, 129–33; in Aeschylus' *Septem* there are repeated allusions which stress Athena Onka's role as protectress of the city (164, 487, 501), and a commentator on Euripides (Σ *Phoen.* 1062) quotes two hexameter lines supposedly inscribed on her temple (which they refer to, as a νηός) describing its foundation by Cadmus. Pausanias (9.12.2) credits her only with a statue and altar in the open air, but other places known to him in Thebes where Athena was honoured are even less well endowed (9.10.2; 9.11.7; 9.17.3); for possible explanations of the literary allusions to Theban 'temples' of Athena (Soph. *OT* 20–21, 'twin temples'; Eur. *Phoen.* 1372, 'the house of Pallas'; Σ Eur. *Phoen.* 1062, above) see Schachter, loc. cit. Aeschylus seems to place Athena Onka 'before the city' though near the gates (*Sept.* 164; 501), but Pausanias, it has been argued, is still at the southern end of the Cadmea when he reaches her; for different proposed locations (south west from the Cadmea; at the southern end of the Cadmea) see Symeonoglou 1985, 185 with figs. 5.1 and 5.2. Only archaeological discoveries can advance the issue.

[9] Schachter's suggestion (1981, 9) that the phrase should be rendered 'and they show a tomb there, calling it that of Aleus', removes the puzzling identification of Aleus and Rhadamanthys, but makes Plutarch's sequence of thought very inconsequential.

[10] Apollod. 2.70[4.11], 3.6[1.2] (doubtless the source for Tzetzes on Lyc. *Alex.* 50), who locates it at Ocaleae near Haliartus (Strabo 9.2.26, 410).

for her to live with Rhadamanthys on the Islands of the Blessed – fit destiny for the mother of the greatest hero.[11] However that may be, two tombs in the Haliartus region were at a certain point identified as belonging to the couple, though only apparently by violence to an existing tradition which assigned one of them to 'Aleus'.

Agesilaus' attempt to move the remains of Alcmena recalls several similar stories.[12] To take only cases to which sources assign an approximate date, the Spartans during their sixth century war against Tegea supposedly brought the bones of Orestes from Tegea to Sparta; Cimon in the 470s (?) those of Theseus from Scyrus to Athens; Hagnon in 437 those of Rhesus from Troy to the new settlement at Amphipolis; the Messenians those of Aristomenes from Rhodes, probably at or shortly after the re-foundation of Messene in 369.[13] The remains of Minos were supposedly handed back, voluntarily as it seems, by the Acragantines to the Cretans when Theron was tyrant in the early 5th century.[14] But none of these cases provides an exact parallel to that of Agesilaus and Alcmena. In every instance except the last the bone transferal occurred on the instructions of an oracle. Agesilaus had no such legitimation for his action, at all events not in the account given of it by Plutarch which treats it as an unsanctioned impiety. It duly proves a failure, and on oracular advice Lysanoridas hurries off to 'fill in the grave again',[15] and appease Alcmena and Aleus. In this regard the closest parallel is a mysterious Theban story in Pausanias that after Chaeronea king Philip, prompted by a dream, took the bones of Heracles' music-teacher Linus to Macedonia, but prompted by another dream later restored them.[16]

A further difference is that in all the cases just mentioned, and in most too of those which float without firm chronological location,[17] the hero in

[11] 'Pherecydes' fr. 84 Fowler ap. Anton. Lib. 33; cf. *Anth. Pal.* 3.13, which describes a Cyzican monument of the third c. B.C.

[12] Cf. McCauley 1999.

[13] Hdt. 1.66–68; Plut. *Cim.* 8.5–7, *Thes.* 36.1–4, Paus. 1.17.2–6, 3.3.7; Polyaen. *Strat.* 6.53; Paus. 4.32.3.

[14] Diod. 4.79.1–2.

[15] The *De genio* account does not allow him time to fetch back from Sparta the finds from the excavation, as full reparation would have required. But there was certainly no 'tomb of Alcmena' shown there.

[16] 9.29.8–9. Pfister 1909, 194–6, treats both the Linus and the Alcmena stories as fictions designed to explain why a site which claimed to be the site of a particular hero's burial lacked all visible relics. But in neither case does the explanation work. Pausanias describes the restoration of Linus' bones and goes on 'but they say that with the course of time the tombstone and all the other markers have disappeared'. What then did the Philip story add? As for Alcmena, in *De genio*, the sole source, her tomb was 'refilled': there were then still 'visible remains'.

[17] So e.g. the return of the bones of Tisamenus from Helice to Sparta (Paus. 7.1.8), Arcas from Maenalus to Mantinea (Paus. 8.9.3–4), Hippodamia from Midea to Elis (Paus. 6.20.7); for suggested dates for these cases see McCauley 1999, 95 n. 38, 97 nn. 43–44. The clear-

question has died abroad and is being brought back to repose in his native soil; usually too he is a figure of high importance for the self-image of the country to whom he returns. Alcmena mother of Heracles was bound to be of interest to any Spartan king, Heraclids as they claimed to be and thus her lineal descendants. But she was not to the Spartans what Theseus was to the Athenians or Aristomenes to the Messenians; and no-one ever claimed that she had resided in Sparta. In this sense the incident resembles attempts to suborn enemy heroes by sacrificing to them secretly or the like, though actual bone-removal is not attested in such cases.[18] The text unfortunately does not make plain what traditions about Alcmena's burial at Haliartus may have pre-dated Agesilaus' interest in the matter. Many different stories were told about Alcmena's post-mortem fate. The Megarians claimed that she died while travelling and was buried in Megara (Paus. 1.41.1); the Thebans claimed she died in Thebes and her body disappeared, being replaced by a stone which was still visible in her sanctuary, while being carried out for burial.[19] But at a certain point there emerged the tradition discussed above which identified two tombs at Haliartus as belonging to Alcmena and Rhadamanthys. Unfortunately we cannot know when one or both tombs were first so explained. The simplest view is that the identification already existed in c. 381 (to take that as the date of Agesilaus' action): Agesilaus will then have opportunistically exploited Spartan control of the region to try to bring his ancestress' remains to Sparta. An alternative scenario would have an impressive bronze age tumulus being discovered by chance in c. 381 and identified (by a local antiquary? by an oracle?) as Alcmena's – a rash identification, given the response it evoked from Agesilaus.[20] No doubt other scenarios are possible too. Plutarch was using the story primarily for its consequences, the grim omens that Agesilaus' impiety evoked at the time of the loss of the Cadmea. Agesilaus' original motivation was not his concern, and we are left with too little information to recover it. For the religious historian, the text promises and disappoints.

All this, however, is to assume that the incident is historical, and that

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est counter-case of a hero whose bones are transported away from home is the bringing (unexplained) of Hector to Thebes (Schachter 1981, I, 233–4).

[18] See e.g. Hdt. 5.89.2–3; Eur. *Erechtheus* F 370.87–9 Kannicht; Plut. *Sol.* 9.1; E. Kearns, *Heroes of Attica* (London 1989) 44–55. For Theban anxieties about such forms of attack Paus. 9.17.4 is striking testimony.

[19] 'Pherecydes' (fr. 84 Fowler) ap. Anton. Lib. *Met.* 33; Diod. Sic. 4.58.6; Paus. 9.16.7; Plut. *Rom.* 28.7, the last without any specific location.

[20] McCauley 1999, 95: 'the bones were found by accident in what must certainly have been a tholos tomb and identified (we are not told how) as those of Alkmene' (with an unexplained dating to, precisely, 382). Schachter 1981, 14 speculates that objects discovered during the excavation might have encouraged the identification, made perhaps by an oracle. But in Plutarch the identification seems to precede the excavation.

assumption must now be tested. In favour of it is the absence of any obvious motive for invention. The story puts the Spartans in a bad light, but not so bad as to make it powerfully anti-Spartan: contrast for instance the myth of the daughters of Scedasus, who died after rape by 'Spartiate guests/strangers'.[21] It has no obvious aetiological purpose.[22] Though it certainly contributes valuably to Plutarch's scene-setting, one hesitates to suppose that he would invent such a story about a historical character for that purpose alone. The disappointing result of the excavation might also plead for authenticity. In his pre-history of archaeology Alain Schnapp[23] contrasts the realism of Plutarch's account, a realism which incidentally should probably warn against introducing the legendary motif of the disappearing body, with the quite different manner of the 'bones of Orestes' story in Herodotus. He observes 'it does not take too much imagination for today's archaeologists to recognize a Mycenaean burial.' Even before the discovery of a large cache of Linear B tablets at Thebes, the possibility that Agesilaus' bronze was inscribed in Linear B (or A) had often been contemplated.[24] It is a difficulty, however, that texts written in linear B on bronze are unknown; and even if we make the easy assumption that a clay tablet changed to bronze in transmission of the story, Linear B tablets have no proper place to our knowledge in or near tombs. An extensive text written in a different pictographic script (Linear A or Cretan hieroglyphic) would be a very surprising find in Boeotia.[25] The possibility that the 'realism' was injected by Plutarch should also not be neglected.[26]

Even a believer in the story must baulk at some details, particularly

[21] Plut. *Pelopidas* 20.4–21.1.

[22] Against Pfister's theory see n. 16 above.

[23] Schnapp 1997, 54. He comments that 'Plutarch, like Pausanias, was more attentive than Herodotus to the discoveries revealed by the soil, because the spirit of the times in the second century AD favoured the collection and interpretation of antiquities.' But, since he does not seem to question the historicity of the incident, it should also have implications for the fourth century. Schwartz 1958, 82 supposes that Plutarch may have fleshed out a skeletal contemporary account with details from his own day.

[24] Linear A: Schwartz 1958, 81, with earlier references; add F.W. von Bissing, "Eudoxus von Knidos' Aufenthalt in Aegypten und seine Uebertragung ägyptischer Tierfabeln", *Forschungen und Fortschritte*, 25 (1949), [225–230] 225–6. Linear B: Schachter 1981, 14; Schnapp 1997, 54 (with reservations).

[25] For the few scraps of Linear A from the mainland see T. Palaima, "The Inscribed Bronze 'Kessel' from Shaft Grave IV", in Y. Duhoux (ed.), *Briciaka. A Tribute to W.C. Brice* (Cretan Studies 9, Amsterdam 2003), [187–201] 194; for the distribution of Cretan hieroglyphic J. P. Olivier / L. Godart / J. C. Porsat, *Corpus Hieroglyphicorum Inscriptionum Cretae* (Études Crétoises 31, 1996), 22. (My thanks to Lisa Bendall for advice on this point.)

[26] Schnapp 1997, 54 comments that 'Plutarch, like Pausanias, was more attentive than Herodotus to the discoveries revealed by the soil, because the spirit of the times in the second century AD favoured the collection and interpretation of antiquities.' Schwartz 1958, 82 supposes that Plutarch may have fleshed out a skeletal contemporary account with details from his own day.

those relating to Egypt. What were the 'many writings' (not just a single tablet)[27] in an arcane script sent by Agesilaus to the pharaoh for decipherment? Simmias says that he was in Egypt with Plato. It is doubtful whether Plato ever went to Egypt; if he did, the ancient tradition suggests that he should have been there somewhere between 399 and c. 387,[28] too early for the most convincing location of the incident of Alcmena's tomb. Chonouphis' interpretation of the arcane writings, above all, strains belief. Heracles' supposed message to the Greeks about the Muses and peace was, it has been suggested, a diplomatic invention on the Egyptian side to turn down a Spartan request for military alliance.[29] One can accept that Agesilaus' dispatch of the tablet might have occurred in the context of an embassy on matters of more immediate concern. But Chonouphis would have needed to be well-versed indeed in Greek culture and Greek preoccupations to devise such an elegantly oblique evasion. If, on the other hand, Heracles' instruction to 'hold a competition in honour of the Muses' has any connection with the famous cult of those goddesses at Thespiae,[30] it is likely to have been concocted in Boeotia and not in Egypt.

The chronology is difficult too. Agesilaus' best-known association with Egypt, which culminated in actual campaigning with the Egyptians c. 360 against the great king, occurred in the last years of his life; the terminus a quo for this phase of Spartan-Egyptian relations is usually taken to be the pro-Theban stance taken by Persia, to Sparta's outrage, in 367.[31] The probably historical visit to Egypt of Eudoxus of Cnidus, carrying a letter of introduction from Agesilaus to the pharaoh Nectanebo, who then introduced him to 'the priests' (among whom Chonouphis is sometimes named),[32] should, it is generally agreed, belong to this period.[33] But a date in the 360s is far too late for the dramatic situation of the dialogue, and also for any Spartan activity at Haliartus. Back in 396 Agesilaus had appealed from Ephesus to Nepherites I for support against Persia; the pharaoh declined an alliance but helped with equipment and supplies (Diod. 14.79.4). Diodorus claims that the rebel Persian admiral Glos made an alliance with

[27] These could of course include the one tablet, as is commonly assumed (the discrepancy that only Simmias' account mentions Agetoridas as intermediary can certainly be explained in terms of the artful interweaving of different narrative perspectives); but can they be reduced to it?

[28] Riginos 1976, 60 n. 1.

[29] Schwartz 1958, 78–79.

[30] So tentatively A. Schachter, *Cults of Boeotia* II (London 1986) 157.

[31] Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33–40.

[32] Sotion ap. Diog. Laert. 8.87. Eudoxus and Chonouphis: Diog. Laert. 8.90 (located in Heliupolis: cf. Strabo 17.2.29, 806); Plut. *De Is. et Os.* 10 (Memphis).

[33] So S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford 1982) 117 ('perhaps the 360s'), with the suggestion that Mausolus, who had ties with both Agesilaus and Eudoxus, had a role; F. Lasserre, *Die Fragmente des Eudoxos von Knidos* (Berlin 1966) 139–140, puts the introduction precisely in 365/4.

both Sparta and the pharaoh Acoris in 383.[34] There is no great difficulty in the hypothesis that diplomatic contacts between Sparta and Egypt occurred at any moment in Agesilaus' long life, even in the period (from the king's peace in 386 down to 367) when they were not actively united by hostility to Persia.[35] All the same, there is a suspicious similarity between the story of Eudoxus, recommended by Agesilaus to Nectanebo and then introduced to Chonouphis, and of the bronze tablet, sent by Agesilaus to a Pharaoh who forwarded it to Chonouphis. Perhaps the former is historical, the latter a fiction calqued upon it. If so, we can abandon the effort to reconcile the Haliartian and the Egyptian ends of the story chronologically. The excavation at Haliartus yielded a tablet in a mysterious script. An imaginative account was then added (we do not know by whom) of how the tablet came to be deciphered.

Detached from its Egyptian tailpiece, the story becomes easy to place chronologically. Or rather, it becomes so if we allow that Plutarch got the story from a source that located it in time and did so correctly.[36] 577E speaks of the tomb being 'opened up' (ἀνοιχθέντος) 'when Agesilaus sent and had the remains removed to Sparta' (ὅτε πέμψας Ἀγησίλαος εἰς Σπάρτην τὰ λείψανα μετεκόμιζε). That language not only does not require but should actually exclude Agesilaus' presence at the site of the excavation; the object of 'sent' is not 'the remains', for that point is covered by 'had … removed', but 'a message' (unexpressed, as often) sent by him to those on the spot at Haliartus. 578F too, τοῦ πίνακος, ὃν παρ' ἡμῶν ἔλαβεν Ἀγησίλαος τὸν Ἀλκμήνης τάφον ἀνασκευασάμενος, can comfortably be rendered in a way that leaves Agesilaus seated in Sparta: 'the tablet which Agesilaus obtained from us when he had the tomb of Alcmena dismantled'. The campaigns conducted by Agesilaus in Boeotia after the Theban recovery of the Cadmea in 378 are irrelevant, therefore; it is perverse to reverse the sequence of events[37] given in the *De genio*, where the Alcmena incident unambiguously precedes the recovery of the Cadmea, in order to find a time when Agesilaus was campaigning in Boeotia in person. There were Spartans in the Haliartus region in 395, when they fought

[34] 15.9.3–5; see P. J. Stylianou's commentary ad loc. for views on the reliability of this claim.

[35] For this factor see F.K. Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jahrhundert vor der Zeitwende* (Berlin 1953), Ch. 7; A. B. Lloyd in *The Cambridge Ancient History* VI^2, *The Fourth Century B.C.* (1994) 345–9. For Agesilaus' permanent hostility to Persia see Cawkwell, above p. 106.

[36] The other possibility, that Plutarch anchored a chronologically imprecise tradition in the context that suited his dialogue, can unfortunately not be ruled out; we know nothing at all of the story's provenance. But I proceed on the more optimistic assumption.

[37] Whether knowingly, as Schwartz 1958, 78, or inadvertently, as Pfister 1909, 195–6 assumes. P. Foucart, "Le culte des héros chez les Grecs", *Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres 42* (1918) 62, speaks vaguely of 'one of [Agesilaus'] campaigns in Boeotia'.

the famous battle at which Lysander fell.[38] But Agesilaus was far away in Asia Minor at the time, and the Spartans on the spot will surely have had little leisure for practical archaeology during that brief and disastrous incursion. Though the campaign of 395 cannot quite be ruled out as a context, it is probably relevant only in the sense that it might have stimulated Spartan interest in the antiquities of the area.

The political situation presupposed in *De genio* is one in which Sparta is free to intervene in a heavy-handed way, but without military force, in Boeotian affairs. Such was exactly the situation from 382–379 but at no other time, the period when both Thebes and the rest of Boeotia (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.46, 49) were in the hands of pro-Spartan juntas. R. J. Buck very reasonably uses the incident to illustrate how in these years (p. 71) 'the Spartans apparently exercised direct control when they desired.'[39] That is perhaps the least infirm conclusion that the historian can derive from the fascinating but frustrating incident.

[38] Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.17–25; Plut. *Lys.* 28.

[39] *Boiotia and the Boiotian League* (Alberta 1994) 71.

Pythagoreanism in Plutarch

John Dillon

1. Pythagorean influences in Plutarch's philosophical upbringing

Plutarch would never, I think, be regarded as being anywhere close to what one might term the 'Neopythagorean wing' of Middle Platonism – that space inhabited by such figures as Moderatus of Gades, Nicomachus of Gerasa and Numenius of Apamea – but there is no question, on the other hand, that he knew a good deal about the Pythagorean tradition, and greatly respected what he knew.

To begin at the beginning, there is the intriguing problem as to what he means by his self-portrayal in the *E at Delphi* (387F), as, in his youth (around 66–7 A.D.), "devoting myself to mathematics with the greatest enthusiasm, although I was destined soon to pay all honour to the maxim 'Nothing in excess' when I joined the Academy." This sounds very much like a mildly ironic confession of excessive enthusiasm for Pythagorean-style numerology at some early phase of his intellectual development, which is depicted as being somehow 'outside' the ambit of 'the Academy' – which can only really mean the (more) orthodox, or main-stream, Platonist tradition, since there was, after all, in his day no Platonic Academy in an institutional sense.

This will have been succeeded by a 'conversion' to a more moderate, and on the whole Peripateticizing, Platonism, presumably under the influence of his later mentor Ammonius. He also, however, portrays Ammonius in this same dialogue (391E), as holding that "in mathematics was contained not the least important part of philosophy," which, in the context, would seem, once again, to imply some interest in Pythagorean number-theory – although such an assertion could reasonably be made by any Platonist.

All that we can tentatively derive from this piece of information is that there would seem to have been a period in Plutarch's youth when he was exposed to, and attracted by, Pythagorean number-mysticism. How much of this, we may wonder, together with interest in other aspects of Pythagoras' life and teachings (and those of early Pythagoreans such as Archytas or Philolaus) continued into later life?

If we take our start from the first principles of his metaphysics, we can certainly identify Pythagorean influence, if we wish, in his postulation of a pair of supreme principles, the One and the Indefinite Dyad, though there is at the same time nothing un-Platonic about this. However, at *De Defectu Oraculorum* 428F, we find quite a starkly dualist scenario presented which is compatible with the oldest Pythagorean traditions:

> "Of the supreme (anótató) principles, by which I mean the One and the Indefinite Dyad, the latter, being the element underlying all formlessness and disorder, has been called Limitlessness (apeiria); but the nature of the One limits and contains what is void and irrational and indeterminate in Limitlessness, gives it shape, and renders it in some way tolerant and receptive of definition."

This pair of principles turns up at various places in Plutarch's works, attributed to a wide range of authorities, including Zoroaster, and various pre-Socratic figures, such as Heraclitus, Parmenides and Anaxagoras, e.g. *De An. Proc.* 1024D–1025D, *De Is. et Os.* 370C–371A, where 'the Pythagoreans' are included. Pythagoras is not included in the list in this passage of the *De An. Proc.*, but elsewhere, at 1012E, we find the information that 'Zaratas' (whom Plutarch does not seem to identify with Zoroaster!) was a teacher of Pythagoras, and called the Indefinite Dyad the mother of Number, the One being its father.

In the third of the *Quaestiones Platonicae*, à propos the analysis of the Divided Line of *Republic* VI, we find, at 1001Eff., a system of derivation of number, and then point, line and solid from the Monad and the Dyad, which, while not being attributed to Pythagoras, agrees with the system set out by the Ist. Cent. B.C. Neopythagorean Alexander Polyhistor in his *History of Philosophy* (ap. Diog. Laert. 7.25), except that Alexander describes the Pythagoreans as deriving the Dyad from the Monad, which Plutarch does not do. How far back such a system goes, however, is a moot point; it might well be itself derived from the speculations of Old Academicians such as Xenocrates, with whom Plutarch was well acquainted.[1]

Plutarch's distinctive doctrines on the nature of the soul, both World Soul and individual soul, on the separable intellect (as set out, for example, at *De genio* 591D–592D), and on daemonology, do not seem to owe anything to the Pythagorean tradition, though one cannot be sure that they do not depend on some Neopythagorean sources not available to us.[2] There does, however, seem some warrant for claiming at least a belief in a personal *daimon* as distinctive of Pythagoreanism from Plutarch's presentation of the doctrine in *De genio* 585E–F (see below).

[1] Cf. e.g. Dillon 1996, 214–18.

[2] The efforts of Marcel Detienne, however, in *La notion de Daimon dans le pythagorisme* (Paris 1963), to derive a Neopythagorean daemonology from the *De genio Socratis* seem much too optimistic. Cf. on this, F.E. Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled: Religious Themes in Plutarch's Moralia and Lives* (Leiden 1977) 139 n. 30. Certainly, the Pythagoreans believed in daemons, as did everybody else.

2. Plutarch and Pythagorean Ethics

In the sphere of ethics, on the other hand, particularly in his essay *De Virtute Morali*, we can discern, I think, interesting traces of Pythagoreanism within the overall framework of a distinctly Peripateticizing exposition, based primarily on *Nicomachean Ethics* II 5–7. First of all, whereas Aristotle speaks of virtue simply as a 'state (*hexis*) in the mean between two extremes' (1106b36), and expressly denies that it is an activity or a faculty (*dynamis*, 1106a5), Plutarch describes virtue at *Virt. Mor.* 444B, as 'an activity (*kinésis*) and faculty (*dynamis*) concerned with the irrational, which does away with remissions and over-strainings of impulse (*hormé*) and reduces each passion to moderation and faultlessness'. This characterization of virtue as something more active than a *hexis* is not in itself, perhaps, distinctively Pythagorean, but Plutarch goes on to discuss the precise sense in which virtue is a 'mean', and that is more significant. Having dismissed three other senses of 'mean', he goes for a distinctively Pythagorean one, as is attested by its presence in various *pseudo-Pythagorica*:

> "But it is a mean, and is said to be so, in a sense very like that which obtains in musical sounds and harmonies. For there the mean, or *mesé*, a properly–pitched note like the *nété* or the *hypaté*, escapes the sharpness of the one and the deepness of the other."

In various Pythagorean treatises, we find virtue described as a 'harmonizing' (*harmonia, synharmogé*) of the irrational by the rational soul (e.g. 'Archytas', *On Law and Justice*, p. 33,17 Thesleff; 'Metopos', *On Virtue*, p. 199,27; 'Theages', *On Virtue*, p. 190,1–14), and Philo of Alexandria, who is also open to influence from Neopythagorean sources, approves of the concept (*Immut.* 24; *Sacr.* 37). This, then, would seem to indicate an overlaying by Plutarch of Neopythagorean influence on a basically Aristotelian substratum.

Apart from the theory of virtue in general, we find in Plutarch's works interesting signs of a commitment to vegetarianism, which, while embraceable within the spectrum of main-line Platonist doctrine, may be regarded as something distinctively Pythagorean. At the beginning of his treatise *On the Eating of Flesh* (*De esu carnium* 993B–C), we find the following rather hyperbolic tirade:

> "Can you really ask what reason Pythagoras had for abstaining from flesh? For my part, I rather wonder both by what accident and in what state of soul or mind the first man who did so touched his mouth to gore and brought his lips to the flesh of a dead creature, he who set forth tables of dead, stale bodies and ventured to call food and nourishment the parts that had a little before bellowed and cried, moved and lived. How could his eyes endure the slaughter when throats were slit and hides flayed and limbs torn from limb? How could his nose endure the stench? How was it that the pollution did not turn away his taste, which made contact with the sores of others and sucked juices and serums from mortal wounds?" (trans. Helmbold).

The *De esu carnium* may well be a youthful work, and it is certainly composed in the diatribe mode. References in more mature works, however,

indicate that Plutarch took vegetarianism less seriously in later life, so it may be that this was an enthusiasm of his youth. At *Symposiaca* 8.7–8 for instance, which portrays a dinner-party at Rome in Plutarch's honour given by his friend Sextius Sulla around the turn of the century, Plutarch presents his friend Philinus as being a vegetarian (727B), and by implication *not* himself. In 8.8, in response to the question 'Why the Pythagoreans used to abstain from fish more strictly than from any other living creature?', Plutarch himself gives an explanation (729D–730D) which, while exhibiting considerable knowledge of and sympathy with Pythagorean traditions, defends the sacrifice and consumption of certain land-animals on grounds of ecology: "if everyone should abstain from eating chickens alone, say, or hares, in a short time their number would make it impossible to maintain city life or to reap a harvest (730A)." Fish, on the other hand, pose no threat to us, and so the Pythagoreans have no wish to harm them.

3. Plutarch's knowledge of Pythagorean traditions and of contemporary Pythagoreans

This same passage of the *Symposiaca* affords useful evidence both of Plutarch's knowledge of Pythagorean traditions and beliefs, and of the existence of contemporary Pythagoreans from whom he could have learned. There is, first of all, among the guests the rather mysterious Lucius (spelled *Leukios*), of Etruscan ancestry – and a patriotic Etruscan, who claims Pythagoras as an Etruscan born and bred (727B)! – who is described as a pupil (*mathétés*) of Moderatus of Gades. Moderatus is known to have posed as an 'extreme' Pythagorean,[3] who, according to Porphyry (*Vit. Pyth.* 53), attacked the Platonists for appropriating all the finest elements of Pythagorean philosophy, while leaving the dross to be attributed to the Pythagorean School. We do not know where Moderatus himself taught (possibly in Rome), but we also find mention in this passage (728D) of a certain Alexicrates, as a 'moderate' contemporary Pythagorean teacher, who abstained from fish, but "sometimes used the flesh of other living creatures in moderation". Moderatus, then, is known to Plutarch at least by repute, but Alexicrates is probably known to him personally.

Plutarch also in this passage, and elsewhere exhibits considerable knowledge both of the life-legend of Pythagoras and of the Pythagorean *symbola*. A propos of abstaining from fish, at 729D, we hear the story of Pythagoras' ransoming of the catch of fish during his journey from Sybaris to Croton (also mentioned at *De cap. ex in. ut.* 91C), and the whole of *Question* 8. 7 is devoted to the discussion of the symbolic meaning of such precepts as not receiving a swallow in the house, always obliterating the mark of a pot in the ashes, and the smoothing out of the bedclothes after arising

[3] On Moderatus, see Dillon 1996, 344–51.

(727B–728C).[4] If we turn from this to such a work as the *Life of Numa*, we find also much of interest under both headings. After initially (ch. 1) recording serious doubts, on the basis of chronology[5], as to whether Numa can have been familiar (*synéthés*) with Pythagoras, he returns to the question in ch. 8, in connection with Numa's religious regulations, by means of which he wished to instil due fear of the gods into his citizens:

> "This was the chief reason why Numa's wisdom and culture were said to have been due to his intimacy with Pythagoras; for in the philosophy of the one, and in the political dispositions (*politeia*) of the other, religious services and occupations have a large place. It is said also that the solemnity of his outward demeanour was adopted by him because he possessed the same mind-set (*dianoia*) as did Pythagoras. That philosopher, indeed, is thought to have tamed an eagle, which he stopped by certain cries of his, and lured down as it flew over him; and also to have revealed his golden thigh as he passed through the crowds assembled at the Olympic Games; and we have reports of other devices and practices of his…" (trans. Perrin, somewhat modified).

Here we can observe Plutarch's familiarity with various of the standard stories about Pythagoras preserved in the later *Lives* of Porphyry and Iamblichus. Just below, he gives evidence of his familiarity with Pythagorean doctrine, in specifying how Numa was in accord with Pythagorean principles in his banning of graven images of the gods, and in his prescriptions for sacrifice:

> "Furthermore his (sc. Numa's) ordinances concerning images are altogether in harmony with the doctrines of Pythagoras. For that philosopher maintained that the first principle (*to proton*) was beyond sense-perception or feeling, invisible and uncreated[6]and intelligible… Their sacrifices, too, were altogether appropriate to the Pythagorean mode of worship; for most of them involved no bloodshed, but were made with flour, drink-offerings, and least costly substances."

For Plutarch, then, Pythagoras is an enormously revered figure, both in respect of his teachings and of his mode of life, but, whatever may have been the nature of his youthful enthusiasms, about which we receive only coy hints, as we have seen, in his mature years he remains firmly a Platonist. For him, as he remarks in an earlier symposiac discussion (8. 2, 719A), Plato combines the spirit of Socrates with that of Pythagoras, and it is that combination which in his view makes Plato the supreme philosopher.

4. Pythagorean elements in *De genio*

Against this background, we can observe, I think, something of Plutarch's broad and deep knowledge of Pythagorean doctrines and history put to

[4] He is also quite fond of the precept about not sitting on a peck-measure (*khoinix*), mentioned at *QC* 7.4.703E, and four other places.

[5] It is claimed by some, he admits, that Pythagoras lived as many as five generations after Numa, and that Numa had no acquaintance whatever with Greek culture.

[6] If the true reading here is *aktiston*, a very rare word; an alternative is *akératon*, 'pure, unmixed'.

use in the *De Genio* in various ways. The visit of the Pythagorean sage Theanor of Croton to Thebes in 379, in search of the body of his former friend and colleague Lysis, is the occasion for the presentation by Plutarch of a good deal of Pythagorean lore, both about friendship and about death and the afterlife,[7] as well as some details about the overthrow of the Pythagorean regimes in Southern Italy.

As regards Pythagorean friendship, we see Theanor, even in old age, journeying across the Greek world to ensure that his friend Lysis has received proper burial, and, in case he has not, to bring his body home to Croton. In the event, he finds that Lysis has received all due honours from his host Epaminondas, and decides to leave him where he is, though after performing a burnt offering and making a libation of milk at his grave (579F). He is also in receipt of an encouraging dream (585EF), which tells him that Lysis' soul has passed the requisite tests in the afterlife and been allotted a new guardian *daimon*.

This brings up the question, alluded to above, as to the possible Pythagorean origins of the belief in a personal daemon, of which we receive quite an exposition in the course of Theanor's approving comments on Timarchus' narrative in the myth (593D–594A). This doctrine is tied in with the Pythagorean doctrine of a sequence of reincarnations, leading, at least in some privileged cases, to a level of purification which allows the daemon to intervene in a special way and give the soul a helping hand, through the sending of inspired dreams and waking visions (of which Socrates' *daimonion* is an instance). These daemons, it would seem, are themselves purified souls, who have gone through the cycle of lives and are now in the position, as it were, of wise and benevolent athletic trainers, who can give due encouragement to those in the final stages of their earthly odyssey (593EF).

How far back in the Pythagorean tradition such a doctrine goes we cannot be sure, but it certainly basic to the tradition from an early stage that Pythagoras himself was such a privileged soul, and of course Empedocles, who was also part of the early tradition, felt himself to be such a one; so there is no reason to doubt that it is ancient.[8]

[7] We also find, à propos Theanor's attempt to press a gift of gold on Epaminondas for looking after Lysis, and Epaminondas' declining of this, a nice detail, not recorded elsewhere, about Pythagorean ascetic practices (585A). The Pythagoreans, it seems, to exercise their self-control, used to have fine feasts prepared for themselves, which they would then contemplate for a while, before allowing their servants to enjoy them, while they dined on humbler fare!

[8] On the other hand, other doctrines presented in the myth, such as the remarkable four levels of reality (591B), or the separable intellect (591E), may not safely be identified as Pythagorean, notwithstanding Theanor's blanket approval of Timarchus' narrative.

Plutarch on oracles and divine inspiration*

Stephan Schröder

1. Preliminary remarks

Presenting various attempts by the speakers in *De genio* to explain the *daimonion* of Socrates, Plutarch enters a field which he has dealt with repeatedly in his writings. As the main question is how Socrates came to receive inspirations from a higher sphere, we have to do with a special form of divination (*mantike*).

An interest in all forms of prophecy runs through all of Plutarch's oeuvre: wherever an occasion presents itself, in the *Lives* as well as in the *Moralia*, Plutarch loves to talk about such things wherever an opportunity offers. He also devotes whole treatises to these topics.

Of some of these, we know only the titles or small fragments. We owe them to a list of Plutarch's writings probably dating from Late Antiquity, the so-called Lamprias Catalogue, and to quotations in later authors. In one or two works Plutarch defends the compatibility of believing in divination with Academic philosophy (Lamprias Cat. 71 and 131, fr. 147 Sandbach), in another he discusses the question whether to know future events in advance is useful (fr. 21–23 Sandbach). Furthermore, he collected oracles (Lamprias Cat. 171) and wrote on the Oracle of Trophonius near Lebadeia (Lamprias Cat. 181), which plays an important role also in *De genio*. While these works are lost, we still have – besides *De genio* – the dialogues "The Pythia's prophecies" (*De Pythiae oraculis*) and "The decline of Oracles" (*De defectu oraculorum*).

Both these dialogues are given a Delphic setting and deal wholly or in part with questions concerning the Delphic Oracle in particular. Not only literary or philosophic and theoretical interests connected Plutarch with Delphi; for many years he held priestly office there.[1] In this function he appears on the base (found in Delphi) of a statue which the Amphictyons dedicated to the Emperor Hadrian (*Syll.*[3] 829A), and in his "Table Talk"

* Thanks are due to Fabian Brenner and Hendrik Obsieger for critical comments on the draft of this paper, and to Obsieger and Henning Schunk for helping me obtain the secondary literature.

[1] According to *Def. or.* 38.431C–D his brother Lamprias, who plays an important role in that dialogue, seems to have held a similar office at the Oracle of Trophonius at Lebadeia.

(7.2.2.700E) he calls one of the participants in the conversation "his colleague in priestly office". Finally, in his essay *An seni sit gerenda res publica* 17.792F he claims to have performed sacrifices in the service of Pythian Apollo and to have participated in processions and cultic dances already for "many Pythiads". Plutarch evidently rendered great services to Delphi: the Delphians (together with the citizens of his hometown Chaeronea) honoured him by setting up a herm, the head of which has unfortunately been lost, but its shaft (together with its verse inscription, *Syll.*[3] 843A) has been found in the excavations.

Let us now have a look at the two essays on oracles and then try to relate the ideas set out in *De genio* to them.

2. The dialogues on the oracles

Neither in *De Pythiae oraculis* nor in *De defectu oraculorum* does Plutarch expound systematically how oracles function, how the Delphic Oracle works, or how we should conceive the process of inspiration. Both dialogues, however, discuss questions of detail for which a more exact determination of how inspiration works is necessary.

2.1. *De Pythiae oraculis*

The main topic of discussion in *De Pythiae oraculis* is the 'scandal' that the Pythia's oracles were said to be no longer expressed in verse. This had been debated already long before Plutarch's time: In the essay itself (19.403E) the historian Theopompus of Chios (who lived in the fourth century BC) is said to have taken people to task who talked about the end of verse oracles (*FGrHist* 115 F 336). On the other hand Cicero in his work on divination (*De div.* 2.116) claims that already at the time of King Pyrrhus (i.e. in the early third century BC) the Pythia had no longer produced verses.

In the picture of the activities of the Delphic Oracle given by ancient literature sayings in verse (almost always in hexameters) play an important role. What share, however, they really had of the pronouncements made by the Pythiae of earlier times is quite unclear.[2] Plutarch himself has one of the participants of the debate express considerable reservations in this respect (ch. 19). In any case, for some people the claim that Delphi had passed from verse to prose was reason enough to reject further belief in the oracle, or more exactly, to question the institution's powers of inspiration at least for their own times.[3] This conclusion is formulated in 17.402B, only to be refuted in the core section of the treatise (which begins at this

[2] See Amandry 1950, 159–68.

[3] How such a conclusion may be reached, is shown by Cicero, *De div.* 2.117.

point) in a continuous speech by Theon, one of the dialogue's participants. I shall concentrate on this section of text (which extends until the end of the dialogue), because there is no space to discuss other parts (e.g. the dispute, in ch. 8, over miraculous phenomena in the god's sanctuary which might be interpreted mantically, or over the Sibyl's oracles in ch. 9–11) or even to give an overall account of the variety of the dialogue's contents.

Theon's arguments develop in four phases: In the first (ch. 18–20.404A) he doubts whether the difference between conditions of the present and those of the past is as fundamental as his opponents claim or at least assume. This, and especially the fact that verse and prose coexisted in the oracular sayings of earlier times, leads him to question the assumption that the form of these sayings entitles us to infer a change in the means by which they were produced.

In a second step (ch. 20.404A–ch. 23) Theon tries to make plausible the view that the form of the sayings goes back not to the god but only to the Pythia, is therefore independent of divine inspiration, and does not allow any conclusions about its nature.

According to Theon, we should conceive the Pythia's soul as an instrument in the hand of the god during the process of divination. The properties of the instrument, however (he claims), are no less important for determining the nature of the thing it produces than the intentions of its user. Now the human soul – and therefore the Pythia's as well – is perpetually disturbed by its connection with the body and by its own passions, and we have to conceive the state of mantic excitement (*enthousiasmos*) as a mixture of two motions, one of which originates with the god, the other with the Pythia. Thus we have to assume that when the Pythia in office is not poetically gifted, different oracles are produced from those which come from a real poetess occupying the tripod. Now people of earlier times had a tendency to express themselves poetically and took every opportunity to indulge this. This (Theon concludes) explains the earlier oracular sayings in verse; with this precondition gone it is now prose that is cultivated.

In ch. 24 Theon enters the third phase of his argument (to ch. 28). To meet the case that the sceptic may not be willing to accept his earlier train of thought, he changes his premise and starts anew: he now wants to show that even if one holds the god responsible for the form of the sayings (not previously assumed), the fatal conclusion that divine inspiration has dried up is not necessary; rather, a number of good reasons are conceivable that may have convinced the god himself to switch to prose.

In the times when metrically phrased und poetically stylised speech was the dominant fashion it was – according to Theon – obvious for the god too to take care that his oracles conformed to this practice. Later, however, when humanity had largely renounced verse and turned to prose, the god had to consider that prophecies in prose would appear more convinc-

ing than those in verse. Otherwise he would have incurred the reproach that he intended to cloak his predictions in the vagueness of poetical expression. Moreover, because some sayings had allegedly been versified afterwards by unauthorized people and forgers had fabricated particularly elaborate oracles, verse had acquired the bad reputation of something not really respectable. Furthermore, poetical form had acquired a bad name because of people who made their living by dealing in versified oracles in the vicinity of sanctuaries of oriental deities, and the god did not want to be associated with such rabble.

Thus (Theon continues) there were – from the god's perspective – good reasons to distance himself from verse. On the other hand, poetical form had something to say for it in earlier times. When powerful people put awkward questions to the oracle, it was sometimes necessary to obscure the answers a bit, in order to protect the staff of the sanctuary or to make sure that important communications would not get to the wrong people. Furthermore, with these communications being often very complex, versification could provide an important mnemotechnic advantage.

Lastly – and with this the third phase of Theon's argument concludes – it would now, under the conditions of *pax Romana*, when the oracle is consulted only in simple everyday matters, be downright offensive, if the Pythia's answers were too pretentiously stylised.

In his fourth and last step (ch. 29–30) Theon confesses – in case his opponent should still not be convinced – the impossibility of attaining certain knowledge in such matters, but he also points to clear and tangible evidence for the continuation of Apolline inspiration at the sanctuary: Delphi's enormous upturn in recent times. This is necessarily founded on the recognition the Pythia's mantic successes enjoy, and as the simple form of her oracular responses make it impossible to hide ignorance, the Pythia clearly still derives her knowledge from Apollo, just as before.

This is a very abbreviated account of Theon's discussion.[4] As we have seen, an analysis of the process of inspiration plays a part only in its second phase, and serves there as one argument among several in the attack directed against the sceptics. Nevertheless it seems best – in view of this paper's topic – to take a closer look at this aspect of the essay first.

Theon's account begins with a very generally and abstractly phrased reflection: The human body uses many instruments, but is itself an instrument of the soul, which, again, is an instrument of the god. The use of an instrument, however, prevents the user from giving unbiased expression to his intentions in the intended product, because the instrument itself exerts influence on this (21.404B–C). A series of analogies follow. Of these,

[4] A more detailed analysis is provided by Schröder 1990, 8–15 and 22–4. There the beginning of the argument's last phase is posited after ch. 27. This error is corrected in Schröder 1994/5, 240–2.

Theon regards as the most suitable the one according to which the moon can be conceived as an instrument reflecting the sun's light upon earth and conveying this light to us only in a very much dimmed form. If we take all this together (thus Theon makes his transition from the general to the particular in 404D–E) with Heraclitus' remark (*VS* 22 B 93) that the Delphic god neither speaks nor conceals but only signifies, it seems plausible to interpret also the Pythia in the sense of this saying as an instrument in the hand of the god: the god reveals his thoughts, but in blended form and by using a human soul. This soul is never available to him "without motion", but is always independently active because of its own passions. In 404F inspiration (indicated by the classic term *enthousiasmos*, also used in 7.397C) is therefore conceived as a blending of two "motions", one of which reaches the soul from outside, while the other is intrinsically her own by nature. Theon adds an *argumentum a minore ad maius* to make this explanation still more convincing: If you cannot use even an inanimate body differently from what its nature allows – i.e. you cannot move a cylinder like a sphere or a cone like a cube, and you cannot play a wind instrument like a string instrument and vice versa –, it is an even stricter rule that a soul can be handled only in accordance with its own intrinsic nature.

Where this leads, is indicated at the end of the chapter (404F–405A) only in a rather general way: of every soul you may expect only the kind of activity that corresponds to its talents and its education. Things become clearer in ch. 23: To express oneself poetically and in verse, one has to have inclination and talent, and only under such conditions will one put the thoughts transmitted by the god in mantic *enthousiasmos* in such a form. Now inclination and talent for poetical expression were widely current among people of earlier times, but between then and now they have vanished. Therefore one need not wonder that the Pythiae of old put their responses into verse every now and then, while the more recent ones have ceased to do so.

Theon's reasoning in this passage seems to be composed mainly of two elements found in the philosophical tradition:[5]

One of them is the idea that the body is an instrument of the soul. This is first stated in various passages in Plato, then in Aristotle's *Protrepticus* and in Neo-Pythagorean Hellenistic texts; in later times it is widely attested, especially in the Neo-Platonists. The *locus classicus* responsible for the spread of this idea seems to be a passage in the (Platonic or Pseudo-

[5] For this, see Schröder 1990, 25–51. Against the view that the core of the theory of inspiration presented by Theon is of Stoic origin, J. Holzhausen, "Zur Inspirationslehre Plutarchs in De Pythiae oraculis," *Philologus* 137 (1993) 72–91 has tried to establish a Platonic derivation. In Schröder 1994/5 I have tried to refute this. Baltes (in: H. Dörrie / M. Baltes, *Der Platonismus in der Antike*, vol. 6.2, Stuttgart 2002, 145–7) again puts emphasis on Platonic origins.

Platonic) *Greater Alcibiades* (128e–129e), the first text in which this idea is more extensively developed.

In *De Pyth. or.* the idea is expanded into a hierarchy with four levels: the god is placed above the soul, and the instrument (in the proper sense) below the body. This four-level construct is found only here, while in another passage of Plutarch, in the *Septem sapientium convivium* (21.163D–E), a combination of the three highest levels returns, with the relationship between body and instrument missing. There is a good reason for that: In the *Banquet of the Seven Sages* it is emphasized that the body is a willing instrument for the soul, and even more that the soul is a willing instrument for the god. In *De Pyth. or.* Theon intends to show the opposite: The soul is not least an obstacle, because its use diminishes the purity with which the god's thought is transmitted to humanity. To make this clear, Theon has to talk of the "instrument" in its everyday sense, and expects that the effects of change wrought by the instrument are accepted as a fundamental fact and extended to the other levels, especially the two higher ones, as well.

This is the decisive conceptual element of his whole theory but this theory does not come from the tradition of the idea of the instrument. In the *Greater Alcibiades* – to say nothing of the fact that the god as the highest level of Plutarch's model is missing – there is no talk of an influence hindering the intentions of the user. Rather, this text (quite in the spirit of the other Platonic references) stresses the problematic and unnatural aspects of the connection between body and soul, with the intention of reducing the role of the body to that of a mere instrument which does not really matter. This is also the tendency of almost all other passages in which similar ideas are expressed, while the idea in which Theon is interested is nowhere to be found.

The origin of this core idea must be looked for in another area. It surfaces in the passage where Theon mentions – as a simile for his view that the god's possibilities are restricted by the specific character of the Pythia's soul – the geometric bodies sphere, cylinder, cone, and cube, each of which can be moved only in its own specific way (21.404F). This simile has its origin in an argument by which the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus tried to preserve man's responsibility for his actions in spite of his deterministic view of the world. Chrysippus located the point at which the individual is affected by external circumstances in notions which approach the individual and to which he reacts either by "assent" or rejection; both assent and rejection are in man's power and not forced on him by external causes. Chrysippus compared this to the fact that cylinder and cone at first need an external impulse, but then move each in their specific way though having undergone the same impulse. This argument is attested by Cicero (*De fato* 42 f. = *SVF* II 974) and Gellius (*Noctes Atticae* 7.2.11 = *SVF* 1000). Sphere and cube are missing in these passages, but they appear together with cylinder

and cone – in a not unrelated context – in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *On the world* (6.398b27–9), which is known for its Stoic affiliations. Here, the four bodies appear in a comparison intended to show that the god provides one basic impulse, after which the various processes of the world run their course according to the nature of things (6.398b19–27). The connection of Theon's theory with such ideas is even clearer than in ch. 21 in a passage which has not yet been mentioned because it does not form a part of Theon's great speech, but belongs together with ch. 21, inasmuch as we are here confronted with a "foreshadowing" of that chapter: In ch. 7 (397B) Theon, wanting to exonerate the god from the intermittently dubious metrical and poetic quality of Delphic oracles in verse, states: "Let us not believe that the verses come from the god, but that he provides the first impulse for motion and that each of the prophetesses moves according to her own nature."

It is clear, then, that although the salient point of Theon's reasoning is already expressed when he first talks about the instrument, he could not find this point within the tradition of the idea of the instrument; it derives from the Stoic theory of causality and responsibility. The 'instrumentalist' phrases, with which Theon starts his argument, conceal this, and they are perhaps not indispensable, if we take into consideration only the aim of his argument. Plutarch, however, may possibly have attached some importance to giving Theon's explanations a Platonic colouring. We may also assume that he did not expect very much from openly drawing attention to his adaptation of a Chrysippan theory that had been much disputed within its original context. The idea that an instrument is not always fully compatible with the intentions of its user might have derived a certain convincingness from everyday experience. And lastly, the hierarchy of the triple user-instrument-connection offered the option of presenting the god as the one who – in spite of everything – is still the master of the mantic process, and this was Theon's overriding aim.[6]

To what extent is Theon's theory valid? And what does it claim to accomplish? It is wholly designed to prove that it is unnecessary to conclude (as Theon's opponents do) that the cessation of verse oracles means the disappearance of divine inspiration. Theon demonstrates that we can perfectly well regard the god as the source of inspiration and at the same time trace the form of the oracles back to the Pythia. It is for this purpose that Plutarch has developed this theory *ad hoc*. It neither asks nor answers the question how inspiration works, how the god's thoughts arrive in the

[6] It is only in this sense that the soul or the medium is called an "instrument" of a god elsewhere as well; see in Plutarch (besides *De gen. Socr.* 20.588F) also *De sollertia animalium* 22.975A, Philo, *Quis rerum divinarum heres* 259 (a passage which J. Holzhausen, "Von Gott besessen?", *RhM* 137 (1994) [53–65] 63 n. 52 connects with *De Pyth. or.*) and the passages in the Neo-Platonic Jamblichus collected in Schröder 1990, 41–2.

Pythia's soul, or what role the Delphic sanctuary plays.[7] Moreover, neither Theon nor Plutarch behaves like a dogmatist. What Theon presents is an hypothesis designed to make an attack against the traditional belief in the Delphic Oracle appear groundless. If the same aim can be reached by abandoning this hypothesis, Theon (and Plutarch, too) will be well content. Thus, at the beginning of ch. 24, Theon can change his premise without further ado and show that to infer a drying up of divine inspiration from the vanishing of verse oracles is not necessary even if we lay responsibility for the oracles' form at the god's door.[8]

The same attitude to this topic characerizes the treatise as a whole. Theon does not insist on the premise of the third phase of his argument (ch. 24–28) either, and at the beginning of ch. 29 he explicitly concedes that real knowledge of these things is unattainable. He then falls back on obvious points: the external splendour and recent upturn of the Pythian sanctuary, from which (he says) we may conclude that inspiration still persists. To be sure, Theon here argues – and this is different from the earlier phases of his reasoning – in the mode of positive proof, and from his perspective – and also from that of the group of people conversing on the steps of Apollo's temple – this is surely meant seriously, though we have to make some allowances for the rhetorical flourish with which Theon ends his lecture, presenting as convincing proof something which is no more than a mere hint. In the end, however, he still expects that many people may remain sceptical (ch. 30). And Plutarch himself may not have put too much trust in Theon's demonstration, because he, for one, could surely not deceive himself as to the political reasons for the happy development of the Delphic Oracle, which were quite independent of the Pythia's successes in prophecy.

The guiding principle and program of this whole inquiry seem to be formulated – right at its beginning – by Sarapion, the Stoic participant in this dialogue: "We must not want to enter into conflict with the god nor abolish providence and the divine together with prophecy, but we must look for solutions for the apparent obstacles and not abandon our pious and traditional faith" (18.402E). Only where no explanation can be found at all is doubt justified.

[7] Still, it is stated as something obvious that inspiration originates with the god (see e.g. *Amatorius* 16.758E; but while the *Amatorius* – following Plato – speaks of "divine madness", there is no trace of that in our treatise). In *De defectu oraculorum* this is temporarily lost sight of; see below, pp. 157–8.

[8] See Schröder 1990, 68–9.

2.2. *De defectu oraculorum*

We find a similar basic attitude also in *De defectu oraculorum*.[9] In many respects, however, this treatise is quite different. Once again, our examination must restrict itself to the sections relevant to our present topic.

In this dialogue too everything starts with a scandalous situation: most of the Greek oracles have suspended operation. This is, of course, not the case with Delphi, and the well-reputed and much consulted oracles in Asia Minor at Clarus and Didyma are never mentioned. In particular, however, in Plutarch's home region of Boeotia, which in classical times boasted an impressive number of sites for prophecy, only the Oracle of Trophonius at Lebadeia is still active (ch. 5).[10]

After this, the reader of the dialogue gets a remarkable demonstration how the dialogue's participants together grope their way looking for a religiously satisfying explanation for the stated situation. In this way, the treatise is laid out very differently from *De Pythiae oraculis* from the very beginning.[11]

The first attempt (not to be taken entirely seriously) to solve the problem is made by an outsider, Didymus Planetiades (who is characterized as a ranter) in ch. 7. Didymus claims that the questions presented to the oracle sanctuaries were of such shamefulness that Pronoia (the personification of divine providence for humanity) felt prompted to pack up its oracles and disappear with them out of the world. The other participants, however, regard this as blasphemy, and he finds himself bowed out of their circle.

Still, Didymus' hypothesis leads to a formulation of what makes the decline of so many oracle sanctuaries so scandalous: Prophecy is a gift of Pronoia, and one must not without good cause believe that the gods take something back which they once granted (7.413C). This is stated by Plutarch's brother Lamprias, who plays a main role in the dialogue and who is also the narrator. Lamprias entreats the others not to hold the divine responsible for this development.

With Ammonius's answer, the problem turns into a dilemma. He sees no way out in what Lamprias has just said. If the cause for the vanishing of the oracles is not to be sought in the divine, we are not very far from separating also their origin and existence from it, and that means – after what Lamprias has said – from Pronoia itself. This is intolerable. Ammonius himself proposes an explanation which is supposed to make direct divine intervention plausible without compromising divine perfec-

[9] Rich material is presented by A. Rescigno, Plutarco, *L´eclissi degli oracoli. Introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento* (Naples 1995).

[10] On the development of oracle sanctuaries from Hellenism to Late Antiquity see S. Levin, "The Old Greek Oracles in Decline," *ANRW* 2.18.2 (Berlin / New York 1989) 1599–1649.

[11] See Schröder 1990, 66–8.

tion. Pronoia (he argues) is always concerned to provide what is sufficient, nothing more, nothing less. However, as Greece has suffered a considerable decline in population since classical times, Pronoia has undertaken the obvious step of abolishing a large part of the oracles that were once needed but are now no more (ch. 8).

Lamprias, however, sticks to his conviction that the gods cannot be held responsible for such an action, and proposes to seek the reasons for it in this world and in the material and human aspects of the oracles' operation. At this point, however, he does not yet tell us how to get a closer view of this (ch. 9).

Yet another participant in the discussion, Cleombrotus, proposes a *via media*, arguing that we should look to the *daimones* for the causes. Without these mediators between gods and humans we would in any case either have to deny any contacts between the divine and human sphere, or to involve the divine inappropriately in the circumstances of this world. Therefore (Cleombrotus continues) we should assume that *daimones* operate the oracle sanctuaries as agents for the gods and that the death of such *daimones* is responsible for the silencing of oracles, and their removal to another place for the loss of prophetic power; in the latter case even the renaissance of a sanctuary is conceivable, in case the demon returns. With this proposition Cleombrotus concludes his speech (15.418C–D).

Ch.s 16–37 present a wide-ranging discussion of the question whether *daimones* may indeed be mortal and how we may imagine a change of place by them; this need not occupy us here. In ch. 38 the conversation returns to questions about prophecy in the proper sense. A theory (it is here said), according to which the drying up of oracles is connected with the vanishing of the associated *daimones*, can command respect only if it also explains by what mechanism the *daimones* (when present) cause the oracles to speak. Lamprias (who once more has the leading part here) and Ammonius agree that *daimones* are souls of the dead. If souls freed from their bodies have the ability to foresee the future, they cannot have acquired this ability (Lamprias argues) after their death, but must have had it always, though diminished by the union of soul and body. The process of prophecy (he continues) is tied to an irrational state, in which the soul is free from all bonds to the mind; this is *enthousiasmos* (cf. how the term is used *De Pyth. or.* 21.404F, and see above p. 151), and it can only occur if the body connected with the soul is put into an appropriate state, i.e. an appropriate "mixture". This happens often during sleep and immediately before death. It can, however, also be brought about by suitable exhalations of the earth. We can only speculate (Lamprias goes on) how these *anathymiaseis* operate exactly; but the assumption that such an exhalation (a *pneuma*) plays a role in the particular case of the Delphic Oracle, is supported by the legend of the accidental discovery of the prophetic power

of the place by the herdsman Coretas. We must believe that such exhalations dry up, spring up anew and change place, just like springs or mineral deposits. Meteorological or seismic events may also play a role. Finally, Lamprias underpins this theory by relating a single case pointing to such connections. In Boeotian Orchomenus the silence of the Oracle of Tiresias coincided with a pestilence (the assumption here seems to be that the epidemic had also been caused by exhalations of the earth, cf. 40.432D).

The crucial element (with regard to the original question) of this lecture by Lamprias (ch. 39–45), viz. the explanation of why the oracles dried up, does not at all require the *daimones* introduced by Cleombrotus. They only appear at the beginning (39.431D–432A, following 38.431B–C), where their characteristics provide the starting-point for considerations concerning the nature of the soul while it is connected with the body. After that they disappear from the argument, which is built solely upon the idea that a (normally dormant) prophetic ability within the soul of a living human being can be activated by natural causes immanent in this world.

It is just this which Ammonius reproaches Lamprias with in ch. 46, and he stresses once again (exactly in accordance with his position in ch. 8) that we have to assign a role also to the gods, especially to the Delphian Apollo.

Confronted with these objections, Lamprias (in the last speech of the dialogue, ch. 47–52) tries to bring his theory of *anathymiaseis* and *pneuma* into harmony both with the mediating role of the *daimones* and the originating role of the god. To the *daimones* as guards and overseers he attributes the task of controlling the composition of the *pneuma*, which provides the Pythia with her divinatory capability, just as one elicits sounds from a string instrument by means of a plectron. Above all reigns the god, who also indicates through signs during the sacrificial ritual preceding the consultation of the oracle whether this consultation is admissible. This, again, depends not only on the current composition of the *pneuma* but also on the question whether the Pythia's current constitution is right to be put into enthousiasmos by the *pneuma*. Finally Lamprias adds that the force of the pneuma is on the one hand "divine" but on the other – like all things between Earth and Moon – not imperishable.

Lamprias concludes in ch. 52 by exhorting all participants of the conversation to reflect further on these matters, adding that he knows very well that there are points which might provide the basis for arguing the contrary.

The engagement with the theory of inspiration in this treatise is somewhat different from that in *De Pythiae oraculis*. It is true that here too an effort is made to 'defuse' a problematic diagnosis by an explanation that leaves traditional religious notions untouched: on the one hand prophecy must not be separated from the gods, on the other the belief in their caring for this world must not be compromised by the assumption that they

would deprive humanity of the support of prophecy which they had once granted. *De Pythiae oraculis*, however, presents the claim that inspiration has dried up as based upon a certain (observed) situation; in *De defectu oraculorum* the end of inspiration is the situation itself. While therefore in *De Pythiae oraculis* Theon needs to do no more than explain why Delphi has passed from verse to prose in another way, in *De defectu oraculorum* the efforts at explanation quickly lead to positive statements about the divinatory process itself (which might be discussed quite apart from the actual problem considered here).[12] Among these statements is Ammonius' hypothesis (38. 431B–C) that the *daimones*, being nothing but souls freed from the connection with a body, could enter into contact with souls which are still within bodies and produce "representations of future things" in them, just as people in everyday life communicate some things without voice, by writing, by looks or by touch (some of this appears again in *De genio Socratis* 20.588D–E and 589B). In 39.431D–40.432D Lamprias assumes the divinatory force to be in the human soul itself and thinks that it must be activated by an exhalation of the earth and freed from control through the rational mind by introducing a suitable disposition in the body to which it belongs. In ch. 41 we even find conjectures about the physical effects the *pneuma* might have on the soul.

There remains, however, the question whether Plutarch himself can be shown to adhere to any of these ideas as a firm conviction or doctrine.

When Cleombrotus undertakes his attempt to explain the silencing of the oracles by the hypothesis that they have been deserted by the *daimones* looking after them, he declares that he is not the first to do so but comes "after many others" (15.418C). The fundamental ideas concerning the *daimones* in ch. 13–15 very probably derive from Xenocrates,[13] Plato's second successor as head of the Academy, who in the late 4th century integrated the thoughts which his master had uttered about the *daimones* as mediators between gods and men in the Diotima myth of the *Symposium* (202d–203a) in his conception of the world, turned them into dogma and thus prepared the way for the philosophic belief in *daimones*, which spread widely in subsequent times.[14] It would certainly be going to far to detect in the mention of the "many" in 15.418C a reference to Xenocrates.[15] Nevertheless it seems probable – in view of the Platonic model (in the *Symposium* the *daimones* are

[12] See Schröder 1990, 67–9.

[13] See Heinze 1892, 81–2. The number of relevant fragments is – in the now authoritative edition by Margherita Isnardi Parente (there fr. 213 and 222–30) – still the same as in Heinze. Almost all of them come from Plutarch, most of them from *De defectu oraculorum*.

[14] Of less influence was the roughly contemporary *Epinomis*, which has been transmitted as part of the Corpus Platonicum; its author develops the *Symposium* passage not unlike Xenocrates (984d–985b).

[15] Thus F. Jäger, *De oraculis quid veteres philosophi iudicaverint* (Diss. Rostock 1909, Borna 1910) 26. Surely Xenocrates had no reason yet to look for causes for the silencing of oracles.

responsible, inter alia, for prophecy) and of the idea of mediation between gods and men – that Xenocrates also attributed a role in divination to the *daimones*. In any case, this was no original thought in Plutarch's time: the Neo-Pythagoreans who according to Diogenes Laertius 8.32 held this belief belong at the latest in Hellenistic times, and Stobaeus claims that the Stoics defined divination as knowledge concerning the signs coming from gods or *daimones* (*Eclogae* 2.7.5b.12 p. 67,16–19 Wachsmuth; cf. Posidonius fr. 108 Edelstein / Kidd, where *daimones* in any case play a role concerning dreams).

The conviction, then, that *daimones* have responsibility for divination seems to have been fairly widespread. On the other hand, it cannot have been *communis opinio*. This is shown by the debate in Plutarch's treatise and by the way in which the unknown man from the Red Sea is presented (21.421B) as tracing divination back to *daimones*; and it does not look as if Plutarch himself was convinced of the importance of the *daimones* for divination, much less for the Delphic Oracle in particular.[16] Not (primarily) because there is nothing about this in *De Pyth. or.*: what is presented there might still be valid if we wanted to introduce a separate 'level' for *daimones* between the god and the Pythia. We would simply get a digression in Theon's argument, if he had chosen to speak of *daimones*.[17] In fact we find clear clues for Plutarch's reluctance also within *De defectu oraculorum*. Ammonius, who as Plutarch's teacher is always a very authoritative voice, wants from the start to look for the cause for the oracles' silence among the gods (ch. 8), and in 46.435A he clearly signals his unease with the 'demonological' explanation and its premises. Lamprias – in the speech in which he introduces the divinatory importance of exhalations of the earth – totally loses sight of the *daimones*, makes them superfluous (at least in view of the main question) by explaining the drying-up of an oracle as the result of meteorological and geological processes, and then – having been admonished by Ammonius – tries to integrate them, the god and the *pneuma* into a comprehensive conception, which causes him no little trouble. In this conception the role of the god – which, of course, especially in Delphi had to remain predominant – does not become very clear. The *daimones* are now allowed to regulate the *pneuma*, which, however, had been introduced in the first place to present a natural cause for the disappearance of the divinatory force. In the concluding words of the treatise Lamprias readily concedes that his construct can only be provisional and that grave difficulties result from it.[18] Cleombrotus – at the end of his speech –

[16] This is not contradicted by *De facie in orbe lunae* 30.944C: this passage belongs to a myth which has been conceived precisely under this premise, which is here regarded as worthy of consideration.

[17] See Schröder 1990, 69–70.

[18] D. Babut, "La composition des Dialogues Pythiques de Plutarque et le problème de

presents the application of demonology to the question raised at the beginning as something distinctly hazardous, and in ch. 16 a controversy erupts around certain aspects, which goes on until ch. 37 without leading to a result that is universally accepted. Not least Cleombrotus himself appears in a somewhat doubtful light. In 2.410A–B we learn that he is a wide-ranging traveller in far-away lands, collecting material there for a philosophy with theological orientation. Such a man will be particularly – indeed, excessively – susceptible to far-fetched lore about *daimones*.[19]

About the hypothetical character of the remarks on the *pneuma*, the main points have essentially been made. The treatise as a whole keeps a cautious distance from it, and this is all the more interesting, because what is said here overlaps with what may be called the vulgate conception (well attested since Cicero, *De div.* 1.38) of how at least the Delphic Oracle functioned.[20] It is often connected with the claim that there was a fissure in the earth from which the *pneuma* arose, which the Pythia approached, and above which she took her seat. Such an opening has not been found, and at least until some time ago there was agreement that the geological preconditions for such a fissure with real exhalations were lacking; this point has recently been debated again.[21] In any case the way in which Lamprias and the others speak about *pneuma* and *anathymiasis* demonstrates that one could speculate about this phenomenon as a material one but not palpably prove it.[22] The idea that a *pneuma* coming out of the earth was the decisive means of Delphic inspiration seems to have developed in an interplay (which we cannot now disentangle) of popular belief with philosophy and to have gained considerable influence. We may asssume that Plutarch, too, did not wholly escape from this influence. It is striking that in *De Pyth. or.* 17.402B, where the dangerous inference from the end of versification to the failure of inspiration is stated, this failure of inspiration is directly conceived as the disappearance of the *pneuma*, although the more detailed circumstances of this will not play any role in what follows. In any case Plutarch does not commit himself to the *pneuma* in *De defectu oraculorum*.

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leur unité," *Journal des Savants* 1992, 2, [187–234] 223 (= Babut 1994, [457–504] 493) possibly overrates the weight to be attributed to Lamprias' exposition in comparison with the other contributions to the discussion in this dialogue.

[19] Nevertheless Cleombrotus is taken quite seriously, as is shown – against earlier interpretations – by Babut 1994b. This paper also presents a well-considered and balanced general judgment on the importance of theory about *daimones* in *De defectu oraculorum*.

[20] For references see Amandry 1950, 215-30.

[21] Cf. Johnston 2008, 47–50.

[22] See Amandry 1950, 221–2.

3. *De genio Socratis*

Let us now consider *De genio Socratis*. As has been stated at the beginning, the problem of the Socratic *daimonion* is a very special case of divination. As far as people knew, Socrates was the only one ever to claim a connection with such a *daimonion*, and somehow he seemed to conceive it as something coming from outside.[23]

We shall see that Plutarch's handling of this phenomenon is not markedly different from the way in which he approaches problems of divination in the other two treatises discussed above. Let us have a closer look at the relevant chapters, their train of thought, and the connections between them.

The discussion starts in ch. 9 with the polemical reaction by Galaxidorus (who appears on the stage as a resolute rationalist) to the account (given in ch. 8) of the appearance of Theanor, who claims to have been instigated to his voyage to Thebes by "dreams and distinct apparitions", which admonished him to perform certain cultic acts at the tomb of Lysis. Theanor then spent the night at this tomb to find out whether τι ... δαιμόνιον ("something daemonic") would dissuade him from his intention to take Lysis' body home. In Galaxidorus' eyes, such recourse to enlightenment by the divine is no conduct worthy of a philosopher, who is obliged to justify his actions rationally. For Galaxidorus, a model of this is Socrates.

To this the seer Theocritus objects that Socrates always talked of his *daimonion*, which shows that Socrates, too, did not refuse to avail himself of help from divine inspiration (9.580B–end of ch. 10). With this, we are already in the middle of the main discussion.

Galaxidorus does not want to see Socratic rationality diminished, and to defend it he chooses to normalise it. The *daimonion* (he claims) was nothing special; on the contrary, Socrates used some form of everyday divination, and even this only if he could not reach a decision by rational means (11.580F–581A). Polymnis at first seems to confirm this assessment, relating how Terpsion ascribed a whole system of interpreting sneezes coming from others or from oneself to Socrates; after that, however, he raises the obvious objection that Socrates himself talked of the *daimonion* and not of sneezes, that a man of such firm resolutions would hardly have let himself be determined to do or not to do something just by a sneeze, and, finally, that the contents of his predictions were too important for such signs (11.581A–E). Phidolaus agrees and asks Simmias – who is not only the brightest mind in this circle, but also formerly enjoyed intimate fa-

[23] In Plato's *Apology* (40a) Socrates himself talks of divination, and Xenophon apologetically places the *daimonion* on the same level as everyday sorts of divination practiced by others (*Mem.* 1.1.2–9 and *Apol.* 12–3).

miliarity with Socrates – to refute Galaxidorus' claims. But before Simmias starts to speak, Galaxidorus justifies himself, presenting two arguments (12.581F–582B) to defend the variety of divination which he adduced. Firstly (he says), nothing militates against the assumption that great events are announced by trivial signs; this is often the case also in medicine and in observations of the weather by seamen. Secondly, we do not perceive the connections of such signs with future events, but this is no reason to reject their use. A third argument (12.582B–C) is to bring his hypothesis into harmony with what Socrates said about himself: when Socrates mentioned his "daimonion", he need not have meant more than that such signs are caused by the divine, which uses them like instruments to indicate things.[24]

One may get the impression that Galaxidorus has painted himself into a corner.[25] It was probably not his original intention to defend everyday divination, as he does in his first two arguments. His main interest surely was to show that no great importance should be attached to the *daimonion*. His third argument is downright dubious: it is really hard to believe that Socrates used a means of everyday divination and then always claimed this as his *daimonion*.[26]

Simmias' comment is for the time being postponed, because the circle now turns to other topics. At the beginning of ch. 17 Plutarch removes the narrator; when he returns at the end of ch. 19, we are told (20.588C) that he has missed Simmias' speech (which had been announced in 12.581E–F and 582C) against Galaxidorus' propositions. Simmias now is just beginning with affirmative statements of his own, setting out how he himself conceives the *daimonion*.

Thus the reader might think that the refutation of Galaxidorus' hypothesis is withheld from him and that something totally new and independent is now starting. This, however, is not the case: there is a close connection of thought between ch.s 9–12 on the one hand and Simmias' speech (20.588C–21.589F), as well as Timarchus' story presented by him (21.589F–23.592F) and Theanor's theory in ch. 24 on the other.

[24] There is only a superficial similarity of this passage with the "theory of the instrument" in *De Pythiae oraculis* (see above pp. 148–9).

[25] Cf. Corlu 1970, 51.

[26] This reasoning looks like a curious exaggeration of what Xenophon says in *Mem.* 1.1.3–4. Xenophon wants to defend Socrates against the accusation of having wanted to introduce "new gods" (δαιμόνια). For this purpose he compares the practice of Sokrates with the use of "technical" divination by others. These people (Xenophon says) surely believe that the signs they use derive from the gods, but talk of birds and other signs as sources for their predictions. Socrates, on the contrary, correctly spoke not of the sign but of the divine behind it. The "voice" on which Socrates relied is (differently from the parallel passage Xen. *Apol.* 12–3) not mentioned explicitly, which suits Xenophon's intention. He does, however, not go so far as to identify the *daimonion* with one of the known kinds of everyday divination; this is only done by Galaxidorus.

Galaxidorus has tried to fit the Socratic *daimonion* into what the theory of prophecy developed by the Stoics called "technical divination".[27] The forms of divination belonging to this domain are based on the interpretation of signs in a more or less rational way, something which everyone can learn.[28] Galaxidorus has objected to an explanation of the *daimonion* according to which Socrates claimed to have an irrational and privileged, even individual, access to divine knowledge. No doubt the seer Theocritus has such an explanation in mind, when he first introduces the *daimonion* into the conversation in 9.580B–10.580C.[29] He definitely thinks that Socrates practised what the Stoic system called "natural" divination.

The account given by Simmias in what follows is calculated in content and structure of the argument to show that an interpretation of the phenomenon within the frame of "natural" divination is perfectly possible and admissible, and that we will prefer such an interpretation in order not to accuse Socrates (whose modest discretion is brought out in 20.588C) of pretentiousness. With this, Galaxidorus is implicitly refuted. One of the major reasons why Plutarch made the direct confrontation between Galaxidorus and Simmias vanish in the "gap of the narrative", may have been that he did not want to diminish the effect of the following lines of reasoning.[30] It is also well-calculated that Galaxidorus' argument ends in 12.582B–C precisely with the dubious claim that Socrates could have spoken of the *daimonion* even if he actually followed sneezes. This remains a difficulty, and whoever wants to save – or rather: not lightly give up – the tradition about Socrates and his good reputation, needs to do nothing more than just to present an hypothesis which avoids this difficulty and at the same time explains Socrates' direct access to the divine and his privileged position.

Simmias' reasoning is structured in the following way:

First of all, he conjectures – in keeping with the attitude to divine revelations exhibited by Socrates in other contexts – that Socrates' experience of the *daimonion* may not have been totally different from that which we can make in dreams, when we believe we hear something, but in reality only receive the content of a thought without hearing a voice. While normal people can have such an experience only in their sleep – after their soul has been freed from the chaos of their everyday cares and passions and attained a state of peace –, one may believe that Socrates had such ex-

[27] For the division of divination in "technical" and "natural" divination see Fr. Pfeffer, *Studien zur Mantik in der Philosophie der Antike* (Meisenheim am Glan 1976) 57–9.

[28] By referring to Terpsion (11.581A) and by stating that Simmias and his friends "did not think highly" (21.589F) of the representatives of such an explanation of the *daimonion*, Plutarch creates the impression that this explanation was already current among the Socratics of the 4th century. There is no direct evidence for this.

[29] From the very start Galaxidorus suspects people who talk about direct contact to the divine of presumption; see 9.579F–580B.

[30] There is not much sense in speculating what Simmias could have said in this gap.

periences also when awake, because of his inner peace and self-command. Socrates' soul (Simmias continues) was accessible to impressions and able always to react to outer influences; such influences, however, we might think of as coming from a *daimon*, who would have been able to touch Socrates' mind with the mere content of a thought.

So far this is a mere hypothesis about the character of the Socratic *daimonion*, formulated as a cautious conjecture (20.588C–E). Now Simmias sets out to justify it as such.

He tries – without explicitly referring to Socrates – to demonstrate as plausible that a communication by such a sublime path is conceivable. To achieve this, he starts by devaluing communication by voice in comparison with the purely spiritual one which he has assumed. Taking over and accentuating a phrase from Plato's *Timaeus* (67b), he compares the sound of the voice to a "blow", by which the thought is somehow "beaten" into the soul via the ears. Humans need such rough means when they communicate with each other; a superior being, however, and a suitably structured soul do not need such a "blow". For them the mere touch by the thought is sufficient, and the soul willingly – and without any resistance induced by the passions – submits to the direction which is offered to it. This description derives its plausibility at first from basic assumptions made by Platonizing philosophy, but is then supported by a conclusion from the inanimate to the animate: if even big ships can be set on another course and then held to it by small tillers and if the potter's wheel can by virtue of its form be kept in regular motion by the tip of the finger, surely the soul can be set in motion by the mere touch of a thought. After all, the roots of passions and impulses reach into the seat of intellectual capability, and if this is disturbed, they, too, are presently set in motion.

When the impulses in turn stir the body in the end it is the thought within the soul which is responsible for the process. The details of how this happens may not be clear, but the fact that the soul is able to set those heavy masses in motion (Simmias goes on, again using an *argumentum a maiore ad minus*) entitles us to assert the possibility that the human spirit can be moved by a superior or more divine spirit or the thoughts of this spirit respectively.

Up to this point the claim seems justified that direct contact between a human intellect and that of a *daimon* working upon it from outside should be possible. The question now naturally arises in what way this might happen. This is, of course, no less impenetrable than the mechanisms which transform the thoughts of a mind into the motion of a body, and therefore Simmias' statements regarding this point (589B τῷ γὰρ ὄντι – 589D ἀνθρώπους καλοῦμεν) remain extraordinarily vague:

Simmias first says that the *daimones* "shine" into the souls, but this seems to be a mere metaphor to indicate that direct transmission of thoughts is superior to communication via the sounds of voices.[31]

After this Simmias introduces – with much reserve – the possibility that, like the voice, thoughts also can perhaps be transmitted through the air, the soul at rest in itself being, once again, superior in perceptive capacity to the normal soul.

This consideration, however, is not pursued further; rather, in 589D–E, Simmias, once more using the analogy of dreams in sleep which he had already used at the beginning of his speech, now formulates a *reductio ad absurdum* of the opposing position, and finally concludes with the argument that – as daemonic inspiration during sleep is accepted by most people – only someone who does not take account of the difference between the soul of Socrates and that of a normal human being can deny the possibility that Socrates received such inspiration also while being awake.

In summary, Simmias' argument is the following: Nothing militates against our regarding that which is transmitted as pure thoughts (not converted into sounds), just as they are believed by many to come to us out of a higher sphere while we are dreaming. This purely spiritual influencing of the human mind by a superior one may seem quite plausible, considering how the body, too, is steered by the thoughts of the human mind. The fact that it was just Socrates who received messages from the *daimonion* can be explained by the philosophical calm of his soul, which made him more susceptible to such purely mental contacts.

Simmias does not seek a comprehensive explanation of how the *daimonion* functions. His aim is more modest: to make it plausible to regard the *daimonion* of which Socrates used to talk, and which seemed to have an effect on his actions, as a phenomenon of direct inspiration and not necessarily – as Galaxidorus thinks – as an instance of simple 'technical' divination.[32] Furthermore Simmias gives reasons why it was Socrates who received such inspiration, while it is denied to others. One may regard Galaxidorus' scepticism as refuted, in view of the problematic consequences for the image of Socrates which would spring from it. In harmony with this is Simmias' remark (at the end of his argument, in 21.589F) that he and his friends in the Socratic circle had agreed on this account of the *daimonion* and rejected the idea that it might belong to 'technical' divination. The theory of *daimones* is not very important here, being only a premise and not the theme of Simmias' discourse.[33] The word *daimon* appears (it

[31] See Schröder 1990, 155

[32] To illustrate this one may contrast Simmias' argument, which is consciously set out as a hypothesis, with the dogmatic certainty of Calcidius and Hermias presenting similar ideas in the same context (see the translation of their texts in the Appendix, below pp. 202. 204–207).

[33] See Babut 1969, 432.

seems) only three times, otherwise Simmias uses the much vaguer *daimonion* or talks of "higher powers". 589B is the only passage which could not be phrased as it is (or in a very similar way) under the premise that inspiration comes from a god; here indeed the argument is founded on the relationship between the daemonic soul and the human soul, much as in *De def. or.* 38.431B–C.

After this reasoning, which Simmias presents on his own account and on that of friends belonging to the circle of Socrates,[34] he relates (in ch.s 21–23) Timarchus' report of what he experienced in the Oracle of Trophonius at Lebadeia, after which (in ch. 24) Theanor, the Pythagorean arrived from Southern Italy, also contributes to the discussion.[35]

The myth of Timarchus does not need to be covered here as a whole, as that will be done by W. Deuse (see below, pp. 173–5. 177–8. 181–83. 191. 194–7). I will restrict myself to what is said in it about the relationship between *daimon* and soul and about divination.

Every soul – so Timarchus is told in 22.591D–F – has its share of reason, but that part of it with which it gets involved with bodies and passions, is prone to degeneration. The degree of this degeneration is in each case different. In any case the remaining reasonable part hovers above the part that has become irrational (it is pointed out to Timarchus that looking more closely he may see the connections between the two parts) and tries to prevent its drowning and perishing. On closer inspection, the part hovering above is seen to be not an integral part of the respective human being, but outside of it, i.e. the *daimon* of the person concerned.

Timarchus goes on to report (591F–592C) that he saw these *daimones* going up and down like corks which have to keep a net in balance on the sea, some of them more than others. Some were also moving vehemently and erratically, and the explaining voice told him that those *daimones* who moved at ease and in a regular way had to control rather docile souls (or irrational parts of souls), while those moving jerkily had great difficulties in keeping under control souls whose lack of education made them recalcitrant and disobedient. It takes a considerable time (the explanation continues) to tame such souls and accustom them to obey the signals of their *daimon*. Other souls, however, have this inclination and ability from the beginning, and it is to these that humans gifted for divination belong. The explanations of the voice conclude in 592C–D with the story of Hermo-

[34] I cannot discuss possible sources here. There are good surveys of the proposals made and controversies raised in Lattanzi 1933, 44–9 and Corlu 1970, 56–60.

[35] On the relationship (which will be some importance in what follows) of these three contributions to the discussion to each other see D. Babut, "La doctrine démonologique dans le *De Genio Socratis* de Plutarque: cohérence et fonction," *L´information littéraire* 35 (1983) 201–5, and K. Döring, "Plutarch und das Daimonion des Sokrates", *Mnemosyne* 38 (1984) 376–92, with assessments that in part differ from each other and from what is argued above.

timus (whom Plutarch erroneously calls "Hermodorus") of Clazomenae, whose soul allegedly used to leave his body (like a shaman) and thus to acquire knowledge of things happening at great distances. This story has to be corrected inasmuch as to talk of a real separation of soul from body here is inadmissible; rather, the soul remained in the body, but kept its *daimon* on a long leash so that he could roam far and wide and have a lot of tales to tell.

Here, too, *daimones* play a role in the divinatory process, and again a calm willingness to be guided, undisturbed by passions, is a prerequisite for inspiration by the *daimon*. Thus far Simmias' considerations and Timarchus' vision go together. There are, however, also important differences. In Simmias' theory there is not a word about a stable and continuous connection of Socrates with one particular *daimon*; moreover Simmias assumed that the inspiring *daimon* was outside Socrates' soul and person, while the myth of Timarchus presents it (in one aspect at least) as an ingredient of the individual soul.

Let us now turn to the Pythagorean Theanor. It is the aim of his speech to underpin the hypothesis that certain individuals have privileged access to divine inspiration, taking account of the fact that the gods grant their special favour to the best of humans. This idea is then connected with the (Pythagorean) doctrine of metempsychosis, which already played a part in the myth of Timarchus (22.591C). *Daimones* (Theanor says) are souls which have passed through the whole cycle of rebirths and become free. These souls feel sympathy with others who have not yet attained the same goal but are very near to it. The souls who have made progress but are still incarnate and still have to make the last steps, are supported by the *daimones* in question with the permission of the god.

Again we find common ground with the other two sections of the text, but also differences. In harmony with the myth of Timarchus – but without a corresponding idea in Simmias' speech – Theanor assumes a firm connection between the individual soul and the *daimon* inspiring it, following the popular conception of an individual protecting *daimon*.[36] Like Simmias, but unlike the revelation of Timarchus he resolutely separates the *daimon* from the inspired soul. The prominence of Pythagorean metempsychosis is new: in the myth of Timarchus it is not explicitly connected with the problem of divination, and in Simmias' speech it plays no role at all.

Theanor, however, certainly does not want to correct Simmias. His speech begins with an expression of total agreement with what Simmias has said in his own name. Theanor's contribution once more tries to come to grips with the point that most fuels the doubts of sceptics like Galaxidorus: why is Socrates allowed to have experiences which are denied to others? Such a claim – expressed by Socrates himself – was the main stim-

[36] Cf. Babut 1969, 431–4.

ulus for Galaxidorus' polemics, and Simmias, too, tried to deal with it at the end. Theanor's words are suited to confirm Simmias' reasoning insofar as they lend plausibility to the idea that an excellent and philosophically purified soul has privileged access to divine knowledge transmitted by a *daimon*. Still, the thrust of Theanor's thoughts is different: it is concerned with religion and morals, not (as Simmias) with physics and psychology. The main aspects of Simmias' discourse play no part in Theanor's considerations, the ideas most stressed by Theanor are not present in Simmias' reasoning, and both speakers reach their goal – to explain the special status of Socrates – by different ways. On the other hand we may not say that Simmias' arguments would become wholly invalid, if Theanor were right. Most of what Simmias has said might even be used to develop Theanor's theory further. Admittedly the remarks of ch. 20 are based on the assumption that the *daimones*' messages are in principle directed at everyone, provided his soul fulfils the relevant requirements.[37] Still, the differences in receptivity might find a place within the frame of Theanor's considerations, if one wanted to inquire into the ways and means of transmission, which he has not got in view at all. The other point concerning which difficulties might arise is the divinatory dream, which for Simmias represents a commonly shared experience of daemonic messages and is therefore of great importance for his argument. Theanor tells us nothing about a 'basic provision' of dreams provided by *daimones* to all or most humans; to do this would surely endanger the logical consistency of his speech. The difference, however, between a divinatory dream and the kind of favour granted to Socrates by the *daimones* is surely so great that there is no real incompatibility in this respect between the positions of Simmias and Theanor.[38]

The case is similar with the revelation reported by Timarchus. It is introduced by Simmias in 21.589F and concluded in 23.592F in such a way as to suggest the impression that he feels confirmed by it. He may indeed well be, because the myth supports the assumption that a few calm souls freed from body and passions have access to superhuman knowledge. Intimately connected with this is an explanation how this superior knowledge comes into being. Differences of detail need not bother Simmias, (i) because the myth's conception of *daimones* suggests an interpretation of the *daimonion* which in itself would be quite adequate to make Galaxidorus' interpretation of the *daimonion* unnecessary, and (ii) because Timarchus' account has the form of a Platonic myth and not a systematic philosophical demonstration. And to overcome his residual doubts, Simmias indeed accepts Theocritus' helpful observation (in 21.589F) that also the 'mythical' may at least partially lead to the truth. Theanor, for one, sets Timarchus'

[37] Thus Hirzel 1895, II 160 n. 0 (starting as note 2 on p. 158).

[38] The limited importance of the discrepancies is stressed also by Lattanzi 1933, 66–7 and Corlu 1970, 81.

report aside as not criticisable (24.593A), but agrees with him in the one main aspect: that of a continuous connection of at least some human beings with a *daimon*.

4. Conclusion

Let us, in conclusion, compare the dialogue about Socrates' *daimonion* with the two treatises on oracles.

When Simmias tries to show the superfluity of an hypothesis that might lead to dangerous consequences, his procedure is not unlike that of the debaters in *De defectu oraculorum* and especially that of Theon in *De Pythiae oraculis*. The respect for Socrates and his testimony about himself – transmitted in different ways by Plato and Xenophon and vouched for by Simmias in this dialogue situation from his own experience – plays a role similar to that of the respect for traditional religious ideas in the other two treatises. The myth stands by itself. Theanor's speech introduces a dogmatic element: his contribution to the discussion is phrased more confidently and argues less cautiously than Simmias'. Theanor regards metempsychosis as incontrovertible fact, and he does not show much doubt regarding the combination of this doctrine with the idea of the *daimones* which he presents. From the beginning, however, Theanor is characterized as a particularly orthodox Pythagorean (cf. also ch. 16) and subscribes to a theory which the reader may regard as strongly coloured by his spiritual upbringing. Moreover, when he has spoken the conversation is broken off. As the scope of his explanations is limited as compared to those of Simmias (Theanor just supplements Simmias' arguments from his own special perspective), we may take this breaking-off as meaning that nobody gets the opportunity to raise critical questions. There is no reason to think that Plutarch meant Theanor's words to be the last word in this matter, even though he may have harboured much sympathy (though perhaps not as much as Simmias) for metempsychosis.

The notion of the *daimones* and their importance for divinatory processes, which is introduced in so roundabout a way in *De def. or.* and meant to provide a starting point for the solution of the problem discussed there, is a simple premise in Simmias' considerations and does not have any great significance for his argument. There is no talk of a mediating role of *daimones* here, nor would it have looked very convincing in connection with the theme under discussion.[39] Explicit theories and beliefs about *daimones* are contained in Timarchus' report, but here there are also many other things which do not fit easily with Simmias' speech, while Theanor

[39] For a similar reason also the term *enthousiasmos*, which appears in both treatises on oracles, is missing in *De genio Socratis*.

just puts the myth on one side. In his speech, however, the *daimones* are really needed: the explanation of Socrates' privileged position given in it is actually based on a specific connection of the doctrine of *daimones* and metempsychosis.

However, considering what we have said about the validity of Theanor's statements this can hardly be the real reason why *daimones* are taken account of in our dialogue. Soon after Plutarch's time other treatises were written about the *daimonion*: Maximus of Tyrus treated the topic in his discourses 8 and 9, Apuleius of Madaura wrote a whole book *De deo Socratis*. Both authors interpret the *daimonion* by connecting it with theories about *daimones*. We may therefore assume that this view of the phenomenon was widespread already in Plutarch's time, even though evidence is lacking.

There is not much that would indicate a firm opinion of Plutarch regarding belief in *daimones*. The belief plays a role in a considerable number of his writings which cannot be discussed here, but in them, too, observations can be made that are similar to those we have made here. Moreover, the various passages exhibit considerable factual differences. It is nowadays *communis opinio* that Plutarch was indeed much interested in belief in and theories about *daimones*, but that he did not go beyond considering – in various contexts – the existence and importance of such intermediate beings as a possibility.[40]

We can therefore hardly claim that Plutarch presented either a theory about the role of *daimones* in the process of inspiration of which he was convinced himself, or a system of doctrines on divination or inspiration in general. What we are dealing with in his case, is on the one hand a firm belief in divination as it had always been practised and in the providence of a god shown by it, and on the other a determination to defend this belief against attacks as well as possible by presenting hypothetically plausible arguments. From the thoughts expressed in the several discussions he keeps a distance that is well suited to his loyalty to the basic Sceptic tendency of the Platonic School. With this goes a cautious modesty and wary restraint in his judgment about things divine, and an aversion to attempts to confront traditional beliefs with all-too-astute criticisms (cf. *De Pyth. or.* 18.402E; *De def. or.* 47.435E; *De sera numinis vindicta* 4.549E–550A; *Amatorius* 13.756A–B).[41] It fits well with this that in *De genio Socratis* he wishes to protect Socrates against interpretations like that of Galaxidorus, and to free him from the suspicion of being pretentious.

[40] The most important presentation of the opposing view is made by Soury 1942; cf. also the judgment by Babut 1969, 435–6. Against this, see D. A. Russell, *Plutarch* (London 1973) 75–8; Dillon 1996, 216–24; Brenk 1986, 2117–30. See also (once more) Babut 1994b.

[41] Cf. J. Opsomer, "Divination and Academic 'Scepticism' according to Plutarch," in: Van der Stockt 1996, 165–94. On Plutarch's basic religious attitude see also Babut 1969, 504–27.

Plutarch's eschatological myths

Werner Deuse

1. Preliminary remarks

In Plutarch's eschatological myths the reader will discover himself as a player in a universal drama of guilt and atonement, success and failure, in which his future – which, as he discovers, was also his past – is significantly revealed (before a truly cosmic background) as something now brilliantly bright, now threateningly dark. This drama is a *Tua res agitur*, transposed from the earthly present into the temporal and spatial dimensions of the cosmos, from which the reader can hardly escape.

Of the three myths which will be discussed here,[1] two (in *De sera* und in *De facie*) are integrated into the course of the presentation, so that they form the grand final act of a series of arguments, which are developed in lively discussion. Many times announced and full of powerful mythical imagery, they transcend the preceding logos, and the reader has the task of interpreting both the myth by means of the logos (as rational argument) and the logos by means of the myth; for Plutarch declines to be a guide and interpreter, as the concluding words of *De facie* show (945D): After its myth (μῦθος)[2] has been told by Sulla as the tale (λόγος) of a stranger, Sulla remarks: "You and your companions, Lamprias, may make what you will of the tale (λόγος)."[3] In *De sera* Plutarch even teases the reader with the deceptive hope that he will be enlightened: The dialogue ends with the myth itself, without further comment on it; but shortly before the myth is told Olympichus remarks (563B, after Plutarch, who is one of the participants, has ended his argument): "We do not applaud, lest you imagine we are letting you off from the myth (μῦθος), on the ground that your argument suffices to prove your case. No; we shall pass judgement only when we have heard that further recital." The judgement of the participants, however, we never learn, so that a hint by Plutarch is lacking here as well. In both cases the myth is neither a mere extra nor just a poetic game which

[1] They are treated in monographs by Beck 1953 and Vernière 1977.

[2] 920B; 940F as translated by H. Görgemanns, *Plutarch, Das Mondgesicht* (Zürich 1968) 63: "meinen [i.e. Sulla's] Mythos"; differently Görgemanns 1970, 53.

[3] For *De sera*, the English quotations are taken from Einarson / De Lacy 1959, for *De facie* from Cherniss 1957, and for *De genio* from that of Donald Russell in this volume.

might allow us to neglect the significance of the myth for the whole work or even not to take it seriously; on the contrary, the reader is called upon to do for himself what was expected of the participants of both dialogues: to continue the discussion and to do this now in the light of the myth.

In *De genio*, on the contrary, the myth is situated in the middle of the dialogue and apparently has – at first sight – hardly a real connection with its general theme, i.e. the narrative of the liberation of Thebes; but it does have a function within the discussion about the *daimonion* of Socrates. Here, too, we may observe that much weight is ascribed to the myth, but that an interpretation of it in the light of the preceding discussion fails to take place and must again be supplied by the reader. Thus the Pythagorean Theanor, when called upon to express his opinion, does not comment upon the myth itself (which he calls λόγος) at all, but simply states (593A): "My opinion [...] is that Timarchus' account (λόγος) should be dedicated to the god, as sacred and inviolable" – a judgement that does not permit us to call individual assertions of the myth into question or examine them critically.

As we have seen, the myth, being a report or narrative, can also be called 'logos', so that we might assume that it may not be easy to make a distinction between myth and logos (the latter weighs arguments against each other and is subject to rational demonstration, as well as being severely critical of all assertions which cannot be verified empirically), especially as in our three myths—apart from the sublime and dramatic cosmic experiences, the geography of the Beyond, and the *daimones* as guides therein—the structure of the Beyond, and dynamic of its processes are given a thoroughly rational basis. The closeness of myth to logos, however, does not invalidate the differences, and this becomes particularly clear, when the participants of the dialogues consider whether the myth might in fact be understood as a logos. Compare Simmias' words in *De genio* 589F: "As for the account of this which we heard from Timarchus of Chaeronea, it is <more like> myth than rational argument (λόγοις), and perhaps it is best left unsaid", to which Theocritus answers: "Not at all, tell us about it. Myth too does touch on truth, even if not very precisely." Similarly Plutarch (as speaker in the dialogue) remarks in *De sera* 561B: "that [...] is shown by an account (λόγος) I recently heard; but I fear you would take it for a myth. I confine myself accordingly to probabilities (τῷ εἰκότι)", to which Olympichus responds: "By no means do so, but let us have it too", after which Plutarch proposes: "First let me complete my account (λόγος) of the probabilities; later, if you decide, let us venture upon the myth – if myth it is." As the participants of the dialogues vacillate, they make it clear that the dignity of *logos* may indeed be ascribed to the myth, but that the myth's approach to knowledge (to 'truth') is apparently so different and of

such a special kind that the speaker who is going to relate the myth at first hesitates to tell it or even does not want to tell it at all.[4]

Thus we may say that Plutarch so shapes the myths that they can and should be interpreted. The myths do not primarily spring from an urge for artistic creation, and they are not simply a compositional means for the aesthetic play of the author's imagination. Of course, they also serve to 'cite' a tradition of literary style deriving from Plato and to satisfy the demands of a sophisticated technique of dialogue, but this should not be taken as the decisive reason why Plutarch introduces myths into his writings.

Summarily – and rather provisionally – we can describe the inner relationship between each of the three myths and the argumentative parts of the three dialogues as follows.

(1) *De facie*: Important topics of the 'scientific' part – like the moon's earthly nature, its size and motion, the earth's shadow and the moon's eclipse, the explanation of the moon's surface (the "face of the moon") – are again taken up in the myth, individual hypotheses and explanations are accepted, rejected, extended or interpreted afresh. At the end of the 'scientific' part (940C–F) some arguments for the habitability of the moon are presented, thus providing a 'bridge' to the conception of the moon as the place of the souls in the myth.

(2) *De genio*: Simmias' attempt to explain the *daimonion* of Socrates as a phenomenon of direct contact between the *nous* of a *daimon* with the *nous* of Socrates corresponds with the defining role that the freedom of the *nous* from soul and body and the definition of the *nous* as *daimon* have in the myth.

(3) *De sera*: The participants of this dialogue discuss the question why God allows wrongdoers to suffer just punishment for their deeds only very late and often not at all during their lifetime. The starting-point of this discussion is an Epicurean's attack against divine providence (at the beginning of the work, 548C): divine agency seems sufficiently refuted by the fact that punishments are delayed. In the further course of the argument Plutarch (as one of the participants of the dialogue) ventures the hypothesis that the concept of divine providence must be combined with the idea that the soul continues to exist after man's death, 560F: "It is one and the same argument, then, [...] that establishes both the providence of God and the survival of the human soul, and it is impossible to upset the one contention and let the other stand." This paves the way to the myth: divine justice is made complete by the punishment of the souls of wrongdoers in the Beyond, and the doctrine of the soul, on which the myth is based, is itself founded on the continuing existence of the soul as laid out in the 'scientific' part.

[4] On Plutarch's myths see Ferrari 1995, 173–5; Hirsch-Luipold 2002, 138–44, esp. 143; Eisele 2003, 336–9, Feldmeier 2003, 325–7.

In the myths we thus (re-)encounter the topics of the dialogues' arguments in the guise of imaginative narrative. The story, however, that is the core of the myth needs corroboration; for when the myth is introduced in order to gain a wider perspective of understanding, it becomes necessary to give a convincing justification of the particular advantage of this perspective as against the procedure by rational argument. This purpose is served by the introduction of informants who tell the story from their own immediate experience. These guarantors, however, are never identical with those who relate the myth to the other participants of the dialogue – a strategy of the author, which on the one hand guarantees the credibility of the story and on the other relieves him from having to take responsibility for details, especially for those arising from the free play of imagination and the delight in experimenting with ideas.

In *De sera* and *De facie* we even get a third person between the author and the narrator of the myth functioning as its transmitter. In *De sera* Thespesius (also called Aridaeus) is introduced as a relative and friend of Protogenes, a well-known acquaintance of the participants of the dialogue; Thespesius told him and other friends what he had seen in the Beyond, after everybody could see that some quite extraordinary experience had to be the cause for the radical change in his way of life, from a reckless rogue to a good and pious man. So, the story came to Plutarch through Protogenes, and Plutarch relates it to the other participants of the dialogue.

In *De genio*, too, the author of the myth is – according to the fiction of the dialogue – a historical person, who was closely connected to Socrates and his circle: Timarchus, a friend of Socrates' son Lamprocles. Timarchus descends into the Oracle of Trophonius to learn something about the *daimonion* of Socrates, and he then relates to Simmias and others what he has experienced during his removal into the world beyond, and Simmias tells his story in *De genio*. Thespesius and Timarchus both report what happened to them, and Plutarch leaves no doubt that these men are to regarded as reliable and trustworthy witnesses: the death which was prophesied to Timarchus during this vision has already happened, as Simmias remarks, and of Thespesius' surprising change of character we have already heard.

The myth related by Sulla in *De facie* has its origin with a widely-travelled stranger, who is highly educated in philosophy and natural sciences; this stranger, however, does not draw on an immediate and personal experience of the Beyond as the two authors of the other myths do, but reports what the *daimones* dwelling on the Isle of Kronos (to the west of Britain) have taught him about the moon, when he stayed on this island for thirty years. Later on the myth will make it clear that the *daimones* belong to the moon and thence come down to earth to fulfil important tasks. It is just such *daimones* that the stranger must have encountered on the Isle of Kronos, which is described as an earthly paradise; there they look after Kronos,

who sleeps in a deep cave, this sleep being the fetters that Zeus has ordained for him. These informants are, of course, even more to be believed than human beings; Plutarch seems here to have succeeded in strengthening the grounds for credibility. For the same reason he makes Sulla stress once more (at the very end of his tale) that the stranger has learned all this from the servants of Kronos (945D): "[...] and he had the account, as he said himself, from the chamberlains and servitors of Kronos." This proof, of course, rests wholly on the trustworthiness of the stranger. Does not his report of the journey to the Isle of Kronos look all too much like the fantastic tales of travel romances? The Carthaginian Sulla, however – who in a long preliminary remark (which serves as the introduction to the myth) portrays the stranger's travels and his astonishing thirst for knowledge – can point out that the stranger came to Carthage, because Kronos enjoys high honours there,[5] and here he discovered holy books which had long remained hidden. Who would refuse to believe such an extraordinary man? Still, some doubts remain. How trustworthy is Sulla (who is perhaps too partial regarding his native Carthage), and how are we to check whether the stranger has really lived on the Isle of Kronos, especially as apparently other travellers,[6] too, have heard of its existence? Compared with that, both the fall of Thespesius and Timarchus' visit in the famous oracular cave – each being the prerequisite of their souls' journeys – acquire a very different degree of credibility: everything in these prerequisites is verifiable and very well attested; even Socrates himself would very much have liked to hear Timarchus' report from himself and to have asked him questions, if only he had learnt about it soon enough (592F).

In what follows we will – always starting with *De genio* – discuss topics that play a part in all three myths. Our synopsis of them will bring out with increasing clarity both common traits and differences, and it will finally help us to answer the question whether Plutarch's myths are based on a uniform and internally consistent conception of the Beyond and of the eschatological conditions of the soul or whether the peculiarities and aims of each work had priority over his wish to stress the unity of his concept.

[5] Emperius' textual supplement ⟨τοῦ Κρόνου τιμάς⟩ 942C is fairly certain; cf. Cherniss 1957, 191 n. b.

[6] The motif of the sleeping Kronos surrounded by *daimones* on an island west of Britain is also found in *De defectu oraculorum* 419E–420A. There Demetrius of Tarsus (apparently a historical figure, cf. Ziegler 1964, 36) talks of the Isle of Kronos in connection with a journey to these islands on an imperial mission. There have been (rather unconvincing) attempts to identify this Demetrius with the "stranger"; see Vernière 1977, 102–3 and von Arnim 1921, 42–4.

2. Travelling into the Beyond and eschatological topography

In *De genio* and *De sera* humans hovering between life and death venture into the world beyond: they are presumed dead (either because of a dangerous fall, as in Thespesius' case in *De sera*, or because, as in Timarchus' case in *De genio*, a return out of the oracular cave is no longer expected), but they are still alive, with their bonds to their bodies preserved, though they have left the earth. In *De facie* no being crosses the frontier between life and death, and a direct experience of separation from the body is not part of the story.

In Timarchus' case external agency leads to the separation of soul and body: a blow on the head, accompanied by a loud noise, causes the sutures of the skull to open and release the soul (ψυχή). Thespesius falls on his neck so unfortunately that his consciousness (his organ of thinking, τὸ φρονοῦν, 563E) jumps out of his body, and he experiences a plunge into the deep like a helmsman thrown off his ship;[7] soon afterwards he is lifted up a bit and feels as though he was breathing freely throughout his whole being – Timarchus experiences the same[8] –, and then his gaze reaches everywhere, as if his soul (ψυχή, 563E) had opened like a single eye. Timarchus' experience is different: he hears something before he looks up, and he looks up, because he hears a pleasant whirring above his head. As Timarchus (when looking up) can no more see the earth but only shining islands, so Thespesius sees nothing of what was before but only the stars in their mighty size. Not only is their beam of light brilliantly coloured, but it also possesses vigorous energy (τόνος), so that Thespesius' soul, using this light as a vehicle, can move easily and quickly in every direction. Thespesius sees very much more, of which he does not tell us; he may have seen the sea of stars with its islands, coasts and mouths of fiery rivers, which Timarchus describes in detail.

Timarchus reports that his soul – immediately after leaving the body, but before breathing its sigh of relief and relaxing while extending – blends with clear and pure air (πρὸς ἀέρα διαυγῆ καὶ καθαρόν, 590BC). This phase is not related by Thespesius, who at once proceeds from breathing to watching, but he, too, mentions the realm of air. However, it is not he that is affected by it, but the souls of the dying ascending from below, whom he observes undergoing the following change (563F/564A): they form a fire-like bubble, while the air divides (i.e. while the air makes room for the ascending souls[9]), then the bubble bursts and the soul in the form of a

[7] On this, see note a by Einarson / De Lacy 1959, 272.

[8] *De sera* 563E: ἔδοξεν ἀναπνεῖν ("was breathing") ὅλος, *De genio* 590C ἀναπνεῦσαι ("to relax") τότε δοκεῖν, and what follows in *De genio* ("and become bigger than before, like a sail being unfurled") looks like a commentary on the word ὅλος in *De sera*.

[9] "They made a flamelike bubble as the air was displaced (ἐξισταμένου τοῦ ἀέρος), and

human comes out of it. We may therefore say with certainty that for the souls – after they have left their body and the earth – the realm of air is the first stopping-place on their way. This is confirmed by *De facie* 943C, where every soul has to stay in the space between earth and moon for a certain time, the good ones "in the gentlest part of the air, which they call 'the meads of Hades'".[10] The realm of air itself is apparently divided into several regions: where the air is "gentlest", the uppermost layer (so we may assume) is reached, and this serves for cleansing the good souls from remains of corporeal contacts. Probably this layer is also alluded to in *De sera*, where two groups are distinguished among the ascending souls according to their motions (564A): on the one hand those moving aimlessly to and fro, on the other hand those moving straight up and probably identical with those who seem cheerful to Thespesius, being situated ἐν ἄκρῳ[11] τοῦ περιέχοντος (564B), and so at the highest point of the space encompassing the souls, i.e. of the realm of air.

Where exactly, however, are the observers Timarchus and Thespesius? First of all, there is a remarkable difference between them: Timarchus does not change his location; he may look more closely at things, but nowhere is it said that he moves to another place in the Beyond. It is different with Thespesius: Already at the beginning it is said that the starlight allows his soul to move quickly and easily in every direction (563F). Thus his relative – acting as knowledgeable cicerone of the Beyond – leads him on beams of light like wings across a vast distance to a deep abyss, the Place of Lethe (565E–566A), then across another distance just as vast to another deep abyss into which mighty streams plunge as into a mixing bowl (566A–C). And still he remains in motion: an attempt to get nearer to the Oracle of Apollo fails, continuing on his way he listens to the Sibyl and is finally driven in the opposite direction by the momentum of the moon (566D–E). His next stop is the site of horrendous punishments, which he

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then, as the bubble gently burst, came forth, human in form, but slight in bulk, [...]." Feldmeier 2003, 115 translates: "wenn die Luft entwich" and comments (378, n. 3 on ch. 23): "Im irdischen Leben war der Seele offenbar Luft beigemischt." This, however, is contradicted by the meaning of ἐξίσταμαι and the fact that the souls first have to cross the realm of air. During this crossing the souls form the airy bubble as a fiery envelope, i.e. they clothe themselves in particles of air when touching the air, which divides before them (see also Einarson / De Lacy 1959, 273 n. e). When Timarchus speaks of his soul as blending with the clear (translucent, διαυγής) air, this might be a preliminary stage to or a variant of the forming of the flame- or firelike 'soul-bubble'.

[10] ἐν τῷ πραοτάτῳ τοῦ ἀέρος, ὃν λειμῶνας Ἅιδου καλοῦσι. On λειμών see Cherniss 1957, 201 n. c.

[11] The majority of the manuscripts transmit κάρῳ, from which no sense can be gained and which in Ambrosianus 859 is corrected to ἄκρῳ; τῷ (Pohlenz) καθαρῷ is read by Paton (citing the above-mentioned passage from *De genio*, 590BC: πρὸς ἀέρα … καθαρόν) and Einarson / De Lacy 1959. If we choose Paton's conjecture, there are also different layers, i.e. of differing purity; should we, in this case, not expect a comparative or superlative?

has to pass through. Even the end of the tale is characterized by change of places: Thespesius wants to turn round, but is forbidden to do so; suddenly he finds himself again in his body, the change from the other world into this being complete (568A).

The series of stops on this way through the Beyond may be interpreted as follows: (1) Thespesius is at first where the souls arrive straight after death; there he encounters not only the souls of the dying,[12] but also those whose death happened some time ago, like the soul of his guide through the Beyond.[13] (2) Then his relative takes him to the Place of Lethe, an abyss near which Thespesius' soul and the other souls are abandoned by the carrying force of the light. The souls move down towards the abyss and – not daring to fly across it – just circle it. We may assume that these other souls[14] correspond to those souls (or at least to some of them) whom Thespesius has observed during and after their ascent, although this is not said explicitly. Now the abyss of Lethe is not a dark and dreadful gorge, but a place of Dionysiac joys,[15] a paradise full of flowers, scents, laughter, play and pleasure. It therefore exerts tremendous attraction, seducing the soul to remember its existence within the body and thus enticing it to yearn for the world of becoming. This abyss, then, is an intermediate stop for the souls on their way back to earth, but for Dionysus (and later Semele as well) it was the place of ascent (566A). Thespesius must not linger here. We do not learn what happens to the souls circling round this seductive abyss; evidently the scents wafting out of it have a beneficial effect on them. Whether, however, these souls proceed from the rim into the deep and join the banqueters (or are even identical with them) or whether, on the contrary, there is a strict distinction between those outside and those inside the abyss, cannot be decided. (3) The next stop, the Mixing Bowl of the Dreams,[16] another abyss, is called the Oracle of Night and Moon by the soul guide. Orpheus (the guide says) came this far, while searching for the soul of his wife, though he later talked erroneously of an Oracle of Apollo and Night at Delphi. It is from the Oracle of Night and Moon that dreams come to humans as a mixture of truth and falsehood. Here, then, we have a second connection with earth, and Thespesius is now apparently in the region of the moon. This is confirmed by the guide's attempt to lead Thespesius still higher to show him the Oracle of Apollo; this, however, fails, because Thespesius is still bound to his body and the beam of the light of

[12] 563F: τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν τελευτώντων.

[13] This is the soul (564BC; 564D) of a relative who died when Thespesius was still a child (564C); he is later called ὁ τοῦ Θεσπεσίου ψυχοπόμπος (566B) and ὁ δαίμων (566D) by the narrator.

[14] 565E καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ψυχὰς ἑώρα ταὐτὸ (i.e. the loss of the force carrying them) πασχούσας ἐκεῖ.

[15] It is compared to cultic grottos of Bacchus; see Vernière 1977, 186 with n. 5.

[16] Cf. M. P. Nilsson, "Krater", in: Id., *Opuscula selecta*, III (Lund 1960) 332–8, esp. 334–5.

the Oracle is too bright. Thespesius, then, cannot transcend the sphere of the moon; he remains there, as is shown by his encounter with the Sibyl, who – wandering in front of the face of the moon – tells him the future (apparently also the time of his death). The movement of the moon, however, drives him off in the opposite direction.[17] (4) The last stop is the terrible spectacle of punishments, extending to the circle of hell where the souls are suitably moulded for their rebirth (567E–F). We do not learn, however, where exactly Thespesius now is. At first both Thespesius and his guide watch the humans being tortured; but as Thespesius encounters his criminal father, he wants to flee in desperation, but his guide has vanished, and he has to follow other dreadful beings pushing him onwards (567A). The fields of punishment, then, must be located where the face of the moon cannot be seen and pure (or purified) souls, like that of his guide, are not allowed to linger.

So the narrative leads us from the place where the souls first arrive and dwell provisionally, to the starting-point of return to life on earth, from the place of oracles, dreams and prophecies – which concern life on earth as well – and thus from the moon and its face to its rear side, which is (it may be thought) the place of hellish punishment and of preparation for rebirth.

As for Thespesius change of place is decisive, so for Timarchus it is change of perspective, of view.

(1) Looking up, Timarchus at first perceives the world of stars (star circles, fixed stars, planets, the Galaxy) as a multi-coloured sea of light (with islands and currents), which delights him. Then, looking down, he sees a big circular abyss, deep and dreadful, full of darkness and restlessly moving, and from its depths varied wails of living beings, sounds of lament and tumultuous noises can be heard.

(2) At this moment a voice (Timarchus will never see the speaker) offers to be his guide and to interpret what he sees. This invisible guide, however, will only be able to enlighten Timarchus adequately about that region of the Beyond to which he himself belongs and which he administers together with the other *daimones*; the higher region, in which he (and the others of his kind) have only little part, is the realm of other gods.[18] His sphere of action (that of Persephone) is the last of four within the hierarchy of the parts of the cosmos, the border area of the zone of light, up to which Styx, the way into Hades reaches from below with its extreme tip (of shadow).

(3) The explanation of the nature of Styx makes it necessary to explain also the whole structure of the cosmos to Timarchus, i.e. the hierarchy not only of the four Principles (Life, Motion, Becoming, Decay), but also of the three connecting links (Monad, Intellect, Nature) together with the three

[17] For a tentative explanation see below pp. 179–80.

[18] 591A ἄλλων γὰρ θεῶν ἐκεῖνα. Perhaps we should understand: "the realm of others, namely gods"; compare 591BC: "The other islands have gods (θεούς), but the moon belongs to terrestrial *daimones*."

associated regions of the cosmos (that of the Invisible, of the Sun, and of the Moon) and the three Moirai (Atropos, Clotho, Lachesis).

(4) Only now is the exact location of the area in which the guide is active revealed: it is the moon, the turning-point of Becoming, to which the earthly *daimones* belong, while the other islands are inhabited by gods. Thus we assume that Timarchus' guide is an earthly demon dwelling on the moon. We have returned – but not without having learned something – to the starting-point of the guide's explanation of the cosmos.

(5) Now it is also possible to describe the special relationship between Styx and moon in more detail and to regard the border region between these two as the stage on which the future of the soul is decided. The guide now focuses on the fate and nature of the soul; he opens Timarchus' eyes for what he sees but cannot understand without explanation.

His following remarks further develop this theme of the soul. (a) In connection with the (periodically failing) attempt of the moon to escape Styx a 'drama of souls' unfolds: on the one hand the souls who are still impure are rejected by the moon, tumble back, become the prey of Hades, and have to go down again into Becoming; on the other hand the souls for whom the end of Becoming has arrived are accepted by the moon. (b) At first Timarchus does not understand this 'drama of souls', because he sees only stars and their various movements: (b1) stars that move up and down around the abyss (παλλομένους, 591D), (b2) stars that plunge into it, (b3) stars that dart up from below. (c) Timarchus does not comprehend – as the guide recognizes – that he is watching the *daimones* themselves. (d) Therefore the guide has to explain the structure and nature of the soul, i.e. its participation in Intellect, so that Timarchus may recognize its nature as being that of a *daimon*.[19]

The moon and the cosmic region bordering the world of Becoming are at the centre of Timarchus' experience of the Beyond. As the voice instructing him does not seem to have a body and a fixed place in space, so the location at which Timarchus gets his round view of the heavenly regions remains oddly indefinite: is he on the moon or near to the border region of moon and Styx or directly above the moon? One thing seems certain: the abyss is below him, for he must look down to see it.

If we compare this to the Thespesius myth, we detect surprising gaps. First of all regarding spatial dimensions: Thespesius has to overcome tremendous distances to arrive at the abyss of Lethe and the Mixing Bowl of Dreams. Of these two abysses Timarchus tells us nothing, and for him space in all its extension is also totally unimportant, when he looks down into his abyss of darkness. We learn nothing of the place of punishment that is the climax of Thespesius' tale, perhaps to be located in the moon region, because that is the last stage of Thespesius' journey in the Beyond. To

[19] This analysis is continued below on pp. 181–3.

be sure, the abyss that terrifies Timarchus sends up wailings and laments of men and women, but also of countless little children: is this to be the place of punishment that we know from *De sera*?[20]

What, however, is missing in both myths? Both are silent about the dwelling place of the good and pure souls. This holds true for the period between the soul's separation from the body and its reincarnation as well as for the unlimited time of an existence that has surmounted the need to return into the world of Becoming. To be sure, there are some hints: The voice mentions the impure souls, which are rejected by the moon and return into the circle of Becoming, and the souls, which arrive on the moon having reached the end of Becoming; but there follows no description where and how they then dwell on the moon. In the Thespesius myth the paradise-like abyss of Lethe serves as the starting-point for rebirth; this may refer to the realm of the blessed and describe the form of existence of the souls after their arrival in the Beyond and before their reincarnation, but the negative aspect of the beguilement and seduction of the souls into association with the body is surely the dominant theme in the description of the place.

We may perhaps get a complete picture by turning to the myth in *De facie* and its topography, for here the moon is at the centre of the story.

The space between earth and moon has already been described as a region for punishing and purifying the souls. Their stay here varies in length, and there is a plain higher up reserved for the good souls, the Meadow of Hades (943C). Only the pure souls reach the moon itself, to lead a life there which is extremely pleasant but neither blessed nor divine, until the Intellect separates from the soul (942F). At the same time the moon is a place of punishment and reward for the souls that have already become *daimones*. There are two ways[21] for them, the one leading to the side of the moon that is turned towards heaven, the other to that turned towards earth. The side turned towards heaven is called the Elysian Field.[22] How the souls live there and whether this is a temporary stay, we are not told, but as the separation of soul from Intellect happens on the moon, this stay can only be temporary.

So we get more detailed indications of topography only in *De facie*, but even they do not help us to locate and understand better certain places named in *De genio* und *De sera*. We may just try to make a few conjectures. Both of the abysses in *De sera* are so far apart from each other that only the

[20] See also von Arnim 1921, 28f.

[21] 944C: Cherniss 1957 considers reading: καλοῦσι δ' αὐτῶν ("sc. the depths and hollows of the moon") τὸ μὲν μέγιστον Ἑκάτης μυχόν, [...] τὰ δὲ δύο μακρὰ ⟨τὰς Πύλας⟩: "and the two long ones are called <'the Gates'>."

[22] Ἠλύσιον πεδίον, see Cherniss 1957, 195 n. d, but *De gen.* 591A τὴν δὲ Φερσεφόνης μοῖραν ("the portion of Persephone") is erroneously interpreted by him as "Hades" and not as "Moon" (see n. 216 to the translation).

Mixing Bowl of the Dreams (the Oracle of Night and Moon) can be thought to be near the moon, but about *this* Oracle *De sera* stays silent.[23] Again, the great distance of the Dionysiac abyss of Lethe from the Mixing Bowl (and thus from the moon) prevents us from connecting this abyss with the Gorge of Hecate or with the side of the moon turned towards earth, though it is here that an intermediate stay of the souls before returning into the world of Becoming might at least be conceivable.[24] The (futile) attempt of the guide to take Thespesius higher towards the light of the Oracle of Apollo might have been launched from the heavenward side of the moon. Shortly after that, when Thespesius, listening to the Sibyl's prophecies, is pushed in the opposite direction by the momentum of the moon,[25] this should take him to the moon's earthward side, which is perhaps identical with the place of punishment Thespesius visits after the episode with the Sibyl.

Neither of the two abysses to which Thespesius is led can be compared with the dark abyss terrifying Timarchus; it is through this abyss of horror that, for the most part, the souls ascending from earth and returning to it move. There is no lack of dark colours either in Thespesius' scenario of 'ascent' or in *De facie*: Thespesius describes the dismay of some of the souls and their "inarticulate sounds, mingled with outcries as of lamentation and terror" (564B); Sulla's report mentions the wailing and lamenting of the souls that are brought to their just punishment in the space between earth and moon (944B, cf. 943C): "At the same time too with wails <and> cries the souls of the chastised then approach through the shadow from below." Wailing and weeping, of course, also fill the place of punishment in *De sera* (566E and 567D), and there we also encounter (at the end) the motive of return, for Thespesius visits the souls who are being prepared for their second birth (567E; here, however, there is no more talk of wailing and lamenting, although the tortured souls would have good reason for this). So there is common ground, but the abyss in *De genio* still preserves its peculiarities – and its mystery, for we would like to separate cleanly what here seems to be treated as a single process: the up and down of the souls on the one hand, their fear and failure on the other, and, thirdly, their punishment. The comparison with the other myths makes clear that these are separate things.

The heavenly space above the moon is to be our last topographical problem; it is also well suited to lead us to the 'anthropology'. We have already

[23] We can hardly take the fact that the *daimones* take care of the oracles on the earth (944C) as an allusion to this Oracle, which, moreover, is not located on earth (564C).

[24] According to *De facie* 942F, the pure souls lead an absolutely easy (though not blessed) life on the moon; only just the final phase of this life shortly before the return into the existence within a body might be reflected in Dionysiac actions – but there still remains the distance problem.

[25] 566E τῇ ῥύμῃ τῆς σελήνης εἰς τοὐναντίον [...] ἐξεώσθη.

seen that there are allusions to this realm beyond the moon in *De genio* and *De sera*: The voice instructs Timarchus that the islands in the heavenly sea are ruled by gods, while the moon is administrated by the *daimones*, stating: "we have little to do with what is above; that belongs to other gods" (591A).[26] Thespesius, too, is permitted to see the stars and their size and distance from each other at the beginning of his heavenly journey (563EF), but his attempt to look up towards the Oracle of Apollo fails because of the excessive brightness of its source of light (566D). In both texts, then, the space above the moon is not really part of the myth; the allusions to it only serve to inform the reader of the restriction of perspective. It is all the more astonishing that in the outline of cosmic hierarchy with which the voice of the guide prefaces his explanations, two further spheres above the moon are mentioned (the Invisible and the sun), but have no part at all to play in what follows. This is further proof that Plutarch wants to exclude the Invisible and the sun as topics and alert the reader to this. Why then is the sun so important in *De facie*? There, the relationship of Intellect to the sun is brought up again and again: Intellect separates from the soul on the moon and longs for the sun (944E), the sun brings Intellect into existence (943A) and 'sows' it on the moon (945C). Why, on the contrary, is the topic of the sun avoided in *De genio*, although the distinction between soul and Intellect is here at the centre of the anthropology of the myth as well? The answer must be: only in *De facie* can the myth cover all aspects of the doctrine of the soul and thus also of cosmology, for it is to the *daimones* that the stranger owes his knowledge, and the *daimones* can give information about the doctrine of the soul and the hierarchy of the cosmos, because it is their nature to wander between the worlds.[27] Timarchus and Thespesius, however, remain fettered to their earthly existence while experiencing the Beyond: there is, on the one hand, a detailed description of the "bond of the soul", which plays a role also in the tale about the end of Hermodorus (*De gen.* 591F–592D), and on the other – in *De sera* – the "cable of the soul", which prevents Thespesius from ascending any higher (566D). Thus the way into the spheres beyond the moon is closed to both of them. The myths of *De genio* und *De sera*, however, gain their importance from their protagonists' personal experience of the beyond, so that this has to be at the centre of their stories, while a more abstract discussion would not carry the conviction of something personally experienced; Plutarch therefore forgoes a presentation of the supra-lunar world in this context.

[26] See also n. 18 above.

[27] Timarchus' guide in the Beyond is a *daimon*, too, and therefore able to explain the structure of the cosmos; and although he has only little contact to the world beyond the moon (see above n. 18), he is obviously familiar with it.

3. The doctrine of the soul and the anthropology of the myths[28]

Both in *De genio* and in *De facie* the whole doctrine of the soul is based on a sharp distinction between soul (ψυχή) and intellect (νοῦς). In *De genio* 591D we read that every soul possesses a share in Intellect and that there is no soul without reason (ἄλογος) or without intellect (ἄνους); this is stated (as the context shows) of the human soul. Now it is important that most people regard intellect as residing in themselves, while it actually exists outside of them; so those with the right understanding call it δαίμων. An even sharper distinction of soul and intellect is worked out in *De facie*: here, too, we find the statement (polemically arguing against a widespread misunderstanding) that the intellect is in no way a part (μόριον) of the soul (as the soul itself is no part of the body), but that it is better and more divine than the soul.[29] During man's "second death" (on the moon) the intellect is indeed separated from the soul, so that only the soul remains on the moon. We do not, however, find an identification of *Daimon* and intellect in this text; it even talks of souls who have become *daimones*.[30]

We will understand the differences between these very similar concepts of intellect only if we pay close attention to the intentions of the respective texts. We therefore have to begin with a detailed analysis of *De genio* 591D–592C.[31] The train of thought of this passage can be described as follows.

(6) The soul has a share of Intellect. When it combines with the body, this means a turn towards the irrational (ἄλογον). There are various degrees in intensity of the connection of soul and body: (a) there are souls which sink wholly into the body, (b) souls which on the one hand combine with the body up to a certain degree, but on the other "to some extent leave their purest element outside". After this the right definition of soul and Intellect / *daimon* is explained. So this section has the function of shifting the centre of the presentation from the "drama of the souls" and the observation of the stars to the form of existence of the soul within a living man's body and of highlighting the meaning of the term 'daimon'.

(7) Timarchus is now able to connect the stars he discovered when he looked at the abyss and the motions of which he described (see above nr. 5b; 591D) with souls: (a) the stars that are flickering out are the souls sinking wholly into the body; (b) the stars that are lighting up are the souls

[28] See K. Alt, "Zur Auffassung von Seele und Geist bei Platon, Mittelplatonikern, Plotin", *Hyperboreus* 11 (2005) 30–59; Baltes 2005; Vernière 1977, 123–215.

[29] 943A νοῦς γὰρ ψυχῆς, ὅσῳ ψυχὴ σώματος, ἄμεινόν ἐστι καὶ θειότερον.

[30] 944C (ψυχαὶ) ἤδη γεγενημέναι δαίμονες.

[31] We start where the analysis of 590C–591D (above, p. 178) ended with nr. 5d, so that the numbering now resumes with nr. 6. There is a good interpretation in: Dörrie / Baltes 2002, vol. 6.2, 228–34 (Baustein 173.2).

re-emerging from the bodies after death; (c) the stars moving above are the *daimones* of people distinguished by Intellect.[32] Section 7, then, has the function of combining both themes treated hitherto (i.e. the "drama of the souls" and the term *daimon*), focusing (at last) on the relationship between *daimon* and soul while the soul is still in the body and making this the real topic of the question about the *daimonion* of Socrates; section 7c provides the transition.

(8) The guide asks Timarchus to have a close look at the bond (σύνδεσμος) of each *daimon* to its soul. Timarchus then observes stars that (a 1) toss up and down to a lesser degree, those that (a 2) do so to a higher degree, and those that (b) move in confused spirals and do not manage a motion in one straight direction. Obviously only those souls are here being described that have entered a body, so that the distinction between soul and intellect-*daimon* is now in the foreground.

(9) The motions of the stars reflect the behaviour of the souls within the body and their strength or weakness vis-à-vis their irrational element (or part, τὸ ἄλογον). The bond of the *daimon* to the soul acts on this irrational element like a rein: (a) a straight and well-ordered motion shows an easily guidable soul; (b) a disordered motion indicates the up and down of victory and defeat in the struggle with a disobedient and barely guidable one. The distinction (which made sense in section 8) between two variants of the (*basically* orderly) up-and-down motion of the stars (a 1 and a 2: the irrational, though pliable, element of these souls will not permit totally uniform movements of the stars / *daimones*, so that varying degrees of this up and down movement result) can be neglected here in section 9, because this section is meant to lead us to a special kind of humans with their οἰκεῖος δαίμων, namely τὸ μαντικὸν ... γένος, of which Hermodorus is presented as an example. Therefore the distinction here is only between (a) *fundamentally* orderly and (b) totally disorderly motion,[33] in connection with the respective nature of the soul. With this, also the question of the *daimon* of Socrates has finally found its answer, now that a number of prerequisites for the right understanding of it have been discussed and explained.

[32] In tabular form (591E–F):

ἀστέρες	**ψυχαί**
(a) τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἀποσβέννυσθαι δοκοῦντας ἀστέρας	(a) τὰς εἰς σῶμα καταδυομένας ὅλας ψυχάς
(b) τοὺς δ' οἷον ἀναλάμποντας πάλιν καὶ ἀναφαινομένους κάτωθεν	(b) τὰς ἐκ τῶν σωμάτων ἐπαναπλεούσας μετὰ τὸν θάνατον
(c) οἱ δ' ἄνω διαφερόμενοι	(c) δαίμονές εἰσι τῶν νοῦν ἔχειν λεγομένων ἀνθρώπων

[33] Cf. 592A (= 8b) ἐνίους δὲ … ἕλικα *τεταραγμένην καὶ ἀνώμαλον* ἕλκοντας and 592AB (= 9b) τοὺς δ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω πολλάκις *ἀνωμάλως καὶ τεταραγμένως* ἐγκλίνοντας.

The whole passage derives its inner tension from the necessity (on the one hand) to elaborate the intimately connected linking and separation in the relationship between soul and Intellect, and (on the other hand) to determine exactly the relationship between soul and Intellect during the two mutually exclusive forms of existence of the soul (during life in the body and after death). The compositional device lies in creating a border region with its up and down (the moon) but to equip this up and down with a special ambivalence: now stressing one strand of the argument (the soul after it has left the body), now the other (the soul in the body), or even letting both run side by side (sections 5b and 7), and finally making one of them (the soul in the body) the real aim of the argument (sections 6, 8–9).[34]

In *De facie* as well there are (from 942F onwards) two primary strands of motifs connected in such a way that now one and now the other receives special emphasis, without the reader noticing this at once. There are some secondary topics as well, the significance of which for the development of the central argument does not immediately become clear.

The discussion (and correction) of the mythological interpretation of the moon's eclipse leads to the description of the border region between earth and moon, which is marked by the earth's shadow. Now Sulla, by describing the souls' ascent to the moon and their stay on it as well as the separation of Intellect from the soul on it, interweaves two main topics from the beginning: (A) the relation between soul and moon (i.e. the soul's movement towards the moon and away from it, the soul's existence on it, the soul's dissolution and renewed union with Intellect), (B) the basic anthropological conception and the separation of Intellect from the soul. Later, however, the tale focuses on topic B; the transition to topic A is then prepared by telling us what the main difference is between the two processes of separation taking place on earth and on the moon: that on earth is quick and violent, that on the moon (i.e. the separation of Intellect from the soul) is slow and gentle (943B). Taken by itself, this description of the mode of separation need not necessarily lead to topic A; topic B could very well be continued and brought to an end, so that the whole topic would be treated coherently and consistently. Plutarch chooses another way: the topic of the separation of intellect from the soul having been left behind, topic A comes into its own, occupying a long passage (943C–944E), which – in connection with the question about the substance (οὐσία) of the moon – also discusses (on a fundamental level) hypotheses about the mixture of com-

[34] How keen Plutarch is on creating a sense of suspense is shown by the fact that the peculiarity of the crucial motion of the stars around the abyss (section 5 b1, παλλομένους; this is going to explain the effects on Intellect as *daimon* on certain distinguished people) cannot be understood either by Timarchus or by the reader, because *all* the stars are declared *daimones*. We might say that everything that follows only serves to explain this kind of star.

ponents in the stars (starting from Plato and following the lead given by Xenocrates' doctrine as a guide: 943F–944A). It is only in 944E that the separation of Intellect from the soul turns up again – somewhat unexpectedly, after passages on the life and activities of the *daimones* on the moon – with the very important statement that this separation is brought about by Intellect's longing for the "image in the sun". Very soon the topic of moon and soul is dominant again (from 944F onwards), and the topic of separation is only briefly and incidentally alluded to,[35] until finally (945C–D), with widening perspective, we get a description not only of the interplay of sun ("sowing" of Intellect), moon and earth during the genesis of the soul, but also of the function of the three Moirai for sun, moon and earth. Thus the demonstration returns to its beginning, but now, in the cosmological perspective, the role of the 'anthropology of sun and moon' has become much clearer.

Why does the separation of soul and Intellect so soon recede into the background? Why does it not continue to be discussed in connection with the topic of moon and soul, or – this could have been an alternative – why did Plutarch not treat these topics one after the other and bring each of them on its own to a neat conclusion? There are two important reasons for Plutarch's choice: (1) To do justice to the complex relationship between soul and moon, many elements and most of all the connection between these elements had to be taken account of; thus there had to be details of argument that did not allow a direct reference to the second main topic and in which a hint of the separation of Intellect from the soul would be an alien element. (2) On the other hand these details of argument create the conditions to take up the second main topic again and deepen it; for before the process of removal of the Intellect from the soul can be described with more detail, it is necessary to discuss both the soul's form of existence on the moon and the nature of the moon itself. The description of the form of the soul's existence on the moon *after* separation naturally follows from this.

We may assume that the strict separation of Intellect and soul is the more important of the two main topics: it is central both at the beginning and at the end and is also the prerequisite of the soul's peculiar existence on the moon; for if the Intellect could not remove itself from the soul entirely, i.e. if there were still traces of Intellect preserved in the soul, it would be unthinkable that the soul could dissolve itself entirely into the substance of the moon. For however a Platonist might define the soul and its parts or faculties, the immortality, indestructibility and immateriality of the rational soul and the Intellect[36] remains the one prerequisite of the Platonic

[35] 945A χωρὶς ἑκατέρου (i.e. without body and Intellect), ibid. ἀφεθεῖσαι γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ ("for abandoned by the mind").

[36] Cf. in *De facie* 945C ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀπαθὴς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ, μικτὸν δὲ καὶ μέσον ἡ

doctrine of the soul accepted by all. The moon, receiving Intellect from the sun, brings forth new souls (945C), i.e. it supplies Intellect with souls lacking Intellect. It is able to do that, because the souls dissolve themselves into it, and this makes the moon their basic element (στοιχεῖον, 945A). Both the separation of Intellect from the soul and the combination of Intellect with the soul happen on the moon. Without the moon there could be no genesis of the soul, but if soul and Intellect were not fundamentally distinct in nature, in origin and on the ontological scale of values,[37] the process of the genesis of man could not even begin.[38]

Let us now look once more at the respective conception of Intellect in the passages of *De genio* and *De facie* that we have discussed. Are both conceptions in harmony with each other? Does it at all make sense to presuppose or indeed demand a uniform conception? A comparison of the purposes of the respective texts quickly shows that this would mean to compare things which are not comparable – strange as this may sound in view of their basic agreement. Since in *De genio* the Intellect as *daimon* guides the human from outside, its separation from the soul seems just as much a given here as in *De facie*. The topic of separation, however, as we know it from *De facie*, plays no part here, because the fate of the Intellect-*daimon* after the soul's ascent to the moon is not so much as discussed in *De genio* at all! This text is only concerned with the Intellect-*daimon* during the existence of the soul within the body of a living human. To be sure, there is talk of the soul's ascent after death and of successful or failed attempts by the souls to get to the moon; but the lunar existence of this soul coupled with the Intellect-*daimon* – this must be stressed once again – is not investigated further. Having read Sulla's myth, the reader will be very keen to put questions to the Timarchus myth which are answered in the Sulla myth; but the Timarchus myth will have nothing to say. Again the Sulla myth will be dumb when asked about the identity of Intellect and *daimon*. We should therefore beware of playing off the statements of the two myths against each other.

In *De sera* the guide distinguishes between the faculty of reasoning, i.e. the intellect,[39] of Thespesius and "the rest of your soul";[40] this part of the

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ψυχὴ ("the mind is impassible and sovereign; but the soul is a mixed and intermediate thing"); on ἀπαθής see *De animae procreatione* 1026D ἔκ τε τῆς θείας καὶ ἀπαθοῦς ἔκ τε τῆς θνητῆς καὶ περὶ τὰ σώματα παθητῆς μερίδος and 1022E (τὸ γὰρ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀπαθές), on which see Cherniss, 214 n. a of his edition (London 1976) with further passages; *De genio* 591E (here τὸ φθορᾶς λειφθὲν is called νοῦς) and in general Alcinous, *Didaskalikos* 25, p. 177.21–178.23 H. (Whittaker / Louis, Paris 1990, 48–50) on the λογικὴ ψυχή as ἀθάνατος, ἀνώλεθρος, ἀσύνθετος, ἀδιάλυτος in contrast to the ἄλογοι ψυχαί, which in all probability are θνηταί and φθαρταί (25, p. 178.31f. H.).

[37] Cf. 943A (above n. 29).

[38] See also Dörrie / Baltes 2002, 203–7 (Baustein 154.2).

[39] 564C: τῷ φρονοῦντι Thespesius has come into the Beyond (the guide says); at the

soul has remained in the body like an anchor. We do not learn any more. As passions and crimes on earth leave their imprints on the soul, the souls in the Beyond show clear traces of them. The nature of these souls is not explained in more detail, so that we can only gather from a few hints by the guide what role intellect plays here and to what extent the irrational element of the souls of the deceased also finds it way into the Beyond. There are souls whose power of reasoning is apparently too weak,[41] so that they wish to enter a body again and experience a rebirth; so the rational element of the soul must be endangered in the Beyond as well.[42] Furthermore there is an explicit distinction between a punishment in the Beyond directed only at the irrational part of the soul,[43] and one aimed at the rational part[44] as the hidden site of corruption. We may therefore assume that the soul arrives in the Beyond as an entity consisting of its rational and its irrational part (or element or faculty) and finds it place of punishment there.

The aspects of the doctrine of the soul just mentioned are important for *De sera*, because they explain the soul's ability to move around with its highest part even outside the body; this is a clear parallel to *De facie* and even more to *De genio* (where the connection to the body is described as well). Crucial, however, is the conception of the soul in the Beyond as an entity consisting of an irrational and a rational part; only so can the myth make it plausible that all transgressions and crimes, the most brutal and the most subtle, leave their mark on the souls and determine their future punishment. Indeed, the inquiry into the consequences for the soul of its offences on earth – their imprint on the souls and the resulting punishment – lies at the heart of the myth. Thus here too, the doctrine of the soul wholly serves the intentions of the text.

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beginning of the narrative (563E) we read: "He said that when his intelligence (τὸ φρονοῦν) was driven from his body"; see also 566A. That this means the intellect (*nous*), is shown by *De facie* 944F–945A: "In fact the self of each of us is not anger [...] but is that with which we reason and understand (ᾧ διανοούμεθα καὶ φρονοῦμεν)" (see Cherniss 1957, 215 n. d).

[40] 564C τὴν ἄλλην ψυχήν.

[41] 565D ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀσθενείᾳ λόγου καὶ δι' ἀργίαν τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἔρρεψε τῷ πρακτικῷ πρὸς γένεσιν [...] ("For one soul, from weakness of reason and neglect of contemplation, is borne down by its practical proclivity to birth [...]").

[42] In accord with this is the seductive effect exerted by the Abyss of Lethe on the intellect, about which the guide says, 566A: ὡς ἐκτήκεται καὶ ἀνυγραίνεται τὸ φρονοῦν ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, τὸ δ' ἄλογον καὶ σωματοειδὲς ἀρδόμενον καὶ σαρκούμενον ἐμποιεῖ τοῦ σώματος μνήμην, ἐκ δὲ τῆς μνήμης ἵμερον [...] ἕλκοντα πρὸς γένεσιν [...] ("that the intelligent part of the soul is dissolved away and liquefied by pleasure, while the irrational and carnal part is fed by its flow and puts on flesh and thus induces memory of the body; and that from such memory arises a yearning [...] that draws the soul toward birth").

[43] 567A: περὶ τὸ ἄλογον καὶ παθητικόν.

[44] 567B: ἐνίους [...] ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ καὶ κυρίῳ τὴν μοχθηρίαν ἔχοντας.

4. The 'corporeal' nature of the soul in the myths

De sera presents the 'materiality' of the soul in particularly drastic images. Right at the beginning of his tale, Thespesius observes the soul coming out of the "soul-bubble" (which formed when the dying human's soul started to ascend) like a kind of homunculus.[45] If the souls did not become visible in this form, the myth could not be told, for Thespesius has to be able to identify dead people as relatives or acquaintances, like his guide and later his criminal father. The various colours, the scars and weals of the souls also imply this. The idea reaches a climax in the hellish punishments, in which the souls are depicted as suffering bodies. And corporeality is almost over-exaggerated at the end, when the souls are presented as metal objects receiving their appropriate animal form at the hands of craftsmen. It would be pointless to try to discover a philosophical concept behind this: Plutarch simply delights in graphically displaying punishment after death and thus permitting his imagination to present the doctrine (established by argument) of the chastisement and purification of immortal souls as a vivid tale. This is an experimental idea, which uses all the liberties allowed by a mythical narrative.

The image of the soul in *De genio* is very different. We might understand the description of the loud lamentations of the souls rejected by the moon as requiring the corporeality of these souls; this would, then, be a concession to the form of the tale and its dramatic elements. This assumption, however, is unnecessary, for Simmias – trying to explain the *daimonion* of Socrates – instructs us that contact between spiritual beings is possible without audible language, as with the voices we seem to hear in dreams (588D). Nowhere in the myth is the soul presented to us as corporeal or body-like. This is confirmed by the programmatic statement in 591D: "every soul has its share of Intellect, there is none which is without reason or Intellect." Deeply as the soul may sink into the body, and weak as its connection to Intellect may become, it will never lose its own nature by this change towards the irrational.[46]

De facie has a peculiar intermediate position. Because of the strict distinction between soul and Intellect, and because of the special role of the moon as the place where new souls come into being, Plutarch here has no qualms about attributing special corporeal qualities to the substance of the soul that is freed from Intellect, because the (already mentioned) dissolution of the soul into the moon and the fact that the moon is the 'element'

[45] 564A: (τὰς ψυχὰς) ἐκβαίνειν τύπον ἐχούσας ἀνθρωποειδῆ τὸν δ' ὄγκον εὐσταλεῖς ("came forth, human in form, but slight in bulk").

[46] 591D ἀλλ' ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς σαρκὶ μιχθῇ καὶ πάθεσιν, ἀλλοιούμενον τρέπεται [...] εἰς τὸ ἄλογον.

of the soul, itself being a mixture of earth and star (943E),[47] can hardly be brought into harmony with an immaterial nature of the soul without Intellect. The corporeal affinity of the soul to earthly bodies is also shown by the fact that even after leaving the body it preserves traces of bodily life on the moon; indeed it has itself formed the body, as intellect in turn has formed the soul.[48] Thus we read of the souls that have enjoyed a philosophical life, that after the loss of Intellect they have no more use for the passions and wither away.[49] On the other hand, the souls of those who were ambitious and driven by passions obviously continue to live[50] without Intellect, dreaming of their lives as in sleep, and must be held back by the moon when unrest and passion draw them away from the moon towards a new Becoming (945B). Here we get the impression that these souls do not really dissolve themselves into the moon but retain their nature. The passion-driven souls that nevertheless succeed in acquiring a body,[51] act in harmful and destructive ways on earth (Tityus, Typhon and Python – whom, however, the moon at last took back into itself – belonged within this category): It seems indeed here as if the preservation of one's own passionate nature on the moon is a mark of a soul that was passion-driven on earth. Thus the dissolution of their irrational souls is accorded only to those who have lived reasonably on earth, as a kind of distinction or reward: where the passions have totally vanished, the irrational soul is free from everything that makes it what it is and consequently vanishes. Regarding this irrational soul, then, we observe a curious inversion of the values of dissolution (now seen as positive) and continuation (now seen as negative).

The souls that were so fortunate as to reach the moon resemble in their outward appearance a beam of light. What follows in the text is unfortunately corrupt, but it at least seems certain that the moon's aether – which,

[47] The substance of stars is obviously aether, as the continuation of the text shows: οὕτως τῷ αἰθέρι λέγουσι (for the subject of the sentence see Cherniss 1957, 205 n. e) τὴν σελήνην ἀνακεκραμένην διὰ βάθους ἅμα μὲν ἔμψυχον εἶναι καὶ γόνιμον, ἅμα δ' [...] ("so the moon, they say, because it has been permeated through and through by ether is at once animated and fertile and [...]").

[48] 945A: "the soul receives the impression of its shape (ἐκμάττεται τὸ εἶδος) through being moulded by the mind (τυπουμένη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ) and moulding (τυποῦσα) in turn and enfolding the body on all sides, so that, even if it be separated from either one for a long time, since it preserves the likeness and the imprint (τὴν ὁμοιότητα καὶ τὸν τύπον) it is correctly called an image (εἴδωλον)." Before that, the good souls had to stay in the space between earth and moon to free themselves there from the impurities acquired by contact with the body (943C).

[49] 945A ἀπομαραίνονται ("they wither quietly away").

[50] For this translation see Cherniss 1957, 217 n. d.

[51] It is remarkable that here – in contrast to *De genio* (591D) – the possibility of existence of an ἄνους ψυχή within the body is in no way denied; already earlier the text states (943C): "All soul, whether without mind or with it (ἄνουν τε καὶ σὺν νῷ), when it has issued from the body [...]."

as we have already heard, is a part of the moon's mixed substance – stabilizes and strengthens the souls.[52] The subsequent explanation of this again strengthens the suspicion that what is spoken of here is some sort of corporeal entity, as we read (943DE): "for what laxness and diffuseness they still have is strengthened and becomes firm and translucent. In consequence they are nourished by any exhalation that reaches them."[53] Next follows Heraclitus' fragment *VS* 22 B 98: "Souls employ the sense of smell in Hades." Scholars have long assumed Stoic influence on this whole passage up to the Heraclitus quotation.[54] It is true that according to Stoic doctrine the moon is a mixture of air and fire,[55] but there is also a Stoic notion of *aither* as being a form of fire.[56] Plutarch is apparently using Stoic clichés to achieve the objects of his presentation. Plutarch certainly does not here surrender unconditionally to the influence of a Stoic source; if he really were using a source and not just a Stoic commonplace, he would do so as his own master, treating the source simply as a means to his end.[57] As it can be said in *De sera* even of the Intellect:[58] "the intelligent part (τὸ φρονοῦν) of the soul is dissolved and liquefied," so here, too, Plutarch may speak of the soul in images evoking corporeal-material processes. All of this is allowed, because in this text the function of the moon – to receive the soul into itself (by making it a part of itself) and to generate it anew out of itself – is at the centre and also because the way in which the moon is an 'element' (στοιχεῖον) of the soul can only be expressed by means of imagery.

[52] 943D: the souls receive τόνος and δύναμις.

[53] τὸ γὰρ ἀραιὸν ἔτι καὶ διακεχυμένον ῥώννυται καὶ γίνεται σταθερὸν καὶ διαυγές, ὥσθ' ὑπὸ τῆς τυχούσης ἀναθυμιάσεως τρέφεσθαι. Here, by the way, Plutarch builds a bridge to the last section of the 'scientific' part and the discussion of the hypothesis of inhabitants of the moon; we read in 940C: τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τῆς σελήνης, εἴπερ εἰσίν, εὐσταλεῖς εἶναι τοῖς σώμασι καὶ διαρκεῖς *ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων τρέφεσθαι* πιθανόν ἐστι. On this see Görgemanns 1970, 84.

[54] See Cherniss 1957, 203 n. e (the term τόνος, the nourishment of the soul, Heraklit); Görgemanns 1970, 84; most of all Donini 1988, 140–3 (140: "Not only is the soul's corporeality here clearly stated, but the language is clearly that of the Stoics"); see also Dörrie / Baltes 2002, 208 (Baustein 154.3).

[55] *De facie* 921F ἀέρος μῖγμα καὶ μαλακοῦ πυρός.

[56] *SVF* 2.580 (= Diogenes Laert. 7.135): ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι. For Stoic *aither* see *De facie* 922B and 928CD, with Cherniss 1957, 203 n. e and 49 n. g.

[57] See the good observations of Donini 1988, 140–1 on this point.

[58] 566A (text quoted above in n. 42).

5. The 'doctrine of *daimones*'[59]

The voice speaking to Timarchus is (as we have seen) that of one of the *daimones* belonging to the sphere of the moon. As it calls the 'intellect-*daimones*' (about whom it enlightens Timarchus) simply "*daimones*" without distinguishing them from the lunar *daimones* (i.e. those like himself), we have to regard the lunar *daimones* likewise as 'intellect-*daimones*' of souls. We may therefore draw the conclusion that the lunar *daimones* are 'intellect-*daimones*' that are no longer united to a body on earth. How this has happened, whether this form of existence is permanent, whether the lunar *daimones* distinguish themselves from the other 'intellect-*daimones*' that have reached the moon, and perhaps have broken the cycle of rebirths – all this we are not told. After the myth has been related, the Pythagorean Theanor voices his opinion about Simmias' hypothesis concerning the *daimonion*, but not about the myth. He knows of souls that have been freed from Becoming and now as *daimones* take care of humans (593D–E). These *daimones* then become the personal *daimones* of human souls that have fought bravely and overcome many rebirths; such a *daimon*, wanting to save a soul, spurs it on, and if it listens to him, it is saved, reaching the higher region of freedom from the cycle of Becoming. Souls, however, that do not obey their *daimon*, are left by him to their misfortunes (593F–594A). Plutarch here makes Theanor develop a doctrine of *daimones* that no-one present comments upon; it shows no relation to the central conception of the Timarchus myth and may perhaps be thought to illustrate a discarded preliminary stage of it.[60] In this comparatively 'archaic' conception, the problem of the relationship between soul and intellect and the necessity to find a solution for it do not yet play any part.

We may now rather surprisedly discover that the idea of the soul becoming a *daimon* is assumed in *De facie* quite as a matter of course. There we meet good and bad *daimones*: the *daimones* dwell not only on the moon, they also go to earth, take care of sanctuaries, participate in the operation of mysteries, execute punishments and are at the same time rescuers and helpers. If, however, these *daimones* get carried away to perform unjust

[59] See Brenk 1986, 2117–30; id., "An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironeia", *ANRW* 2.36.1 (1987) [248–349] 275–94; Vernière 1977, 249–62; I. Kidd, "Some Philosophical Demons", *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 49 (1995) 217–24, esp. 222–3; H. S. Schibli, "Xenocrates' Daemons and the Irrational Soul", *CQ* 43 (1993) [143–67] 156–9 and 166–7.

[60] It is presumably for that reason that Plutarch once talks about the 'intellect-*daimon*' as the οἰκεῖος δαίμων in the myth (592C), using the term properly reserved for the personal *daimon* to describe the function of the intellect. See K. Alt, "Der Daimon als Seelenführer. Zur Vorstellung des persönlichen Schutzgeistes bei den Griechen", *Hyperboreus* 6 (2000) [219–52] 236: "Dass dieser unmittelbar der Person des Menschen angehörige Daimon hier οἰκεῖος δαίμων genannt wird, ist verwirrend, denn diese Bezeichnung gilt in der Regel – und so auch im Kap. 24 – dem separaten Wesen, dem Daimon als Seelengeleiter."

deeds – being seized by anger or envy –, then they must enter human bodies[61] and are driven back to earth (944C–D). We may conclude from this that *daimones* act in an entirely uncorporeal way on earth; it is only after wrongdoing that they receive a body and apparently no longer function as *daimones*, but as human souls in human bodies. This helps us to better understand a passage in *De facie*, where there is talk (rather unexpectedly) of souls having already become *daimones*. In the biggest of the depressions on the moon, "Hecatê's Recess", "the souls suffer and exact penalties for whatever they have endured or committed after having already become Spirits."[62] So those *daimones* are punished who committed faults when they were active on earth. After their return from earth they first have to answer for their deeds in "Hecatê's Recess" and are then punished by rebirth in a human body. They can commit evil on earth, because on the moon – like all pure souls – they still exist as a combination of soul and intellect,[63] and it is only on earth that the soul gains the upper hand over intellect and itself gives in to the passions. The good *daimones* must presumably have painful experiences while acting as rescuers and avengers, so that they get compensation for that in "Hecatê's Recess". Which souls become *daimones*, we are not told. The triumph of reason over the passions and irrational inclinations distinguishes all souls that finally arrive on the moon (943D); but perhaps there are those among them that are even more perfect than others, or that have honoured oracle sanctuaries and mystery cults already on earth in some particular way, so that it is especially these that become *daimones*. It is, by the way, not totally excluded that after the 'sowing' of intellect on the moon the newly generated souls become *daimones* as well. All this is speculation. On the other hand, it is certain that the souls that have become *daimones* also die a 'second death', in which their intellect leaves the soul. We may note that Plutarch here chooses phrases that do justice to the peculiar dignity of the better *daimones*[64] (944E): ὧν (sc. τῶν βελτιόνων) [...] τῆς ἀρίστης ἐξαλλαγῆς τυγχανόντων ("as they achieved the ultimate alteration").[65] This separation of soul and intellect happens sometimes sooner, sometimes later.

[61] 944D: συνειργνύμενοι σώμασιν ἀνθρωπίνοις ("confined in human bodies"); parallel passages about the failure and punishment of *daimones* in Plutarch are cited by Cherniss 1957, 212 n. a.

[62] 944C Ἑκάτης μυχόν, ὅπου καὶ δίκας διδόασιν αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὧν ἂν ἤδη γεγενημέναι δαίμονες ἢ πάθωσιν ἢ δράσωσι. In what immediately follows the text again only speaks of souls that pass through two other recesses or gorges in different directions (see above p. 179, n. 21).

[63] On this see Cherniss 1957, 210 n. a. According to 943A (with Bernardakis' supplement) the combination of intellect and soul creates reason (λόγος), and this is ἀρχὴ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ("source of virtue and vice").

[64] It is to these that also the servants of Kronos belong, as they themselves have told Sulla's source (944D).

[65] The transmitted text is: ὧν ἱερὰ καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ προσηγορίαι διαμένουσιν, αἱ δὲ δυνάμεις ἐνίων (ἔνευον Cherniss, following Apelt) εἰς ἕτερον τόπον τῆς ἀρίστης

As we have seen, in *De sera* the soul of a relative is the guide through the Beyond. This guide is later (566D) called a *daimon*. Thespesius meets yet other *daimones*: the three responsible for the mixing of dreams (566B), the *daimones* of punishment at the several lakes of metal (567C). As the guide explains, punishment is executed in three degrees of various severity; the middle one, of which Dike is in charge, concerns grave cases, the healing of which is difficult. The *daimon* (ὁ δαίμων) leads these humans to Dike (564F); this is obviously the personal *daimon*, who leads the soul first into court and then into Hades in the *Phaedo* (107d–e). It is remarkable that although (only[66]) in this myth the conception of a personal *daimon* is just mentioned, this conception is then no longer required in the detailed description of punishments. Probably Plutarch just wants to remind us of his Platonic models – the final myth of the *Republic* also knows the personal *daimon* (617e; 620de) – and at the same time to encourage the reader to notice the differences too.

So the three eschatological myths are indeed creations of Plutarch himself, although he owes many individual traits and images to the Platonic models in *Gorgias* (523a–527a), *Phaedo* (107d–115a), and most of all in the *Republic* (613e–621b).[67] With these myths – the creation of which may be called a success – he tries to find answers for new, exciting and controversial questions regarding the doctrine of the soul and the doctrine of intellect within the frame of cosmology and anthropology. These questions arose not least from reading Plato, and particularly from intensive concern with the *Timaeus* and the history of its interpretation.[68]

ἐξαλλαγῆς τυγχανόντων (Ziegler translates: "[...] deren Heiligtümer, Kulte und Verehrung noch besteht. Doch lassen die wirkenden Kräfte mancher von ihnen nach, wenn ihnen die höchste Wandlung und Versetzung an einen anderen Ort zuteil wird"; Cherniss: "whose rites, honours, and titles persist but whose powers tended to another place as they achieved the ultimate alteration"). νεύω does not necessarily mean a downward movement, and one cannot see why only some of the better *daimones* can reach the sun (see the continuation of the text).

[66] Theanor's remarks are no part of the Timarchus myth; on the 'non-terminological' use of "personal *daimon*" in the Timarchus myth see above n. 60.

[67] See (apart from references of detail in commentaries and translations) Vernière 1977, 95–101 and *passim*; W. Eisele, "Jenseitsmythen bei Platon und Plutarch," in: M. Labahn / M. Lang (edd.), *Lebendige Hoffnung – ewiger Tod?! Jenseitsvorstellungen im Hellenismus, Judentum und Christentum*, Arbeiten zur Bibel und ihrer Geschichte 24 (Leipzig 2007) 315–340; C. Wiener, "Kurskorrektur auf der Jenseitsfahrt. Plutarchs Thespesios-Mythos und Kolotes' Kritik an Platons Politeia," *Würzburger Jahrbücher* N.F. 28a (2004) 49–63 (on *De sera*). I give only two examples for Plutarch's transferral of even small details from the myth of Er into *De genio*: 591CD ἀστέρας ... ἄττοντας ≈ *Politeia* 621b ἄττοντας ὥσπερ ἀστέρας; in 591C it is said of the moon that it prevents the impure souls from approaching μυκωμένη, while in *Rep*. 615e Er reports that the 'Mouth of Ascent' (στόμιον) refused to receive someone and ἐμυκᾶτο every time a criminal thought he could ascend.

[68] See, e.g., F. E. Brenk, "'Speaking with Unperfumed Words, Reaches to a Thousand Years.' Plutarch and His Age," in: Id., *With Unperfumed Voice. Studies in Greek Literature,*

6. The 'hierarchical models' in *De genio* and *De facie*

Timarchus wants to know everything, but the voice giving him information modestly points to the limits of its competence, only to contradict this modesty in what follows: Before starting its instructions the voice – by giving a very brief sketch of a complex and not easily comprehensible[69] doctrine of cosmic principles (591B) – makes it clear to Timarchus (and the reader) how little he knows and still will know even after the guided tour through the cosmos. There remains, however, the incentive (and for the reader, the curiosity) to want to know more. With the four Principles (Life, Motion, Becoming and Decay) are coordinated three groups of three: firstly the ontological triad of Monad, Intellect and Nature, which guarantees the connection between the four Principles; secondly the cosmological triad of the Invisible, the Sun and the Moon, which marks the appropriate place of the connection in the cosmos; finally the three "daughters of Necessity", the Moirai Atropos, Clotho and Lachesis, who as "holders of the keys" are in charge of the connection of the four Principles. Life (ζωή) may have been chosen as the highest Principle, because the model of the Demiurge in the *Timaeus* is the perfect intelligible living being (παντελὲς ζῷον 31b, τέλεον καὶ νοητὸν ζῷον 39e).[70] *Tim*. 31a–b stresses the uniqueness of the living being, which becomes the model also for the visible cosmos, which is therefore similar to its model also κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν. This leads us to the Μονάς of the ontological triad situated in the Invisible, which, being God, Intellect and the Demiurge,[71] must have its place above the visible world and the movements of the stars. It is only by the creative act of the Demiurge that the cosmic soul comes into being; the Intellect (Νοῦς), who combines Motion and Intellect in the sun, is not a second Intellect besides the first transcendental one, but presumably the Intellect of the cosmic soul, since the original soul attains orderly motion and becomes the world-soul only by participating in the intelligible being of the

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Religion and Philosophy, and in the New Testament Background, Potsdamer Altertumswiss. Beiträge 21 (Stuttgart 2007) [1–35] 14–7 ("The philosophical revolution") and 17–20 ("The revolution within Platonism") with further literature.

[69] Dörrie 1981, 105: "Die Benennungen, mit denen die vier ἀρχαί gekennzeichnet werden, stellen ihrerseits wieder Verschlüsselungen dar, geeignet, den Laien vom vollständigen Verständnis fernzuhalten;" Dillon 2001, 38: "There is indeed much that is peculiar here;" Opsomer 2007, 288 n. 22: "The obscure passage should not, however, overrule the evidence of the texts in which Plutarch directly exposes his views."

[70] See Krämer 1964, 98 n. 250, who further refers to Arist. *De anima* I 2, 404b19–20; perhaps more important is Arist. *Metaph*. 12.5, 1072b19–30, esp. 28–30 (before that, the text states: ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή): φαμὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ.

[71] For the identity of God, the Demiurge and Intellect see Opsomer 2007, 289–92; Ferrari 2005, 18–20.

Demiurge.[72] The world-soul itself carries out demiurgic functions,[73] so the Principle of Becoming is important for it too. We will then have to interpret the combination of Becoming with Decay in the sphere of the Moon by the operation of Nature, Φύσις, by saying that in this sphere the world-soul governs with its irrational part,[74] for example, by supplying the 'soul-substratum' that is necessary for the soul's contact with the body, and then taking it back again after the individual soul has been separated from the body.

This doctrine of Principles has always been compared with the passage 945C in *De facie*, where we read: "Of the three Fates too Atropos enthroned in the sun initiates generation (τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνδίδωσι τῆς γενέσεως), Clotho in motion on the moon mingles and binds together, and finally upon the earth Lachesis too puts her hand to the task (ἐσχάτη ... συνεφάπτεται περὶ γῆν), she who has the largest share in chance."[75] In contrast to the doctrine of Principles offered in *De genio* the sense of this passage is elucidated by the context. It is preceded by an explanation of how the sun 'sows' intellect into the moon, which then generates new souls, while earth supplies the body. The sun, then, is the origin of becoming for the souls, the moon combines its substance with the intellect, and on earth the soul enters a body.

Ferrari[76] wants to interpret the core of this cosmic hierarchy as the triad Intellect ("intelletto", i.e. "il piano trascendente e intellegibile"), soul (i.e. "il nivello matematico-astronomico"), and body, claiming an analogy with the doctrine of Principles in the Timarchus myth. He refers to 944E as proof that the sun is to be connected to the space of the Intelligible and to the transcendent god: in this passage the intellect takes leave of the soul "by love for the image in the sun through which shines forth manifest the desirable and fair and divine and blessed towards which all nature in one way or another yearns".[77] The same arrangement of the Moirai seems also to confirm Ferrari's order.

In *De facie*, however, the sequence sun, moon, earth necessarily follows from the central theme of the "first" and the "second" death. It suffices

[72] See *De animae procreatione* 1014E, 1016C, 1017Af., 1026E; cf. Ferrari 2005, 20: "nach Plutarch überträgt Gott der Weltseele einen Teil seiner selbst."

[73] See Opsomer 2007, 297.

[74] See Dillon 2001, 38 and Krämer 1964, 98 n. 250, following Xenocrates; further Ferrari 1995, 176–83; on the cosmic and the individual soul see Baltes 2005, esp. 84–9.

[75] For an interpretation of his passage within its context see Dörrie / Baltes 2002, 207–13 (Baustein 154.3).

[76] Ferrari 1995, 178–81.

[77] ἔρωτι τῆς περὶ τὸν ἥλιον εἰκόνος, δι' ἧς ἐπιλάμπει τὸ ἐφετὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ θεῖον καὶ μακάριον, οὗ πᾶσα φύσις [...] ὀρέγεται. See also P. Donini, "Il *De facie* di Plutarco e la teologia medioplatonica," in: St. Gersh / Ch. Kannengiesser (edd.), *Platonism in Late Antiquity* (Notre Dame, Indiana 1992) [103–14] 104–6.

therefore to name only the cause of the intellect's striving towards the sun; there is no need for an ontological differentiation on the level of the intellect, all the more so as the idea of the 'sowing' of intellect by the sun is not used to explain the origin of intellect in more detail, but puts the moon right at the centre as the receiver of this 'sowing' (945C). It is thus more probable that the reference to τὸ ἐφετὸν κτλ. serves only to remind the reader that the cosmic gradation mentioned here can be restricted to what illustrates the central topic of the text appropriately and sufficiently.[78] We must therefore restrain our wish to make both hierarchies agree fully with each other, and content ourselves with stating that the sphere of the Monad (and of the Invisible) remains excluded here (although it has been alluded to in 944E) and that the sun-intellect-relationship (with Atropos in the sun) corresponds to the sun-intellect-relationship on the second level of the hierarchical model in *De genio* (with Clotho in the sun).[79] When Plutarch joins Atropos to Intellect in *De facie*, this is not really a serious change compared with *De genio*, because the Monad too can be interpreted as Intellect. Incidentally, one is readily tempted to find the true key to the association of Becoming with Intellect as given in the *De genio* doctrine of Principles only in the statement of the function of Atropos in *De facie* 945C (τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνδίδωσι τῆς γενέσεως, see above); in this way this doctrine of Principles would presuppose the hierarchical model of *De facie*.[80]

Why, then, does the guide initiate Timarchus in the doctrine of Principles at all, as it plays no part in what follows,[81] while the doctrine of hierarchy in *De facie* is in fact a necessary consequence of the train of argument? First, the tradition of eschatological myth is important in a purely formal way. The doctrine of Principles is, of course, constructed quite differently from the model of heaven in the Myth of Er in *Republic* 616b–617d, but Plutarch at least wants to remind us of this model. That is why he mentions the three Moirai; the model of heaven shows that they have a

[78] Ferrari himself (1995, 180–1) acknowledges the difficulty of subsuming the whole realm of the stars under the sphere of the moon. His solution moves too far away from the context of giving and taking, of separating and combining, which is the moon's most important function evoked here (945C σελήνη δὲ καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ δίδωσι καὶ συντίθησι καὶ διαιρεῖ); Ferrari instead demands that we not only take into account the composition of the whole text (including its mathematical-astronomical part), but also make the moon the paramount paradigm of the world of stars and interpret the hierarchy from this perspective.

[79] See already von Arnim 1921, 30–2; Hamilton 1934b, 176–8; also Vernière 1977, 238–41 (also on variations in the order of the Moirai).

[80] Cf. the thoughts on the relative chronology of *De genio* and *De facie* in Vernière 1977, 239 n. 9, but also Hamilton 1934b, 178–9. For a comparison of *De genio* and *De facie* see also the extensive analysis in Eisele 2003, 307–28 and 332–5.

[81] Cf. Dörrie 1981, 106 n. 58: "Im Grunde überfordert diese Kumulierung den Hörer und den Leser, zumal hernach keine dieser Reihen und keiner dieser Begriffe irgendwelche Bedeutung erlangt."

different function in the Myth of Er, but this does not lessen their potential allusive value. This makes them important for *De facie* too.[82] It is not without reason that the doctrine of Principles is placed at the beginning of the guide's explanations, for the myth gives access only to a very restricted part of the cosmos. Thus the myth has a certain 'compensatory' function: we are to perceive the section of the cosmos we are introduced to as part of a multi-layered reality. Moreover, Timarchus is to recognize how tightly the bonds between the degrees of being, the powers at work and the levels of the cosmos are woven. The knowledge about this interplay of all levels and powers permits Timarchus to feel confident that the ascent of the intellect-*daimon* does not end in the sphere of the moon. The doctrine of Principles also provides the ontological and cosmological foundation of the special existential status of the intellect-*daimon* and a promise for the future.

Looking back, we can see that Plutarch is indeed a masterly constructor of myths. Each of the three myths takes the reader into a world that far transcends his own experience and permits him to have a "view from above";[83] at the same time, however, this is also the world of his fears and hopes. Each myth fulfils a specific task of its own within the work for which it was conceived, and yet in each there are also motifs and elements that connect it with the other myths. It is a sign of Plutarch's great art that the myths supplement each other, but that they can hardly be subjected to a comprehensive synopsis or interpreted as parts of a uniform and overarching conception. The oscillating play of real or apparent 'doublets', which so fascinated 'Quellenforschung',[84] sufficiently shows that the myths must not be taken as doctrinal treatises; they are a play of the philosophical and theological imagination, but at the same time a proclamation of the effort and seriousness of inquiry and research.

[82] Cf. Jones 1916, 59 n. 152; for linguistic allusions to Plato's text see ibid. and Cherniss 1957, 221 n. b (this note also discusses the order of the Moirai).

[83] Cf. P. Hadot, *Philosophie als Lebensform. Geistige Übungen in der Antike* (Berlin 1991) 123–35.

[84] See – *inter alia* – Heinze 1892; von Arnim 1921; Reinhardt 1926, 313–53; Reinhardt 1953, 782–9; Beck 1953 (on the doublets esp. 57ff.); for criticism of 'Quellenforschung' see – *inter alia* – R. M. Jones, "Posidonius and Solar Eschatology", *Classical Philology* 27 (1932) 113-135, also in: id., *The Platonism of Plutarch and Selected Papers* (New York / London 1980); Hamilton 1934a and 1934b; Görgemanns 1970, 80 n. 117; Donini 1988, 141 n. 26.

D. Appendices

Some Texts similar to *De genio*

D. A. Russell

We give here translations of four passages which present theories similar to those advanced in De genio, and especially in Simmias' speech (583C–589F), on the way in which daimones might communicate with human minds without using physical organs of speech. This topic received considerable attention from philosophers, both in connection with divination and in the interpretation of myths (such as the Myth of Er in Plato's Republic*) in which disembodied souls are represented as conversing with one another. The passages are those mentioned in our Introduction (p. 5, p. 6 n. 6). Two of the four are directly concerned with Socrates, the other two are not. Apart from the first (Philo), they are all later than Plutarch, and all from the Neoplatonist school; hence, though the similarity of their ideas with those in Plutarch is evident, it must be remembered that they rest on a metaphysical structure undeveloped in his time.*

I. Philo, *De Decalogo* 32–35

This passage tries to explain, in philosophical terms, how God conveyed his message to the assembled people of Israel when he delivered the Ten Commandments to Moses.

The ten sayings or oracles, in truth laws and commandments, were proclaimed by the Father of All when the whole nation, men and women alike, was gathered in assembly. Did he himself utter them like a voice? Of course not, we must not so much as entertain the idea. God is not, as man is, in need of mouth and tongue and air-passages. I believe that, at that moment, he wrought a most holy wonder, ordering an invisible sound to be created in the air, one more marvellous than any instrument, tuned with perfect harmony, not without soul, yet not composed, like a living creature, of soul and body, but a rational soul, pervaded by clarity and lucidity, which, by shaping and stretching the air and turning it into brilliant fire, produced (like breath through a trumpet) an articulate voice of such power that those far away seemed to hear it as well as those near at hand. Human voices naturally become weaker as they reach out into the distance, and the apprehension of them is no longer clear to remoter hearers, but grows gradually fainter as the distance increases, since its organs also are subject to destruction. In contrast, the power of God which inspired this

newly contrived voice roused it, kindled it, spread it all around, and made its end more brilliant than its beginning, implanting in each man's soul a new sense of hearing much better than that which depends on the ears, because that slower sense remains inactive until it is moved by being struck by the air, whereas the sense of a mind divinely inspired responds with great speed, and goes out to meet what is being said.

II. Calcidius, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* §§ 254–5 (ed. Waszink)

This account of Socrates' divine sign follows a discussion of dreams (based on Timaeus 45e) which has ended with a mention of Socrates' dreams (Crito 44a, Phaedo 60e).

That Socrates was used to having these vivid dreams [*evidenter ... somniare*] is, I believe, due to the fact that his entire being [totum eius animal] was strong in purity both of body and of soul.

(255) Nor did he lack a friendly divinity to guide his actions in his waking hours, as Plato shows in *Euthydemus* [actually not *Euthyd.* 272e, but *Theages* 128d] in these words:

> 'From my early years I have had a divinity [*numen*] as companion. It is a voice which, when it visits my mind and sense, indicates that I should hold back from what I intended to do; it never encourages me in any action, and if a friend desires my advice about something he plans to do, it forbids me this also.'

The reality of these facts and signs is assured. Man's feeble nature needs the protection of a nature that is higher and better, as he asserts above [cf. *Tim.* 41c (?); Calcidius § 132]. The voice of which Socrates was conscious was not, I believe, such as might be produced by impact on air, but rather such as might reveal the presence and company of a familiar divinity to a soul cleansed by exceptional purity and consequently more capable of understanding, if it is indeed right and proper for the pure to be close to, and mixed in, the pure [cf. *Phaedo* 67b]. Just as in dreams we seem to hear voices and articulate speech, though there is no voice but only a sign [*significatio*] reproducing the function of voice, so, when Socrates was awake, his mind divined the presence of a divinity by its observation of a clear sign [*signum*]. It would be quite wrong to doubt that the Intelligible God, who in the goodness of his nature consults the interest of all things, has chosen to bring aid to the human race by the intermediary of divine powers, since he himself has no affinity [*conciliatio*] with the body. The benefits which these powers confer are evident in prodigies and in divination, both the divination of dream at night and the daytime activity of Rumour [*Fama*] that has the foreknowledge which enables it to spread news. They are evident also in the communication of remedies against disease and in the truthful inspiration of prophets.

III. Proclus, *Commentary on Plato's Republic* (2.166–7 Kroll)

Here Proclus asks how the souls, in the Myth of Er in Republic *X, can converse with one another, though they no longer have bodily organs. His answer involves Neoplatonist metaphysics and psychology; but the crucial notion of the disembodied soul's 'Vehicle' (*ochēma*: see E.R. Dodds, Proclus:* the Elements of Theology, *Appendix II, pp. 313–21, and, for a selection of relevant texts, R. Sorabji,* The Philosophy of the Commentators: a sourcebook *(London 2004), i. 221–41) has clear affinities with the picture Plutarch gives in the myth of Timarchus (591D) of the starry objects which represent the souls in their afterlife. Parts of our text are given in Sorabji, op. cit., p. 71, p. 226. The text (which depends on a single manuscript) has some gaps, but, except in one passage, the sense is fairly clear.*

(166,10) If then souls can know souls also in the other world, achieving knowledge and recognition of one another either through themselves or through their Vehicles, it follows that acquaintances recognize one another <and rejoice> to have one another's company <on meeting> after a long absence, for their whole being will be anxious to make contact with <the others'> whole being and feel friendly towards it. Again, it would be wrong to doubt that souls can also have conversations, though they have no tongue, windpipe or lips, which, in our life on earth, can alone make speech possible. This is because their Vehicles, in their entirety, possess the form of tongues, and are themselves in their entirety eyes and ears, and can hear, see, and speak. It would be paradoxical if, while the tongue can produce articulate sound by making an impact on the air from the lungs, the souls' Vehicles cannot move the air around them and fashion it into different sounds by various kinds of movement. Furthermore, their manner of converse is not necessarily complex or involving many movements, like that of souls in this world; they can signal their thoughts to one another by some simpler movements. Just as their thoughts and imaginings (*phantasiai*) are simpler, so their conversation is effected by movements which are correspondingly smaller and, in all probability, free of the complexity of this world. And since true perception resides in their Vehicles – for every body that partakes of soul lives, and if it partakes of rational soul it both lives by perception and furthermore needs perception also if it possesses locomotion; and similarly every Vehicle which is attached to a rational soul ... can in the same way hear and see and in general perceive what is simple (for as Aristotle says somewhere in his work on perception and perceptibles [455 a20], perception in the strict sense is a unity and the true sense-organ is one) – if then the Vehicle uses the 'common' sense also, it can surely apprehend sounds without being affected (*apathōs*) and can hear sounds which the hearing in our body cannot grasp. Not every sense of hearing grasps every audible object: different hearings grasp different objects. This is why some hear the voices of *daimones* and others do not, even if they are in the company of those who do. This ability is given to some by hieratic power, to others by the make-up of their nature, just as these same two

factors allow some eyes to see visions invisible to others. Thus the first Vehicle of the souls, as it possesses the common faculty of perception, is naturally capable of seeing and hearing things which are not audible or visible to the hearing and sight of mortal beings.

IV. Hermias, *Commentary on Plato's Phaedrus* (65.26–69.31 Couvreur)

This is a commentary on Phaedrus 242a–b, where Socrates says he received his usual 'warning' when he was about to cross the Ilissus with Phaedrus.

As to Socrates' *daimonion*, that it is neither 'a part of his soul' nor 'Philosophy itself', as some have thought, has often been said, and is plainly stated by himself in this passage [242b7]: 'My usual daemonic [*daimonion*] sign came to me, and I instantly heard a voice; it always checks me.' But Philosophy often *encourages* and 'a part of the soul' *desires* to do a thing. It is therefore clearly stated that Socrates' *daimonion* is not either of these. What it is, we must explain.

The race of *daimones* as a whole is said by Plato in the *Symposium* [202e] to be 'between' gods and men, 'ferrying' messages from the gods to us and reporting our affairs to the gods. There is however a special race of *daimones* which is set immediately over us and guides each one of us, for each of us always serves under some *daimon* which controls our whole life. For example, we are not masters of all our circumstances, since we have no control over certain kinds of action (e.g. becoming a general) or indeed over our own nature. If you claim that *reason* controls all our doings, that will not be true. We have no control over the kind of visions we see in our sleep, or over the manner in which we digest our food. Yet there must be some one thing that does rule and control all our affairs and guide our whole life. If you say that this is God, you are stating a transcendent cause; but there must be some proximate cause which rules our life. This is the *daimon* to which we have been allotted, which is assigned to the soul after it has made its choice [this is the 'choice' made by souls in the Myth of Er, *Rep.* 617e], as the fulfiller of all its choices.

Not everyone is aware of his daimon; for one to be conscious of its care, there needs to be great suitability [*epitēdeiotēs*] and a turning [*epistrophē*] towards the control on the part of the controlled: For, just as all things are subject to the providence of the gods, though not all have consciousness of this, unless they have the natural ability to see and are purified, so it is also with regard to the supervision [*epistasia*] of the *daimon*. The suitability and consciousness arise, in the first place, as a consequence of the soul's having made certain choices and been allotted to a certain *daimon* and then at once turning towards this *daimon* and continuing always to hold fast to it, having

moreover drunk only so much of the water of Lethe as it is essential for it to drink in its descent to birth, without altogether forgetting the counsel and supervision of its *daimon*. That is why such souls are conscious of the supervision of their *daimon* in this world also, whereas others, which rebuff the *daimon* – like the person who chooses 'tyranny and eating children' [Plat. *Rep.* 619b] – and do not turn towards it, but are driven like irrational creatures – *these* are totally incapable in this world also of understanding the guidance [*prostasia*] of the daemonic [*daimonion*].

So whether they are conscious of the *daimon* or not depends, firstly, on the fact that some souls turn immediately towards the *daimon* to which they have been allotted, and others do not; secondly, on their not having drunk much of Lethe; and thirdly on the order of the universe, because a particular order of the universe has made one person suitable to acquire this consciousness and another not. This is why <this particular order> has allotted to one person and not to another a body of a kind to bear certain tokens [*sumbola*] in visible form, in spirit and in soul.

Consciousness or the absence of it depends also on a certain kind of life. Virtuous men who live well devote their whole life, activity, contemplation and action to the gods and the unseen causes; they perceive by means of certain tokens and signs whether the *daimon* inhibits them from an action or not. If a weasel runs across their path, or their coat is caught in something, if a stone falls or a voice speaks or a thunderbolt descends, they become aware of the inhibition and desist from the action. Most men however live the life of cattle [Plat. *Rep.* 586a].

In view of all this, it was to be expected that Socrates, having seen the discouragement of the *daimonion*, should now 'not go away' [*Phaedrus* 242c2]. But why did it inhibit Socrates and never positively encourage him? Perhaps because, just as some horses need the spur because they are slow, and some the curb because they are eager, so some men who are generous, anxious to do good, and enterprising in everything, like Socrates, often need to be checked by the *daimonion*, whereas ungenerous persons need to be aroused. It would also be reasonable that the *daimonion* should restrain him from common actions because it is preparing him to be raised up [*sc.* to a more divine level].

But why did it not also give him positive instructions? In order that Socrates should not be like an irrational thing moved by something else [*heterokinēton*], not doing anything on his own or as a soul that is rational and self-moving [*autokinētos*]. It allowed him to act as self-moved, but if, as a fallible human being, he was about to do something inappropriate, it restrained him from that action. How? Well, will not the *daimonion* be found also to give positive instruction if it projected a voice towards him which (as he says) 'does not let me go away until I have atoned for some offence I have committed against the divine'? To wait to 'atone' was a positive in-

struction. Or should we say rather that this 'usual' sign, as he has himself indicated, was preventive; for even if it was a voice (as he says elsewhere [*Theages* 129b, *Euthydemus* 272b] as well as here), yet it was the 'usual' voice, that is to say a preventive one. However, it would also be quite reasonable to say that this voice prevented him from going away by showing him his fault, and that Socrates then, on his own initiative, becomes conscious that he must make atonement. 'Atonement' is the fulfilment of a neglected religious duty. And as he said, 'I *thought* I heard a voice', and the voice was obviously daemonic (for otherwise Phaedrus would have heard it too), we need to inquire how such voices are heard and whether *daimones* have a voice [*phōnousin*].

Plotinus, in his first book *On Difficulties* [*Enn.* 4.3.18] says that there is nothing 'extraordinary' about *daimones* uttering sounds, because they live 'in air' and a particular kind of impact on air is sound. And since divine persons [e.g. the inspired poet Homer] attribute voice and senses to the gods and to heaven ('sun who sees all things' [*Od.* 12.323], 'a smell came into my mind' [oracle, Hdt. 1.47.3][1]) and indeed assign a voice to the whole universe [*sc.* the music of the spheres (?)], we must seek a general explanation, which will apply to all, of how the higher classes of beings speak, and, more generally, how they perceive.

Let us put it clearly and concisely, as follows: When we recognize something on our own account by sense, two things happen: an experience (*pathos*) of a sense-organ (e.g. eye-jelly [commonly translated "pupil"] or another organ of sense) and cognition (*gnōsis*) of the experience. In the case of superior beings, let us take away the experience but leave the cognition. We must then say that the body of the sun does not perceive through experience (we are speaking of sense-perception, and sense-perception belongs to the body) but that it is capable of cognition [*gnōstikon*] as a whole and throughout its being, and is, through and through, both vision and hearing; remember that, in our case too, when we have been separated from the body, our Vehicle is bright and pure, capable of perception throughout its whole being, and sees and hears as a whole. Note in general that the divine men of old allow cognitive faculties (of which perceptive faculties are a part, since the senses are a kind of cognition) to the gods in heaven, but suspend judgement about the appetitive faculty. Plotinus grants them this also, Iamblichus denies it [cf. Plot. *Enn.* 4.4.8, Iambl. *De mysteriis* 1.12–14].

As to voice, we have to say that they do not utter the voice we have, based on impact and sound, nor do they depend on the air-passages and organs like that, or need an intervening space and an impact on air. Instead, as we have given them another form of perception, which is cognitive and not based on experience [*pathos*], so we have given them a different

[1] I owe this explanation to Prof. M. L. West, who saw that the text should read ὀδμή μ' ἐς φρένας ἦλθε.

kind of voice, corresponding to their level [*sustoichon*]. This is released by them in one way, and accepted by the recipient in another. Just as, while the sun itself is not burning, but there is in it a living, live-giving and non-irritant [*aplēktos*] heat, the air receives the light from it by being affected [*pathētikōs*] and by burning, so likewise, there being in them [i.e. the *daimones*] a certain harmony and a different kind of voice, we hear this by being affected [*pathētikōs*] but we do not of course hear it with our sensible ears, nor do we see daemonic and divine visions with our sensible eyes. Instead, since there are in the spirit [*pneuma*] senses more primary [*archoeidesterai*], exemplary, and pure than all our ordinary senses, it is obviously by means of these that the soul hears and sees divine apparitions. She alone sees them, and not any of those around her. Compare:

> 'Appearing to him alone, and none of the others saw her' [*Il.* 1.198, the appearance of Athena to Achilles].

There is a community between the Vehicle of the *daimon* and that of the soul; for the Vehicle of the *daimon*, not using a tongue or vocal organ, but simply the will of the soul of the *daimon*, produces a movement and melodious and meaningful sound, which the human soul perceives by the sense present in its primary[2] Vehicle. There is, as has been said, a *daimon* which essentially (*kat' ousian*) guides the soul; but it is often the case that the soul, in the same life (*bios*), but according to its various life-stages (*zōai*), is assigned to various *daimones*, not to the one which is essentially assigned to it (for this *daimon* is always present) but to other more specialized (*merikōteroi*) *daimones* which supervise its various actions. Even it it chooses the lot corresponding to its own peculiar god and is assigned to the *daimon* subordinate to this god, it will still fall under various more specialized *daimones*. If it lives sinfully, it falls under a *daimon* more liable to passion [*empathesterus*], and wallows in evils. When however it recovers its sobriety and lives more purely, it ranges itself under a *daimon* of a better kind, and thus changes its supervisory *daimones* without departing from the latitude (*platos*) of its lot. So, in the *Republic*, everyone has the power, through actions of a particular kind, to set himself under the Serf class or under the Auxiliary class. This is what is meant by 'The *daimon* will not draw you as its lot, you will choose your *daimon*' [617e].

[2] So Couvreur, probably rightly; MSS have αὐγοειδεῖ, 'luminous'.

Bibliography

1. Abbreviations

BAGB	Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé
CPG	*Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
FGrHist	F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*, Bd. I–IIIC (Berlin 1926–1958)
GGM	C. Müller (Hg.), *Geographi Graeci Minores*, Bd 1–2 (Paris 1855–1861; repr. Hildesheim 1990)
ICS	*Ilinois Classical Studies*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
RE	A. Pauly / G. Wissowa (Hgg.), *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 83 Bde (Stuttgart 1893–1980; 2 Registerbde 1996/98)
VS	H. Diels / W. Kranz (Hgg.), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Bd. 1–3, (^{7}1954)
WJbb	*Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft*

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